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INTRODUCTION

Empirical research on the practical effects of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context has been almost nonexistent.
This Article seeks to help fill the gap by synthesizing traditional
doctrinal analysis with the results of a survey of individuals with
first-hand information about the subject: corporate attorneys, corporate management, and federal judges and magistrates. The survey, which consisted of 182 interviews in New York City, produced
a broad range of information about some of the assumptions underlying the corporate privilege, the forms and processes of corporate attorney-client communications and the adjudication of privilege claims.
The first Tentative Draft of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes at the outset that the scope of the attorney-client privilege for corporate clients continues to be a
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source of controversy.' In precluding compelled disclosure of attor-

ney-client confidences, the privilege is intended to foster candid
communications that will lead to well-informed legal advice.2 The
factual premise upon which the privilege is based, however, is
largely a matter of faith that is supported only by a minimal
amount of empirical evidence.3 Furthermore, by blocking access to
relevant testimony and documents, the privilege clashes with the
public's right to every person's evidence 4 and violates the precept

of modern pretrial discovery that "[mlutual knowledge of all the
IRESTATEMENT OF THE LAW

xv-xvi (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1988) (Reporter's Memorandum). Tentative Draft No. 2, issued in April 1989, contains only minor
modifications to the first draft with respect to treatment of the corporate privilege. See
GOVERNING LAWYERS

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYEns § 123 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989).
2 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass.

1950).
A frequently quoted formulation of the privilege was penned by Judge Wyzanski:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to
become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
an opinion on law or
strangers (c)for the purpose of securing primarily either (i)
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59. See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EvmrDNcE, § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961):

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
waived.
Id. In another section of his treatise, Wigmore recognizes the crime/fraud exception that
Judge Wyzanski incorporated into his definition. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra § 2298.
The rationale of the privilege is discussed in detail infra notes 63-92 and accompanying
text.
3 Prior empirical research with respect to the attorney-client privilege is limited principally to a survey reported in Note, Functional Overlap between the Lawyer and Other
Professionals:Its Implicationsfor the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALr L.J.
1226, 1262, 1269-73 (1962) [hereinafter Yale Study]. The findings of the Yale Study, which
do not distinguish between individual and corporate attorney-client communications, are
discussed infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
' Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980). Statements to counsel might otherwise be admissible evidence either as party admissions or prior inconsistent statements. See,
e.g., FED. R. Evm. 801(d) (excluding admissions and prior inconsistent statements from
hearsay definition). In addition, the content of the legal advice received by a client might
bear on such questions as the client's good faith, knowledge or intent. See, e.g., Cohen v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 484-85 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (since plaintiffs' claims in shareholder
action against corporation appeared bona fide and honest, and due to difficulty of proving
scienter, attorney-client privilege held not bar to disclosure of information requested in
interrogatories).
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relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litiga-

tion."5 Although for many years the balance has been struck in

favor of the privilege,' particular tension arises in the corporate
setting. Unlike the individual client, a corporation can "speak" to
counsel only through agents-its officers and employees. In a large

corporation, cloaking all such communications with an inflexible
privilege may produce a veil of darkness so impenetrable in some
cases as to preclude effective discovery of the truth.7 The modern

trend toward increased participation of house counsel in the dayto-day affairs of large corporations makes this prospect all the

more likely.8
5 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Discovery under modem rules is not
restricted to material that would be admissible at trial. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
The scope of discovery is often described as encompassing nonprivileged information "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id.; see also King v.
Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
6 In criminal cases, the privilege may have constitutional underpinnings that would require its recognition regardless of the obstructive impact on the fact-finding process. See,
e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (sixth
amendment); Hazard, An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,66 CALIF.
L. Rav. 1061, 1062-63 (1978) (fifth and sixth amendments); Uviller, The Advocate, the
Truth, and JudicialHackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel'sIdea, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067,
1078 (1975) (due process). On the civil side, despite misgivings about the value of the privilege, Professor Edmund Morgan conceded that any proposal for its abolition would arouse
"such strenuous opposition from the Bar that it would be futile to attempt its enactment."
Morgan, Foreword, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 28 (1942). See also Hazard, supra at 1062
(issue is not whether privilege should exist, "but precisely what its terms should be").
7 See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations,65 YALE L.J.
953, 955 (1956) ("Where corporations are involved, with their large number of agents,
masses of documents, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone of silence grows large").
I See Chayes & Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. Rv.
277, 277-78 (1985). In the early 1970s, approximately 10% of all lawyers in the United
States were employed as in-house counsel to corporations. Szabad & Gersen, Inside v.
Outside Counsel, 28 Bus. LAw. 235, 235 (1972). In 1983, the figure was placed at 20%.
Lynch, Moving the Law Inside at Mass Mutual, 70 A.B.A. J. 45, 45 (1984).
"Corporate counsel" is probably the preferred appellation for attorneys who serve in a
corporation's internal legal department. The term "house counsel" is used in this Article,
however, to distinguish a corporation's internal lawyers from attorneys in law firms. I refer
to the latter as "outside counsel."
No distinction exists in the United States between house counsel and outside counsel as
to entitlement to privilege, provided the lawyer is acting as legal adviser. See, e.g., In re
Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (conversations between senior executive and
general counsel qualified for privilege where lawyer rendered legal advice based on confidential information disclosed to him); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp.
357, 360 (D. Mess. 1950) (where inside counsel functions as legal adviser, communications
with management should not be treated differently from communications between outside
counsel and management); Rossi v. Blue Shield of Greater New York, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 588,
593-94, 540 N.E.2d 703, 706, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (1989) (privilege applies to memoran-
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An adversary may, of course, question the corporation's officers and employees about their personal knowledge because the
privilege can only immunize their discussions with counsel, not the
facts themselves." In some cases, however, eliciting the facts from
individual employees may prove unduly difficult as a result of
failed memories, evasiveness or unavailability. Additionally, some
adversaries may not have the resources to unearth the essential
facts that were collected through attorney-client communications.
These potential obstacles, however, did not deter the Supreme
0 from taking a broad
Court in Upjohn Company v. United States"
approach to the corporate privilege. The Court held that the representatives of a corporation whose communications with counsel
are not limited to those in the corporate
qualify for protection
"control group";11 communications at lower levels of the corporate
hierarchy are also eligible.1 2 While the decision may bring a certain
degree of comfort to corporate attorneys, Upjohn nevertheless fails
to resolve many of the problems raised by the privilege in the corporate setting. The opinion leaves the exact scope of the corporate
privilege uncertain, and the Court was dealing with the privilege
only as applied in federal courts; a number of states continue to
adhere to the control group standard.1 3 Upjohn also left untouched
the "good cause" exception to the privilege that several courts
have applied in shareholder suits. 14 Other issues the Court did not
resolve include how confidentiality-the sine qua non of the privilege-should be measured within a corporation and how courts
should handle communications that contain a mixture of business
and legal matters. Additionally, the Court has recently stressed
that a corporation's attorney-client privilege may be waived over
the objections of the individuals whose communications with counsel are involved.1 5 This raises questions about the attorney's ethical
responsibility to explain to corporate employees the entity concept
of corporate representation. Finally, the factual premise that cordum from house counsel to management where subject matter concerns legal rights and
obligations).
9 See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
10 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
"lSee infra note 359 and accompanying text.
2 Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390-91; see infra notes 377-93 and accompanying text.
13See infra note 361.
11 See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1104 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1971); infra notes 536-53 and accompanying text.
16Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1985).
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porate representatives will communicate less openly and less frequently with counsel in the absence of privilege continues to be a

matter of speculation.
My field study sought to produce a more solid empirical basis
than has previously been available for analyzing these issues. Most
literature relating to the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context has been limited to doctrinal analysis. I felt that the views
and experience of corporate attorneys, executives and federal
judges would add new knowledge concerning the validity of some

of the assumptions upon which the corporate privilege is based and
suggest solutions to questions regarding its operation and proper

scope."6
On the other hand, I harbored no illusions that the type of
information that I was likely to obtain in interviews of corporate

lawyers and executives was the ideal form of empirical data about
the corporate privilege. While these individuals may have had ex-

tensive experience with the subject matter, they also have a personal stake in the preservation of the privilege and the expansion

of its scope.'7 As a consequence, I doubted that their answers to
my questions would debunk the fundamental empirical proposi-

tions upon which the corporate privilege is based. Not surprisingly,
the attorneys and executives proved to be generally enthusiastic

about the benefits of the privilege, but some of their responses do
" The value of obtaining the views of persons affected by rules of privilege was recognized by Justice Patter Stewart in a case involving proposed changes in the marital privilege
against a spouse's adverse testimony: "It would be helpful . . . to have the benefit of the
views of those in the federal system most qualified by actual experience with the operation
of the present rule-the district judges and members of the practicing bar." Hawkins v.
United States, 358 U.S. 74, 82 n.4 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring).
,7A leading treatise observes that "Upjohn has substantial economic implications for
the legal profession. It makes it highly advantageous to use lawyers, or paraprofessionals
acting under their direction, for investigations with some possible governmental regulatory
impact on the corporation." 2 J. WMNSTEIN & M. BEaCER, WMNSTEiN'S EVIDENCE I
503(b)[04], at 503-80 (1989).
Professional bias may have played a role in development of the attorney-client privilege
from its inception. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. Edward Livingston, a leading nineteenth-century writer on the law of evidence, conceded that his commitment to the
privilege may have been attributable, in part, to such bias: "[I]t is yet possible... that ideas
entertained during a professional course of more than forty years may have so fastened
themselves upon the mind, as to give them a force they are not entitled to, and induced me
to retain a provision which ought to be abolished." I E. LIVINGSTON, THE ComET= WORKS
459 (1873); see also Waits, Work Product Protectionfor Witness Statements: Time for
Abolition, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 305, 342 ("lawyers, like all other human beings, tend to rationalize, to convince themselves that what is good for them and their profession is good for
society").

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:191

have negative implications for the scope of the privilege. Even the
judicial participants in the study, who have no personal interest in
preserving the secrecy of attorney-client discussions, displayed a
generally pro-privilege attitude. This was somewhat surprising. Because the attorney-client privilege can be an obstacle to the ascertainment of truth in the adjudicatory process, judicial opinions
often reiterate Wigmore's view that the privilege should be
"strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent
with the logic of its principle."'i8 On the other hand, judges have a
background in the practice of law and cannot be expected to have
shed entirely their professional bias upon their ascent to the
bench.19
That the participants may have been biased, however, does
not necessarily invalidate those results which are supportive of the
privilege. An element of caution is simply counseled in their interpretation. Furthermore, professional bias does not by any means
imply dishonesty. Having observed the participants in a confidential interview setting, I have little doubt that they expressed honestly held beliefs. In any event, not all of the information they provided was favorable to arguments in support of broad approaches
to the corporate privilege.
One may fairly question the value of undertaking a study in
which the views of the participants about the effects of the privilege must be read with some degree of skepticism. Four reasons
explain the approach that I took. First and foremost, despite
whatever bias they may have, the fact remains that business executives, corporate attorneys and federal judges and magistrates have
valuable first-hand experience with privileged communications.
Second, the survey was not limited to questions calling for subjective analysis. I also sought a great deal of descriptive data, such as
the frequency with which privilege issues are discussed and the
methodology of maintaining the privilege, as to which the potential
for biased results is sharply reduced. Third, alternative methods of
studying the impact of the privilege were not readily available. Ob-

is

8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (privilege protects "only those disclosures-necessary to obtain informed legal advice-which might not have been made absent the privilege"); United States

v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
29 See, e.g., Waits, supra note 17, at 342 n.178 ("attorney-client issues strike a very
personal chord in the judiciary").
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serving actual attorney-client communications was out of the question.2 0 Comparing conduct with and without the corporate privilege would be nearly impossible because of the long-standing
applicability of the privilege in one form or another throughout the
United States.2 1 Although it might be feasible, a systematic comparison of the conduct of counsel and corporate employees in the
United States with that of their counterparts in foreign jurisdictions in which the privilege is not recognized would be extremely

difficult because of the need to account for wide variations in the
nature of the foreign legal profession, attorney-client relationship
and procedural system. 22 Superior sources of empirical data, therefore, were not easily obtainable. Finally, there is instructive value
simply in confirming the views of the business and legal

community.
Another source of uncertainty, of course, is whether the experience of executives and corporate attorneys in New York City
with respect to the attorney-client privilege is typical of that elsewhere in the country. I suspect that the results of a geographically
broader survey would not differ significantly, except perhaps as to
information concerning the effects of the control group standard.23

In some states, the law is clear that the control group standard
governs the scope of the corporate privilege, 2' whereas the issue in
2DThe presence of an outsider would destroy the element of confidentiality upon which
the privilege depends, see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 406 F. Supp. 381,
386 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), making it highly unlikely that either corporate attorneys or their clients would consent to the procedure. See, e.g., Danet, Hoffman & Kermish, Obstacles to the
Study of Lawyer-Client Interaction:The Biography of a Failure,14 LAw & Soo'y REv. 905,
912-13 (1980) (description of researchers' failed attempt to observe private lawyer-client
conversations because of lawyers' refusal to risk loss of attorney-client privilege). Some authority exists recognizing a qualified privilege for the confidential aspects of academic field
research. See, e.g., Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 39091 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (due to public interest in encouraging confidential relationships between
academic researchers and their sources, plaintiff not entitled to disclosure absent prima facie showing of defamation of plaintiff). I doubt, however, that many corporate lawyers would
be willing to place much faith in any such privilege. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated
Jan. 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1984) (refusal to recognize academic research privilege on basis of sparse record).
21Although the scope of the corporate privilege may be narrower in some states than
others, see infra note 361, none have disavowed the corporate privilege in its entirety.
22 Some of these problems are described infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. A
limited amount of comparative international experience was sought and obtained in my
study, but it was not intended to be the main thrust of the study for the reasons indicated
in the text.
3 See infra notes 398-403 and 420-21 and accompanying text.
21 See infra note 361.
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New York is unresolved. 5 The approach taken in federal courts,
26
however, even if somewhat inconsistent from district to district,
is a common denominator. In addition, many of the participants in
the survey had dealt with attorney-client communications at several locations throughout the country. In any event, New York City
has a large concentration of corporations and corporate attorneys,
making its corporate legal community worthy of study in its own
27
right.
Thus, I believe that the systematically collected views and experience of the participants in my study will shed some muchneeded light on the subject. This study is a beginning, and perhaps
it will inspire others to pursue more refined research techniques.
The data that I have obtained provide a basis for tentative conclusions about the realities surrounding the corporate attorney-client
privilege and its proper scope.
Section I of the Article describes my research design and gives
a profile of the samples in the study. Sections I, III and IV deal
with fundamental questions about the rationale of the corporate
attorney-client privilege. Section II provides the history and theoretical background of the attorney-client privilege, in general, and
as applied to corporations. Section II reports the results of questions put to the lawyers and executives regarding the purposes and
benefits of the corporate privilege and its impact on their behavior.
This section also contains information obtained from the judges
and magistrates about the cost of the privilege in the adjudicatory
process.
The empirical findings concerning the basic rationale of the
privilege are analyzed in Section IV. I conclude in this section that
the corporate attorney-client privilege, despite lingering doubts,
may perform a useful function by enhancing candid disclosure between attorneys and corporate management. For this reason, and
because of its potential contribution to corporate legal compliance,
it is worthy of continued recognition in most circumstances. The
findings raise doubts, however, about the broad scope that often is
given to the corporate privilege. The analysis thus focuses on the
questionable value of the privilege as an inducement to candor in
particular types of legal counseling and in communications beSee infra note 398.
See infra notes 431-49 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
25
2I
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tween house counsel and corporate employees. In this section I also
argue that existing ethics codes should pay closer attention to the
need for lawyers to warn corporate employees that the corporation's attorney-client privilege does not belong to them personally.
Each of the remaining sections of the Article deals with a discrete problem area in application of the attorney-client privilege to
corporations. Section V addresses the question: Who speaks for the
corporate entity for privilege purposes? After tracing the background of the Supreme Court's Upjohn opinion, I examine responses that the participants in the survey gave to questions about
the impact of the control group standard in comparison to the
broader approach taken in Upjohn. The results, although mixed,
suggest that permitting the privilege to extend to lower levels potentially serves the valuable goal of voluntary legal compliance by
corporations. In this section, I offer suggestions for resolution of
some of the questions that were left unanswered in the Upjohn
opinion.
Section VI contains descriptive information about two very
practical matters that play a role in the analysis of privilege issues
in the corporate context: (1) how corporations maintain the confidentiality of documentary attorney-client communications; and (2)
the extent to which business and legal matters are mixed in communications with counsel. In the analysis of the findings, I suggest
that the adjudication of these issues should take account of actual
corporate practices. Section VII examines the "good cause" qualification to the corporate privilege in shareholder litigation. Because
the findings suggest that it does little damage to the instrumental
benefits of the privilege, and because the doctrine is sound, I argue
that the good cause qualification deserves continued recognition.
The final section explores the potential impact of a hypothetical qualified approach to the corporate privilege. Based on the answers given by the participants to questions about such an approach, and drawing upon data obtained in earlier portions of the
survey, I conclude that the goals of the corporate attorney-client
privilege can be adequately achieved in many circumstances without the necessity of applying the same absolute privilege that applies in the case of an individual client. Maximizing the potential
benefits of the corporate privilege by extending its coverage to the
lower levels of the corporate hierarchy, which may be appropriate
as a general matter, will nevertheless have the inevitable effect in
some cases of creating an unacceptable barrier to truth. Thus, I
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argue that the corporate privilege should be relaxed in favor of a
qualified privilege with respect to communications between counsel
and employees who are not in the corporate control group. The
corporation's privilege for lower-level communications should yield
when a particularized showing by the adversary of a compelling
need for such communications outweighs the corporation's interests in confidentiality.
I. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
A.

Research Design

The survey was designed to obtain interviews of individuals
most likely to have engaged in attorney-client communications in
the corporate context on a fairly regular basis and to have had the
greatest depth of experience. Emphasis was placed on seeking the
participation of partners in large law firms2 8 and lawyers and business executives in corporations large enough to have house counsel.
New York City was an ideal site. At or about the time of the survey, Manhattan contained the largest concentration in the United
States of corporate headquarters with internal legal departments
on the premises. 9 Manhattan was also domicile of the greatest
number of large law firms in the United States."
Three distinct populations were defined for the study. The
house counsel segment consisted of the highest-ranking lawyers, or
their designees, in the legal departments of large corporations with
headquarters in Manhattan. To qualify as "large," the corporation
must have had either average annual revenue (or assets) of at least
$100 million or at least 1,000 employees in addition to an internal
legal department. The second group, outside counsel, was comprised of partners in large Manhattan law firms (twenty or more
partners) who represent principally corporate clients. The third
population, corporate executives, consisted of the senior management of large corporations with an internal legal department and
28 Studies have shown the correlation between size of law firm and type of client. See,
e.g., J. CARaxN, LAwYERs' ETHIcs 23-25 (1966) (New York City law firms of 15 or more partners principally serve large corporate clients); J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:
THE SocIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 36-83 (1982) (lawyers in Chicago who represent large
corporations are usually affiliated with firms of 30 or more partners).
29 See 1986-1987 DIRECTORY OF COPORATE COUNSEL 1631-72 (Corporate Index by Geographic Location).
30 See THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 1986, at 2-78 (Survey of 500 Largest Firms).
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headquarters in Manhattan.3 1 "Senior management" included any
member of the class of executives immediately below the corporation's chief executive officer or equivalent.3 2 Heads of corporations
were excluded on the assumption that they were not likely to grant
a personal interview or, at best, would seek to delegate participation to a lower-level executive. The latter prospect was undesirable
for the client segment of the study. With respect to the clients, it
seemed particularly important to interview individuals whose answers would be free of direction or influence from superiors. This
concern was of lesser magnitude in the case of the lawyers. Thus,
referrals were accepted from a corporation's chief counsel to a
subordinate lawyer, or from one partner to another partner in the
same law firm, but not from one business executive to another.
A total of 208 corporations and seventy-nine law firms were
identified as falling within the definitions for the target populations.3s Thirty pretest interviews were then conducted with lawyers
and executives affiliated with organizations in Manhattan and surrounding areas that were not within the target populations. The
final research design called for samples of fifty individuals within
each of the three population categories-house counsel, outside
counsel and corporate executives.3
Respondents were selected pursuant to a two-stage random
sampling technique. First, using a computer-produced list of random numbers, all eligible organizations for each population were
lisited in random order for the purpose of solicitation in the given
sequence. The second stage consisted of the selection of appropriate individuals as prospective respondents within each organiza31 The same definition of "large" corporation was used for both the house counsel and

corporate executive samples.
32 In most of the corporations, this class consisted of individuals with the title of Senior
or Executive Vice President.
32 The relevant institutions were culled from three sources: 1986 and 1987 STANDARD &
PoOR's REGISTER op CORPORATIONs, DmECTons & ExncTrmvns; 1986-1987 DnRcaroRy oF CORP0RATE CouNsEL; and 1987 MARTINDALE-HutBELL LAW DnREcToRy.

-1 For the final sampling, approximately 150 interviews were deemed feasible for the
private sector portion of the study. (An additional twenty-to-thirty interviews were contemplated for the judicial segment). The use of interview assistants, such as law students, might

have permitted larger samples, but this approach was rejected. The issue under investigation-corporate client confidentiality-was a sensitive one, and assuring a sense of trust in
the interviewer would be important in obtaining candid answers. As it was thought that the
participants would be more responsive to a law professor than to lay assistants, I decided to
conduct all interviews myself.
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tion.3 5 In the house counsel survey, this person was always the
head of the legal department of the particular corporation. In the
outside counsel and corporate management surveys, the names of
potential respondents within each organization were listed in random order by means of a table of random numbers, and respondents were to be approached in the given sequence. Beginning at
the top of the list of each category of organization, a letter was
sent to the first prospective respondent within that organization
explaining the project; a follow-up telephone call was made seeking
an appointment. In the house counsel survey, if the chief legal officer declined to participate either personally or through a designee, the next corporation on the list was approached. In the
outside counsel and corporate management surveys, if the first individual on the list of prospective respondents for the particular
organization declined to grant an interview, a request was sent to
the second person on the list. If the second individual refused, no
further approaches were made to the particular organization.
Response rates varied depending on the population category.
For the house counsel portion of the survey, the cooperation rate
of the corporations that were approached was 57%. The rate for
the law firms in the outside counsel survey was 69%, and the rate
was 41% for the corporations in the management survey36 A total
of 154 interviews were conducted in the private sector: fifty house
counsel, fifty-two law firm partners and fifty-two corporate executives. The sampling was structured in a manner that would avoid
the conducting of multiple interviews in any one organization. If
the house counsel of a particular corporation granted an interview,
no business executive in that company was solicited. Similarly,
once a law firm partner granted an interview, no requests were

" The

head of the legal department of each corporation (usually bearing the title of

General Counsel) was readily ascertainable as were the members of senior management. Appropriate law-firm partners-those who represented primarily corporate clients-were identified on the basis of biographical entries in the Martindale-HubbellLaw Directory, bar
association membership lists and inquiries made by the author of personal acquaintances at
the firms in question.
11 Not surprisingly, the response rate of the lawyers was higher than the response rate

of the business executives. The subject matter undoubtedly was of greater interest to the
lawyers, and they also may have been motivated in part by a sense of professional obligation
or courtesy to assist in the project.

The most frequent reason volunteered by the lawyers who did not participate was "lack
of time." The reasons given by corporate executives included "lack of time," "too much
travel," "not interested,"
interviews."

"prefers not to," and "blanket corporate

policy against
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made of other partners in that firm. As a result, each of the 154
respondents was a representative of a different organization.
Avoiding overlap proved especially valuable in the case of house
counsel and corporate management because it maximized the

amount of data obtained about systems and procedures used in
large New York City-based corporations. This type of descriptive
information was collected with respect to 102 (nearly one-half) of
the 208 large corporations with headquarters in Manhattan.
In the judicial segment of the study, the objective was to inter-

view those officials most likely to have frequent exposure to attorney-client privilege issues in the corporate context. The judges and

magistrates of the Federal District Courts for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York (whose main courthouses are in
Manhattan and Brooklyn, respectively) provided an excellent population both because of geographical accessibility and potential ex-

perience with the subject matter. During 1986 and 1987, the
Southern District of New York had the largest number among all

ninety-four federal districts of filings of civil cases of the type that
are likely to involve corporate litigants.3 7 The Eastern District of
New York was not too far behind; only eleven other districts in the
nation had higher relevant filings.38 The combined response rate of
the judges and magistrates was 48% for a total of twenty-eight
interviews."
The interviews were conducted between October 1986 and
37 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts classifies civil case filings in
the district courts under twelve categories: Social Security; Recovery of Overpayments and
Enforcement of Judgments; Prisoner Petitions; .Forfeitures and Penalties and Tax Suits;
Real Property; Labor Suits; Contracts; Torts; Copyright, Patent and Trademark; Civil
Rights; Antitrust; and All Other Civil. See ADm sTRAnrn OpFicE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 1986 and 1987, at 167 Fold-Out [hereinafter 1986 and
1987 COURT STATIsTIcs]. Although any of these categories, with the exception of Social Security and Prisoner Petitions, could involve a corporate party, the three most likely to involve corporate litigants are Contracts; Copyright, Patent and Trademark; and Antitrust.
The total number of these three types of cases filed in the Southern District of New York
was 4,731 in 1986, see 1986 COURT STATISTICS at 48; and 4,042 in 1987, see 1987 COURT
STATISTICS at 48. With respect to these three categories, the closest district in terms of volume to the Southern District of New York was the Central District of California with 2,976
such cases in 1986, see 1986 COURT STATISTICS at 129; and 2,955 such cases in 1987, see 1987
COURT STATISTICS at 129.

1 The total number of filings in the Eastern District in the relevant categories, see
supra note 37, was 1,254 in 1986, see 1986 COURT STATsTIcs, supranote 37, at 47; and 1,081
in 1987, see 1987 COURT STATISTICS, supra note 37, at 47.
3, "Time constraints" was the most frequent reason given by the judges who did not
participate. A few said that their personal exposure to the issues had been so infrequent
that they did not feel they would have anything to contribute to the study.
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April 1988 in the offices of the participants." No one was present
during the interviews other than the respondents and myself. Interview questionnaires, developed and refined during the pretest,
were used to elicit the desired information. The questionnaires
contained a combination of forced-response and open-ended questions and were designed to obtain both quantitative and qualitative data. The house counsel questionnaire appears in the Appendix; the other questionnaires were variations on this model.41
B. Profile of the Samples
Each of the samples will be described separately in this section. In the balance of the Article, however, data obtained in the
samples of house counsel and outside counsel are frequently pooled
and reported as aggregate findings with respect to the 102 attorneys. Although each group of lawyers was sampled separately, the
results are reported on a pooled basis when no statistically significant differences were found between the responses of the two
groups. On the other hand, the data are reported separately if differences in the responses were found to be statistically significant.42 Descriptive information about the 102 corporations employing the respondents in the samples of house counsel and executives
also is occasionally combined.43
Turning first to the sample of house counsel, the fifty respondents were employed by corporate clients with a median annual
revenue of $500 million and a median of 5,000 employees. 4 The
40

The average length of time for each type of interview was as follows: house counsel,

67 minutes; outside counsel, 45 minutes; corporate executives, 39 minutes; judges and magistrates, 35 minutes. The total number of hours spent "in the field," including the pretest, was

approximately 700.
41The author will provide copies of all four questionnaires upon request. Copies will
also be kept on file in the offices of the St. John's Law Review.
42In general, differences in responses between any of the samples in the study and
between any subgroups within samples will not be presented either in text or tables unless

the differences are statistically significant at least at the 95% level of confidence as determined by the chi-square test of statistical significance. The 95% level can be considered
conservative, as no correction was made for finite population size.
In some of the reported frequency distributions in tables and text, the total per cent
occasionally may be 0.1% below or above 100.00 due to rounding.
3 Pooling of descriptive information about the 102 corporations employing the respon-

dents in the samples of house counsel and corporate executives was feasible because both
samples were randomly selected from the same population of 208 large, New York Citybased corporations. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
" The median number of attorneys in the legal departments of these corporations was
six. The staffs ranged in size from one to over 300 attorneys.
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fifty corporations employing the house counsel were engaged in the

following types of business (with a parenthetical indication of the
number of corporations in each category): manufacturing (twelve);
commercial services, such as retail, advertising, management consulting (nine); insurance (seven); commercial banking (six); publishing or broadcasting (five); investment banking, stock brokerage
or other financial services (four); oil, gas, metal or mining (three);
transportation or utility (two); miscellaneous (two). The median
number of years of professional experience of the respondents was
twenty-four, 45 and thirty-seven of the lawyers had the title of Gen-

eral Counsel. 6
In the sample of outside counsel, each of the fifty-two respondents had represented more than one corporate client during the
five years preceding the interviews, the total median range being
twenty-one to forty different corporate clients. 47 All of the outside
counsel were partners in their law firms, the median size of which
was 125 lawyers.4 8 The median number of years of professional experience of the respondents was twenty.49
45The in-house lawyers' median length of affiliation with their corporate employers was
12 years, and their median age was 47.
4 Seven bore the title of General Counsel by itself; another thirty were entitled General Counsel and, in addition, were officers of the corporation at the rank of Vice President
or above; five were entitled Associate or Assistant General Counsel and, in addition, held a
corporate position of Vice President or above; six were entitled solely Associate or Assistant
General Counsel; one was called General Attorney and another was called Chief Litigation
Counsel.
" The partners were asked to estimate the number of different corporate clients, within
given ranges, that they had represented during the past five years. Fourteen of the lawyers
(26.9%) had represented 1-20 different corporations) 16 (30.8%) indicated the 21-40 range;
10 (19.2%) indicated the 42-60 range; two (3.8%) indicated the 61-80 range; and nine
(17.3%) said they had represented over 100 corporations. Only one of the lawyers was unable to provide an estimate.
The types of business in which their corporate clients were engaged, with a parenthetical indication of the percentage of respondents who had represented clients engaged in the
particular type of business, were as follows: manufacturing (78.8%); commercial banking
(75.0%); investment banking, stock brokerage or other financial services (61.5%); diversified
or conglomerate (59.6%); commercial services, such as retail, advertising, management consulting (42.3%); insurance (40.4%); publishing or broadcasting (40.4%); transportation or
utility (40.4%); oil, gas, metals or mining (7.7%); miscellaneous (13.5%).
The median percentage of time that the attorneys had devoted to the representation of
corporate clients was 95.5%.
48 The firms represented in the sample ranged in size from 28 lawyers to over 500. The
partners' median period of affiliation with their firms was thirteen years.
4" The median age of the outside counsel was 44. When the samples of house counsel
and outside counsel are combined the median number of years of professional experience is
21 and the median age is 46. All of the participating lawyers were males.
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Both samples of lawyers contained a mix of litigators and nonlitigators. Among the house counsel, eleven (22.0%) had devoted
primarily all of their time during the past five years to matters
relating to litigation; twenty-four (48.0%) said that their work had
involved primarily nonlitigated matters; and fifteen (30.0%) said
that their work had been about equally divided between litigation
and nonlitigation5 ° There were more "pure" litigators in the sample of outside counsel: twenty-two (42.3%) had devoted primarily
all of their time during the past five years to litigation; twenty-five
(48.1%) had been primarily nonlitigators; and five (9.6%) had divided their time about equally between litigation and nonlitigation.
The subgroup of respondents in both samples who had devoted
primarily all of their time to litigation or whose work had been
about equally divided between litigation and nonlitigation will be
referred to as "litigators" throughout this Article. There were
twenty-six litigators in the sample of house counsel and twentyseven in the sample of outside counsel, a total of fifty-three litigators in the survey of attorneys as a whole. The remaining fortynine lawyers in the survey (twenty-four in the sample of house
counsel and twenty-five in the sample of outside counsel) will be
referred to as "nonlitigators."
The litigation handled by the fifty-three litigators was almost
exclusively civil in nature, usually involved representation of corporations in a defensive posture and most often took place in federal tribunals. 1 More specifically, during the five years preceding
the interviews, the median percentage of litigation time devoted by
the litigators to civil matters was 98%; the median percentage of
litigation time spent in representing corporate clients as defendants was 75%; and the median percentage of litigation time devoted to matters in federal tribunals was 65%. The litigators were
also asked to indicate the types of cases they had handled in the
five years prior to the interviews. The type of case handled by the
80 All but one of the 37 house counsel with the title of General Counsel had worked
principally on nonlitigated matters or their work had been about equally divided between
litigation and nonlitigation. The precise litigation-nonlitigation breakdown of the 37 respondents with the title of General Counsel is as follows: one was primarily a litigator, 21 were
primarily nonlitigators, and 15 had divided their time about equally between litigation and
nonlitigation.
51 The fact that the litigators had spent most of their time in federal courts is another
potential source of bias because the corporate attorney-client privilege is generally given
broader scope under the Federal Rules of Evidence than under the law of some states. See
infra notes 398-401 and accompanying text.

1989]

CORPORATE PRIVILEGE STUDY

largest percentage of litigators involved the law of commercial
transactions (88.7%), followed by business fraud (66.0%) and antitrust (601%).52 The types of cases that were handled in significantly greater proportion by litigators in the house counsel sample
than by those in the outside counsel sample involved administrative law (76.9% house counsel vs. 37.0% outside counsel), employment discrimination and related personnel matters (65.4% vs.
37.0%), and labor law (61.5% vs. 18.5%). Significantly greater percentages of outside litigators than in-house litigators had handled
securities (77.8% outside counsel vs. 50.0% house counsel) and
banking matters (55.6% vs. 23.1%).
The forty-nine nonlitigators were asked to indicate the types
of nonlitigated corporate matters they had handled during the five
years preceding their interviews. Contract preparation and review
comprised a part of the work of all of the nonlitigators. Other
types of matters handled in significant proportion by the nonlitigators as a group were acquisitions and mergers (85.7%), financing
(81.6%), corporate governance (75.5%), securities (71.4%) and international (67.3%).53 Significantly greater percentages of nonlitigators in the house counsel sample than in the outside counsel
sample had handled miscellaneous government compliance (e.g.,
FDA, OSHA, EEOC) (95.8% house counsel vs. 36.0% outside
counsel), antitrust/trade regulation (66.7% vs. 32.0%), trademarks
(66.7% vs. 40.0%), labor relations (62.5% vs. 12.0%), and tax
(62.5% vs. 36.0%).
The fifty-two respondents in the business executive sample
were employed by corporations with a median annual revenue of
$2.4 billion and a median of 10,000 employees." The fifty-two cor82 No statistically significant variation was found between the percentages of litigators
in the samples of house and outside counsel who had handled these three types of cases,
thus allowing a pooling of the data. The same holds true with respect to the following types
of cases handled by the indicated percentages of litigators: insurance (49.1%); products lia-

bility (49.1%); corporate governance (41.5%); trademarks (41.5%); business crime (39.6%);
environmental (34.0%); copyright (30.2%); patents (26.4%); admiralty (17.0%); miscellaneous, e.g., bankruptcy, personal injury, real estate, tax (34.0%).
5s

No statistically significant variation existed between the proportion of nonlitigators

in the samples of house and outside counsel who had handled these types of matters. Simi-

larly, no variation was found with respect to the following types of matters that the indicated percentages of nonlitigators as a group had handled: banking (49.0%); environmental
(28.6%); patents (12.2%); miscellaneous, e.g., real estate, ERISA (20.4%).
"I When the data of the house counsel and executive samples are pooled, the 102 corpo-

rations in the combined samples have a median annual revenue of $2A billion and a median
of 9,000 employees.
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porations employing the executives were engaged in the following
types of business (with a parenthetical indication of the number of
corporations in each category): manufacturing (fourteen); commercial banking (eight); publishing or broadcasting (six); commercial
services, such as retail, advertising, management consulting (five);
transportation or utility (five); investment banking, stock brokerage or other financial services (four); oil, gas, metals or mining
(four); diversified or conglomerate (three); insurance (three). All of
the respondents held high managerial positions in their companies 55 and were well-educated. 6 Interestingly, eight of the respondents had law degrees, five of them having practiced law in the
corporate sphere. Most of the executives had communicated on a
frequent basis with lawyers for their companies during the five
years prior to the interviews. Thirty of the fifty-two executives had
communicated with attorneys more often than once a week, twelve
had done so about once a week, seven about once a month, two at
the rate of three-to-six times per year, and one on three-to-six occasions. Forty executives said that most of their communications
had been with house counsel, while only three said that they had
communicated most often with outside counsel. Nine stated that
their communications were about equally divided between house
counsel and outside counsel.
For the most part, the executives were not "coached" prior to
their interviews. Fifty stated, in response to a direct question on
this point, that they had received no pre-interview briefing from a
The legal departments of the corporations in the executive sample ranged in size from
one to 140, and the median size was eight attorneys. When pooled with the data in the
house counsel sample, the median size of the legal staffs of the 102 corporations in the
survey is seven attorneys.

All of the house counsel and corporate executives indicated that their corporations refer
a certain amount of legal work to outside counsel. Litigation was identified by the largest
number of respondents (92.0% house counsel and 75.0% executives) as the type of legal
matter that is most often referred to outside counsel. Other principal areas of referral that
were mentioned include specialty matters, e.g., tax, patents, trademarks, pensions (59.8% of
102 respondents); major transactions (37.3% of 102 respondents); and government regulatory matters, e.g., SEC, FTC, EEOC compliance (32.4% of 102 respondents).

55 The distribution by title is as follows: Senior Executive Vice President, 3; Senior Vice
President, 13; Executive Vice President, 26; Vice President, plus Financial Officer, 4; Vice
President, 3; Other, 3. Eighteen of the executives were also members of their companies'
boards of directors. Four years was the median length of time that the respondents had held

their current positions. The median age of the executives was 54, and all of them were
males.
"' The distribution by highest degree attained is as follows: B.A. or B.S., 21; M.B.A., 12;
Other Master's Degree, 7; J.D. or LL.B., 8; Ph.D., 4.
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lawyer. The two who had been briefed said that house counsel had

merely refreshed their recollection as to the basic rule of attorneyclient privilege. Thus, the views of the executives in the survey

should be of special significance in light of the fact that they were
essentially unrehearsed.
In eighty-eight of the 102 corporations in the combined house
counsel and executive samples (86.3%), members of middle management were authorized to seek legal advice for the company from
house counsel without the need to obtain permission from their
superiors. In fifty-two of the corporations (51.0%), employees below middle management shared the same authority.
There were twenty-eight respondents in the sample of federal
judges and magistrates. Eleven judges and seven magistrates were
located in the Southern District of New York, and six judges and
four magistrates in the Eastern District of New York. Their median length of time on the bench was ten years. One unexpected
datum in the sample of jurists was the seemingly low frequency
with which many of them had been called upon to decide questions
of attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. Four of the
district court judges had never been required to decide an issue
involving the corporate attorney-client privilege. 57 The other
twenty-four judges and magistrates estimated that they had decided corporate attorney-client privilege questions with the following degrees of frequency: less often than once a year, six respondents (25.0%); once a year, five (20.8%); two-to-three times a year,
six (25.0%); four-to-six times a year, one (4.2%); seven-to-twelve
times a year, four (16.7%); over twelve times a year, two (8.3%).r,
The six respondents in the two ranges of greatest frequency were
all magistrates." This fact was not surprising, since the privilege
issue most often arises in pretrial discovery; magistrates in both
the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York exercise a great
deal of responsibility over the discovery phase of civil litigation.e
31 Three of these judges had been on the bench less than six years. The fourth had been
on the bench for over 25 years.
88 The judges' estimates were the best available source of information. An
analysis of
court records would not have provided any greater accuracy than the judges' recollections

because adjudications of pretrial discovery issues are not always recorded.
"8The four magistrates who had decided the issue in the range of 7-12 times a year
were all located in the Southern District of New York, and one magistrate from each district
fell in the range of over 12 times a year.
60 See, e.g., 1987 COURT REPORT OF THE UNrrED STATES DisTRiCT COURT FOR THE SOUTHBRN DiSmc op Nzw YoRKI3; Weinstein & Wiener, Of Sailing Ships and Seeking Facts:
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As between the Southern and Eastern Districts, respondents in the
Southern District had adjudicated the issue with greater frequency. In terms of the total number of occasions on which the
twenty-four respondents with relevant experience had decided an
attorney-chent privilege issue in the corporate context, the median
range was seven to twelve times.
The reported frequency of adjudication of issues involving the
corporate attorney-client privilege understates somewhat the judicial respondents' exposure to the matter. Although no specific inquiries were directed to the frequency of informal or "off-the-record" resolution of privilege disputes, eight of the judicial
respondents volunteered that they seek as often as possible to
avoid the need for actual adjudication through informal conferences with the lawyers. Some of the techniques identified by the
respondents include the encouraging of compromise and reciprocal
exchanges of factual information; allowing the opponent to look at
selected privileged documents on a "lawyer's-eyes-only" basis to
enable counsel to determine whether pursuit of the particular discovery is worth it; and simply telling the opponent, after the jurist's preliminary in camera review, that the documents are "of no
interest" or contain "no smoking guns." Two of the magistrates
said that in disputes involving numerous documents, they first outline for the parties their own views regarding the definition of the
attorney-client privilege. The parties are then instructed to "work
out disputes between themselves" in accordance with the given
guidelines and only thereafter to present specific disagreements to
the magistrate. Another magistrate uses the threat of sanctions in
an attempt to reduce the need for adjudication. 1 Local pretrial
discovery rules requiring documentary substantiation of privilege
claims were also said by some to be effective in obviating the need
for judicial resolution of disputes. 2
Il.

RATIONALE OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Rationale of the Attorney-Client Privilege,In General
The principal justification for the attorney-client privilege in
Brief Reflections on Magistratesand the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,62 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 429, 437-40 (1988).
X See infra note 183.
67 See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
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modern times is based on the instrumental argument that the privilege promotes candor in the attorney-client relationship.63 The argument begins with the assumption that laypersons need to consult lawyers in order to cope with society's complex laws and
regulations. Lawyers cannot, so the argument goes, adequately vindicate their clients' rights and advise them how best to conduct
their affairs if clients do not make all pertinent facts known. Such
facts will not be revealed, it is said, if clients are fearful that the
lawyer can later be compelled to disclose the communications in
litigation. Absent privilege, clients will be inhibited from disclosing
not only adverse facts but also favorable information that the client mistakenly believes is damaging. At the extreme, they might
refrain from consulting lawyers altogether.
Thus deprived of complete information, the attorney cannot

13 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Morgan, supra note 6, at 25-26; 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5472, at 80-85 (1986); RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 comment c (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989).

Instrumental argumentation for privileges-the attorney-client privilege as well as
others-was advocated by Wigmore. He posited four prerequisites for the recognition of any
class of privileges for confidential communications: (1) the communication must originate in
an assurance of nondisclosure; (2) confidentiality must be "essential" to the "satisfactory
maintenance" of the relationship; (3) the relationship must be one that society seeks "sedulously" to foster; and (4) the injury to the relationship from disclosure "must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 8 J. WiGMORE, supra
note 2, § 2285, at 531. It bears emphasizing that the cost-benefit analysis advocated by
Wigmore is not a case-by-case exercise. Rather, once a privilege category is recognized, the
privilege generally operates in an absolute manner, absent the applicability of some pertinent exception. See Berger, Comment: The Privileges Article in the New York Proposed
Code of Evidence, 47 BRoOKYN L. REv. 1405, 1406 n.6 (1981). The instrumental model,
which has also been called "utilitarian," see Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 111 (1956), justifies privileges for socially desirable relationships in which the potential for disclosure of confidential
communications in subsequent litigation would chili candor and openness between the parties. See Berger, supra at 1405-06.
Noninstrumental arguments, in contrast, generally do not depend upon such factual
premises. Rather, compelled disclosure of the communication is seen as a harm in itself,
regardless of whether the privilege actually serves to encourage communications. See 23 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5422, at 671-72

(1980); id. § 5422.1, at 163 (Supp. 1989).
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give the most competent legal advice, and the administration of
justice will suffer either because of the perpetuation of meritless
litigation or noncompliance with the law. Furthermore, an attorney
who is called upon to give testimony that is prejudicial to the client, such as damaging admissions by the client, is disqualified from,
serving as trial advocate.6 4 Such disqualification would interfere
with the client's freedom to choose counsel and delay the progress
and efficiency of litigation while new counsel became acquainted
with the case. By assuring clients that disclosure of confidential
communications with counsel cannot be compelled without their
consent, the law of privilege is intended to reduce these adverse
consequences.
To be distinguished from the attorney-client privilege are two
doctrines that are sometimes confused with the privilege: the attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality and the work product immunity. Whereas the privilege is a rule of evidence that permits the
testimonial exclusion of confidential attorney-client communications, the ethics of the legal profession require attorneys to maintain client confidences and secrets even outside the arena of litigation. 5 A second discrete concept is the work product doctrine,
which provides qualified protection against an adversary's discovery of materials prepared by a lawyer or other agent of the client
in anticipation of litigation, regardless of the source of the information.6" Whereas the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to
e1See MODEL CODE OF PRoFESsIoNAL RESPONSIBiLITY DR 5-102(B) (1981); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.7(a) (1983). An attorney-witness's entire firm is
similarly disqualified on conflict-of-interest grounds if the testimony would be harmful to
the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 3.7(b) comment 15 (1983); see
also RESTATEENT OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 118 comment c (Tent. Draft No. 2,

1989) ("The attorney-client privilege, in effect, supplements the [rules on disqualification]
by limiting the number of instances in which a lawyer might be effectively called as a witness by an adversary"); Note, The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege: Culpable Employees, Attorney Ethics, and the Joint Defense Doctrine, 58 Tnx. L. REV. 809, 832-35 (1980).
"' See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY EC 4-4 (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment T5 (1983). In legal proceedings, the attorney also

has an ethical duty to assert the privilege on behalf of the client, absent instructions to the
contrary. See Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352

U.S. 833 (1956).
" See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (work product generally not available for discovery
pursuant to Federal Rules). The work product doctrine was first given authoritative recognition by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). As codified in FED. R.
CIv. P. 26(b)(3), two types of materials fall within the concept: "ordinary" work product and
"opinion" work product. The former includes statements of witnesses, investigative reports,
surveys, intra-office memoranda, photographs, diagrams and charts. See Note, The Work
ProductDoctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 791-98 (1983). Opinion work product constitutes
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encourage clients to be candid in their communications with lawyers, the work product immunity is intended to encourage lawyers
to be diligent in their case preparation.17 Statements of witnesses
obtained in anticipation of litigation, for example, would not fall
within the attorney-client privilege but would be prima facie
nondiscoverable under the work product doctrine. The immunity
for such work product, however, may be lifted by the court upon a
showing by the adversary of substantial need for the materials and
the inability without undue hardship to obtain their equivalent
through other means.68 The attorney-client privilege, in contrast,
traditionally has been treated as an absolute privilege once all of
its definitional elements are satisfied. 9
As to the costs of the attorney-client privilege, its proponents
argue that the court's loss of potentially valuable evidence is outweighed by the social benefits of well-informed legal advice and
good advocacy.70 In addition, the overall damage to the fact-finding
process is thought to be minimal because the client, at least as to
matters with no criminal implications, may be compelled to testify
as to all facts within his knowledge, even if they have been communicated to the attorney. Only the version of the facts given to the
attorney, i.e., the attorney-client communication itself, is privileged. 7 ' Proponents also argue that the cost of the privilege to
a more narrow field consisting of "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories" about the litigation. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Ordinary work product loses its immunity
upon a showing by the adversary of substantial need of the materials and an inability without undue hardship to obtain substantially equivalent materials through other means. Id. A
higher threshold must be met to overcome the immunity for opinion work product, but the
exact standard has never been established. Whereas some courts have required "extraordinary" need and hardship, see, e.g., In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977), others
have held the protection to be absolute, see, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie
de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
" See In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (11), 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980). In
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the Court observed that "[p]roper preparation of a
client's case demands that [the attorney] assemble information, sift what he considers to be
the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his legal strategy
without undue and needless interference." Id. at 511. According to the Court, if trial preparation materials were available to the adversary, "much of what is now put down in writing
would remain unwritten" and "[ilnefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial." Id.
"5See supra note 66.
"1 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1979); State ex rel.
Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 581, 150 N.W.2d 387, 399 (1967).
70S ee Morgan, supra note 6, at 26.
71 See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). "The client cannot be compelled to answer the
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truth is negligible in the long run because absent the privilege, no
communications of evidentiary value to the adversary would come
into existence in the first place.72 The privilege thus conceals only
communications that would not otherwise occur. Furthermore, the
privilege may not be used to shield attorney-client communications
that were made in furtherance of a future crime or fraud.7 3 Com-

munications in aid of ongoing or future wrongdoing represent an
abuse of the attorney-client relationship that public policy will not
condone.7 4
Justification for the attorney-client privilege has not always
been based on instrumental arguments regarding candor in attorney-client communications. The privilege first emerged in England
during the reign of Elizabeth I at about the time when witnesses
were first made subject to compulsory process.75 Attorneys who

were called as witnesses invoked their "oath and honor as gentlemen" not to answer questions that would require them to reveal
matters confided by clients, and courts upheld these claims of privilege."0 By 1776, however, the oath of honor-whether invoked by
question, 'What did you say or write to the attorney?' but may not refuse to disclose any
relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact
into his communication to his attorney." Id; see also Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74,
79-80 (1913) (pre-existing documents in hands of client, such as corporate books and
records, do not become privileged by transfer of possession to counsel); In re Sealed Case,
737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (facts learned by attorney from independent sources and
then reported to client are not within privilege); Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 55 App. Div.
2d 466, 469, 390 N.Y.S.2d 715, 719 (4th Dep't 1977) (client-party may be compelled to state
the facts, regardless of client's source of information).
7'Saltzburg, Priuileges and Professionals:Lawyers and Psychiatrists,66 VA. L. REv.
597, 610-11 (1980).
1 See, e.g., Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277, 281 (8th Cir.
1984);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979). The crime/fraud exception has no application to communications relating to past misdeeds, as to which the seeking of legal counsel
is entirely legitimate. See Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 360 (1891).
7"See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). "The privilege takes flight if the
relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the
commission of a fraud will have no help from the law." Id. Some courts have suggested that
the exception includes not only crimes and frauds but also any other intentional misconduct. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Irving Trust Co. v.
Gomez, 100 F.R.D. 273, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Diamond v. Stratton, 95 F.R.D. 503, 505
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
75 9 IV. HOLDSWORTH, A HSTORY oP ENGLISH LAW 201-02 (7th ed. 1956). Wigmore asserted that the attorney-client privilege was the oldest of the common law privileges. 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290, at 552.
'7 See, e.g., Wafron v. Ward, 82 Eng. Rep. 853 (K.B. 1654). See
generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290, at 543; Hazard, supra note 6, at 1070-71. Indeed, until the mid-

1989]

CORPORATE PRIVILEGE STUDY

attorneys or other "gentlemen"-had been repudiated as a basis
for any type of evidentiary privilege. 7 Judicial interest-in the ascertainment of truth had become a paramount concern, necessitating an alternative rationale if the privilege for attorney-client communications was to survive. According to Wigmore, the new theory
was that of social utility-the promotion of client candor; possession of the privilege thus shifted from the attorney to the client7
Noninstrumental justifications, however, have re-emerged in
recent times.79 Under noninstrumental rationales, compelled disclosure of client confidences is considered intrinsically wrong, regardless of whatever effect the privilege may have on client candor
and regardless of the cost to society's interest in accurate
adjudication. 0
Perhaps the leading noninstrumental rationale is based on the
client's right of privacy-the ability to determine "when, how, and
to what extent information about [oneself] is communicated to
others."8 ' In preserving the confidentiality df information disclosed
1700s, English courts exempted almost any "gentleman" from testifying if such testimony
would violate a private vow of secrecy. 9 W. HOLnSWORTH, supra note 75, at 202; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2286, at 531.
Professor Radin suggested that the roots of the attorney-client privilege may be traceable to the notion in Roman law that advocates were incompetent to testify against their
clients because of the immoral breach of fidelity that would be involved. Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487,
488-89 (1928). The incompetency apparently was based on the irrebuttable presumption
that an advocate who would testify against his cent was'a "disreputable" person and therefore not worthy of belief. Id.
17Trial of the Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 586, 589 (1776) (in bigamy
trial, court rejected Lord Barrington's claim that as "man of honor" he could not reveal
whether defendant had confided in him fact of her prior marriage); Trial of James Hill, 20
How. St. Tr. 1317, 1362-63 (1777) ("the wisdom of the law knows nothing of.that point of
honour"). See 9 W. HOLDsWORTH, supra note 75, §§ 2286, 2290.
71 8 J. WGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2290-91.

19 See generally Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HAav. L.
REV. 1450, 1480-83, 1502-04 (1985).
80 See Berger, supra note 63, at 1408; Louisell, supra note 63, at 110-12.
1 A. WVESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDoM 7 (1970). Privacy, as defined by Sissela Bok, is
"the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others-either physical access,
personal information, or attention. Claims to privacy are claims to control access to what
one takes ... to be one's personal domain." S. BoK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 10-11 (1982). She notes that secrecy (defined as intentional conceal-

ment) is a means of enhancing one's control over privacy. Id. at 11-13.
Drawing upon such "control-over-access" definitions of privacy, Professor Thomas
Krattenmaker explains the connection between privacy and testimonial privileges as follows:
"The rejection of a claim of privilege destroys the claimant's control over the breadth of the
audience receiving personal information as well as his control over the timing and conditions
of its release." Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privilegesin Federal Courts: An Alternative to
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in the privacy of a legal consultation, the privilege shows respect

for the client's autonomy.2 Although the lawyer is ethically bound
in any event to preserve client confidences outside the arena of legal proceedings, the evidentiary privilege broadens the circumstances in which the client's privacy interests are protected. The
privilege thus reflects governmental respect for the exchange of information that occurs in the privacy of the attorney-client
relationship. 8
Another noninstrumental argument bears traces of the original
concept that the attorney's honor would be diminished by a duty
to reveal client confidences. Wigmore observed that the privilege

may be justified, at least in part, by the "sense of treachery" that
the lawyer would experience if compelled to testify against a client,

thus creating "an unhealthy moral state in the practitioner."8 4 As
noted above, lawyers are disqualified from representing clients

against whom they must give adverse testimony.8

5

The privilege

may be worth preserving, therefore, "[i]f only for the sake of the
peace of mind of the counselor."88 Finally, public confidence in the
The Proposed FederalRules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61, 86 (1973).
The privacy banner has been carried by several commentators in support of other privileges, such as the husband-wife and doctor-patient privileges. See, e.g., Black, The Marital
and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DuKE L.J. 45;
Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (pts. I & II), 8 VML. L. REv. 279
(1963); Krattenmaker, supra at 91; Louisell, supra note 63; Saltzburg, supra note 72, at 618.
82 Professor Charles Fried argues in favor of the attorney-client privilege on the moral
ground that in giving legal advice, the lawyer is helping the client to learn his rights under
the law; the government thus has no right to interfere in the process of communication. See
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976) [hereinafter Lawyer as Friend]; Fried, Correspondence, 86
YAL L.J. 584, 586 (1977).
83 See Saltzburg, supra note 72, at 609-10. State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 417 A.2d 474
(1980), is one of the few judicial opinions expressly endorsing a privacy rationale for the
attorney-client privilege:
The necessity of full and open disclosure by a defendant... imbues that
disclosure with an intimacy equal to that of the confessional, and approaching
even that of the marital bedroom ....
Any interference with the intimate relationship between attorney and client
may do profound violence to the individual privacy of the client .... The privacy
between attorney and client is but an extension of the client's personal privacy.
Id. at 12-13, 417 A.2d at 479-80 (citations omitted).
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 553.
88 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
88 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 553. See also Louisell, supra note 63, at 112
(attorney's adverse testimony would be morally repugnant because attorney would "know
that he was perverting the function of counseling"). Professor Radin observed that although
the original rationale for the privilege-the attorney's honor as a gentleman-had long since
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fairness of the adjudicative process might also suffer if attorneys
became "informers" for the adversary.8 7 As one commentator expressed it, a client should be entitled to "rely on his attorney without question or doubt" and to take comfort in knowing "that giving the truth to his attorney will not hurt him." 88 For criminal
defendants, the privilege might even be justified on constitutional
grounds8 9
There is no reason why instrumental and noninstrumental rationales must be viewed as mutually exclusive; it is perhaps a matter of emphasis. For example, the instrumental argument is bolstered if consideration is given to the notion that the protection of
privacy and autonomy is another social benefit fostered by the
privilege.9 0 The privacy argument, in turn, may require some degree of utilitarian analysis to justify extension of an evidentiary
privilege to the attorney-client relationship while denying it to
other relationships that are more intimate in nature.9 1 Furtherbeen abandoned, the Roman concept of mutual fidelity was still "very much in our bones."
Radin, supra note 76, at 492.
8 Lasky, Lawyer-Client Privilege,38 CAL. ST. B.J. 427, 437 (1963); see also Alschuler,
The Search for Truth Continued, The Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel,54
U. COLO. L. Rav. 67, 72-74 (1982). One of the goals of modem adjudicatory procedure, of
course, is to instill public respect for the fairness of the system. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 2-3 (3d ed. 1985).
85 Alschuler, The Preservationof a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or a
CategoricalImperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 349, 352 (1981).
" See supranote 6. In the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham argued that the common good would be much better served if attorneys could be compelled to disclose their
clients' confessions of guilt. 7 J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENmA 473-79 (Bowring ed. 1842). Edward Livingston countered such criticism of the privilege, in part, with the
noninstrumental argument that an attorney's incrimination of his client would be a "repugnant" means of destroying "[a] public enemy ... by poisoned weapons." 1 E. LIVINGSTON,
supra note 17, at 464-65. Today, Livingston's moral argument might be premised on a confluence of the fifth and sixth amendments. In order to obtain effective legal counsel, which
requires making full disclosure of all relevant facts, the defendant should not have to waive
the right to remain silent, which would be the result if the attorney could be compelled to
testify to the disclosures. See Hazard, supra note 6, at 1062-63.
,0 See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 79, at 1504-07.
,1 For example, the privacy argument, standing alone, does not answer the question
why an evidentiary privilege has not been extended to the parent-child relationship. Although a few courts recently have recognized a parent-child privilege principally on privacy
grounds, see, e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983); In re A & M, 61
App. Div. 2d 426, 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (4th Dep't 1975), most courts adhere to the
common law view that denies the existence of any such privilege. See United States v. Davis, 768 F.2d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 1985).
The usual answer to the "picking and choosing" that occurs under a privacy rationale is
that privacy is not an absolute right, and society is therefore entitled to extend greater
protection to some relationships than to others. See, e.g., Ruebbausen & Brim, Privacy and
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more, under both rationales, the values advanced by the privilege
arguably must be weighed against the cost of potentially inaccurate
fact-finding when society determines whether the privilege should
be recognized.92 When the instrumental and noninstrumental arguments are combined, they may strengthen the case for continued
recognition, despite the costs, of the attorney-client privilege.
Whether the balance produces the same outcome for corporate as
well as individual clients, however, is another question.
B. Should the Privilege Apply to Corporations?
The most frequently litigated questions about the corporate
privilege concern its operation and scope, not whether the privilege
should exist. English courts have applied the attorney-client privilege to corporations since at least 1833 without questioning the appropriateness of so doing,9 and American cases involving claims of
privilege by corporations date from the late nineteenth century."
In 1962, however, the district judge in Radiant Burners, Incorporated v. American Gas Association95 declared that he could
find no precedent specifically holding that the privilege applied to
corporations.9 " Considering the question an open one, he concluded
that in the absence of legislation, corporations were not entitled to
claim the privilege because, like the privilege against self-incrimiBehavioralResearch,65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1190 (1965); Saltzburg, supranote 72, at 622.
The notion that the state may properly show favoritism to some intimate relationships but
not others is critically analyzed in Levinson, TestimonialPrivileges and the Preferences of
Friendship,1984 DuKE L.J. 631, 645-62.
92 See, e.g., Shuman & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An EmpiricalExamination of the
Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 60 N.C.L. REv. 893, 906-07 (1982) (instrumental and
noninstrumental values of psychotherapist-patient privilege must be weighed against accuracy in judicial proceedings); see also Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 577 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) ("[b]alancing of competing interests is permissible, and in fact required, to determine
whether a federal evidentiary privilege should be extended to particular communications as
a matter of social and legal policy").
91 Bolton v. Corporation of Liverpool, 1 Myl. & K. 88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Oh. 1833).
Modern English authorities with respect to the corporate attorney-client privilege are discussed in Gergacz, Privileged Communications Between an Attorney and a CorporateClient: A Comparison Between the United States and Great Britain, 14 ANGLo-Ali. L. REV.
127, 135-39 (1985).
91See, e.g., Edison Elec. Light Co. v. United States Elec. Lighting Co., 44 F. 294, 298
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 26 F. 55, 56-57
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885); Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 166 Pa. 480, 486, 31 A. 245, 246
(1895).
95 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), supplemented, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. IIl. 1962), rev'd,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
96 Id. at 772-73.
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nation, the attorney-client privilege was "historically and funda-

mentally personal in nature. 9 7 An additional reason was the impossibility, in the judge's view, of maintaining confidentiality for
documentary communications with counsel in the corporate
settinges
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 9 holding that

the corporate privilege had been in existence "for more than a
hundred years."10 0 Without denying that the privilege first

emerged in one-to-one relationships between attorneys and individual clients, the court of appeals stressed that the principle underlying the privilege-facilitation of the administration of justice

by encouraging full disclosure by clients-was just as applicable to
corporate clients as to individuals.1 0 1 In response to the district
97 Id. at 773. Since the corporation was a "mere creature of the state and not a natural
entity," it could not, in the absence of legislation, take advantage of a privilege "historically
created only for natural persons." Id.
The district court was correct, of course, that corporations are not entitled to assert the
privilege against self-incrimination. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906). It is believed that one of the original reasons. for the privilege against self-incrimination was to
protect against confessions coerced by physical torture, see C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENcE § 114
(E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984), which corporations are incapable of experiencing. See also Greenawait, Silence as a Moral and ConstitutionalRight, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 39 (1981)
(privilege against self-incrimination is essentially protection against cruel affront to human
dignity). In denying the privilege to corporations, the Supreme Court may have been influenced by this consideration, as well as the view that the corporation, as a creature of the
state, is subject to limitations on its rights when deemed necessary for effective law enforcement. See Braswell v. United States 108 S. Ct. 2284, 2294 (1988) ("recognizing a Fifth
Amendment privilege on behalf of the records custodians of collective entities would have a
detrimental impact on the Government's efforts to prosecute 'white collar crime' "); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) (antitrust laws would be "nullified" if fifth amendment could
"close the door of access to every available source of information upon the subject"); cf.
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-702 (1944) (privilege denied to labor union because of "impersonal" nature of its records and documents and necessity of government
access to organization's records and documents for law enforcement purposes).
8 Radiant Burners, 207 F. Supp. at 773-75. Oddly, the court indicated that the traditional rationale for the privilege-promotion of open communication between client and attorney-would warrant extension of "a similar privilege" to a corporation, but insisted that
it was precluded by the common law requirement of absolute secrecy and the "purely personal" origin of the privilege from so doing. Id. at 775. See also Radiant Burners, 209 F.
Supp. at 325.
" Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).

100Id. at 323.

101Id. at 322. That the original privilege may have contemplated only clients who were
natural persons is probably explained by the historical fact that publicly held business corporations did not become an active part of English or American society until the late nineteenth century. See Werner, CorporationLaw in Search of Its Future, 81 COLUM. L. Rv.
1611, 1641-42 (1981). There is no reason why the privilege should not have evolved to embrace new circumstances if there was an appropriate rationale for doing so. To suggest oth-
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court's concern over lack of confidentiality, the court of appeals
saw no reason why this problem could not be addressed on a caseby-case basis, noting that the nature of the requisite confidential10 2
ity would vary with the size of the corporation.
Since the Radiant Burners litigation, no reported decision has
ever explicitly rejected the corporate privilege, and in 1985 the Supreme Court considered it "by now well established" that corporations may claim the privilege.103 That the privilege is justifiable in
the corporate context, however, is not self-evident. Setting aside
questions concerning scope, is there sufficient justification for extending the privilege, in general, to corporations? The determination of this question depends on a weighing of benefits and costs.
1.

The Benefits of the Corporate Privilege

Proponents of the corporate privilege usually advance an instrumental justification along the following lines.1 04 Because the
laws and regulations governing modern business corporations are
complicated, corporations need sound legal advice. Such advice is
more likely to produce appropriate corporate behavior if based on
full disclosure of the facts rather than incompleteness, half-truths
and distortions prompted by the apprehension of revelation in litigation. The privilege encourages corporations to provide their attorneys with all of the facts necessary for the rendering of competent legal advice, and this, in turn, will help ensure corporate legal
compliance.1 0
As in the case of individual clients, noninstrumental arguments conceivably could be advanced to justify recognition of the
corporate attorney-client privilege even if it were demonstrated
that the privilege has little or no effect on the openness of commuerwise is to contradict centuries of experience under the common law. B.
PARADOXES oF LEGAL SCIENCE 7 (1928).
102 Radiant Burners, 320

CARDozo,

THE

F.2d at 323-24.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).
10, See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); A.B. Dick Co. v.
Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the
CorporateArena, 24 Bus. LAW. 901, 913-914 (1969); Kobak, The Uneven Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporationsin the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. Rnv. 339, 339-40
(1972).
105 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).
The Commodity Futures Court wrote: "Both for corporations and individuals, the attorneyclient privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank communications between
attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the
administration of justice." Id.
203
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nications. It might be argued, for example, that the attorney-client
privilege protects the right of privacy of a corporation just as it
does that of an individual client.1 06 But the concerns about human
dignity and autonomy that have prompted most writings about
privacy are minimal in the corporate context.""7 For example, in
connection with the fourth amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Supreme Court has said that "corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a
right to privacy" because "[t]hey have a collective impact upon society from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities.""' As an artificial entity, the corporation would be incapa106Cf. Allen & Hazelwood, Preservingthe Confidentialityof Internal CorporateInvestigations, 1987 J.CORP. L. 355, 357 (corporate right to privacy suggested as rationale of
emerging privilege for corporate self-evaluation). No court has explicitly relied upon a privacy rationale for the attorney-client privilege as applied to corporations, but the opinion in
State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 383-85 (Mo. 1978) (en banc),
comes close to doing so in the course of criticizing Wigmore's instrumental argument. See
supra note 63.
Existing privacy protections for corporations include the fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures, see, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
429 U.S. 338, 353-54 (1977), and laws protecting trade secrets, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(1988) (Freedom of Information Act exempts trade secrets and confidential commercial information from disclosure); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 17, 112508[02]-[03]
(qualified evidentiary privilege for trade secrets).
107 See R. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION 51 (1980). In his book on
corporate secrecy, Professor Russell Stevenson wrote:
Certainly corporations do have legitimate interests in preserving some degree of
secrecy with respect to their operations. It is, however, as fallacious to assume that
those interests are identical to or deserving of the same protection as the interests
of living and breathing persons as it is to treat corporate wrongdoing as if it were
the act of some sort of evil or antisocial being. The social conventions and legal
rights we have established to protect personal privacy are founded on human values and human traits shared by the members of every society. Corporations-and
other organizations-can make no direct claim to the benefits of those social and
legal rules, for their fictional "personalities" do not partake of the characteristics
wherein the rules find their basis.
Id, (emphasis in original); see also S. BoK, supra note 81, at 110 ("It is fallacious to argue ... from individual privacy to corporate privacy").
In Gardner, A PersonalPrivilegefor Communications of Corporate Clients-Paradox
or Public Policy?, 40 U. DnT. L. REV.299, 323-25, 353-54 (1963), the author argues that the
only proper rationale for evidentiary privileges in modern times is privacy and human dignity, and for this reason, he concludes that corporations should not be entitled to the attorney-client privilege.
0I United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (corporation engaged in
commerce can be required by FTC to file report showing extent of its compliance with judicial decree); cf. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-38 (1986) (aerial surveillance of commercial property upheld, in part, because owner of commercial property has
lesser expectation of privacy than individual home-owner).
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ble of experiencing a sense of betrayal or loss of autonomy if
counsel to the corporation were compelled to testify to information
acquired in confidence while performing legal services for the
corporation.

On the other hand, the corporation is a vehicle through which

real persons seek personal objectives.Y' 9 Directors, officers, employees and shareholders might indeed feel betrayed if the corporation's lawyer were required to reveal confidential communications
made by representatives of the corporation. But the attorney's duties of loyalty and confidentiality are owed to none of these persons individually. As will be further developed below, ordinarily
the corporate lawyer's sole client is the organization-not its individual representatives or shareholders." 0 Thus, any breach of privacy experienced by the persons "behind" the corporation would
be merely vicarious because the only cognizable attorney-client relationship exists between the collective entity and the attorney.
The privacy interests at stake in the corporate context, therefore,
are of an entirely different nature from those of individual clients. 1 1 As Wigmore argued, however, the attorney-client privilege
Corporations are not entitled to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, see
supra note 97, and they have been largely unsuccessful in obtaining recognition of a tort
cause of action for invasion of privacy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 651(I) comment c (1981); but see Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against CorporatePrivacyRights: Some
Conceptual Quandries [sic] for the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. R-v. 607, 626-39
(1987) (arguing in favor of corporate privacy actions).
1*1 See Fried, Lawyer as Friend, supra note 82, at 1076 (arguing that rights-based rationale of autonomy applies to both individual and corporate attorney-client relationships);
see also Alschuler, supra note 87, at 73 n.29 (fairness rationale of attorney-client privilege
applies to corporations).
10 See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
" See 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MuELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 208 at 732 (1985) ("the privacy factor looms larger in the relationship of the individual to his personal attorney than in
the more impersonal relation of an organization"); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGA ETHICS §
6.5.3, at 283-84 (1986) ("[t]he corporation as an entity has no legal or moral claims to
dignity").
A distinction that is relevant to privacy interests, however, might properly be drawn
between large, publicly held corporations and small, closely held corporations. Sole proprietors or small partnerships, in order to give their enterprise the advantage of limited liability,
perpetual life and the other benefits that the separate-entity concept of corporation law
provides, may incorporate their businesses for the sake of convenience. Under law, all corporations, regardless of the number of shareholders, are treated alike in the sense that, upon
incorporation, a separate and distinct entity springs into existence. See 1 W. FLErCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 25, at 306 (1983 perm. ed.). The sole proprietor
or small group of partners who are doing business in a formal and legalistic sense through a
corporation may nevertheless experience a personal sense of privacy in their dealings with
counsel "to the entity." See, e.g., Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (S.D.N.Y.
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may be justified, in part, by the "sense of treachery" that the attorney would feel if routinely required to testify against the client.1n 2 This burden could weigh heavily on the attorney irrespective of the type of client involved.
In any event, few writers have advocated noninstrumental rationales for the corporate privilege. The debate has been waged almost exclusively in functional terms. Concentrating, then, on the
instrumental rationale, a serious question is presented as to
whether the privilege has any actual role in accomplishing the benefits that are attributed to it in the modern corporate context. Obviously, since the corporation itself is an inanimate entity, it is the
conduct of corporate representatives-directors, officers and employees-that either is or is not affected by the privilege. The argument that the privilege is necessary to induce the corporation's
agents to confide in counsel rings somewhat hollow. Because a vast
array of laws and regulations must be taken into account in the
accomplishment of business objectives, and because these external
forces present a grave potential for liability, corporate managers
would appear to have no practical choice but to consult lawyers.11 3
In so doing, it would seem that they must, out of business necessity, disclose all relevant facts about the corporation's past and
prospective conduct if they wish to obtain the informed legal advice required to properly manage the corporation's affairs. 1 4 The
1987) ("where, as here, the corporation is a close corporation consisting of only two shareholders with equal interests in the corporation, it is indeed reasonable for each shareholder
to believe that the corporate counsel is in effect his own individual attorney"). The
problems of such a corporation are, in a very real and direct sense, the personal problems of
its entrepreneurs. See R. SaEVNsoN, supra note 107, at 74. When they communicate these
problems in confidence to counsel, their expectations of privacy are qualitatively different
from those of corporate agents who speak on behalf of more impersonal entities. For this
reason, the attorney-client privilege for some small corporations may very well find justification, at least in part, in the right of privacy.
112 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
1,3 Corporations and lawyers have been described as "ineluctable bedfellows." Note,
The Attorney-Client Privilege:Fixed Rules, Balancingand ConstitutionalEntitlement, 91
HARv. L. REV. 464, 473-74 (1977).
114 See Nath, Upjohn: A New Prescription for the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Defenses in Administrative Investigations, 30 Buffalo L. Rev. 11, 41-47 (1981); Sedler & Simeone, The Realities of Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 23-25
(1963); Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Considerationof the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 464 (1982); Note, Attorney-Client Privilegefor CorporateClients:
The Control Group Test, 84 HARv. L. REv. 424,428 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1980 Term,
95 HARv. L. REV. 91, 276-77 (1981); cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237
(3d Cir. 1979) ("the potential costs of undetected noncompliance are themselves high
enough to ensure that corporate officials will authorize investigations regardless of an inabil-
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fear of disclosure of legal consultations will no more bring an end
to such consultations, it is argued, than the absence of the fifth
amendment privilege for corporate documents has caused corporations to stop retaining general business records." 5 Thus, in the
daily routine of corporate decision-making, good business judgment-not an implied or explicit promise of secrecy in possible
subsequent litigation-may be the inducement to disclose facts to
lawyers.
On the other hand, it may be that some corporate officers and
employees would hesitate to reveal certain facts to counsel if they
believed them to be derogatory and possible cause for corporate
liability. Such agents, particularly at lower levels of the corporation, might also fear punishment by the corporation in the form of
discipline or loss of employment. Knowledge that the revelation of
such information would remain privileged might very well provide
an incentive to disclose in such circumstances. 16
The problem with this reasoning, however, is that any sense of
personal security on the part of the employee may be illusory. The
lawyer's client is the corporation-the entity-not its constituents. Unlike the individual client who can control the decision as
to whether and when to assert the privilege in his own behalf, the
agents of a corporation have no such control. Thus, information
conveyed to the company's lawyer by an officer or employee may
be reported by the lawyer to superior authorities within the corporation.""' Furthermore, several recent cases show that the corporation, despite the objections of the individual whose communications are involved, has the power to waive its privilege and permit
ity to keep such investigations completely confidential").
115 Freeman, The Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege:An Obstacle to the Pursuit of
Truth, LrrGATrON, Spring 1976, at 14, 16.
"See Sexton, supra note 114, at 464-67.
21
See Evans v. Axtek Sys. Corp., 715 F.2d 788, 792 (2d Cir. 1983) (in-house lawyers
and law firms retained by corporation have duty to act in accordance with interests of cor-

porate entity); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Goldman, 421 F. Supp. 7, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (fact that
individual was officer and director of companies represented by law firm did not create attorney-client relationship between him and firm); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBiLrry EC 5-18 (1981) ("A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity

owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUOT Rule 1.13(a) (1983) ("A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization, acting through its duly authorized constituents").
28 See MODEL RULES OF PROFSSIONAL Co~NutT Rule 1.13(b) (1983); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 202 (1940); ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1349 (1975).
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disclosure to outsiders.11 9 A potential waiver of this nature is most
likely to cause concern to an individual involved in a matter with
criminal or quasi-criminal implications. The employee may fear
that the corporation, in exchange for favorable
treatment by the
1 20
government, will "hang him out to dry.

Even top-level executives, who might ordinarily have sufficient
power to prevent the corporation from waiving the privilege for
their communications, would not be able to override the company's
board of directors or a subsequent management team. This point
was recently underscored by the Supreme Court in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 2 , in which the trustee
of a corporation in bankruptcy was held entitled to waive the privilege for management's prebankruptcy communications with counsel. Justice Marshall wrote for a unanimous Court: "Displaced
managers may not assert the privilege over the wishes of current
managers, even as to statements that the former might have made
to counsel concerning matters within the scope of their corporate
duties."1 22 The courts have given the individual a voice on the is" See, e.g., In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120,
124-25 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 798 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir.
1986); United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 699-701 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1183 (1986); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1979);
Odmark v. Westside Bancorporation, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 552, 556 (W.D. Wash. 1986); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777, 779-80 (N.D. Ga. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jackier), 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1977), af'd per curiam, 570 F.2d 562
(6th Cir. 1978); cf. Dooley v. Boyle, 140 Misc. 2d 177, 186, 531 N.Y.S.2d 161, 167 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1988) (county employee's revelation of personal wrongdoing to County Attorney may be disclosed by county to prosecuting authorities over objections of employee).
"0G
See, e.g., In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 1988) (corporation
under investigation for fraud in performance of government contract entered into administrative settlement whereby it agreed to stop funding legal defense of employee, who subsequently was indicted). In the past, such waivers by corporations may have been rare. See
Barnette, Leary & DeLone, PracticalAspects of Internal Antitrust Investigationsin Light
of the Upjohn Decision (Panel Discussion), 51 ANTrusT L.J. 123, 145 (1982) (waiver by
corporation for purpose of "ingratiating" itself with government said to be "highly unlikely"). Depending on relationships with the particular individuals involved, a corporation
might offer to plead guilty or allow entry of a consent decree in exchange for the government's promise not to seek sanctions against the individuals. Recently, however, it has been
said that corporations increasingly are using internal investigations "to exonerate the corporation and to implicate the employee." InternalProbesBecoming Part of CriminalProcess,
Nat'l L.J., Jan. 9, 1989, at 24, col. 1; see also Arkin, The Individualand Internal Corporate
Investigations, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 9, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
121471 U.S. 343 (1985).
121 Id. at 349. See also Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs. Inc., 689 F.
Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. II. 1988) (upon sale of stock of subsidiary corporation, former parent
corporation relinquishes control over subsidiary's attorney-client privilege; new management
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sue of waiver only where the attorney has undertaken joint representation of both the corporation and the employee in question.'
Absent a finding of joint representation, the person whose candor
is thought to be induced by the implied promise of nondisclosure
ultimately has no control over the matter. This state of affairs
tends to undermine the argument that the availability of the attorney-client privilege to the corporation provides an incentive to reticent employees to confide in corporate counsel. 24 With or without
1' 25
the privilege, employees communicate "at their own risk.

2. The Costs of the Corporate Privilege
Weighed against the putative benefits of the corporate attorney-client privilege are its potential costs in blocking discovery of
the truth in the judicial process. Because of the privilege, a corporation's adversaries generally must seek information directly from
the corporate client, which theoretically they are able to do because the privilege protects only communications with the lawyer,
not the client's knowledge of the underlying facts. 126 An individual

opponent usually can be questioned about his or her knowledge
of subsidiary is generally free to waive privilege for subsidiary's pre-sae communications
with counsel); United States v. De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. 840, 841-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (chairman and former trustee of union pension fund cannot prevent waiver of privilege by current
board of trustees).
12 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jackier), 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (corporate officer may assert privilege individually if he "makes it clear when he is
consulting the company lawyer that he personally is consulting the lawyer and the lawyer
sees fit to accept and give communication knowing the possible conflicts that could arise"),
aff'd, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Forma, 117 F.R.D. 516, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(outside counsel represented both corporation and chairman of board of directors as evidenced by fact that chairman sought advice from lawyer regarding sale of his own stock in
the company). Even without actual joint representation, the individual employee might be
entitled to claim the privilege against third parties if he "reasonably believed" that the
company's lawyer was providing individual representation. See United States v. Keplinger,
776 F.2d 678, 701 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1183 (1986); Odmark v. Westside
Bancorporation, 636 F. Supp. 552, 555 (W.D. Wash. 1986). The employee might be able to
claim the privilege at least for his initial communications if he was seeking to become an
individual client of the corporation's attorney. See In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset
Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986) (privilege includes communications
between counsel and prospective client even if actual retainer does not result).
124 See 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAAM, supra note 63, § 5476, at 145-47; Marcus, The
Perils of Privilege:Waiver and the Litigator,84 MICH.L. REV. 1605, 1621 (1986); Saltzburg,
Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HoFSTRA L. REv. 279, 306-08 (1984) (corporation's privilege provides incentive to communication
only for corporate employees who are in position to control waiver decision).
125 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1979).
128 See supra note 71.
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with relative ease. But in the case of a large corporation, unearth-

ing "corporate knowledge" may be quite difficult because of the
need to conduct depositions of numerous directors, officers and
employees. 127 The less costly alternative of interviewing corporate
agents outside the formal deposition process-assuming willingness on the part of an individual to cooperate-may be unavailable
because of an ethical rule that prohibits lawyers from communicating on an ex parte basis with an adverse party who is represented

by counsel.128 When the adversary is a corporation, a number of
authorities have taken the position that the corporation's manage-

rial employees, and in some circumstances lower-level employees
as well, are to be treated as the party for purposes of the rule. 129
127 Ascertaining the identity of appropriate corporate representatives with knowledge of
relevant facts may be possible through pretrial discovery. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
(parties entitled to discovery of "identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter"). The names of the particular individuals who were "interviewed by
counsel", however, may qualify as attorney work product. Compare Massachusetts v. First
Nat'l Supermarkets, 112 F.R.D. 149, 152-54 (D. Mass. 1986) (work product) with Castle v.
Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 F.2d 1464, 1467 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The law is clear that [information regarding the names and addresses of witnesses 'already interviewed'] is subject to
discovery") and United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 987-88 (3d Cir. 1980)
(no work product protection for pre-existing list 6f employees who were interviewed).
Interrogatories may be a less expensive discovery method because the corporation can
be required to assemble and provide information in the possession of its employees. See,
e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 33(a) (corporate party served with interrogatories "shall furnish such
information as is available to the party"); Casson Constr. Co. v. Armco Steel "Corp., 91
F.R.D. 376, 384-85 (D. Ken. 1980) (default judgment against corporation for failure to satisfactorily answer interrogatories). But interrogatories are usually construed narrowly by the
responding party's counsel, and answers are often incomplete, evasive and misleading. See
Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalsfor Change,
31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1323-24 (1978); Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. Rev. 1055, 1061-64, 1072-77 (1979). In an empirical study of discovery, one lawyer quoted a federal judge as having said that "'interrogatories are useless
because any lawyer who can't answer interrogatories without giving [an] opponent useful
information is not worth his salt.'" Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by
Chicago Lawyers About the System of Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FoUND. RES. J. 219, 233
[hereinafter Views from the Front Lines].
112 MODEL CODE OF PRoFEsSIoNAL RESPONSIBILrry DR 7-104(A)(1) (1981) (footnote
omitted) (lawyer may not communicate "on the subject of the representation with a party
he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so"); accord MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983). The rule seeks to prevent interference
with the adversary's attorney-client relationship by giving the adverse party's counsel control over negotiations and client disclosures. See Frey v. Department of Health & Human
Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 34-35 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsiderationof the CurrentRules of Access and Restraint,87 COLUM. L.

REv. 1137, 1179 (1987).

"I The Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility is silent on the issue, but the com-
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Thus, as a precondition to informal interviews, consent of the corporation's counsel must be obtained, which is an unlikely prospect. 130 The corporation's lawyer, however, may have already accumulated important information from all of the corporation's
internal sources. 13 ' .Although parties to litigation are expected to
do their own discovery and not to "borrow the wits" of their adversary,5 2 access to a corporate agent's communications with counsel
sometimes may be more than a mere matter of convenience. On
occasion, such access may be closer to a matter of necessity.
Furthermore, the answers to questions submitted to the corporate agents in the course of formal pretrial discovery or at trial
may prove to be of slight value due to failed memories or deliberate evasiveness. 133 The problem is exacerbated if the activities that
are the subject of a civil action involve any potential for criminal
liability, because corporate employees may refuse to testify on the
basis of their personal right against self-incrimination even though
the corporation itself has no fifth-amendment privilege.23 4 Alment to rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that in the case of
corporate parties, the prohibition on ex parte contacts extends to persons with "managerial
responsibility" and "any other person whose act or omission in connection with the matter
may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization." MODEL RULES OF PRoFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 comment 1 2 (1983); see also Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F.
Supp. 250, 252-53 (D. Kan. 1988) (endorses comment to rule 4.2 of Model Rules of Professional Conduct); Massa v. Eaton Corp., 109 F.R.D. 312, 315 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (prohibition
covers all managerial-level employees); Mills Land and Water Co. v. Golden W. Ref. Co.,
186 Cal. App. 3d 116, 129-30, 230 Cal. Rptr. 461, 467-69 (1986) (drawing of "clear and unequivocal" line requires prohibition against ex parte contact with all employees); Miller &
Calfo, Ex parte Contact with Employees andFormer Employees of a CorporateAdversary:
Is It Ethical?,42 Bus. LAw. 1053, 1071-73 (1987) (arguing in favor of prohibition on contact
with any employee). But see Wright v. Group Health Hasp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 691
P.2d 564, 569 (1984) (prohibition covers only employees who have sufficient managerial authority to speak for and bind the corporation); Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another
Lawyer's Client: The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 708
(1979) ("opposing counsel should be free to contact directly any employee, high or low, who
is a possible witness").
,30The obstructive effect of a broad approach to the prohibition on ex parte contacts
was noted in the analogous context of an employment discrimination suit against a government agency: "[T]o permit the [agency] to barricade huge numbers of potential witnesses
from interviews except through costly discovery procedures, may well frustrate the right of
an individual plaintiff with limited resources to a fair trial and deter other litigants from
pursuing their legal remedies." Frey v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 106 F.R.D.
32, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
131 The Control Group Test, supra note 114, at 427.
132 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
13 See Nath, supra note 114, at 48 n.128.
134 See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 553 F. Supp. 45, 50
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though an employee's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination may support an adverse inference against the corporation,13 5 such an inference generally will not serve as a substitute for
affirmative proof.136 Finally, the corporation's knowledge may be
unobtainable for the additional reason that it lies in the memory of
a former employee who cannot be located or one who is deceased
or otherwise unavailable. If the forgetful, evasive, silent or unavailable employee had previously communicated the relevant information to the corporation's counsel, however, a basis would be available for testing credibility and filling the gaps of missing proof.
If one accepts the argument that absent an attorney-client
privilege, communications between corporate employees and lawyers will either cease to exist or, at minimum, become incomplete
and guarded, then the foregoing costs would become negligible.
Without the privilege, the accessibility of lawyer-client communications in the future would often yield little of value to the adversary. The existence of the privilege, therefore, generally leaves the
adversary in no worse position than if there were no privilege.137
The logic of this argument, however, rests upon the disputable assumption that the privilege in fact promotes open communications
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). See generally Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle - The Fifth Amendment
Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1067-69, 1082-82 (1982) (discussing how corporation can use privilege of employees to own advantage).
135 See, e.g., RAD Servs., v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 808 F.2d 271, 275-77 (3d Cir. 1986)
("nothing forbids imputing to a corporation the silence of its personnel"); Brink's Inc. v.
City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 707-10 (2d Cir. 1983) (employees' refusal to respond to
questions regarding pilferage of coin boxes allowed as circumstantial evidence of employer's
negligent collection); United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705, 729 (8th Cir. 1926)
(defendant corporation's failure to call its negotiator as witness supported inference of
fraud), aff'd, 275 U.S. 13 (1927); E.H. Boerth Co. v. LAD Properties, 82 F.R.D. 635, 644-45
(D. Minn. 1979) (inference could be drawn from refusal of financial agent to answer questions about financial matters). Since a claim of privilege is nearly invulnerable to challenge
where the facts involve possible criminal liability, see Heidt, supra note 134, at 1071-80, "it
would seem proper to afford a civil litigant stymied by his adversary's silence some means of
moderating the potentially overwhelming disadvantage he faces in establishing his case."
SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
"6 See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977) (adverse inference based
on party's refusal to testify in administrative disciplinary proceeding permissible provided it
is "only one of a number of factors to be considered by the finder of fact"); Pagel, Inc. v.
SEC, 803 F.2d 942, 946-47 (8th Cir. 1986) (drawing of adverse inference was appropriate
where it "served only to support already established findings"); SEC v. Scott, 565 F. Supp.
1513, 1533-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court considered defendant's invocation of fifth amendment
only after prima facie case against him was presented), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Cayman Islands Reinsurance Corp., 734 F.2d 118 (1984).
'" See Alschuler, supra note 87, at 74.
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in the corporate context.
III.

RATIONALE OF THE CORPORATE PRIVILEGE: EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS

A. PriorEmpirical Research
Instrumental arguments for and against recognition of the corporate attorney-client privilege are empirical in nature. The most
controversial part of the debate is whether the privilege actually
serves to increase the flow of communications between corporate
employees and counsel. Because empirical evidence one way or the
other has been scarce, a large portion of my study was devoted to
this issue.
The only previous empirical study of direct relevance appears
in a 1962 issue of the Yale Law Journal.3 ' In a questionnaire survey, fifty-five of 108 laypersons (50.9%) indicated that they would
be less likely to make full disclosure to a lawyer in the absence of
privilege.""9 Of 125 lawyers, ninety (72%) said that the client's
awareness of the privilege enhanced communications. 40 Although
these findings suggest that lawyers are more enthusiastic about the
privilege than are potential clients, they do provide evidence supportive of the instrumental rationale for the attorney-client privilege in general. The data are not very helpful in gauging the effects
of the corporate privilege, however, because the Yale Study does
not indicate whether the participants based their views on individual or corporate attorney-client relationships.
A more recent survey concerning the ethics of corporate attorneys touched tangentially on the candor-inducing effect of the
privilege.' 4 ' Twelve out of fifteen high-level business executives
said that "an assurance of confidentiality" by counsel would make
138 See Yale Study, supra note 3.

13 Id. at 1236 n.59, 1262 (question 6). The laypersons to whom the questionnaire was
submitted were members of the middle-to-upper-class social and economic status "because
it was thought that such people would be more likely to consult... professionals." Id. at
1227 n.6. They were geographically located in the eastern half of the country. Id.
140 Id. at 1236 n.59, 1270 (question 5). The lawyers were from Chicago, Atlanta, Detroit,
New York City, New Haven, Miami and Philadelphia. Id. at 1269.
141 CorporateLegal Ethics-An Empirical Study: The Model Rules, the Code of Pro-

fessional Responsibility, and Counsel's Continuing Struggle Between Theory and Practice,
8 J. CORP. L. 601 (1983) (project of students of University of Iowa School of Law).
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them "more willing to comply fully with an investigation.' '

42

This

finding is ambiguous with respect to the impact of the corporate
attorney-client privilege, however, because the question presented
to the executives did not indicate whether the confidentiality at
issue concerned nondisclosure to superiors within the corporation,
such as the board of directors, or to outsiders, such as the
government.
On the cost side of the privilege issue, relevant data are contained in a 1979 interview survey of Chicago litigators by Professor
(now United States Magistrate) Wayne D. Brazil.143 In his study of
pretrial discovery problems, he found that 132 of 157 respondents
(84%) thought that privileges, in general, were rarely the cause for
an adversary's failure to discover "arguably relevant information. 144 Although Professor Brazil's questions did not focus on any
particular privilege in this section of his study, it is reasonable to
assume that the practitioners did not view the attorney-client privilege as causing any significant reduction in the quantum of available evidence.

45

Aside from these studies, our beliefs about the effects of the
corporate privilege have been largely dependent upon the scattered
writings of practitioners and judges who seem firmly convinced, by
intuition if not empirical evidence, that the privilege enhances
Id. at 625 n.139. The survey consisted of a mail questionnaire to 200 chief executive
officers of corporations on the Fortune 1000 list; 36 executives returned the questionnaire.
Id. at 604 n.6. Only 15 answered the question regarding the effect of an assurance of
confidentiality.
11 Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its PrincipalProblems
and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 789.
14 Id.

at 822-23. The more common cause for an adversary's inability to obtain infor-

mation was said to be the "failure to ask the right questions or for the right documents or to
depose the right people." Id. at 822. Professor Brazil's findings are consistent with the views

of lawyers and judges in the Yale Study. One hundred and seven.of 132 lawyers in the Yale
Study (81%) expressed the opinion that the attorney-client privilege does not significantly
disrupt the administration of justice. See Yale Study, supra note 3, at 1271 (question 13).
Of the 47 judges who participated in the Yale Study, none thought that the privilege disrupted the administration of justice. Id. at 1272 (questions 10 and 11).
115 A separate issue from loss of evidence is the extent to which privilege claims cause
"friction" between adversaries. In this regard, one of Professor Brazil's inquiries focused

specifically on the attorney-client privilege. Brazil, supranote 143, at 841-42. He found that
large-firm lawyers representing corporations in "big cases" were more likely to experience
discovery disputes over the attorney-client privilege than were small-firm lawyers representing individuals in "small cases," such as personal injury lawsuits. Id. Nineteen small-case
litigators said the privilege had caused friction in only 7% of their cases, whereas 32 largecase litigators indicated that the privilege had caused problems in 36% of their cases. Id. at
833 (figure 17).
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communications and does little damage to the fact-finding process. 4 ' In light of the paucity of empirical data, I undertook to
ascertain through interviews of members of the corporate bar and
high-ranking corporate officials the extent to which the privilege
influences candor in corporate attorney-client communications. To
this end, I posed questions addressed to the following issues: To
what extent are corporate representatives aware of the existence of
the corporate attorney-client privilege? What do lawyers and executives believe about the relationship between the privilege and the
encouragement of candor? Does the privilege have an effect on the
frequency with which legal advice is sought? Do corporate representatives realize, without prompting, that the corporation's attorney-client privilege is not their personal privilege? Have lawyers
with an international practice experienced any adverse effects on
attorney-client communications due to the absence of privilege in a
foreign jurisdiction? And finally, what is the experience of judges
and magistrates with respect to the costs of the corporate privilege
in the adjudicatory process?
B. Awareness of the Privilege Among CorporateRepresentatives
It is unlikely that the corporate privilege could have the instrumental effects that are attributed to it if corporate representatives 147 are unaware of its existence. A series of questions in the
survey of lawyers and executives sought to measure the extent of
knowledge of the corporate privilege through three indices: (1) the
lawyers' perceptions of such awareness; (2) the frequency with
which the privilege is explicitly discussed by lawyers and corporate
employees; and (3) what lawyers generally tell corporate employees
about the privilege.
146 See, e.g., Miller, The Challenges to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REv.
262, 268 (1963); Sedler & Simeone, supra note 114, at 4-5; Simon, supra note 7, at 954 n.6.
The views of the organized bar were represented by the American Bar Association and
various local bar associations in amicus curiae briefs attesting to the utility of the privilege
for corporate clients in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); and Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929
(1963).
147 The term "corporate representative" was defined for the respondents as any director
or employee of a corporation other than house counsel. The point was stressed to respondents in the sample of outside counsel that the questions were addressed only to their experience with the nonlegal personnel of their corporate clients.
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1. Prevalence of Knowledge of the Corporate Privilege
According to the lawyers, a corporate representative's general
awareness of the applicability of privilege is related to his or her
rank in the corporate hierarchy. The lawyers were asked: "To what
extent do you think that members of upper management, middle
management, and those below middle management, respectively,
believe, without any prompting, that their communications with
you concerning the corporation are protected by the attorney-client privilege from disclosure to outsiders?"'14 8 The respondents
correctly interpreted the question as asking whether the employees
in the three specified levels of the corporate hierarchy were aware
of the privilege and its applicability, in general, to their communications with counsel.14 9
As shown in table 1, awareness of the privilege was thought to
be widespread among upper management and less prevalent
among the lower ranks of the corporate hierarchy. Roughly 74% of
the lawyers (75 of the 102 lawyers in the combined samples of
house counsel and outside counsel) expressed confidence that all or
nearly all members of upper management believed that their communications with counsel were covered by the privilege. Another
15.7% said that a majority of upper management held this belief.
In volunteered comments, the lawyers attributed upper management's awareness to such factors as prior experience with litigation, the educational efforts of counsel, the status of some senior
executives as former attorneys, and the general "sophistication" of
upper-level managers. Interestingly, a dozen of the lawyers drew a
distinction between the management of American corporations and
those based in foreign countries. In foreign corporations, appreciation of the American rule of privilege was said to be minimal or
nonexistent. Conversely, several lawyers observed that the upper
managers of American companies assume that much more is encompassed by the privilege than is in fact the case.
As addressed to house counsel, the question focused on awareness among the employees of the respondents particular employer. The outside counsel were asked to express
their opinion with respect to employees among all of their corporate clients.
"' The question contains a potential ambiguity in that it might appear to be asking
how many corporate employees, within the three groups, think that everything they discuss
with counsel is covered by privilege.
1'"
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Lawyers' Perceptions of the Extent to Which Corporate Representatives at Three Levels of the Corporate Hierarchy Believe that Privilege Applies to Their Communications with
Counsel.
Percent of lawyers in combined samples* indicating how
many employees, at given level, believe that privilege applies:
Upper
Management

Middle
Management

Employees Below
Middle
Management

All or nearly all

73.5

18.6

4.9

Majority

15.7

21.6

3.9

About half

2.0

8.8

5.9

A few

3.9

8.8

24.5

25.5

20.6

Can't say for sure
about employees at
this level, but
awareness
decreases when
descending the
corporate ladder

Employees at this
level do not think
about the privilege

3.9

11.8

23.5

Can't say

1.0

4.9

16.7

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

(N=102)

(N=102)

(N=102)

Totals
See supra note 42.

The lawyers' views were mixed regarding the extent of knowledge among middle management executives. Only 40.2% of the respondents were confident that middle managers were aware of the
privilege on a widespread basis. Of the remaining attorneys, the
largest percentage (25.5%) could only say that awareness of the
privilege was less among middle management than among upper
management. The attorneys who believed knowledge was widespread in the ranks of middle management volunteered that such
executives often become heavily involved in litigated matters, have

frequent contact with attorneys in routine corporate matters, or
are "well-educated, M.B.A. types."
As to employees below the level of middle management, 24.5%
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of the lawyers thought that "only a few" employees believe privilege applies to their communications, 20.6% thought that knowledge at this level was less common than at the middle management
level, and 23.5% opined that lower-level employees simply "don't
think about privilege unless a lawyer brings it up." Some of the
lawyers suggested that a lower-level employee's knowledge turns
on his prior exposure to litigation. In a similar vein, others volunteered that the nature of the employee's work can be a factor. Insurance claims adjusters, newspaper reporters and editors, and
personnel directors were given as examples of employees whose
work brings them into frequent contact with attorneys. Thus, they
are likely to have been advised about the privilege on numerous
occasions.
Although these data reflect only the lawyers' perceptions of
the matter, they do suggest that awareness of the privilege generally is high at the top of corporate hierarchies and gradually dissipates at the lower levels. If displayed graphically, the extent of
knowledge would assume the form of an inverse pyramid.
2.

Frequency of Privilege Discussions

The second avenue taken to explore the extent of corporate
representatives' knowledge of the privilege was to ascertain the frequency with which the attorneys in the study had explicitly discussed it with their clients. The lawyers were asked to estimate
how often, during the past five years, they had raised the issue of
attorney-client privilege at the time of their communications with
individual representatives, regardless of rank, of their corporate
clients. Ninety-five of the lawyers (93%) had mentioned the privilege on at least one occasion. Almost half of them had brought up
the issue at least twenty-five times, and nearly 23% (23 of 102)
said that they had mentioned the privilege over 100 times.1 5 Table
2 displays the frequencies in detail.
250 Some of the lawyers who had raised the privilege with the greatest frequency included in their count the occasions on which they had placed stamps or labels saying "confidential" or "protected by attorney-client privilege" on documentary communications. This
aspect of lawyering was covered in detail at a later point in the interview, and the results are
discussed infra notes 451-86 and accompanying text.
Some of the lawyers who reported frequencies in the lower ranges, regardless of whether
they were litigators or nonlitigators, volunteered that most of the corporate representatives
with whom they had dealt were "sophisticated" or had previously been involved in litigation
and therefore needed no reminder about the existence of the privilege.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
TABLE 2.

Frequency
Never
Once or Twice

Frequency (During Five-Year Period Preceding Interviews) with Which Lawyers Have Raised Issue of
Attorney-Client Privilege Regarding Prospective
Communications with Corporate Representatives.
Percent of lawyers
in combined samples
6.9
7.8

2 - 6 Times
7 - 12 Times

13.7
12.7

13 - 24 Times

10.8

25 - 50 Times

12.7

51 - 100 Times
Over 100 Times
Does not know

11.8
22.5
1.6

Total
*
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99.9%*
(N=102)

Total percent does not -add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

Litigators had initiated privilege discussions with the greatest
frequency. 161 Numerous nonlitigators offered comments to the effect that they give little thought to the privilege in their daily
practice. "I don't worry about the privilege until the potential for
litigation arises; then I usually call in a litigator to explain the details," was a typical observation. In contrast, one of the litigators
declared, "Privilege pervades my thinking on a daily basis."
That litigators tend to raise the privilege with corporate employees more often than nonlitigators is consistent with responses
to a follow-up question. The lawyers were asked to describe the
circumstances in which they had mentioned the privilege to corporate representatives. The most frequent context, cited by 78.9% of
95 respondents, was potential or actual litigation. 52 The second
most frequently mentioned situation (38.9% of 95 respondents)
was in connection with "sensitive" matters or transactions. Several
'51 Nearly two-thirds of the litigators (34 of 53) had raised the privilege issue at least 25
times during the past five years, whereas 29% of the nonlitigators (14 of 49) had raised the
issue with such frequency.
112 In connection with litigation, a number of respondents, most of whom were outside
counsel, specifically noted that they had mentioned the privilege while preparing corporate
representatives for pretrial depositions.
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respondents in the house counsel sample, in particular, stressed
that their mentioning of the privilege is restricted to "a few sensitive areas." One observed that "because of the need to meet business objectives, it is not practical always to think or function in
terms of the attorney-client privilege," and another said that it is
only when he "senses trouble" that he thinks about privilege. The
examples offered most often by the attorneys to illustrate what
they meant by "sensitive" included large commercial transactions,
acquisitions and mergers, tax planning, and personnel matters. In
descending order of frequency, the following additional contexts
were identified: internal corporate investigations (24.0% of 95 respondents), the giving of written legal opinions (17.9%), government regulatory compliance or government investigations (14.7%),
and the employee's unfamiliarity with the lawyer or the law of
privilege (9.5%).153 For the lawyers in the survey, then, litigation

and matters of a sensitive nature are the two principal areas in
which they are most likely to mention the attorney-client privilege
to corporate representatives. Since these are inevitable events in
the existence of most large corporations it is reasonable to infer
that the existence of the privilege is well-known at least to the corporate representatives who deal with such events.
The survey of executives also produced findings suggesting
that lawyers discuss the privilege from time to time with the members of upper management. Almost 70% of the executives (thirtysix of fifty-two) reported that during the past five years, a lawyer
for the corporation had explicitly raised with them an issue of attorney-client privilege regarding their communications. In addition, 50% of the executives responding to the question (twenty-five
of fifty) said that at some point in their employment, the basic
nature of the law of attorney-client privilege had been explained to
them by the lawyer for the corporation.5
152 Obviously, many of these situations may overlap, and the number of attorneys mentioning a particular type of circumstance might have been larger had the question been
presented in the form of a list of possible multiple responses rather than as an open-ended
inquiry.
151 Among those who said that the attorney-client privilege had never been defined for
them by a lawyer for the corporation were seven executives with law degrees. Most of these
executives surmised that the privilege had not been explained to them because they were
known to be lawyers.
Regardless of the source of their knowledge, all but one of the executives in the survey
indicated that they were aware of the existence of the privilege prior to receipt of my letter
requesting their participation in the study. The one respondent who was unaware of the
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3. What Lawyers Generally Tell Corporate Representatives About
the Privilege
The ninety-five attorneys who said they had discussed the
privilege with corporate representatives were asked to describe
what they usually say about the rule of privilege, i.e., how they
define it. Table 3 contains the descriptions of the privilege that the
respondents said they give and the percentages of respondents who
give each type of description.
TABLE 3.

What Lawyers Tell Corporate Representatives About
the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege.

Percent of lawyers
Description

in combined samples

A brief statement to the effect that
communications with counsel are privileged
[hereinafter "the rule"], without elaboration ............................. 26.3
A brief statement of the rule, with emphasis
on the need to maintain confidentiality or
the danger of waiver .................................................. 43.2
A brief statement of the rule, with a warning
that the privilege is narrowly applied .................................... 9.5

A brief statement of the rule, with an explanation
that its purpose is to induce candor ..................................... 4.2
A brief statement of the rule, with a warning

that the individual is not protected ..................................... 4.2
Depends on the situation .............................................. 10.5
O ther ................................................................. 2.1
Total ............................................................... 100.0

(N=95)

Roughly one in four makes only a "brief' statement that communications with counsel are privileged: "a one-sentence description" or "a general statement without technical details." Well over
a third (43.2%), however, said that they emphasize in various ways
the need for confidentiality. For example, some of the attorneys in
this group routinely caution corporate representatives against circulating attorney-client communications "too broadly" within the
corporation or making disclosure to employees "without a need to
privilege said he had assumed lawyers would maintain confidentiality, in general, but that
anything said to counsel would become "public knowledge" in litigation.
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know." A few warn against disclosure "to others" or "to outsiders"
without defining who such individuals might be. Other respondents
give a general warning that "the privilege can be easily lost by
waiver." Another ten percent add a caveat to their brief statement
to the effect that the privilege is "narrowly applied." Some of these
attorneys advise, for example, that only legal advice-not business
advice-is covered.
A majority of the lawyers, therefore, apparently make an effort
to stress some of the limitations of the privilege. In this regard,
during other portions of the interview, five respondents indicated
that whatever else they say about the privilege, they often give a
warning that the privilege is "not absolute": judges sometimes
"breach" the privilege and "the other side may poke holes with
exceptions." Two of these lawyers tell corporate representatives
"not to rely too much on the privilege."
C. The Relationship Between Privilege and the Candorof Corporate Representatives
Whether the attorney-client privilege actually encourages corporate clients to be candid was a key question in the study. A
methodological problem of the interview approach, however, was
how best to maximize answers based on the experience of the respondents rather than purely on professional biases about the privilege. The interview questionnaire thus sought to elicit objective
data about client conduct before asking the respondents the direct
(and leading) question whether the privilege enhances candor.
1. Do Corporate Representatives Express Concern Over Privilege
Protection?
Since one empirical index of the functional value of the privilege is whether clients explicitly show concern over confidentiality
in the course of communications, the attorneys were asked whether
corporate representatives had ever taken the initiative in raising
the issue of privilege. One reasonable inference to be drawn from a
representative's mentioning of the issue is that he is concerned
about secrecy and will be less likely to speak openly without an
assurance that privilege applies. If this is so, then the findings tend
to show that the privilege does play a role, at least in some circumstances, in encouraging candor in the corporate setting.
Seventy-two of the attorneys (70.6%) reported that in the five
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years preceding the interviews, one or more- corporate representatives had initiated a discussion of attorney-client privilege with
them. As a follow-up, these attorneys were asked to describe the
circumstances in which the issue had been raised. The response
given by 65.3% of the lawyers (forty-seven of seventy-two) was
that the representative was inquiring whether the privilege would
apply to prospective communications. A typical description of the
scenario was as follows: "In trouble situations, such as litigation,
people will sometimes ask, 'Is this privileged?'" One of the house
counsel reported that senior executives in his company sometimes
begin meetings with him seeking "an understanding that this is
privileged." More often, however, it was reported that executives,
perhaps not wanting to appear overly concerned about a matter,
will ask in an off-handed or "half-joking" manner whether their
statements to the lawyer will be privileged.
Data obtained in the survey of executives also suggest that the
privilege actually affects the behavior of corporate clients. The executives were asked to give a rough idea of how often, during the
past five years, the protections provided by the corporate attorneyclient privilege had been an important concern for them in their
communications with lawyers for the corporation (either in-house
or outside counsel). They were given five alternative responses
from which to choose: "never," "rarely," "occasionally," "frequently," and "always." Eleven of the fifty-two respondents
(21.2%) said "never"; thirteen (25.0%) said "rarely"; twenty-one
(40.4%) said "occasionally"; five (9.6%) said "frequently"; and two
(3.8%) chose "always." Although the frequency of concern for the
largest number of executives was at the lower end of the scale, a
total of forty-one executives (78.8%) indicated that they had been
concerned about the applicability of privilege at least once in the
past five years.
Thirty-one of the executives who had experienced concern
over attorney-client confidentiality (three out of four) also reported that they had expressed their concern to counsel. As to the
frequency with which they had explicitly raised the issue, sixteen
of the thirty-one executives (51.5%) reported "once or twice,"
seven (22.6%) said "three-to-six times," two (6.5%) said "seven-totwelve times," and six (19.4%) indicated "over twelve times." Litigation and sensitive transactions were mentioned most often by
the executives as the two types of circumstances in which they had
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experienced particular concern 5 ' and in which they had expressly
.raised the privilege issue with counsel. 15 6 It is noteworthy that
these are the same two principal situations in which the attorneys
in the survey said that they had discussed the privilege issue with
1 57
their clients.
Thus, expressions of concern by corporate representatives over
the applicability of privilege apparently occur on a fair .number of
occasions in matters that are either commercially sensitive or involve adversarial circumstances. This does not, of course, prove
that the attorneys' reassurances of privilege actually induced candor on the part of the corporate representatives with whom they
were communicating. On the other hand, one reasonable inference
is that the expressed desire for an assurance of confidentiality was
a precondition to full and frank communications.
One additional form of objective information was sought from
the lawyers prior to making a direct inquiry as to their beliefs
about the candor-related effects of the privilege. The ninety-five
lawyers who said they had specifically raised the privilege with corporate representatives1 5 8 were asked to state their reasons for doing so. Two-thirds (sixty-four of ninety-five) said that on at least
one occasion they had raised the privilege for the specific purpose
of encouraging candor on the part of the corporate representative
with whom they were communicating. It is doubtful that so many
would have raised the privilege for the purpose of inducing candor
if they did not believe that. a causal relationship existed. On the
other hand, nearly 70% of the lawyers (sixty-six of ninety-five) also
said that they are often motivated by a tactical purpose when they
raise the privilege: to help the client follow proper procedures to
preserve the privilege so that communications will not be subject
"I The forty-one executives for whom the privilege had been an important concern
were asked the following additional question: "Have you experienced any particular types of
situations in which your concern over the attorney-cient privilege was greater than others?"
Thirty-four (82.9%) said "yes." In describing those situations, 64.7% (22 of 34) mentioned
matters relating to potential or actual litigation, and 47.1% (16 of 34) spoke of "sensitive
matters," such as personnel decisions, major business transactions, mergers or corporate
restructuring.
16 Of the thirty-one executives who had explicitly raised the privilege issue with counsel, thirty provided additional information about the circumstances: twenty (66.7%) described situations involving potential or actual litigation and thirteen (43.3%) spoke generally of "sensitive matters."
117 See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
I See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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to discovery in litigation.5 9 In addition, three attorneys, without
prompting, admitted to a practice that is thought by some commentators to be a particular problem in the corporate setting: filtering a communication from businessman A to businessman B
through the attorney simply for the purpose of cloaking the communication with privilege.1 60
2. Does the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Enhance Candor?
A solid majority of both the attorneys and the executives in
the survey said they believed the privilege does, in fact, encourage
candor. The lawyers were asked the following question: "Based on
your experience, does the attorney-client privilege serve to increase
the candor of corporate representatives, regardless of rank, who are
aware that privilege applies?" Table 4 displays the responses of
the house counsel and outside counsel separately because of a statistically significant difference in the replies. Although a majority
of the house counsel felt that the privilege encourages candor, the
percentage giving this response (62.0%) was significantly lower
than that of outside counsel (88.5%). Possible reasons for this disrelparity and additional details about the respondents' comments
i
subsection.
later
a
in
explored
be
will
point
this
to
evant
Regardless of whether the privilege may be viewed with
greater enthusiasm by one group of corporate lawyers than another, a clear majority in both samples said that in their experience, the privilege encouraged candor. Several anecdotes, such as
the following, were proffered: "When an employee finds that something is disagreeable to talk about, the privilege encourages him to
be candid about it." Another recurring description of the effect of
the privilege was that "it puts people at ease." Some respondents
1*0 Twenty-six (27.4%) of the 95 respondents indicated that their only purpose in mentioning the privilege to clients was to avoid possible discovery of communications in litigation. Several of these lawyers explained that they had found no need to remind corporate
representatives of the privilege in order to induce candor because the representatives already spoke freely with them.
16D See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 127, at 230 n. 21; Nath, supra note 114, at 49, 57; see
also In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.RD. 595, 602 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (opponents of broad corporate attorney-client privilege fear that "attorney can be used to shield information by routing data through him").
161 See infra notes 277-97 and accompanying text.
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took the opportunity to offer praise for the privilege as a means of
TABLE 4 Respondents' Beliefs as to Whether the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege Encourages Candor on the
Part of Corporate Representatives Who Are Aware
of the Privilege.
Percent of house
counsel, with respect
to corporate
representatives
regardless of rank

Privilege
encourages
candor
Privilege
does not
encourage
candor
Not
sure
Totals

Percent of outside
counsel, with respect
to corporate
representatives
regardless of rank

Percent of executives
with respect to
managements
communications with
attorneys for the
corporation

62.0

88.5

75.0

26.0

5.8

23.1

12.0

5.8

1.9

100.0%
100.1%*
(N=50)
(N=52)
* Total percent does not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

100.0%
(N=52)

encouraging law-abiding conduct. One typical evaluation of this
nature was as follows: "The privilege encourages open and frank
communications. Lawyers can thereby keep clients from doing
foolish things, and this is in society's interests in the long run."'' 6 2
Most often, the lawyers described the benefits of the privilege by
suggesting that corporate representatives would be less candid in
its absence: "People operate in an atmosphere where they feel
comfortable talking to lawyers, and the attorney -client privilege
has helped to create this atmosphere; if it were taken away, the
atmosphere would change"; "Although people don't focus on privilege that much in practice, if it were no longer there communica,,2 Some of the lawyers were even more rhetorical in their responses. For example, one
house counsel described the privilege as a means of "keeping corporate America on a
straight and ethical path for the benefit of shareholders, consumers, and the public at
large." Similarly, a respondent who had "assumed the privilege was just a cover-up for
wrongdoing" while previously employed as a government attorney, was now convinced that
the privilege "helps encourage good conduct more often than serving as a subterfuge. It's a
crucial part of the U.S. system."
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tions would be chilled"; "I'd have trouble getting people to talk
without privilege"; "When I tell people that privilege does not apply to a particular discussion, they become more reticent."
Not all of the spontaneous statements about the privilege,
however, contained unqualified praise. A few of the attorneys who
said that the privilege encourages candor nevertheless indicated
that its effects are minimal in this regard and that it is often nothing more than an "after-the-fact device" used to prevent the disclosure of documents adverse to a corporation's interests. A few
others commented that the privilege is sometimes abused by litigants who assert the privilege for every communication in which a
lawyer was somehow a participant: they "get away with it" because
the adversary does not challenge the assertion.163 Most of these observers added, however, that occasional abuse does not justify abolition because "the good that the privilege does outweighs the
bad."
Turning to the views of corporate clients, the executives in the
survey were asked: "Do you think the corporate attorney-client
1 64
privilege serves to increase management's candor with counsel? '

As table 4 shows, 75% of the executives (thirty-nine of fifty-two)
perceived a positive influence on candor.

65

The same 75% also

said that management would be less candid with counsel if there
were no privilege. About a third of these executives, however, qualified their response by noting that the extent to which candor
would be reduced would depend on the circumstances. Some specifically noted, for example, that written communications would be
more circumspect but that oral discussions would be just as open.
Others said there would be less candor in discussions relating to
litigation or sensitive matters but not otherwise. A few executives
suggested that their level of candor with house counsel would remain about the same but that they would be inhibited by the ab' See also supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
I" In view of their more limited frame of reference, the executives were asked to consider the impact of privilege only with respect to the candor of management rather than
that of corporate representatives in general.

161The executives who answered the question in the negative offered explanations similar to those of the house counsel who said the privilege did not affect candor. See infra
notes 277-87 and accompanying text. The executives stressed that in their particular companies, communications with counsel were candid either because executives "want to give
counsel all the facts in order to get the best advice" or "the company already has a candid
culture."
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sence of privilege in their communications with outside counsel.:6

3. What Other Factors Influence Candor?
Despite the widely shared view among the lawyers and executives that the privilege encourages candor in corporate attorneyclient relationships, the responses to additional questions showed
that privilege is not always the key ingredient. All of the respondents were asked to identify factors other than privilege that affect

the candor of corporate representatives either affirmatively or negatively. They were then asked to indicate the one that they be-

lieved had the greatest impact on candor. The first part of this
open-ended question produced a list of nine additional factors that
67
influence candor: (1) trust or confidence in the particular lawyer;
(2) the representative's perception of the lawyer as a practical

problem-solver; 16 (3) faith in the lawyer's ethical responsibility to
preserve the client's commercial secrets; (4) a recognition that the
lawyer needs disclosure of all the facts in order to give good advice
and to enable the client to achieve its business goals; (5) a corporate "culture" of candor;169 (6) an "employment duty" to be candid; 170 (7) a fear of contradiction, or a realization that all of the
facts will eventually emerge during litigation; 17 1 (8) the individual
146As one executive put it, "I'm not comfortable when dealing with outside counsel and
would be even less so without privilege."
167 This factor was articulated in various ways. One of the house counsel, for example,
described it as follows: "The personal relationship with counsel: Do they have confidence in
you? Have you represented them well? Do you understand their needs and concerns?" Another general counsel used the following language: "Confidence in the individual lawyer-his
perceived loyalty, competence and judgment." A law firm partner referred to "trust and a
good rapport-not necessarily friendship, but respect on a business level." One of the executives put it this way: "Trust in the professionalism and integrity of counsel."
119 Lawyers and executives in the survey both used the term "naysayers" to describe
counsel who fail to explore alternatives or who lack creativity in helping management to
meet business goals within the law. Management was said to be more candid with "how-to"
lawyers who act as "partners in making the business work."
"I Some of the respondents used the term "good business ethics" as descriptive of this
factor. One of the executives explained it as follows: "The tone of business ethics is set by
management. Our General Counsel's concern for legal compliance is reinforced and supported by the CEO. This opens up discussions with the General Counsel that might not
otherwise exist."
170 As one of the house counsel phrased it, "Candor is enhanced when the employee
knows that he will lose his job if he doesn't disclose all of the facts to counsel."
171This factor was mentioned by some of the litigators in the sample of outside counsel.
The context described by most of them was that of preparing an employee-witness for a
pretrial deposition. These lawyers observed that witnesses more willingly disclose facts to
counsel when they are reminded that the opponent will eventually "drag out the truth
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representative's predisposition for openness; and (9) as a negative
influence on candor, the corporate representative's fear that full
disclosure of the facts to counsel, if thought to be personally damaging, might jeopardize the representative's employment status.
The second part of the question asked them to specify the
"most important" factor affecting candor. The largest number of
respondents (44.0% of the lawyers and 46.0% of the executives)
indicated that trust or confidence in the particular lawyer was the
most important factor. Several of these respondents, however,
qualified their answer by adding that the privilege helps to reinforce a trusting relationship. "Having a good relationship is the
most important factor," said one of the lawyers, "but you wouldn't
have the same relationship without the privilege."'' 2 Similarly, one
of the executives declared, "Without privilege, you'd destroy the
basis of trust." Another 33% of the attorneys and 16% of the executives took this argument one step further and concluded that
privilege is either the most important factor in encouraging candor
or is "of equal weight with other factors.' 7 3 One attorney observed
that no matter how good the rapport, in sensitive matters some
corporate representatives would not talk openly without the
privilege.
D. The Relationship Between Privilege and the Frequency of Legal Consultation
The effect of the privilege on the frequency with which corporate clients seek legal advice-a related but analytically distinct
issue from their candor in communications-was also explored in
the survey. Forty-five percent of the lawyers and 31% of the executives thought that the privilege increases the frequency of consultation. One of the lawyers who felt this way said that since the
privilege "increases the comfort-level," it is bound to increase the
frequency with which legal advice is sought. Some of the lawyers
also suggested that the privilege helps bring clients to counsel
sooner-"before they're in extremis." Most of the respondents,
however, said that they perceived no connection between the frethrough cross-examination or other witnesses and documents."
17 Other qualifications of a similar nature were that clients "may tell you a little bit
more because of privilege"; "privilege provides reassurance in a good relationship"; and
"privilege makes a trusting relationship possible."
"I The remaining responses were widely scattered among the other factors.
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quency of consultation and the privilege: "It is not a factor that
draws clients to counsel," was a typical comment. Several lawyers
observed that the privilege affects only the openness of communications-not whether the communications take place. In the words
of one of the executives, "The need for counsel would still exist
without the privilege."
When asked to identify the "most important factors" affecting
the frequency with which legal advice is sought, the largest number
in each sample (37.5% of house counsel, 57.7% of outside counsel,
65.4% of the executives) indicated "business necessity." The response of one of the house counsel summarizes this finding: "Prudent businessmen, dealing with complex laws, and fearful of making mistakes, need lawyers to cope. The privilege is a secondary
consideration." Such factors as trust or confidence in the particular
lawyer, the practical value of the lawyer's services, counsel's "visibility" (a factor mentioned only by house counsel), and management policy were chosen by the remaining respondents as most important. Only one respondent-an executive-ranked privilege as
the primary factor motivating him to seek legal advice, and only
seven lawyers gave equal weight to the privilege and other factors.
E.

The Absence of PersonalPrivilege

While the foregoing data tend to suggest that the attorneyclient privilege does, on occasion, encourage corporate representatives to be candid, a paradox-or "sleight of hand" as one attorney
in the study put it-is that the privilege does not belong to them
personally. 114 To what extent are corporate representatives aware
of the limitation on their ability to assert the privilege in their own
behalf? Slightly more than half of the 102 lawyers in the study
(52.9%) believed that virtually no one at any level of the corporate
hierarchy is aware of the limitation. Most of the remaining lawyers
thought knowledge of the limitation was either confined t6 a few in
top management (the opinion of 15.7%) or to a few individuals at
various levels of the corporate hierarchy (the opinion of 18.6%).175
Some of the lawyers volunteered that corporate representa17, See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.

175 Seven of the remaining 13 lawyers were all house counsel who thought knowledge
was widespread among the top management of their particular corporations. Three lawyers

indicated that employees have no knowledge of the privilege issue per se but have a general
awareness that the lawyer represents the corporation and may disclose the communications
to the employee's superiors. Another three were unable to say.
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tives with knowledge of the privilege limitation probably acquired
it during prior experience with conflicts of interest between the
corporation and employees ("especially when a grand jury is investigating the company") or from a general understanding that the
corporation's lawyer does not represent them personally. The lawyers who thought that at least a few in top management would be
aware of the privilege limitation attributed such awareness to the
"sophistication" of upper-level executives. To the contrary, a
larger number of the lawyers thought that upper management, in
particular, would not even be sensitive to the issue. The reason,
according to the latter group, was upper management's predisposition to see an identity of interest between itself and the corporation. As a result, upper managers were thought likely to think of
the privilege as belonging to them personally. One respondent
summed up the apparent view of several of the lawyers when he
said, "No one at any level of the corporation really gives the issue
much thought in the absence of a conflict."
The lawyers' beliefs that the existence of the privilege limitation is mostly unknown even among the members of upper management is corroborated by the results of the following question
that was put to the executives in the survey: "Prior to this interview were you aware of the limitation on the executive's personal
ability to claim the privilege for his or her communications with
the corporation's counsel?" Twenty-one executives (40.4%) answered "yes," and thirty-one (59.6%) answered "no." The twentyone executives who said they knew about the limitation were asked
to state the source of their knowledge. Only seven executives in the
knowledgeable group recalled having been told by a lawyer. The
others said either that they had assumed this was the rule based
on their knowledge that a corporation's attorney represents only
the entity (seven executives), or that they "intuitively" knew this
was the rule (three executives). The remaining four had acquired
knowledge during their prior careers as practicing attorneys.
The thirty-one executives who first became aware of the limitation during their interview were asked to describe their reactions
as to what they had just learned. The responses ranged from
"Sounds like a fair rule" to "It doesn't make a difference" to "Unfair!" Seven executives said that they were "surprised" this was the
rule, but an equal number said that they were "not surprised." Examples of responses that might be characterized as expressing a
positive or at least neutral attitude were: "The rule makes sense";
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"If an executive has done something wrong, the corporation should
be able to protect itself"; "Knowing this won't make any difference
because I'm not concerned over a conflict arising"; and "Because of
my status, I would not expect the corporation to waive the privilege to my detriment." On the negative side were comments such
as the following: "This is discomforting"; "I don't like it"; "Executives should be told about this rule, especially if there's a conflict";
"This is unfair to executives who act in good faith"; and "This will
chill candor." Several of the executives who displayed a negative
attitude toward the limitation nevertheless seemed reconciled to it
"if the lawyer warns the executive in a conflict situation exactly
whom he represents." The most interesting comment by any individual executive was one which covered nearly the entire range of
possible responses:
My initial reaction as you began to describe the limitation was
"Gee, I didn't know." As you continued, I realized that intellectually, this should come as no surprise. The logic is that the executive works for the corporation and so does the lawyer. But I
wouldn't particularly like the rule if my personal liability were
involved. What would the C.E.O. or the board think of this rule?
I'm sure they view their communications with counsel as their
own. But I doubt that the rule has any practical effect in this
company because no illegal positions are being taken.
Apparently, the fact that the privilege belongs to the company
alone generally does not influence an executive's beliefs that the
privilege enhances candor. Fifteen of the twenty-one executives
who knew about the privilege limitation had said earlier in the interview that the privilege encourages candid communications between management and counsel. Regrettably, the thirty-one executives who did not know about the privilege limitation prior to the
interview were not asked a direct follow-up question as to how
their newly acquired knowledge would affect their views concerning the relationship between the corporate privilege and management's candor. (Twenty-four of the thirty-one executives without
prior knowledge had said earlier that the privilege encourages
management to be candid). Since only three of the thirty-one executives without prior knowledge volunteered that the absence of
personal privilege would chill candor, however, one reasonable inference is that few of them would change their earlier answers.
When, and under what circumstances, do lawyers explain to
corporate employees that the corporation's attorney-client privi-
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lege is not theirs to assert? Only 43.1% of the attorneys in the
survey (forty-four of 102) had ever told a corporate representative
that the privilege belongs solely to the corporation, and about one
in three of this group volunteered that the occasions had been rare.
When the lawyers who had alerted corporate representatives to the
privilege limitation were asked to describe the circumstances, the
typical response of each respondent was: "Only when I perceived a
conflict or potential conflict between the interests of the representative and the corporation. 1 78 Of the fifty-eight attorneys who had
never alerted a corporate representative to the privilege limitation,
two out of three explained that either they had never encountered
a conflict situation or the personal liability of an employee had
never been an issue. Additional proffered reasons for not raising
the point, in order of frequency, were: (1) in conflict situations,
employees had simply been advised, instead, to retain personal
counsel; (2) employees had occasionally been reminded that the
lawyer represents only the corporation; (3) employees had occasionally been reminded that their communications may be disclosed to their superiors; (4) in the absence of a conflict, the lawyer
did not want to create anxiety or reduce candor; and (5) privilege
issues, in general, were seldom discussed.
The reasons given by both the lawyers who had raised the
privilege limitation issue and those who had not show clearly that
the principal determining factor is whether the lawyer perceives a
potential or actual conflict of interest between the individual and
the corporation. "The lawyer walks a fine line" in such situations,
according to one of the house counsel. "You want the employee to
give you all of the facts so you can represent the corporation, but
you also have to look out for the individual." Unsolicited comments suggested that the circumstances in which the decision is
made to give a Miranda-like warning are infrequent. One lawyer
noted that most corporate litigation is civil in nature, rather than
criminal; the corporation alone is the defendant; and "the real issue is purely economic-who has the deepest pocket to pay for a
A few added that they had also raised the issue whenever an employee asked that
the lawyer not disclose his communications to superiors within the corporation or whenever
personal advice was requested on such matters as the terms of his contract of employment
with the corporation.
The infrequency of conflicts of interest is suggested by the finding that very few attorneys routinely describe the entity theory of the privilege to their clients. See supra table 3,
section I.B.3. at 240.
178
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deal that went sour. The employees are in no personal trouble in
such cases." Another observed that "individual executives and employees, even if they made an error in judgment, are usually acting
in the best interests of the company." Similar examples were given
by several other lawyers to make the point that the interests of the
individual and the corporation usually coincide. 1 7 This eliminates,
in their view, the need to say anything about the corporation's control over the privilege. "There's only so much you can tell people
about the privilege," according to one of the house counsel. "In the
absence of a conflict, there's no reason for bringing it up."
Interestingly, when a conflict does arise, the employee is not
always told explicitly that his communications with counsel may
be disclosed by the corporation to third parties. For example, in
the group of fifty-eight lawyers who said they had never advised an
employee that the privilege is not his to assert, thirteen respondents indicated that in conflict situations they had simply suggested the retention of personal counsel. The reasoning of the lawyers in this group is best illustrated by some of their comments:
"The privilege limitation is implicit in telling them that the corporation is the client"; "The privilege issue is not meaningful to the
employee. The practical question from the employee's point of
view is whom the general counsel represents"; "Employees don't
think of the conflict problem in terms of who can assert the privilege"; "It's too complicated to explain the corporate entity concept.
It's enough that you tell them to get separate counsel."
Even some of the lawyers who said they had advised an employee of the privilege limitation in fact may have only cautioned
the employee about the existence of a conflict and the possible
need for personal counsel. This inference is suggested by some of
the comments that immediately followed the lawyers' "yes" responses: "Sometimes I advise an employee to get separate counsel
because our firm represents only the corporation. I'm not motivated by the privilege issue but by the conflict of interest"; "The
conflict is explained, but not to the level of the privilege issue"; "If
there's a conflict of interest, I warn them I'm only representing the
corporation." The number of lawyers who said that they had actu177 One lawyer said that he considered it his job to represent both the corporation and
its top executives except when a conflict arises. The responses of most of the other lawyers,
however, showed that the corporation was perceived to be the only client in the absence of
an agreement to represent an employee during litigation, as, for example, when the employee was serving as a witness at a pretrial deposition.
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ally told an employee about the privilege limitation, therefore, may

be slightly inflated. It appears that in a conflict situation, some
lawyers feel either that the individual is sufficiently protected by
the advice to retain personal counsel or that this advice, by itself,
is a warning of the absence of personal privilege.
F.

Comparative InternationalExperience

To obtain empirical evidence of what legal counseling would
be like in the absence of privilege, the lawyers were asked to de-

scribe their experience, if any, in representing multinational corporate clients under foreign legal systems in which no attorney-client
privilege is recognized. Only thirteen attorneys (four house counsel

and nine law firm partners) had ever knowingly encountered such
circumstances. In addition to the small size of the subgroup, the
value of the findings may be further diminished because of cultural
variables that distinguish the United States legal system from for-

eign systems, such as structure of the legal profession, nature of
the attorney-client relationship and form of adjudicatory process.
In some civil law countries, for example, the attorney-client privilege does not apply to a corporate client's communications with
house counsel. 178 The reason for this, however, lies in the fact that
178 See, e.g., Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Del. 1982)
(court assumed that French law denies privilege to house counsel); A.M.& S. Europe Ltd. v.
E.C. Comm'n, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, 1655, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. 264, 309-10
(house counsel in Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg do not have full professional status); Burkard, Attorney-Client Privilege in the EEC: The Perspective of Multinational
Corporate Counsel, 20 INT'L LAW. 677, 684 (1986) (communications with house counsel not
privileged in France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands).
Regardless of nationality, no privilege for house counsel applies in proceedings to enforce the anticompetition laws of the European Economic Community (EEC). A.M.& S. Europe Ltd., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, 34 Common Mkt. L.R. at 323. The Court of
Justice of the European Communities reasoned that lawyers employed by a single client will
not pursue their client's interest with sufficient independence of judgment. Id. at 1611-12,
[1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 324. The Court also suggested that because house counsel in
several of the member-states of the EEC are not subject to professional discipline and rules
of ethics, no adequate safeguards exist against abuse of the privilege. Id., [1982] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 324. Thus, only a client's communications with "independent lawyers"-those
"who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment "--are protected by the
attorney-client privilege before the Commission. Id. at 1611, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at

323.

While it is true that some of the individual EEC members do not accord full professional status to house counsel, see infra note 179, this is not the rule throughout the Common Market. English courts, for example, apply the legal professional privilege without distinguishing between "salaried legal advisers" (house counsel) and attorneys in private
practice. See, e.g., Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd. v. Commissioners of Cus-
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full-time legal employees of a continental corporation often do not
have the same professional status as do lawyers in private practice.vs If candor in communications between corporate representatives and house counsel in Europe is less than in the United States,
therefore, it may be attributable as much to the diluted nature of
the attorney-client relationship as to the absence of privilege. In

addition, the same wide-ranging pretrial discovery that is practiced
in the United States is unknown in civil law countries, perhaps
eliminating one of the perceived benefits of privilege in restricting
the adversary's access to one's files.'80 A reduced threat of discovery naturally reduces anxiety over the absence of privilege.
In any event, a total of eight of the thirteen lawyers with relevant international experience indicated that the absence of privilege had an inhibiting effect on communications. Five of these individuals perceived no major difference in the degree of candor in

oral communications but observed that writings are "sanitized" or
are much more "circumspect" than in the United States. Two of
the house counsel with experience in tribunals of the European Ec-

onomic Community, in which no privilege exists for house counsel,""' said that their clients relied almost exclusively on outside
European counsel for legal services related to EEC matters.
Five attorneys perceived no adverse impact on candor in intertoms and Excise, [1972] 1 Q.B. 102, 129.
171 In France, for example, the legal profession is divided into several categories of practice. See Herzog & Herzog, The Reform of the Legal Professions and of Legal Aid in
France,22 rr'L & Comp. L.Q. 462, 463-80 (1973). The avocat, the only French legal adviser
who may appear in court as well as give general legal advice, holds the highest status, and
his communications with a client are entitled to privilege. See P. HERZOG, CxvL PROCEDURE
IN FRANCE 77 (1967). An avocat, however, cannot become house counsel (iuriste
d'enterprise)without forfeiting his title and full professional status. See Herzog & Herzog,
supra, at 475.
Some of the other civil law countries similarly view house counsel as having a lesser
professional status because they are not subject to rules of legal ethics and professional
discipline. See A.M.& S. Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1982 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, 1655, [19821 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 264, 309-10 (Opinion of Advocate
General).
180 Continental procedure, unlike that of common law systems, places the principal responsibility for fact-gathering on the judge rather than on the adversaries' lawyers. See
Lowenfeld, Some Reflections on TransnationalDiscovery, 8 J. Comp. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L.
419, 422-23 (1986). An observer of German civil procedure has stated that judicial control
"works to confine the scope of fact-gathering to those avenues of inquiry deemed most likely
to resolve the case." Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CH. L.
Rav. 823, 846 (1985). See also P. HERzor., supranote 179, at 233, 318-19 (in France, party's
ability to obtain documents in adversary's possession is very limited).
"I See supra note 178.
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national attorney-client communications despite the absence of
privilege. Two of these attorneys, both nonlitigators, said that they
were unaware of any differences between the communications of
their clients in foreign matters as to which no privilege applies and
those of American clients in United States matters. The other
three attorneys were litigators who said the absence of privilege
had few if any adverse effects because pretrial discovery in the relevant foreign systems was far less probing than in the United
States, thereby reducing the threat of disclosure in litigation.
Thus, the experience of a majority of the lawyers in a position
to make a comparison between a system with privilege and one
without lends support to the proposition that the existence of the
privilege makes a difference in freedom of communication. The difference, however, appears to be more in the form and procedure of
communication than in the content: clients may exhibit the same
degree of candor but less is put into writing. Obviously, the small
number of respondents with relevant experience prevents the
drawing of any conclusions based solely on this data.
G. The Costs of the Privilege
The principal social cost of the corporate attorney-client privilege is the loss of potentially relevant evidence that occurs when a
claim of privilege is upheld. This cost is tolerable in an adjudicatory system that values truth only if the competing benefits-candid communications and legal compliance-are deemed to
have greater weight. The case for privilege, however, is bolstered if
access to much of the same factual information contained in privileged communications can be obtained from nonprivileged sources.
Another cost of the privilege is the time and effort that the judiciary must sometimes spend in adjudicating assertions of the privilege. Vigilant judicial screening, however, may help reduce the cost
of lost evidence by ensuring that the privilege applies only in appropriate circumstances. Judicial experience with these costs was
explored in the survey of the federal judges and magistrates.
All but one of the twenty-four judicial respondents with experience in deciding corporate privilege issues had used in camera
procedures on at least one occasion in reviewing disputed documentary communications. This approach was said to have been
used whenever the respondents were unable to resolve a dispute on
the basis of the litigants' characterizations of the challenged com-
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munications.181 Fifteen reported using in camera procedures in
over 50% of the privilege disputes they had adjudicated, and seven
of these respondents said that they "always" look at contested documents in camera. No questions were directed to the burdens imposed by in camera review, but seven of the respondents volunteered that when corporate parties are involved, it can be a "timeconsuming," "tedious" or "unpleasant" task "to be avoided whenever possible." 183 They were quick to add, however, that sometimes
there is no alternative.
Some of the respondents also commented that the problems
associated with resolving corporate privilege disputes are eased by
local rules requiring that litigants who object to pretrial discovery
on the basis of privilege submit to both the court and the other
parties detailed information concerning the surrounding circumstances of the challenged communications.

T

According to eight re-

spondents, these rules help reduce the judicial workload. When attention is focused on the details of particular communications,
parties who initially are inclined to assert the privilege may withdraw their claims, and conversely, opponents sometimes concede
the applicability of privilege.18 5 Even if a dispute remains thereafter, indexing of the communications in accordance with the rules
was said to aid in sharpening the issues or even enabling the judi12 Seven of the respondents volunteered that distinguishing between communications
relating to legal advice and those relating to business advice was a difficult task and one of
the most frequent reasons requiring in camera review.
I's One magistrate said that before undertaking in camera review, he cautions counsel
against making blanket assertions of privilege and "reminds" them of the court's power sua
sponte to impose sanctions for frivolous litigation under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. He suggested that this had been an effective means of reducing the number
of documents that he had been required to review in camera.
"2See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 46(e)(2) (applicable to interrogatories and document requests); E.D.N.Y. Standing Order on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases No. 21 (applicable to
depositions, interrogatories and document requests). The purpose of the rules is to produce
background information that will assist the court and the party seeking discovery to determine whether a claim of privilege is well-founded. The information required by the rules is
as follows: if a document, the type of document (letter, memorandum, etc.), date, author,
addressee, other recipients, the relationship of the participants, and the general subject matter; if an oral communication, its date, the speaker, persons present, the relationship of the
speaker to those present and the general subject matter. On an ad hoc basis, other courts
have imposed requirements similar to those in force in the Southern and Eastern Districts.
See, e.g., United States v. AT & T Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 604-08, 651 (D.D.C. 1979); Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1156-58 (D.S.C. 1975); International Paper Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 63 F.ID. 88, 93-94 (D. Del. 1974).
111The related experience of some of the judges and magistrates in resolving privilege
disputes without formal adjudication is described supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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cial officer to decide the question without the need for in camera
review>1e6 One of the judges described the value of the procedure as

"mak[ing] the lawyers, not the judges, do the work. '1 87 Although
the interview questionnaire did not directly address the effectiveness of these local indexing rules in facilitating the adjudication of
corporate attorney-client privilege claims, the information that was
obtained both here and in another survey on the rule as adopted in
the Eastern District of New York suggests their beneficial value.118
Nearly all of the judicial respondents had difficulty estimating
the percentage of disputed corporate attorney-client communications that they had held to be nondiscoverable as a result of the
privilege. Nineteen, however, were able to give a rough indication
of whether they had upheld the privilege more often than not: Ten
said they had sustained claims of privilege more than 50% of the
time; five said under 50%; and four said that the ratio was "about
fifty-fifty." The respondents therefore were about evenly divided
between those who had upheld privilege more often than not and
those who had done so only 50% or less of the time. Most of the
respondents said the following grounds were fairly frequent reasons for rejecting claims of corporate privilege: waiver due to disclosure to outsiders; the communications were business in nature
rather than legal; and lack of confidentiality within the
corporation. 18 9
188 For example, a magistrate said that he can sometimes base his determination as to
whether a particular attorney-client memorandum was intended to be confidential on the
quantity and status of the persons to whom the document was distributed.
'87 For a published opinion illustrating how the listing requirement has been used as a
means of reducing the need for in camera review, see Standard Chartered Bank PLC v.
Ayala Int'l Holdings (U.S.) Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
"I The Eastern District privilege rule took effect in 1984 as part of an experimental
package of rules intended to make discovery more effective and less costly. In a 1986 survey
of lawyers who litigate in the Eastern District, 20 of 110 respondents (18%) felt that the
rule had produced an increase in the information necessary to decide privilege claims, and
86 (78%) saw no change. REPORT OF THE DiscovERY OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE TO THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF Nnw YORK 91 (July 10, 1986). The
Committee that undertook the study concluded that the data, though limited, were sufficient to warrant retention of the rule. Id. at i. No similar study has been conducted in the
Southern District of New York. Id. at 98.
18I These elements of the attorney-client privilege are explained infra notes 450-66 &
487-94 and accompanying text.
In contrast to the grounds cited in text, the future crime or fraud exception, see supra
notes 73-74 and accompanying text, was said by most of the jurists to be a rare basis for
rejecting claims of corporate privilege. The "good cause" exception in shareholder actions,
see infra notes 536-54 and accompanying text, was not discussed with the respondents during this portion of the interview. Their responses to subsequent questions relating to this
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To ascertain the extent to which upholding claims of corporate
attorney-client privilege may have frustrated the fact-finding process, the judicial respondents were asked to give a rough idea of
how often the information contained in the privileged communications would have been "necessary" in arriving at an accurate resolution of contested issues. As to communications that did not contain necessary information, the respondents were asked how often
the information would have been at least "helpful" in deciding the
case.190 They were then asked how often the necessary or helpful
information, respectively, was available from nonprivileged sources
through reasonable discovery efforts. 91 The responses, although of
limited value as quantifiable data, lend support to the argument
that application of the privilege to corporations usually causes no
severe damage to the search for truth. The majority of respondents
reported that information protected by privilege was "never" or
only "rarely" necessary to the adjudicatory process. 9 In the occasional or rare instances when it was thought to be necessary, a majority also thought the information was frequently obtainable from
other sources through reasonable discovery efforts. 93 In contrast to
necessary information, attorney-client communications containing
merely "helpful" information were encountered by a majority of
the judges on an "occasional" or "frequent" basis.' 94 Here, too, the
aspect of the privilege, however, show that it, too, is an infrequent cause for rejection of
corporate privilege claims. See infra note 560 and accompanying text.
The possible grounds for rejecting privilege that were specifically discussed with the
judges and magistrates do not, of course, exhaust the universe of limitations and exceptions.
For example, some of the lawyers in the survey expressed concern over what they perceived
to be an increasingly frequent basis for denying application of the privilege: the notion that
a lawyer's legal advice to the client is not privileged unless it reveals, either directly or
indirectly, the substance of a confidential communication from the client. See infra note
267.
10 The term "necessary" was not used in its literal sense. Rather, it was explained to
the respondents as connoting "crucial" or "highly significant" evidence in proof of an element of a claim or defense. "Helpful" was defined as "relevant but less than significant."
"I For both questions, the respondents were asked to select one of five possible response categories: "never," "rarely," "occasionally," "frequently," and "always." The respondents found it impossible to provide estimates in the form of percentages.
132 The breakdown of responses among the 24 judges and magistrates was as follows:
never 3-(12.5%); rarely 12-(50.0%); occasionally 5-(20.8%); frequently 1-(4.2%); always 0-(0.0%); couldn't say 3-(12.5%).
19 The responses with respect to availability from other sources were as follows: never
1-(5.6%); rarely 3-(16.7%) occasionally 1-(5.6%); frequently 11-(61.1%); always
1-(5.6%); couldn't say 1-(5.6%). The question applied to the 18 respondents who recalled
having encountered necessary information on at least one occasion.
"'Six respondents (25.0%) indicated that privileged communications "rarely" contain
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majority of judges and magistrates felt that the same information
was frequently discoverable in some other form. 19 5 One judge argued that "[i]f the other side's lawyer cannot obtain the same information elsewhere, he's not doing his job." Interestingly, the
same opinion was voiced in almost identical language in a number
of the interviews of lawyers in the survey."" 6
The results of the questions put to the judges and magistrates
provide only a partial indication of the nature and extent of the
information that is lost as a result of being shielded by the corporate privilege because the questions elicited only information concerning communications that were litigated. Some claims of privilege go unchallenged. Even when privilege claims are litigated, a
judge may not always be in a position to ascertain the value of the
evidence in question. One of the magistrates in the study, for example, noted that it is especially difficult during the early stages of
pretrial discovery to know whether particular facts are even relevant to the litigation. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that to the
extent the corporate privilege does result in a loss of relevant information, it does so in only a limited number of cases.
IV. RATIONALE OF THE CORPORATE PRIVILEGE: ANALYSIS OF THE
FINDINGS

A. Benefits and Costs of the Privilege
1.

Conventional Instrumental Rationale

On their face, the survey findings reinforce the conventional
instrumental rationale of the corporate attorney-client privilege.
According to the lawyers and executives, corporate representatives
are encouraged by the privilege to be candid in their communications with counsel, 9 7 and the judicial participants indicated that
the costs to the process of adjudication in terms of lost evidence
are seldom significant because alternative sources of information
helpful information, but nine (37.5%) said "frequently" and six (25.0%) said "occasionally."
Three judges (12.5%) were unable to answer.
"'

The responses with respect to alternative availability were: never 2-(9.5%); rarely

2-(9.5%); occasionally 3-(14.3%); frequently 11-(52.4%); always 2-(9.5%); couldn't say
1-(4.8%). The question applied to 21 respondents who recalled having encountered helpful
information on at least one occasion.
"' In addition, similar observations were made by the attorneys in Brazil's study of the
Chicago bar. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
,1,See supra table 4, section HI.C.2. at 245.
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are usually available.298 Although awareness of the privilege by corporate representatives does not necessarily mean that their communications will be candid as a consequence, knowledge surely enhances the possibility of a causal connection to candor. In this
connection, three of the findings suggest that a foundation for such
a causal relationship exists: (1) knowledge of the privilege is
199
thought to be widespread among top-level corporate managers;
(2) lawyers often initiate privilege discussions with respect to litigious matters and sensitive issues; 200 and (3) corporate representatives themselves make occasional inquiries about the privilege. 0 1
In addition, the fact that corporate representatives sometimes express concern over whether their communications are privileged
suggests that assurances by counsel of the applicability of the privilege lead to more candid discussions. 202 Lawyers apparently act in
reliance on the utility of the privilege because most of them said
that they had raised the privilege issue with corporate representa20 3
tives at least occasionally for the purpose of encouraging candor.
Setting to one side for the moment the disparity in the responses
of house counsel and outside counsel, 20 4 a solid majority of the lawyers said that "based on their experience" the privilege encourages
candor on the part of corporate representatives regardless of their
rank in the corporate hierarchy. 20 5 Moreover, three out of every
four executives thought that the privilege increases management's
candor with counsel.2 08 Although only thirteen attorneys had experienced the absence of privilege in an international setting, the
majority of these respondents reported that communications were
inhibited as a result.2 07 The latter empirical findings, despite their
limited value, reinforce the views of the lawyers and executives
whose experience has been solely in jurisdictions in which privilege
is generally a given.
The fact that the corporate attorney-client privilege belongs
solely to the corporation apparently does little to alter the views of
',See supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
"91See supra table 1, section IH.B.1. at 236.
210 See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
202 See id.
211 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
204 The analysis of this disparity appears infra notes 277-97 and accompanying text.
205 See supra table 4, section II.C.2. at 245.
208 See id.
227 See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
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upper-level executives concerning the effect of the privilege in encouraging management's candor. This may be due, in part, to the
fact that most of them are unaware that the corporation may waive
the privilege over the individual's objections-or at least they have
given little if any thought to the issue.208 On the other hand, even
the majority of executives who knew prior to the interview that the
corporate privilege did not belong to them personally said that the
privilege enhances management's candor. In addition, very few of
the executives who first learned of the rule during the interview
indicated that it would chill candor. Surely communications would
be inhibited in situations in which executives are told by counsel
that a conflict exists and that they might wish to retain a personal
attorney,0 9 but the lawyers' responses suggest that such situations
are rare.21 0 Most executives probably do not perceive the threat of
waiver by the corporation to be a realistic threat. In most circumstances, they appear to assume, rightly or wrongly, that their interests and those of the corporation are the same. They may also feel
that their relatively high rank in the corporate hierarchy will give
them an influential voice on the waiver decision or that, as a result
of their companies' loyalty to them, the privilege will be invoked to
protect both the company and themselves (or intentionally waived
only when no harm will come to either party).
Until recently, there have been few reported cases in which
waivers have occurred over the objections of individual employees. 1 ' The trend may be changing, 212 but very few of the executives in the survey showed any signs of serious concern over the
issue, other than that they thought they had a right to know about
it in cases of conflict. This raises a separate question about the
ethical obligations of attorneys to warn corporate employees of the
privilege limitation, a point that will be considered below. 21 3' In

sum, executives appear to be encouraged by the privilege to communicate with the corporation's lawyers even though ultimate control over the privilege does not belong to them. Whether the same
208

See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.

208 See Lang, Investigations by Outside Counsel, LITIGATION, Fall 1988, at 31-35.
210 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
211 See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: A Look at Its Effect on the Corporate

Client and the CorporateExecutive, 55 IND. L.J. 407, 408 (1980).
2 See Arkin, supra note 120, at 3, col. 1 (increasing number of white-collar criminal
prosecutions said to put pressure on corporations to "sacrifice" employees); see also supra
notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
"1 See infra notes 318-43 and accompanying text.
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holds true for lower-level employees is an open question and an
appropriate area for further research. Such employees, for example, might be more likely than top executives to have an intuitive
sense of their personal inability to control the privilege based on
the realization that anything they say to counsel may be revealed
to their corporate superiors and used as a basis for employment
sanctions.
Despite the survey's apparent confirmation of the utility of the
corporate privilege-at least as to corporate management-it was
emphasized at the outset of this Article that the bias of the participants must be taken into account in weighing the accuracy of the
results. 214 I have no doubt that the lawyers and executives honestly
reported the frequency with which they discuss privilege issues.
Whether "in their experience" the privilege has actually served to
encourage candor, however, is a subjective evaluation. The findings
on this point do not directly measure the effect of the corporate
attorney-client privilege; they measure only the respondents' feelings about the matter. One may reasonably suspect, therefore, that
the role of the privilege as an incentive to candor was exaggerated
by the participants.
In addition, the findings themselves raise ambiguities that
lend support to arguments against the corporate privilege. First,
although two-thirds of the lawyers said that they had explicitly
raised privilege issues with clients for the purpose of encouraging
candor, seventy per cent of this group also indicated that often
their purpose was solely to ensure nondiscovery in litigation.2 15 Advising clients on how to use the privilege to prevent discovery is
not necessarily inconsistent with the goal of encouraging candor,
but it shows that the privilege may also be used simply as a device
for conducting corporate activities in secrecy without producing
any positive effects on candor.
Second, the privilege is not the principal magnet that draws
corporate clients to lawyers. Even without the privilege, business
considerations would motivate corporate managers to seek legal
advice. 210 On the other hand, the competing findings with respect
to candor suggest that although legal counseling would continue in
the absence of privilege, the communications would not be as open,
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
-11See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
216 See supra section M.D.
21
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at least as to litigious and sensitive matters. Corporate clients
would still seek legal advice in such situations, but the respondents
thought that the discourse would be less candid.2 1
Third, the results of additional probing into the importance of
the privilege in relation to other factors that may influence candor
show that a corporate representative's rapport with the particular
lawyer may alone suffice to engender open communications. "Trust
and confidence in the lawyer" was the factor most often cited as

being "most important" in influencing candor.218 Even if the corporate privilege were abolished, trust and confidence in the attorney

might be sufficient to maintain candid communications. The relationship would continue to be reinforced by the attorney's ethical
duty to keep client secrets, thus preventing the attorney from dis-

seminating sensitive information to competitors and other third
parties.

19

Moreover, the work product doctrine would still keep

most litigation-related communications out of evidence.220

As a result of abolition, perhaps fewer attorney-client commu-

nications would be put into writing, but most oral discussions
would probably be just as frank if the corporate representative had
confidence in the attorney. This outcome is suggested both by the
experience of some attorneys in the survey who had encountered
217 The Supreme Court made the same point in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 393 n.2 (1981):
The Government argues that the risk of civil or criminal liability suffices to
ensure that corporations will seek legal advice in the absence of the protection of
the privilege. This response ignores the fact that the depth and quality of any
investigations to ensure compliance with the law would suffer, even were they
undertaken.
Id.
218 See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text. Interestingly, in a study of the Chicago bar on issues affecting legal education, lawyers ranked "instilling others' confidence in
you" as one of the most important skills for a practicing lawyer to develop. F. ZEMANS & V.
ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 125 (Table 6.1) (1981).
29 See supra note 65 and accompanying text; C. McCoRmICK, supra note 97, § 87, at
206 (ethical rule "furnishes to most clients having a good faith claim or defense all the
security (and hence encouragement to full disclosure) for which they would feel any need").
220 See supra note 66-68 and accompanying text. In federal courts work product is not
only prima facie immune during pretrial discovery but also apparently functions as an evidentiary privilege at trial. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975) ("Disclosure of an attorney's efforts at trial, as surely as disclosure during pretrial discovery, could
disrupt the orderly development and presentation of his case").
Professor Richard Marcus has noted that work product contributes to the trusting relationship between client and attorney. "[W]ork product seems critical to building client
trust; surely the client would lose confidence in his lawyer if the lawyer's work were routinely available to assist the other side." Marcus, supra note 124, at 1624.
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the absence of privilege in international settings.21 and by comments of some of the executives regarding the potential loss of
privilege.2 22 The hypothesis is further reinforced by the results of a

"what-if' question in a later portion of the survey in which the
majority of respondents said that fewer attorney-client communications would be recorded if the privilege were qualified rather
than absolute.223 Oral communications probably are not perceived
as being threatened by a loss of privilege to the same extent as
documentary communications because lawyers and corporate representatives may in good faith forget the details of what was said
orally by the time the matter becomes relevant in litigation.224
Documents, in contrast, would provide a semi-permanent "paper
trail" that would be more easily discoverable. Once the initial
shock of abolition had subsided, however, attorneys and corporate
clients might very well return to the recording of their communications.2 25 An empirical study of the practices of prosecutors and de-

fense attorneys faced with potential mandatory disclosure of pretrial statements they have obtained from witnesses who testify at
trial might
be a useful source of analogous information on this
226
point.
Without the privilege, however, some of the lawyers in the survey were quick to argue that even if trust in the lawyer is the principal incentive to candor, such trust, standing alone, might not be
2'3 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
"23See infra notes 612 & 616 and accompanying text.
2 This observation is buttressed by findings from other portions of the survey. See,
e.g., infra notes 562-63 and accompanying text; see also infra note 470 (attorneys complain
that clients put too much in writing). It is also easier to commit perjury in the absence of a
documentary record, but I doubt that many corporate attorneys would lie for their clients.
25 See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,and the
Productionof Information, 1981 Sup. CT. Rav. 309, 362: "[I]t is easy to overstate the costs
of accommodating one's conduct to disclosure rules. It is unlikely that Upjohn's general
counsel would have abandoned note-taking in the future if Upjohn had lost its case. Certainly the government has not abandoned memo writing, despite the Freedom of Information Act." See also Waits, supranote 17, at 333-35 (arguing that abolition of work product
immunity for witness statements would not reduce the recording of such statements because
lawyers need to "pin witnesses down"; the large amount of data to be collected and shared
with other lawyers in a firm or law department in large commercial litigation cannot reliably
be remembered without a written record; and institutional clients may refuse to make decisions on "say-so of subordinates" in the absence of documentation).
126 Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a), for example, a prosecutor must, upon demand, deliver to the defendant any relevant pretrial statements in his possession made by a witness
for the prosecution following such witness's direct testimony. Defense counsel must do likewise with respect to any defense witnesses other than the defendant himself. Id.
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enough to enable an attorney to get all of the facts in sensitive
matters. 7 Furthermore, even as to routine matters, the atmospherics of the privilege-its potential availability in crisis situations-may help to instill the sense of trust that induces candor.
As one of the lawyers put it, "The privilege is another factor you
can toss in to enhance their candor."
Five other findings in this portion of the survey, while not necessarily supportive of arguments for abolition of the corporate
privilege, nevertheless raise questions about its scope and operation: (1) concern among executives and lawyers about the applicability of privilege is limited for the most part to actual or potential
litigation and other "sensitive" matters; 228 (2) privilege may not be
as important to house counsel as to outside counsel; 229 (3) employees at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy generally know little
about the corporate privilege;230 (4) in their discussions of the privilege with corporate representatives, most lawyers indicate that
claims of privilege may not be upheld by courts for one reason 232
or
231 and (5) assertions of privilege claims often lack merit.
another;
That the applicability of privilege is not a major concern either for lawyers or executives except in communications relating to
litigation and sensitive matters implies, of course, that the privilege does not induce candor in equal measure in all types of legal
counseling. Indeed, one of the most pro-privilege litigators in the
survey admitted that the privilege affects candor only "to a minor
degree in most circumstances" and is only "crucial in a few critical
areas of concern." His conclusion, of course, was that the privilege
must apply in all circumstances in order to safeguard the role of
privilege in the critical areas. But if the privilege has little impact
in noncritical areas, does it not follow with equal if not greater
force that the privilege should be confined to those ares of counseling where it makes a difference? 23 3 To apply the privilege in an
27 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes 151-53, 155-57, & 166 and accompanying text. The increased concern over privilege that the respondents experience in litigation and sensitive matters reappears throughout the survey like a Wagnerian leitmotif. See, e.g., infra notes 396-97, 468,
470-71 & table 7, section VI.A. and accompanying text.
21' See supra note 161 and accompanying text. See also supra table 4, section l1I.C.2.
at 245.

110 See supra table 1, section IILB.1. at 236.
231 See supra table 3, section III.B.3. at 240.
232
233

See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
See Easterbrook, supra note 225, at 362-64 (questioning whether some types of legal
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overinclusive manner is to conceal evidence without producing any
compensatory benefits.
It would be easy enough from a definitional standpoint to
limit the privilege to the same situations in which attorney work
product immunity applies, i.e., communications made "in anticipation of litigation.

' 23 4

This is a standard with which judges are fa-

miliar, even if their application of the standard is somewhat uneven. 235 The attorney-client privilege would by no means be
superfluous in such cases because it generally provides absolute
protection, whereas work product protection is qualified. 236 Interestingly, for several decades of its common law existence, the attorney-client privilege encompassed only communications relating to
the litigation in which the lawyer's testimony was sought.2 7 It was

not until the mid-1800s that the privilege was held to include comcounseling for corporations may be more dependent on confidentiality than others); see also
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979) (with respect to counsel's
interviews with lower-level employees, court noted "where there is no prospect of litigation,
corporate counsel has little reason to be apprehensive about the unprivileged nature of his
investigation"). As Wigmore and courts have frequently stated, the privilege "ought to be
strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554. See supra note 18.
231See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
238 Compare Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131, 134 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (court favors
case-by-case approach to determine when casualty insurer's investigation of a loss shifts
from "mere claim evaluation" to anticipation of litigation), with Landmark Ins. Co. v. Beau
Rivage Restaurant, Inc., 121 App. Div. 2d 98, 99-100, 509 N.Y.S.2d 819, 821-22 (2d Dep't
1986) (court adopts bright-line rule that investigatory materials prepared by casualty insurer are created in anticipation of litigation after insurer decides to disclaim policy holder's
loss).
Various formulations of the anticipation-of-litigation standard have been articulated.
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir.) ("litigation need not necessarily be imminent.., as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the
document was to aid in possible future ligation"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (threat of litigation must be "real and imminent"); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 690
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("while one might argue that almost all of the work attorneys do, or the
advice they dispense, is in anticipation of litigation or its avoidance, the work product immunity requires a more immediate showing than the remote possibility of litigation"); see
generally Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine:Protection,Not Privilege, 71 GEo. L.J. 917,
925-29 (1983); Note, supra note 66, at 843-55.
236 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
237 See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2294. This early limitation may have been attributable, in part, to the class distinction in England between barristers, who were courtroom
advocates and therefore entitled to assert the privilege, and solicitors and other attorneys
who essentially performed office counseling. The latter generally could not claim the privilege. See Hazard, supra note 6, at 1070-72.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:191

munications relating to "legal advice of any kind. ' 238 Wigmore supported this expansion of the privilege with the argument that legal
advice is as valuable in avoiding litigation as in conducting it and
that society is better served if more clients seek legal advice before
litigation ensues. 39 Wigmore is surely right that seeking legal advice to avoid disputes is a socially desirable goal. One of the most
important services performed by the modern corporate lawyer, for
example, is the practice of "preventive law"-providing advice on
the legality of corporate action before it' takes place. 240 But the
question still remains whether the privilege itself plays any significant role in encouraging candor during such nonlitigation counseling. The survey results suggest that it does not.
On the other hand, it is not just litigation-related communications that prompt concern by lawyers and executives over the applicability of privilege. Many of the respondents spoke also of
"sensitive" matters and internal investigations into possible corporate illegality.4 1 What they may have meant by "sensitive" matters are corporate transactions that appear on their surface to be
nonlitigious but which have the potential for producing major conflict or involve conduct that approaches the threshold of illegality.
Since internal investigations may be made in anticipation of litigation,2 42 legal services in this connection might qualify as a hybrid
of "sensitive" and "litigation-related" matters. Assuming the privilege is worth preserving for the reason that it encourages candor in
all of these types of matters, there may be no practical choice but
to continue to include legal counseling "of any kind" within its ambit. What workable definition could be devised to limit the corporate privilege to litigation and "sensitive" counseling? Additional
empirical research into the specific types of circumstances in which
the privilege does and does not affect candor would help in formu238 See 8 J. WGMORE, supra note 2, § 2294, at 554. The decision credited with expansion of the privilege beyond its litigation-based origins is Greenough v. Gaskeil, 1 My. & K.
98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1833), in which Justice Brougham wrote: "If the privilege were
confined to communications connected with suits begun, or intended, or expected, or apprehended, no one could safely adopt such precautions as might eventually render any proceedings successful, or all proceedings superfluous." Id. at 103, 39 Eng. Rep. at 621.
"1 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2295, at 566.
210 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 8, at 280-89; Forrow, The CorporateLaw Department Lawyer: Counsel to the Entity, 34 Bus. LAw. 1797, 1804-08 (1979); Lynch, supra note
8, at 46; Ruga, Attorney-Client Relations with Your Corporate Client/Employer,65 MIcH.
B.J. 1058, 1058 (1986).
, See supra notes 152-53 & 155-56 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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269

lating a definition. Without such a specific standard, courts would
be left to determine on a case-by-case basis whether particular
nonlitigation counseling involved a sufficiently sensitive topic to
warrant privilege protection, thus diluting the traditional absolute
nature of the privilege. The existing approach, although apparently
overinclusive in protecting communications relating to legal counseling on any
subject, is perhaps necessary in the interests of
243
certainty.
Nevertheless, the survey data suggest that, any damage to the
instrumental effects of the privilege would be less likely to occur if
privilege is occasionally lost-through waiver or otherwise-for
communications relating to routine matters than for those that
hover at the edge of litigation. Furthermore, if the corporate privilege were to be converted to a qualified privilege that could yield in
cases of compelling need for evidence, an issue that is explored in a
subsequent section, 4 the extent to which the communications in
question concerned litigious or sensitive matters would be important factors for a court to consider in deciding whether discovery
should be granted or denied.
Another significant finding in this portion of the survey is that
house counsel were less enthusiastic about the candor-inducing effects of the privilege than were outside counsel. Because of the importance of the issue, this finding is given extended treatment below. 245 Also to be considered in a later section 246 is the fact that
employees at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy, according to
the lawyers, know little or nothing about the corporate privilege.
Although presumably such employees could be quickly educated
by counsel in specific situations, it is otherwise questionable
whether their candor could be influenced by a privilege about
which they are ignorant.247 This finding is relevant to the question
of whose communications within the corporation should qualify for
coverage by the corporate privilege.
The fact that lawyers sometimes warn corporate representatives that the privilege does not provide ironclad protection also
213 See id. at 393 (if purpose of privilege is to be served, parties "must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected").
2" See infra notes 623-799 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 277-317 and accompanying text.

214See infra notes 409-14 and accompanying text.
217

But see Developments in the Law, supranote 79, at 1475 ("knowledge of a privilege

may not so much encourage communications as knowledge of its absence would deter
them").
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has implications for the operation of the privilege. If corporate clients already are aware that the privilege is not as absolute as they
might wish, modification of the privilege to a qualified standard in
certain narrow circumstances would do little to diminish whatever
instrumental benefits currently are fostered by the privilege. This
point, too, is treated in depth in a later section.24 8
Finally, the data obtained from the judicial respondents concerning the near parity between valid and invalid claims of privilege 248 calls into question the arguments made by some authorities
that corporate attorney-client communications should be treated
as presumptively privileged. 25 0 On the contrary, the data reinforce
judicial pronouncements imposing on the party invoking the attorney-client privilege the burden of demonstrating satisfaction of all
its definitional elements.2 " The findings also suggest that opponents of corporate litigants should not acquiesce in unsubstantiated claims of privilege. In the survey of lawyers, for example,
some noteworthy but unquantifiable incidents were reported in
which litigants had asserted blanket claims of privilege for all corporate documents that had passed through the hands of a lawyer
252
and "got away with it" because the claims went unchallenged.
2. Alternative Instrumental Rationales
If the candor-inducing impact of the privilege on individual
corporate representatives remains uncertain, a related but distinct
2'8 See infra notes 674-704 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
250 See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1978) (en
249

banc) (matter committed to lawyer was "prima facie" for legal advice and therefore privileged "absent a clear showing to the contrary"); CAL. Evm. CoDE § 917 (Deering 1986) (attomey-client communications are presumed to have been made in confidence); Davidson,
JudicialProceduresfor Resolving Claims of Privilege,LITIGATION, Summer 1982, at 36, 38
(proposing that presumption of privilege attach upon showing that communication was between lawyer and client).
251 See, e.g., Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Res. & Mgt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir.
1981); FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); Priest v. Hennessey, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 68-69, 409
N.E.2d 983, 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (1980); see also Research Institute for Med. and
Chem., Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Res. Found., 114 F.R.D. 672, 675 (W.D. Wis. 1987)
("Neither the existence of an attorney-client relationship nor the mere exchange of informa-

tion with an attorney make out a presumptive claim").
252 See supra note 163 and accompanying text; see also supra note 160 and accompany-

ing text. Some of the lawyers suggested that members of the bar should be better educated
about the limited scope of the privilege and that claims of privilege should be challenged
more often.
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instrumental argument may help justify the corporate privilege.
Perhaps the focus of the inquiry with respect to the incentives provided by the privilege should be on the corporation itself, not individual employees. In other words, regardless of whether the privilege has any direct effect in encouraging individual corporate
employees to be candid, the privilege may provide a stimulus to
the institution to encourage employees to communicate openly
with the company's attorneys.2 5 3 While there may always be employees who will be reticent with counsel for one reason or another,
there may be others who are simply not willing to discuss matters
with counsel unless directed to do so pursuant to company policy.
Availability of the privilege for the corporation might serve as the
incentive for implementation of such a policy either on an ongoing

basis or with respect to particular matters, such as internal investigations of possible wrongdoing. To the extent a few more employees speak candidly with counsel as a result of the policy, benefits
may flow to the corporation through improved legal compliance

and the avoidance of litigation. By extension, society at large benefits through law-abiding corporate conduct.
The notion that corporations should be given a special incentive to undertake voluntary action to comply with the law was suggested by the Supreme Court in Upjohn.2 54 The Court observed
that legal compliance "is hardly an instinctive matter" in the regulatory milieu of the modern corporation, and it praised the "valua2SSSee, e.g., 24 C. WRnHT &K. GRAHAM, supra note 63, § 5476, at 147; Sexton, supra
note 114, at 467.
"I Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see also Diversified Indus. Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (application of attorney-client privilege to internal investigations "will encourage corporations to seek out and correct wrongdoing in their own house and to do so with attorneys who are obligated... to conduct the
inquiry in an independent and ethical manner").
Similar reasoning has also been proffered in support of yet another privilege in the
corporate context* a privilege for "self-critical evaluation." See generally Allen & Hazelwood, supranote 106; Leonard, Codifying a Privilegefor Self-CriticalAnalysis, 25 HRv. J.
ON LEGis. 113 (1988); Murphy, The Self-Evaluative Privilege, 5 J. CorP. L. 489 (1980). The
self-evaluative privilege is broader than the attorney-client privilege because a lawyer need
not be involved in the internal investigation; at the same time it is narrower in that it is a
qualified rather than an absolute privilege. See, e.g., Hardy v. New York News Inc., 114
F.R.D. 633, 641-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (in employment discrimination case, plaintiff's interest
in obtaining evidence of discriminatory intent held to outweigh employer's "interest in fostering candid self-analysis and voluntary compliance with equal employment laws, because
the threat of disclosure would have an insignificant deterrent effect upon the preparation of
the kind of documents that are being withheld in this case"). The self-evaluative privilege is
also broader than work product because the company's internal investigation need not be
prompted by the anticipation of litigation. See Leonard, supra at 121-22.
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ble efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their clients' compliance
with the law." 25 Implicit in such language (and in the Court's rejection of a narrow approach to the corporate privilege) is a policy
choice that the "carrot" of privilege as an inducement to corporate
self-policing is preferable to the "stick" of post hoc regulatory enforcement. 5 6 For example, government agencies responsible for
regulating corporate conduct in antitrust and securities matters
apparently rely to some extent on corporate
lawyers in the private
17
25
effort.
regulatory
the
in
adjuncts
as
sector
The Tentative Draft of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers also relies upon the legal compliance rationale for
the corporate privilege.25 8 In several places the comments refer to
the value of the privilege as an inducement to the organization to
"direct" its employees to communicate openly with the organization's lawyers. 259 The privilege thus encourages
corporations "to
26
' 0
achieve voluntary compliance with the law.

But is privilege really helpful in ensuring legal compliance?
This particular empirical question was not investigated in my survey; no inquiries were made, for example, into the record of legal
compliance of the corporations employing the respondents in the
study or the connection between the privilege and law-abiding conduct.28 1 The respondents' views that business necessity dictates
135Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
'1
See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 114, at 468-71 (Upjohn Court's broad approach to privilege is based on "voluntary compliance model" of corporate behavior in contrast to "regulatory model" that would require narrow privilege in order to make more information discoverable by litigants and public); 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAm, supra note 63, § 5476, at 189-90
("any limitation on the power of courts and agencies to compel revelation of corporate activities is a pro tanto loosening of the regulatory apparatus"; Upjohn "made a subtle but not
insignificant change in the balance of power").
Special CounselInvestigations and the
217See, e.g, Brodsky, The "Zone of Darkness':"
Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 SE C. REG. L.J. 123, 123 (1980); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed
Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. R-v. 1099, 1248-49 (1977); Shenefield, Compliance Programsas Viewed
from the Antitrust Division, 48 ANTITRusT L.J. 73, 73 (1979).
258 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
259 Id.

§ 123 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989).

§
§

123 comments b, c & d.
280 Id. 123 comment b.
28I A few respondents, however, volunteered positive opinions on this point. See, e.g.,
supra note 162 and accompanying text.

It would be possible, of course, to ascertain from records of courts and administrative
agencies the number of instances in which a corporation's alleged noncompliance with the
law had been litigated. See, e.g., M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRimE 113-24 (1980)

(study of charges and sanctions against Fortune 500 corporations). Such information is inadequate, however, because it does not account for undetected instances of corporate
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consultation with lawyers, however, casts some doubt on the voluntary legal compliance rationale. The very existence of the numerous laws and regulations'with which corporations must contend
and the omnipresence of lawyers in corporate affairs suggests that
corporations will encourage open communications with counsel in
order to comply with the law regardless of the privilege. They have
little choice, since noncompliance will expose the corporation to liability to the government, shareholders and private parties as well
as to adverse publicity that may injure its business. Furthermore,
management owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
shareholders to comply with the law.26 2 Voluntary compliance is an
obvious social good and should be encouraged, to be sure, but it is
doubtful that the attorney-client privilege plays a major role in accomplishing this goal because legal advice will be sought in any
event. If the lawyer's advice is not followed, or if the advice proves
erroneous because it was based on an incomplete and misleading
presentation of facts, there is little social good to be found in veiling the communications in secrecy.263 As Professor Edmund Morgan observed several years ago, the client who suppresses the facts
when consulting with a lawyer has no one to blame but himself if
complications arise as a result of inadequate legal advice based on
incomplete data. 84
Yet another instrumental rationale suggested by some commentators 2S--and hinted at by the Supreme Court in
Upjohn2e6--is that the corporate privilege is necessary to ensure
misconduct.
Some commentators have questioned whether attorneys have been very successful in
recent years in achieving legal compliance by their corporate clients. See, e.g., Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 615 (1985); Sexton, supra note
114, at 469-70 n.107.
22 See, e.g., Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir. 1979) (bank officers and
directors have duty to investigate and remove wrongdoers from corporation); Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970) ("management has an obligation to the
corporation, to the stockholders and to the public to do what is lawful"), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1971); Block & Barton, InternalCorporateInvestigations:Maintainingthe Confidentiality of a Corporate Client's Communications with Investigative Counsel, 35 Bus.
LAw. 5, 7 (1979); Kaplan, FiduciaryResponsibility in the Management of the Corporation,
31 Bus. LAw. 883, 887-88 (1976).
262 See Garner,430 F.2d at 1102 ("to grant to corporate management plenary assurance
of secrecy for opinions received is to encourage it to disregard with impunity the advice
sought").
2" Morgan, supra note 6, at 26.
265 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 146, at 268-70.
266 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390, 392 (1981).
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that the lawyer's advice will be candid. The Court noted, for example, that the absence of privilege for communications with lowerlevel corporate employees would make it "difficult to convey full
and frank legal advice" to such employees.267 Focusing on the
motivations of the attorney is a clear departure from conventional
teaching that the purpose of the privilege is to motivate clients-not attorneys-to be candid. In effect, the argument conflates the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine."" The implication of the argument is that without the
privilege, the attorney's advice may be "hedged." Some suggestion
of this potential effect was made by a few of the attorneys in the
survey with an international practice who said that their written
advice is sometimes "sanitized" in matters as to which privilege is
absent. 29 The danger of such "sanitized" advice-assuming it is
not augmented by oral explanations-appears to be that instead of
condemning proposed illegal conduct in no uncertain terms, the
lawyer's legal opinion might be framed in an ambiguous manner,
perhaps leading the client to take action that would violate the law
or result in litigation. Legal advice might take this form if the law267 Id. at 392. In another portion of the opinion, the Court states that "the privilege
exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but
also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice." Id. at 390. The sentence structure is intriguing because it implies that the applicability of the privilege to an attorney's legal advice is a foregone conclusion. Among the lower
courts, however, there continues to be a division of opinion concerning the extent to which
the attorney's advice is protected by the privilege. Some courts hold that since the purpose
of the privilege is to induce clients, not attorneys, to be candid, the lawyer's advice is protected only if it would reveal,'directly or indirectly, the substance of the client's confidential
communications. See, e.g., American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745-46 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); In re Sealed case, 737 F.2d 94, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Clute v. Davenport Co.,
118 F.R.D. 312, 314 (D. Conn. 1988); Potts v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 118 F.R.D. 597, 601-05
(N.D. Ind. 1987).
Others hold that the privilege should apply to the lawyer's advice in all circumstances,
regardless of whether it would reveal a client's confidential communication. See, e.g., In re
LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 602 (N.D. Tex. 1981); State ex rel. Great American Ins. Co.

v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 383-85 (Mo. 1979); see also CAL. EvID. CODE § 952 (Deering 1986).

The all-inclusive approach has been described as "simpler and preferable" to case-by-case
determination as to which parts of counsel's advice might reveal a client's communication.
C. MCCORMICK supra note 97, § 89 at 212. Contra, Rice, JudicialManagement of Complex

Litigation:FurtherComments on the Use of Informal Managment Techniques and on Procedures for the Resolution of Privilege Claims, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRAcTICAL GUIDE TO THn USE OF SPECIAL MAsTEHs 293, 299-302, & 302 n.24 (1983) (all-inclusive

approach would represent "drastic" expansion of existing rule).
268 See Marcus, supra note 124, at 1621, 1623-24 (Upjohn Court "blends" attorneyclient and work product privileges).
289 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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yer feared that in possible litigation relating to the conduct in
question, the communication would be relevant and admissible as
evidence of the client's state of mind.
The short answer to this argument is that the lawyer has an
ethical duty to provide candid and thorough legal opinions.2 70 As
one court stated, "[T]he guarantee of a veil of secrecy [n]either
establishes [n]or narrows the attorney's obligation in the giving of
advice." 271' On the other hand, human nature being what it.is, perhaps it is inevitable that the quality of lawyers' advice would be
affected by the absence of secrecy. It was this realization, in part,
that prompted the creation of the work product immunity in litigation lest "[i]nefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices" develop in
the lawyer's preparation for trial.2 7 2 The attorney-client privilege

serves a dubious social policy, however, if, in assuring candid legal
advice, it also assures the client of the ability to disregard such
advice without fear of impeachment.
On the whole, the survey data neither prove nor disprove the
merits of instrumental rationales for the corporate attorney-client
privilege. I hesitate to suggest that it be abolished both because
the suggestion would be heresy 27 4 and also because the findings fall
See MODEL RuLEs OF PRoFrssoNAL CoNDucT Rule 2.1 comment 11 (1983):
A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest
assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a
client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to
sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty
permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by
the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.
Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFSSIONAL RESPONsmiLrry EC 7-8 (1981) ("A lawyer should
exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has
been informed of relevant considerations"); cf. Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F. Supp. 30, 3940 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (attorney owes duty to client to disclose all "information material to the
client's decision to pursue a given course of action, or to abstain therefrom").
171 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971).
171 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
273 Possible noninstrumental rationales, as suggested previously, see supra notes 106-12
and accompanying text, do not provide a sufficient basis for recognition of the privilege for
large corporations. The human traits and values that the right of privacy is intended to
protect simply are not present. While corporate representatives are entitled to respect as
individuals, their roles in the corporate context are as agents of the entity. The attorney's
client ordinarily is the corporation, and the privilege belongs to the corporation, not to its
individual agents. See C. Wolfram, supra note 111, § 6.5.3, at 284; supra notes 117-25 and
accompanying text.
274 See Waits, supra note 17, at 309 (author states that her proposal to abolish work
product immunity for witness statements "may be heresy"). Aside from the district court in
Radiant Burners, see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text, only a handful of writers
270
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short of supporting abolition on empirical grounds. Some of the
findings, however, do raise doubts that the privilege is either an
essential incentive for corporate employees to confide in attorneys
or a principal encouragement for voluntary corporate compliance
with the law. The corporate privilege is perhaps justified if for no
other reason than that it has the potential for achieving such benefits and that it may on occasion produce the effects that are attributed to it. 27 5 Continued recognition of the privilege for corporate
clients, however, does not necessarily require acceptance of all the
terms that define the privilege for individuals. Although it may not
happen often, the potential still remains that the privilege will effectively suppress a great deal more evidence in the corporate setting than it does in the case of individuals.2 76 A corlorate attorneyclient privilege that is flexible enough to yield to the needs of the
fact-finding process in appropriate cases may be what is needed in
the future.
B. House Counsel versus Outside Counsel
One of the most significant findings of the survey was that
fewer house counsel (62.0%) than outside counsel (88.5%) thought
that the corporate privilege encouraged candor. 1 Of the fifty respondents in the house counsel sample, a total of nineteen were
skeptical that any relationship existed between the privilege and
candor: thirteen (26.0%) said that the privilege has no effect on
candor and six (12.0%) said they were not sure.
One of the recurring comments made by the nineteen respondents with doubts about the instrumental value of the privilege
was to the effect that "in this corporation" employees would be
candid even without the privilege. Five of the house counsel commented that their companies were seldom involved in litigation,
which is the only time, in their view, that the privilege would have
any impact. Noting that their companies were highly regulated,
have been bold enough to urge total abolition of the corporate privilege. See, e.g., 24 C.
WRIGHT

& K. GRAHAM,supranote 63, § 5476, at 192 n.366 (junior author of treatise "leans"

toward abolition); Gardner, supra note 81, at 496-500; Gardner, supra note 107, at 402.
I75
See Sexton, supra note 114, at 471 ("[J]ust as nobody would deny that a corporate
attorney-client privilege induces some (though perhaps minimal) increased communication
with attorneys for corporations, so also would nobody deny that voluntary compliance occurs at least some of the time").
276 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 17,
277 See supra table 4, section III.C.2. at 245.

503(b)[04], at 503-42.
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two others posited that employees were generally candid because
"we operate in a fishbowl environment." Another felt that the major concern in his company was trade secrecy-not the attorneyclient privilege. One rejected the connection between privilege and
candor for the reason that the employees in his company were
aware that counsel represents only the corporation, not the individuals personally: "business ethics" was said to be the incentive to
candor. Another said that employees know "they'll be fired" if they
are not candid with counsel. "Communications must go on, with or
without the privilege," was the conclusion of another.
The fact that the house counsel were answering with respect
to a single client while the outside counsel were drawing upon experience with numerous corporate clients may partially explain the
difference in responses between the samples. That some house
counsel thought that communications would flow even without the
privilege may be a function of the culture of the particular corporation in which they worked-its size, litigation history, and policy
set by top management. The responses of outside counsel were
based on experience with more than one corporate client; the freedom with which communications flow to outside counsel may have
varied significantly among these clients. The views of outside counsel, therefore, may represent a generalization of the overall impact
of the privilege, while the responses of house counsel represent a
client-by-client breakdown.
Assuming, however, that the results for both samples can be
generalized, i.e., the privilege is more important for outside counsel
than for house counsel as an incentive to candid communications,
a possible explanation is that most outside counsel do not participate in daily corporate affairs to the same extent as house counsel.
The more frequent contact between house counsel and corporate
representatives may produce a rapport that is alone sufficient in
most instances to ensure candor. Nearly all of the executives in the
survey, for example, said that they communicate more often with
house counsel than outside counsel. 278 Additionally, in most of the
102 corporations represented in the combined samples of executives and house counsel, middle management and lower-level employees are free to consult with house counsel about legal problems
of the corporation without a specific direction from their superi275 See

supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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ors.2 79 These findings are consistent with those of another study
showing that the members of in-house legal departments have routine contact with middle management and employees at the operational levels.2 0 As previously discussed, a sense of trust and confidence in the lawyer is the most important factor influencing
candor according to the largest number of respondents in the survey (both lawyers and executives).2 8 1 This element of the attorneyclient relationship may therefore develop more quickly in the case
of house counsel, who interact with corporate reprQsentatives on a
daily basis and are always "on call" for legal consultation.
Besides the frequency of contact between corporate representatives and house counsel, another reason that trust and confidence
may develop more readily in the client's relationship with house
counsel than with outside counsel is that most house counsel-at
least chief legal officers with the title of General Counsel or its
equivalent-are on the company's "management team." For example, thirty of the thirty-seven house counsel in the survey who held
the title of General Counsel were also officers of their corporations
at the rank of Vice President, Executive Vice President or Senior
Vice President. 28 2 Furthermore, thirty-six of the fifty house counsel
(regardless of title) indicated that they perform some amount of
nonlegal work for their employers. 283 The median percentage of
time devoted by these thirty-six respondents to nonlegal duties
was twenty per cent.28 4 Data obtain ed at a later point in the interview also suggest that a great many business communications flow
through house counsel's office, and only some of them involve reSee id.
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 8, at 288 (study of compliance and preventative
law programs of legal departments of thirteen large corporations).
281 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
282 See supra note 46. Five additional respondents with the title of Associate or Assistant General Counsel were also Vice Presidents or higher.
280 The performance of nonlegal duties was more prevalent among the chief legal officers than among the lower-ranking in-house attorneys with titles such as Assistant General
Counsel: 33 of the 37 respondents with the title of General Counsel devoted a portion of
their time to nonlegal activities, whereas only three of the thirteen lower-ranking attorneys
did so. The types of nonlegal activities performed by these lawyers are described infra notes
495-503 and accompanying text.
284 Of the nineteen house counsel in the survey who said either that the
privilege does
not encourage candor or that they were not sure of the effect, fifteen were chief legal officers
of the corporations employing them, and twelve of these individuals also held the title of
Vice President, Executive Vice President or Senior Vice President. The median percentage
of time devoted by the nineteen skeptics (regardless of title) to nonlegal business duties for
their corporations was ten per cent.
229

280 See
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quests for legal advice.2 85 For a sizeable number of house counsel,
therefore, a blending of the roles of lawyer and businessperson is
occurring. A few of the house counsel noted, however, that having
the title of Vice President did not necessarily imply that they also
performed business functions. The purpose for the title, they said,
was simply to increase their clout as a lawyer within the
organization.
Considering their visibility, ease of access to and by corporate
employees, role in the corporate hierarchy and participation by
many in nonlegal work for their employers, house counsel are quite
differently situated from outside counsel with respect to the opportunities for development of a candid relationship with corporate
representatives. The implication, of course, is that house counsel
may not need the corporate privilege as a stimulus for candid communications to the same extent as outside counsel, if at all.
Comments volunteered by various respondents are consistent
with this hypothesis. Some of the members of both samples of lawyers said that the privilege is "more important" for outside counsel, who are usually not as well known by corporate employees. Respondents in both samples also reported instances in which
corporate executives had shown wariness about speaking to outside
counsel until assured that privilege would apply 2 88 According to
one house counsel, "The privilege especially helps to put people at
ease with outside counsel." In a similar vein, one of the law firm
partners said: "To tell people who don't know you that there is a
privilege opens them up." The following quotation from the interview of another partner was the most articulate exposition given of
the privilege's value to outside counsel:
When I started practicing thirty years ago, most of my contacts
were with managers directly. Now they have dozens of lawyers on
their staff.... We're strangers today because of the growth of inhouse counsel. Management tends to be tight-lipped with outside
counsel and things would be even worse without the assurance of
confidentiality. Outside lawyers need the privilege to help foster
trust on the part of management. At least the litigators-the
"hired guns" who are called in on an ad hoc basis-need it.
Maybe it's not so important for the corporate department people
who deal with management on a more regular basis.
205

See supra notes 502-05 and accompanying text.

216 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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This lawyer's observation also echoes the results of other field research suggesting that outside counsel "tend more to be 'hired
guns,' chosen for a particular job, and less and less members of an
ongoing relationship with responsibility for the client's overall
well-being. "287
Subliminal reasons, however, may also account for the greater
enthusiasm shown by outside counsel for the corporate privilege.
Perhaps it is not so much that some in-house attorneys undervalue
the privilege as that outside counsel exaggerate its value due to
economic motives. Because so many corporations have increased
the size of their in-house legal staffs in the past few years,2 88 private law firms have had to find ways to continue making their services attractive to and desired by corporations. 28 9 To this end,
large law firms have increasingly relied upon their capacity to handle large litigation and specialized legal services in such areas as
tax, major acquisitions, and international transactions, as opposed
to the sort of "general corporate counseling" that is now performed
more and more by in-house legal departments. 90 This trend is
borne out by data in the survey showing that the 102 corporations
in the combined samples of executive and house counsel principally retain outside counsel for litigation and specialty matters.291
In connection with their marketing efforts to obtain the legal
business of corporate clients, outside counsel may be able to offer
greater assurance that the attorney-client privilege will apply to
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 8,at 294. In their study of thirteen corporate law
departments, the Chayeses conclude that "today with respect to outside law firms, the general counsel is the client, rather than the CEO or some other representative of the firm." Id.
at 290 (emphasis in original).
287

288 See supra note 8.

See Fried, The Trouble with Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at
61; Nelson, Practice and Privilege:Social Change and the Structure of Large Law Firms,
1981 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 95, 111-17, 130-31.
290 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 8, at 293-95 (reporting results of studies showing
that major role for outside counsel is in litigation, major transactions and "exotic specialties"); Fried, supra note 289, at 61 (law firms may "carve out a distinct niche for themselves" through the advantages they offer in specialty fields and litigation); Nelson, supra
note 289, at 137-38 (law firms will continue to attract corporate clients for legal business in
areas of large litigation and newly developing areas of the law).
Regardless of the type of legal problem involved, outside counsel also are thought to be
of continuing value to corporations when time is of the essence and a hasty deployment of
manpower is required. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 8,at 295. Some of the house counsel and executives in my own survey made mention of this as a reason for retaining outside
counsel.
281 See supra note 54.
268
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their communications than to those of house counsel. Writers have
often suggested that, despite paying lip service to the rule that the2
29
privilege applies equally to house counsel and outside counsel,
courts are predisposed to reject claims of privilege for communications with house counsel on the ground that the matter involves
business rather than legal advice. 293 House counsel are more likely
to be seen as giving business advice, it is said, because they "start
out looking like.businessmen. '294 Outside counsel who specialize in
performing internal investigations of possible corporate wrongdoing, for example, can point to case law in which privilege has been
denied for communications with house counsel whose investigatory
work was characterized by the court as a nonlegal managerial function 5 Despite the apparent rejection in Upjohn of the idea that
house counsel is not acting as a lawyer when conducting an internal investigation,' 8 the retention of outside counsel is still more
likely to remove uncertainty on this point.
No explicit statements of an economic motive were made by
2 See supra note 8. The Supreme Court in Upjohn also implicitly endorsed the prevailing assumption that the privilege applies to house counsel in the same manner as to
other lawyers who provide legal services for a corporation. See Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981). Almost all of the attorney-client communications at issue in
Upjohn were with the company's general counsel Id. at 386-87.
213 See, e.g., Brereton, Pye & Withrow, The Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 24
REC. A.B. Crry N.Y. 230, 240-41 (1969); Burnham, Confidentialityand the CorporateLawyer: The Attorney-Client Privilege and "Work Product" in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542, 543
(1968); Kobak, supra note 104, at 353; O'Neal & Thompson, Vulnerability of ProfessionalClient Privilege in ShareholderLitigation, 31 Bus. LAw. 1775, 1793-94 (1976).
The legal/business advice dichotomy is discussed infra notes 487-94 and accompanying
text.
294 Burnham, supra note 293, at 543. One treatise suggests that "intraprofessional rivalry" may lie behind the arguments of practitioners who oppose house counsel's entitlement to privilege on the ground that they are more like businessmen than lawyers. 24 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 63, § 5478, at 222.
210See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Participation of the general counsel does not automatically cloak the investigation with legal garb.")
At a continuing legal education seminar on the corporate attorney-client privilege held
in New York City, July 12, 1984, prominent law-firm litigator Judah Best urged corporations to retain outside counsel to conduct internal investigations in order to ensure the applicability of privilege. See Best, How to Conduct an Internal CorporateInvestigation, in
CORPORATE DlSCLOSURE AND ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 163, 167 (Practising Law Institute,
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 450, 1984).
200 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981) (communications to general counsel during internal investigation were characterized by Court as having been made
"to counsel for Upjohn acting as such.., in order to secure legal advice from counsel"). But
see Easterbrook, supra note 225, at 355 n.174 (questioning why privilege was applicable in
Upjohn since "[t]here was no need for an attorney to do the interviewing.... If the attorney is a supernumerary, the privilege is inapplicable").
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any of the outside counsel in the survey, but one tax partner in a
law firm did stress that the attorney-client privilege gives him a
competitive edge over accountants when it comes to advice on tax
matters because a client's communications with an accountant usually are not privileged.297 Thus, there may exist subconscious reasons for the relatively stronger enthusiasm displayed by outside
counsel for the privilege that have little to do with its actual effects
on candor.
Assuming, however, that the difference in responses between
house counsel and outside counsel is empirically accurate and that
the privilege is not as important to house counsel as it is to outside
counsel in encouraging candor, should the corporate privilege be
withdrawn from house counsel's communications? 2 8 What would
be the impact? Since most house counsel-at least chief legal officers-are members of their employers' management teams, it
seems reasonable to suppose that most communications would continue to flow unabated. Even lower-ranking members of the inhouse legal department who lack management status are nevertheless part of the "corporate team" because of their continuous onsite presence; they, too, would probably have the trust of the nonlegal employees and would still receive candid communications. As
co-employees within the same enterprise, nonlegal personnel and
house counsel share institutional incentives to be candid with each
other in order to achieve company objectives. 29 9 In addition, it is
unlikely that taking away the privilege from house counsel would
arrest the trend toward expansion in the size of in-house legal
staffs. Corporations still need to consult lawyers to comply with

2" An accountant-client privilege is not recognized at common law or in federal courts.
See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); cf. United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-19 (1984) (no "work product" privilege for auditor's tax
accrual papers). A few states have created an accountant-client privilege by statute. See,
e.g., MCH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 339.713 (West Supp. 1989).
In limited circumstances, communications with an accountant may fall within the attorney-client privilege when the accountant is acting as an agent of the attorney or client in
facilitating the lawyer's giving of legal advice. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d
918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
'13 Elimination of the privilege for house counsel is advocated in Gardner, supra note

107, at 354-62, and Sedler & Simeone, supra note 114, at 23-25.
"I See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text; cf. Developments in the Law, supra

note 79, at 1612 (privileges designed to promote open communication within certain organizations, such as the government and academic institutions, are of questionable empirical
validity because "[tihe parties to these internal communications are involved in ongoing
relationships and are working together to achieve institutional objectives").

1
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the law, and consultation with in-house lawyers may be the most
cost-effective way of doing so."°
Since house counsel are actively engaged in the daily affairs of
the corporations employing them, removal of the privilege from
their communications would undoubtedly produce an increase in
the amount of relevant evidence in corporate litigation. At minimum, it would eliminate costly disputes over-the question whether
a particular communication between employees that was routed
through the legal department was for the purpose of seeking legal
advice or was merely an attempt to cloak the communication with
privilege. 0 1
There may be some force, however, in preserving the privilege
for communications with house counsel that are made in connection with pending or anticipated litigation. As noted above, litigation is one of the areas in which concern over the applicability of
privilege is at its highest.30 2 Preserving the privilege for such matters would allow the corporation to continue to maintain a litigation staff within its legal department, secure in the knowledge that
privilege would apply to most communications with the litigation
lawyers. 3 This would eliminate the felt need to refer all litigation
work to outside counsel, which apparently is the practice of corporations in Europe with respect to matters involving the tribunals of
30 4
the EEC.
On the other hand, American corporations already refer a
great deal of litigation to outside counsel.305 Even companies with
an in-house staff of litigators tend to refer complex cases, such as
antitrust, securities, mass torts and large commercial disputes to
law firms either for exclusive case management or for a sharing of
responsibility with house counsel.306 Privilege would attach to the
300 See Fried, supranote 289, at 60-61 (house counsel can often perform corporate legal

services more cheaply, more quickly and more effectively because "they know the personnel
and needs of the company intimately").
301 See supra notes 145, 160, 182-83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.

112

303There should be no requirement, of course, that the particular in-house attorney be
a litigator in order for the privilege to attach. The test should focus on whether the communication was made in connection with actual or anticipated litigation regardless of the attor-

ney's specific role in the matter. Conversely, the mere fact that the attorney is denominated

a "litigator" or a member of the litigation department should not automatically throw the
mantle of privilege over communications with him.
30,See supra note 181 and acbompanying text.
See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
O6 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 8,at 291; Fried, supra note 289, at 61.
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communications between the in-house lawyers and the outside lawyers in such matters because the in-house lawyers would become,
in effect, the "client.

' 30 7

Furthermore, house counsel's records of

communications with corporate employees in connection with potential or actual litigation would receive qualified protection as attorney work product.30 8 Thus, there may be little need even in the
litigation context to preserve the attorney-client privilege for inhouse lawyers.
A loss of privilege for house counsel would probably be most
noticeable, if at all, in the area of legal counseling in connection
with prospective business transactions. As to such matters, there is
already an element of uncertainty that privilege will attach because of the risk, noted above, that courts will characterize house
counsel's role in such matters as that of a business adviser rather
than a legal adviser.30 9 Yet such communications go on. The loss of
privilege would, of course, increase the frequency with which house
counsel are compelled to give testimony, thus implicating Wigmore's concern over the sense of "treachery" that lawyers would
experience if routinely called upon to testify against their clients. 10 Courts, however, could require, as some already do, that
house counsel be subpoenaed or deposed only as a last resort, thus
enabling them to perform their primary role as counselors, not witnesses.311 In those instances where house counsel are compelled to
give adverse testimony, the complications caused by disqualification of the advocate-witness 312 are not likely to be a frequent problem because litigation is often handled by outside counsel.
In sum, there is reason to doubt that abrogating the attorneyclient privilege in the case of house counsel would do much to alter
the nature of their clients' communications or otherwise disrupt
existing practices. House counsel are integral members of the legal
30, See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 36-37 (D. Md. 1974).
018 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
309 See supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 487-94 and accompanying text (discussing privilege and business communications).
3,0 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
311 See, e.g., Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327, 1330 (8th Cir.
1986) (taking deposition of opposing house counsel "should be employed only in limited
circumstances" in which no other source for information is available; evidence is relevant
and nonprivileged, and information is crucial to case); N.F.A. Corp. v. Riverview Narrow
Fabrics, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 83, 85-86 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (party seeking deposition of adversary's
attorney must demonstrate lack of alternative sources and methods of discovery).
' See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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profession in every sense of the word, but it does not necessarily
follow that the privilege is needed to facilitate counseling in their
particular type of practice.31 3
Having come to the brink of advocating abolition of the attorney-client privilege for house counsel, I nevertheless back away
from it for several reasons. First, although some of the house counsel in the survey were less enthusiastic about the instrumental effects of the privilege than the outside counsel, a 62% majority of
the house counsel said that the privilege helps encourage candor.
Since too much uncertainty would prevail if the applicability of
privilege for house counsel were determined on a corporation-bycorporation basis, overinclusiveness may be necessary in order to
ensure the benefits of the privilege for those corporate legal departments for whom the privilege makes a difference. Second, the
samples were relatively small. Further research confirming the discrepancy between the effects of the privilege in counseling by
house counsel and outside counsel would provide greater assurance
that abolition is warranted. Third, even if the privilege in fact is
less efficacious in producing candor in communications with house
counsel, abolition might resurrect an unhealthy class distinction in
the legal profession. Until recently, house counsel have commanded less prestige and respect in the legal profession than have
the partners of large corporate law firms.3 14 This difference in status is unjustified and should not be magnified by suggesting that
house counsel are "second-class citizens" due to the inapplicability
of privilege, as is the case, for example, with house counsel in
France. 1 5 In addition, the communications of house counsel may
often be discoverable in any event if they involve predominantly
business advice, 316 which tends to lessen the overall cost of applying the privilege to house counsel. To take advantage of this prospect, of course, opposing litigants must be willing to challenge
blanket assertions of privilege for communications with house
313 See Sedler & Simeone, supra note 114, at 25 ("Granted, [house counsel] are lawyers
in the full sense, there is no need to extend confidentiality to communications made to them
because the same communications would be made even in the absence of confidentiality ").
314 See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 111, at 736-37; Kritzer, The Dimensions of LawyerClient Relations: Notes Toward a Theory and a Field Study, 1984 Am.B. FoUNn. REs. J.
409, 418 n.30; Slovak, Giving and Getting Respect: Prestige and Stratification in a Legal

Elite, 1980 Am.B. FOUND. Ras. J. 31; Fried, supra note 289, at 60.
315See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
31' See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text; infra notes 487-94 and accompanying text.
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counsel, and courts must rigorously police the existing limitations
of the privilege. Finally, if the corporate privilege were converted
to a qualified standard, the fact that certain communications were
with house counsel rather than outside counsel could still be a factor for the court to consider in determining the extent to which the
instrumental effects of the privilege would be harmed by lifting the
privilege in the particular case.
C. Implications for Attorneys' Ethical Responsibilities
The data obtained in the survey provide strong evidence that
most corporate officers and employees are unaware of the limitation on their ability to assert the corporation's privilege on their
own behalf.3 1 This finding, when coupled with the increasing number of reported decisions in which corporate representatives have
discovered, too late, that their communications with the corporation's counsel are not protected by a personal privilege,3 1 suggests
that lawyers should be extremely sensitive to issues of fairness in
their dealings with corporate representatives. The problem is particularly acute when counsel is conducting an internal investigation
into possible wrongdoing that could expose the corporation or employee, or both, to criminal or civil liability.2 In such investigations, employees will be under pressure to cooperate lest they lose
their jobs. Many of the attorneys in the survey use the criterion of
potentially conflicting interests as the primary trigger for a warning regarding the privilege limitation.321 Are they thereby fulfilling
their ethical obligations to the parties involved?
Until recently, the regulatory codes of ethics for lawyers did
not directly address the issue.32 2 In 1983, however, the American
Bar Association adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
See infra notes 729-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
310 See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
320 See Lang, supra note 209, at 34-58.
321 See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. Such occasions apparently are rare,
as suggested by the finding that very few of the lawyers routinely include the entity theory
317

3,0

of the privilege in their descriptions to corporate representatives. See supra table 3, section
IILB.3. at 240.

32 The only relevant provisions in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility are
EC 5-18, which simply reminds corporation lawyers that their allegiance is owed "to the

entity," not to individual employees, and DR 7-104(A)(2), which disallows the giving of advice to persons whose interests conflict, or potentially conflict, with those of a client other
than the advice to secure counsel. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY EC 5-18,
DR 7-104(A)(2) (1981).
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as a proposed national standard of legal ethics, and rule 1.13(d)
thereof contains a guideline on point. The rule states that in dealing with the "constituents" of an organization, "a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with
whom the lawyer is dealing. 3 23 The language of the rule itself does
not include "potential" conflicts nor does it impose a requirement
that privilege implications be explained, but the accompanying
nonmandatory comment refers to potential conflicts and also
states: "Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, . . . discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual
may not be privileged." 324 To the extent that they advise corporate
representatives about the rule of privilege or give warnings in situations involving only potential conflicts, many of the lawyers in the
sample appear to be following, commendably, the standard sug3 25
gested in the comment to rule 1.13(d) rather than the rule itself.
The consequences of a corporation's decision to make thirdparty disclosure of a corporate representative's communications
with counsel, over the individual's objections, may be severe: at
minimum, waiver of the privilege could cause embarrassment and
at worst expose the individual to criminal liability.326 Is it fair to
assume, as suggested by Model Rule 1.13(d), that employees have
no need to know about the privilege limitation except when a conflict becomes "apparent" to the lawyer? One of the executives in
the survey observed, for example, "You never know when a matter
may turn out to involve a conflict." In allowing the lawyer to remain silent until an actual conflict is perceived, the standard of
rule 1.13(d) may provide inadequate protection for employees. By
323 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.13(d) (1983).
321 Id. Rule 1.I3(d) comment 1 8.The Model Rules state at the outset,

"Comments do
not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the
Rules." Id. Scope 1 1.
3' Interestingly, New York, the jurisdiction in which the lawyers in the survey practice,
rejected the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1985. See Gillers, Amending the Ethics
Code-Solicitation,PrepaidPlans, Fees, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 3, and at 3, col.
1. At the time of the survey, the official code of ethics for New York lawyers was the Code of
Professional Responsibility, in which EC 5-18 and DR 7-104(A)(2) provided the only relevant guidance. See supra note 322.
316 One court has suggested that when an internal investigation is being conducted by
"special counsel" pursuant to a consent decree between the corporation and a government
agency, due process may require that employees be warned of their right to silence and
individual counsel. Handler v. SEC, 610 F.2d 656, 660 n.1 (1979).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:191

the time the conflict is apparent to the lawyer, the employee may
have made several personally damaging statements. Furthermore,
telling corporate representatives only that the lawyer is "counsel to
the entity" may not be sufficient to instill an appreciation that
communications with counsel are, in effect, "the property" of the
corporation. Three-fifths of the executives in the survey, all of
them well-educated members of top management, were unaware of
this point, or at least had not given the matter any thought.
In addition to considerations of fairness to the individual, a
pragmatic reason for the lawyer to clarify his role as counsel to the
entity is to help protect against disqualification in the event of any
subsequent litigation between the corporation and the individual
involving the subject matter of the communications that were exchanged. For example, if the corporation and an employee are
named as co-defendants in a civil action for damages based on the
employee's misconduct, the company may wish to assert a crossclaim against the employee for indemnity. The corporation might
also want to bring an independent action for damages against the
employee (or, more likely, former employee) if the employee's conduct has caused injury to the corporation.2 7
In adherence to the entity theory of corporate representation,
courts generally have held that the corporation's lawyer may continue to represent the corporation in such litigation even though
the former employee had conveyed personally damaging information to the lawyer.32 8 Some cases suggest, however, that even in the
327 Conversely, the employee might bring an action against the corporation in connection with the matter, alleging, for example, breach of contract or wrongful discharge. See
generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 1404 (1967).
2I See, e.g., W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 675-77 (2d Cir. 1976) (corpora-

tion's law firm permitted to continue representation of company in action against former
officer despite existence of "close question" whether lawyers violated DR 7-104(A)(2) (prohibition on giving advice to unrepresented person with adverse interests) by suggesting to
officer that candid answers to inquiry, taking of lie detector test and providing access to
personal records would clear his name); Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1124,
1126-28 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (in dissolution proceeding by 50% shareholder and director of
closely held corporation, motion to disqualify corporation's lawyer denied because plaintiff
failed to show information given to counsel was to be concealed from corporation); Wayland
v. Shore Lobster & Shrimp Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (counsel to

closely held corporation not disqualified from defending action by officer because officer
could not have reasonably believed information he gave to counsel would be kept confidential from corporation). The court in Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284, 301 P.2d 10
(1956) stated:
To hold that the [officer's] giving of such information in that more or less intimate
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absence of an actual attorney-client relationship with the em-

ployee, a lawyer who has spoken with the employee about sensitive
matters relating to his employment may not represent the corporation against the employee where those matters are the subject mat-

ter of the litigation.2

The rationale for disqualification in these

cases appears to be the existence of a de facto attorney-client relationship between the individual and the employer's attorney.3 3 0
Disqualification has also been based on the notion that an em-

ployee, even though fully aware that counsel represented the entity
alone, was lulled into thinking that his cooperation and forthrightrelationship which necessarily must exist between an officer of the corporation and
its attorneys would prevent the corporation attorneys from thereafter using it in
favor of the corporation in litigation against the officer, [and] would be unfair to
the corporation and its stockholders ....
Id. at 292-93, 301 P.2d at 15-16.
321 See, e.g., Perillo v. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 83 N.J. 366,370, 416
A.2d 801, 803 (1980) (municipal attorney may not represent municipality against municipal
employee where attorney's contacts with employee in course of handling municipal business
were regular and frequent); DeCherro v. Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc., 94 Misc. 2d 72,
76-77, 404 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257-58 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1978) (union attorney disqualified
from defending union in action by union member for breach of duty of fair representation
where member had discussed the facts underlying action with union's attorney; attorneyclient relationship had been "sufficiently established" in part because member was not legally sophisticated enough to understand distinction between personal and organizational
representation); In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 471-78, 584 P.2d 284, 290-94, (1978) (counsel to
closely held family corporation could not ethically represent corporation in contract dispute
with former chief executive officer who dominated corporation because counsel had drawn
contract and officer had no basis for believing counsel had other than officer's individual
interest at heart).
330 See Nichols v. Village Voice, Inc., 99 Misc. 2d 822, 824, 417 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1979) ("fiduciary obligation" or "implied professional relation" may exist
in absence of formal attorney-client relationship such affected person has right to believe
attorney will respect person's confidences); Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200
(Utah 1985) ("Even in the absence of an express attorney-client relationship, circumstances
may give rise to an implied professional relationship or a fiduciary duty toward the client,
thereby invoking the ethical mandates governing the practice of law").
If actual joint representation of two clients is undertaken by an attorney, it is clear that
disqualification of the attorney is required in any subsequent litigation between the two
clients if the subject matter is substantially related to the prior joint representation. See
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.9(a) (1983). Disqualification may be compelled even if the former client did not intend to keep information confidential from the
other client. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 385-95 (S.D. Tex.
1969) (law firms retained by corporation conferred with corporate officer and represented
him during SEC and bankruptcy hearings; firms were estopped from representing corporation in its later action against officer based on transactions at issue in prior hearings despite
fact officer was told information given to lawyers would be reported to corporation's
management).
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ness would result in clearing his name with the company.33 1 At the
outset of any interview in a matter in which the interests of the
employee potentially conflict with those of the employer, a warning
by counsel that he represents only the entity and that any information provided by the employee may be disclosed to the employer and possibly to outsiders should be sufficient to dispel any
3 32
such false sense of security on the part of the employee.
3 For example, in Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Higgeston, No. 17864/84 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County, Oct. 11, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, N.Y. file), the law firm retained as
special counsel to Chase Manhattan's board of directors was disqualified from representing
the bank in an action for damages against six former officers based upon their alleged negligence in the handling of certain loan participations. The lawyers had engaged in in-depth
interviews of the officers concerning the transactions at issue. All of the officers had been
represented by personal counsel at the time of the interviews and had been made aware in a
letter from Chase's chairman that the law firm had been retained by Chase for the purpose
of determining whether Chase had legal claims against present or former officers and, if so,
whether it was in Chase's interest to pursue them. Apparently no additional warnings were
given by the law firm during the interviews. The court reasoned that "[d]efendants' legitimate expectation [was] that candor and cooperation [during the interviews] would buffer
them against any further legal action" and that the law firm had "obtained a potentially
unfair advantage."
The purpose of disqualification in such cases is not entirely clear since the corporation
presumably is still entitled to use the information that was obtained from the employee.
Disqualification, of course, does provide a form of judicial "punishment" to the lawyers, but
it also delays the litigation and separates the client from knowledgeable and well-prepared
counsel. See W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 581 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976) (in absence of
tainted trial, appropriate forum for any punitive measures against counsel is bar grievance
committee). On the other hand, if the lawyer is to testify on behalf of the corporation to
admissions made by an employee, disqualification may be justified by the advocate-witness
rule. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmILrrY DR 5-101(B), DR 5-102 (1981)
(withdrawal by attorney required if he "ought" to be called as witness for his client); Mac
Arthur v. Bank of New York, 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (disqualification required if attorney's testimony would be significantly useful to client). The Higgeston court
relied upon the advocate-witness rule as an alternative ground for disqualification, and this
may be a sounder basis for the result that was reached. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v.
Higgeston, No. 17864/84(Sup. Ct N.Y. County, Oct. 11, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, N.Y.
file).
"s Some of the attorneys in the survey indicated that they suggest to corporate representatives the need for separate counsel. Such advice is also recommended in the comment
to rule 1.13(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: "[T]he lawyer should advise any
constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and
that such person may wish to obtain independent representation." MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL

CoNbucT Rule 1.13(d) comment %8 (1983); see also MODEL

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSmiLITY DR 7-104(A)(2) (1981) (no advice may be given to person whose interests
conflict with those of client except advice to obtain counsel).
In cases of potential conflict, some lawyers may give a preliminary warning about their
limited role but delay recommending the retention of separate counsel until the conflict
becomes "real and imminent": "[W]hen a firm is already counsel to a corporation, it would
in many cases-such as a typical corporate payments investigation-be wholly impracticable
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As an alternative to the existing rule that generally gives the
corporation the exclusive power to waive its attorney-client privi-

lege for the employee's communications to its counsel, some commentators have urged that the employee be given the right to assert the corporation's privilege in his own behalf even when he has
not become the individual client of the corporation's attorney.3 3 3
The corporation thus could not voluntarily disclose the employee's

communications with counsel to the government or other third
party without the consent of the employee. 3 The argument is
made that broadening the right of the employee in this fashion is
necessary to further the purpose of the corporate attorney-client
privilege to encourage employees to be candid.3 Analogy is drawn
to the "joint defense" or "pooled information" doctrine, which allows two clients with separate counsel, who share a common inter-

est in pending or potential litigation, to participate in joint attorney-client consultations and to share their separate attorney-client
communications with one another without either client relinquishing the right to assert the privilege against third parties with re-

spect to his own communications. 36

and unduly costly to shareholders to recommend a separate counsel for every individual
employee or director at the outset of the investigation." Cutler, The Role of the PrivateLaw
Firm, 33 Bus. LAw. 1549, 1556 (1978).
3" See Sexton, supra note 114, at 505-14; Note, supra note 64, at 838-43; see also Note,
supra note 211, at 420-21 (proposing independent privilege for corporate executives).
The proposed extension of privilege would not create an attorney-client relationship
between the corporation's attorney and the employee. The attorney's duty of loyalty would
continue to be owed solely to the corporation. See Note, supranote 64, at 842. If the attorney has actually undertaken joint representation of the corporation and the employee, the
individual may, of course, assert his personal privilege to prevent access by third parties.
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
3,, Another possible solution that would not involve any change in existing doctrine is
for the officer or employee to negotiate a contract with the corporation, either at the time of
employment or as a precondition to the lawyer's investigatory interview, giving the employee the right to determine whether his communications with counsel could be disclosed
to outsiders. See Arkin, supra note 120, at 4, col. 5. Even if the employee had foresight and
sufficient bargaining power to demand such an agreement, public policy might preclude its
enforcement, since it would run counter to the corporation's interest in self-protection. See
id.; see also Sexton, supra note 114, at 510 n.213 (contract giving veto power to employee
would be ineffective because of inadequate remedy in event of breach).
"' See Sexton, supra note 114, at 508-10.
31 See id. at 510-12; Note, supra note 64, at 838-42.
The joint defense doctrine, if applicable, overcomes the objection that the confidentiality essential to the attorney-client privilege has been lost by making or sharing communications in the presence of "strangers." See In re LTV See. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D.
Tex. 1981); Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 572, 579 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). Only communications that advance common interests may be pooled without loss of
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This approach, however, should be rejected. The corporation,
as a collective enterprise with a duty to shareholders, should have
the right to protect itself against the acts of individuals within the
corporation who have caused it injury. 3 7 The corporation therefore
should be free to enter into negotiations with the government or
other party that may involve a waiver of its attorney-client privilege if it is in the company's best interests to do So.33 s In addition,
it is doubtful that giving the employee the right personally to assert the corporation's privilege would do much to increase the employee's candor. In trouble situations, the employee would reasonably suspect that what he told the company's lawyer would be
disclosed to superior authorities in the corporation even if disclosure could not be made to third parties. Thus, his disclosures to
counsel would still expose him to discipline or loss of employment.
In all likelihood, therefore, the employee would give counsel an incomplete or inaccurate account of his conduct. Furthermore, even
if the individual could personally assert the corporation's privilege
against third parties, he should not be able to assert it against the
corporation itself in any civil litigation between him and the company. It is a well-settled principle both in the case of clients with
the same attorney339 and clients with separate attorneys who share
privilege. Compare SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 512-13 (D. Conn.), appeal
dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976) (common interest lacking where joint venturer
shared counsel's antitrust analysis with other joint venturer which was not potential antitrust co-defendant) with Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 310
(N.D. -Cal. 1987) (common interests existed where potential purchaser of business was
shown opinion letter of seller's counsel regarding validity of competitor's patent; competitor

was likely to sue seller and/or buyer).
33 See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 111, § 6.5A, at 287 ("[Ihe benefits of the privilege are
solely for the advantage of the corporation. Its decision to forego those benefits... should
not be subject to veto by an employee whose perspective might be quite personal"); Kaplan,

Some Ruminations on the Role of Counsel for a Corporation,56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 873,
884 (1980) (interpreting Model Rules of Professional Conduct as advocating corporation's
lawyer has duty to protect corporation against injury from its agents); Saltzburg, supra note
124, at 305 n.128 (internal corporate investigations will be ineffective in exposing and eradicating wrongdoing, "if the employees and officials responsible for a corporation's problems
never suffer as a result of an investigation").
'" The Supreme Court's decision in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985), which allowed a trustee in bankruptcy to waive the debtor corporation's privilege with respect to management's prebankruptcy communications with counsel, implicitly recognizes the importance of the corporate entity's right to expose internal
wrongdoing by its officers and employees. See id. at 348-58; see also infra notes 572-76 and
accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 216 N.Y. 28, 35-36, 109 N.E. 872, 873 (1915) (confidential communications between lawyer and two joint clients concerning representation are pro-
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their communications under the joint defense doctrine4 0 that the
privilege protects only against disclosure to third parties; the two
clients may not invoke the privilege against each other. Even if the
attorney undertook joint representation, therefore, the potential
for a falling out between the employee and the corporation with
the consequent loss of privilege should be explained to the employee, regardless of whatever effect there may be on candor.3 41
A more satisfactory solution than giving employees the right
to claim for themselves the corporation's privilege against outsiders is to broaden the circumstances in which lawyers explain to
corporate representatives the law regarding the nature of the corporate privilege. Rule 1.13(d) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct should be modified in two respects: a lawyer's reminder to
corporate representatives that he represents only the corporation
should be accompanied by a clarification concerning the privilege,
and both disclosures ought to be made not only when conflicts become "apparent" but also whenever the interests of the employee
and the corporation "may differ. '3

42

Similarly, the Code of Profes-

tected by privilege as to third parties but not as between two joint clients themselves in
subsequent litigation between them on same subject); Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y. 420,
424, 28 N.E. 651, 652 (1891) (same); see also infra note 548.
30 See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 29, 32 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (if parties who share attorney-client communications in common defense have falling
out and litigation later develops between them, any party may use shared communications
against any other). In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381, 393-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(same).
3'" See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmITy EC 5-16 (1981) (when lawyer undertakes joint representation, "he should explain fully to each client the implications
of the common representation"); MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 comment 1 6 (1983) (where lawyer represents two clients with potentially conflicting interests,
"it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not
protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised").
"42 Proposed amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility in New York, for
example, incorporate the disclosure requirement of Model Rule 1.13(d) but expand the language to include situations in which the interests of employees "may differ" from those of
the organization. See DRAFT OF TE NEw YORK LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmiTy DR 5-109 (Oct. 5, 1987). Rule 1.13(d) of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct
(1988) also broadens Model Rule 1.13(d) by omitting any reference to the lawyer's perception of adverse interests as the determinant for a warning. The lawyer is directed to "explain the identity of the client [to corporate representatives] when the lawyer believes that
such explanation is necessary to avoid misunderstandings on their part." MICHiAN RuLEs
OF PROFSSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(d) (1988); see also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 111, at 736
(recommending that lawyer explain nature of representation to all employees "whose interests might in the future come into conflict with those of the organization"). The more liberal
standards of the proposed New York rule and the Michigan rule as to the appropriate circumstances for a warning are preferable to Model Rule 1.13(d), but they still fail to require
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sional Responsibility, which currently is silent on the entire issue, 343 should be amended to make the corporate lawyer's duties

clear. Whenever a conflict is possible, as, for example, during an
internal investigation of potential corporate wrongdoing, communications with the employee should be prefaced with the reminder
that the lawyer represents the corporation, not the individual, and
that statements of the employee may be disclosed to higher authorities within the company and eventually to outside parties at
the discretion of the corporation, even if no current intent to do so
exists. It is doubtful that candor would be chilled in the overwhelming majority of corporate attorney-client communications:
As one of the executives in the survey put it, "It won't make any
difference in my communications, but it's good to know the rule."
V.

WHOSE COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD FALL WITHIN THE

CORPORATE PRIVILEGE?

A. The Road to Upjohn.- The Control Group and Subject Matter
Tests
The issue of whose communications within the corporate hierarchy should fall within the corporation's attorney-client privilege
has consumed a great deal of judicial energy in the past few years,
and still no consensus exists for its resolution. One possible approach is suggested by Wigmore's general proposition that "[a]
communication.., by any form of agency employed or set in motion by the client is within the privilege."' 3 44 In the early 1950s, two

federal district courts seemed to agree that a broad agency approach is indeed proper by stating simply that the corporate privilege encompasses "information furnished by an officer or employee
of the [corporation]"3

45

and that communications from the corpo-

rate "client" are those of its "employees, officers, [and] directors."

46

The Tentative Draft of the Restatement of the Law Gov-

erning Lawyers adopts essentially the same broad approach by
extending the corporate attorney-client privilege to any person
who is in "an agency relationship with the organization" if "the
notice of the privilege limitation.
*11See supra note 322. Bar authorities in New York, for example, are contemplating
revision of the Code to address the issue. See supra note 342.
"' 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2317, at 618 (emphasis in original).
"
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954).
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communication concerns a legal matter of interest to the
organization." 3 7
If all employees of a corporation are to be treated as its
spokespersons for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, however, the corporation will have a tactical advantage that is unavailable to a similarly situated individual. The scenario of an automobile accident between a privately-owned car and a corporate
vehicle being used in the business of the corporation provides an
example. If the lawyer for the owner-driver of the private vehicle
interviewed a friend of the owner who was a passenger in the car at
the time of the accident, the interview would not fall within the
attorney-client privilege since the lawyer obviously would not be
talking to his client.34s At most, the attorney's record of the interview would be conditionally privileged as work product. 49 In contrast, if the corporation's attorney interviewed an employee of the
corporation who happened to be a passenger in the company car en
route to a worksite at the time of the accident, the interview would
receive the absolute protection of the attorney-client privilege
under a literal application of general agency principles. But as one
court queried: "Does the fact that a corporation may speak only
through a natural person grant to it privileges which a natural person would not possess?"350
On the foregoing facts, a court might be inclined to hold that
the co-employee was speaking as a "mere witness" and not as the
corporate client.351 How it would arrive at this conclusion, however,
17RESTATEMENT oF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS § 123(2)-(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1989).
-" The privilege does not apply to communications with third parties, even though the
lawyer may have been directed by the client to speak to such parties. 8 J. WIMOR, supra
note 2, § 2317(2).
318 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
,,0 D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 735, 388 P.2d 700, 708, 36
Cal. Rptr. 468, 476 (1964).
251

See, e.g., id. (statement to attorney by corporate employee who had performed work

at scene of accident held not privileged); Atlantic C.L.R.P v. Daugherty, 111 Ga. App. 144,
141 S.E.2d 112 (1965) (statements of railroad crew members to railroad's investigator following accident not privileged even though subsequently given to railroad's attorney); Con-

solidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982) (corporate
engineer's metallurgical report concerning machine that caused accident held not privi-

leged); Leer v. Chicago, K., St. P. & P. Ry., 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981), (statements
taken by railroad investigator of members of switching crew who witnessed accident that
killed fellow crew member held not privileged), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
Earlier decisions holding to the contrary with respect to employee-prepared accident
reports may have been influenced by the English doctrine of "legal professional privilege,"
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is far from clear. The notion that corporate employees who are
mere witnesses fall outside the zone of eligibility for the corporate
privilege has its origins in the Supreme Court's opinion in Hickman v. Taylor.352 Shortly after a tugboat accident in which five
seamen drowned, the partners who owned the tugboat retained a
lawyer who obtained statements from the surviving crew members.
When the partners were later sued in a wrongful death action, the
plaintiff sought access to these statements. Although discovery was
denied on the basis of work product immunity,3 53 the Court observed that the statements fell outside the scope of the attorneyclient privilege.3 54 Without elaborating upon the exact scope of the
attorney-client privilege, the Court simply noted that the privilege
"does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a
witness.3 55
Despite the fact that Hickman involved employees of a partnership, not a corporation, 56 it has been read by some observers as
which gives absolute protection to all communications between the solicitor and any of the
client's agents or third parties for the purpose of assisting in litigation. See Gergacz, supra
note 93, at 130-31. Growth of the English doctrine in the United States was stunted by
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), in which such documents were classified as "work
product," entitling them only to a qualified immunity, unless they involved communications
with the client See infra notes 352-55 and accompanying text
352 329 U.S. 495 (1947).

353 The Hickman Court held that even though the attorney-client privilege may not
apply, a party is not entitled to discovery of "written statements, private memoranda and
personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his
legal duties" absent a showing of undue prejudice. Id. at 510. Such discovery would "[contravene] the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims."
Id. See also supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
- Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
355 Id.

31 Since Hickman involved a partnership-an aggregate of individuals-the clients
were natural persons, thus eliminating the problem of identifying someone who personified
the client. On the other hand, employees of a partnership arguably could qualify as agents
for the purpose of communicating on behalf of the partners. See supra note 344 and accompanying text. The proposed Restatement position is that the attorney-client privilege should
include not only the communications of employees of corporations but also those of any
"organization," including sole proprietorships. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs § 123 comment c (Tent Draft No. 2, 1989). Admittedly, it seems unfair to give corpo-

rations an advantage over unincorporated businesses with respect to extension of the privilege to employees' communications merely because the artificiality of corporate existence
creates the need to bestow "client" status on corporate agents who can speak for the corporation. By the same token, however, extending the privilege to counsel's communications
with any employee of any organization, including a sole proprietorship, as does the proposed
Restatement, see id., gives organizational parties, in general, an unfair advantage over individuals. For example, if a sole proprietor's employees, while on the job, fortuitously witness
an accident that implicates their employer, the communications of the employer's counsel
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suggesting the boundaries for the corporate privilege: If the em-

ployee is speaking as a mere witness, the corporate attorney-client
privilege does not attach.3 5 7 In seeking to exclude "mere witnesses"
from the scope of the corporate privilege, lower federal courts developed essentially two approaches to the question of whose communications within the corporate hierarchy should qualify for the
privilege: the control group and subject matter tests.
Rejecting a broad agency approach as conflicting with Hickman, the court in City of Philadelphiav. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.5s fashioned what has come to be known as the control group
test as a means of distinguishing between qualified corporate
spokespersons and employees who are mere witnesses:
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank
he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial
part in a decision about any action which the corporation may
take upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized
member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in
effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his
disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply.359
The control group test thus extends the privilege to those individu-

als who "personify" the corporation by their ability to control
whatever corporate action is taken in response to counsel's advice.

As a practical matter, the control group consists of most members
with the employees about the accident would be privileged. An individual who was also
involved in the accident and whose friends were witnesses could not claim the privilege for
his attorney's communications with his friends. See supranote 348 and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAmAM, supra note 63, § 5483, at 287 (Hickman expressed an "attitude... at odds with the notion that communications from any corporate
employee could qualify as privileged communications from the corporate client to its
attorney").
211210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
3$9 210 F. Supp. at 485. City of Philadelphia
was decided shortly after the district court
in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), supplemented,
209 F. Supp. 321 (1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963), had
totally rejected the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations. See supra
notes 95-102 and accompanying text. The City of Philadelphiacourt found a good deal of
"sound logic" in the view that corporations do not fall within the common law attorneyclient privilege, but it felt compelled by tradition to recognize the corporate privilege. City
of Philadelphia,210 F. Supp. at 484. Some of the problems implied by the district court in
Radiant Burners, such as the danger of overbreadth if too many corporate communications
are immunized, see Radiant Burners, 207 F. Supp. at 774-75, seemed to awaken courts to
the need for more carefully "tailoring the ordinary rules to the peculiar cloth of this legal
entity." American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88 n.12 (D. Del.
1962).
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of top management and those lower-level managers who are closely

involved in the decision-making process with respect to which the
particular legal advice is being sought.
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn, the control
group test was followed by an apparent majority of federal
courts 3 0 and has remained the governing standard in roughly onefifth of the states. 61 Aside from the conceptualism that members
of a control group personify a corporation because, like an individual client, they are the corporate actors who will make discretionary decisions on the basis of the attorney's legal advice, other arguments have been advanced in support of the control group test.
Principal among them is the limitation that the test imposes on
the number of communications that are eligible for privileged
treatment, thus aiding in pretrial discovery.36 2 Proponents of the
36 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979) (control
group test described as having been "adopted by a majority of the federal courts"). Federal
decisions agreeing with City of Philadelphiainclude United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d
1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d
1224 (3d Cir. 1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975); United States v.
IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26
(D.Md. 1974); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), afl'd
mem., 478 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1973); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515
(S.D. Cal. 1963).
"I Most of the states that have explicitly endorsed the control group test have done so
through codification. See ALASKA R. Evm. 503(a)(2); ARK. R. Evm. 502(a)(2); A. R. Evro.
502; Nnv. REV. STAT. § 49.075 (1979); N.D. R. EVID. 502(a)(2); OKLA. R. Evm. 502; S.D. R.
EviD. 502(a)(2); Tax. R. EvD.-CvIL & CRIM. 503(a)(2). In Illinois, the control group test

has been adopted by judicial decision. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89
11.2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Koppers Co., 138 MI.App.
3d 276, 485 N.E.2d 1301 (1985).
The codified versions of the control group standard appear to have been influenced by
the pre-1971 proposals of the Advisory Committee's draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in which the attorney-client privilege for corporations was defined in terms of the control
group test because of its seemingly widespread acceptance. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AM MAGISTRATES, Proposed Rule 5-03(a)(3), 46 F.R.D. 161, 249-51 (1969) ("representative of the client" defined
as one "having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered
pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client"). Following the Supreme Court's divided affirmance of the decision in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.
1970), aff'd per curiam, 400 U.S. 348, reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971), however, the Committee eliminated its definition of "representative of the client" because of the apparent
lack of a consensus on the subject among the Justices of the Supreme Court. See 56 F.R.D.
183, 235-40 (1973); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 17, 503(d)[04], at 503-47.
Ultimately, none of the advisory committee's proposed rules of privilege were adopted. See
infra note 392.
262 See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.RtD.
397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975) (control group test coexists well with need for discovery); Consoli-
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control group test also argue that coverage of other employees is
unnecessary to fulfill the goals of the privilege. It is contended that
under the test, corporate managers will continue to employ attorneys to conduct internal investigations because of their business

duty to be vigilant and to comply with the law;363 attorneys will be
thorough in interviewing employees because of their professional
obligation to do so; 364 and lower-level employees will be no less in-

hibited in their communications with attorneys than they would
under a broader privilege because the corporation's privilege is not

theirs to invoke.3 65 Thus, a narrow attorney-client privilege, together with the work product immunity in situations where litigation is likely, arguably provides sufficient protection to encourage
corporate self-policing. 6 6
The predominance of the control group test was challenged,
however, in the 1970 decision in Harper& Row Publishers,Inc. v.
Decker.3 67 The plaintiffs in a massive antitrust suit sought discovdation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. App. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250, 256-57 (1982)
(same); Note, supra note 114, at 429-30 (same).
"' Nath, supra note 114, at 44-47.
" In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979).
313 Id. at 1236. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text. Because of the limitation on the individual employee's control over corporate attorney-client communications,
Professor Stephen Saltzburg proposes a somewhat different type of control group test. See
Saltzburg, supra note 124. He contends that the corporate privilege should encompass only
those employees who, in the particular corporation, have the actual power to control the
subsequent use of their communications, i.e., to assert the corporation's privilege against
outsiders. Id. at 306-13. In his view, such individuals are the only persons for whom the
rationale of the privilege-the assurance of secrecy as an inducement to candor-truly applies. Professor Saltzburg's argument would be virtually unassailable but for the fact that no
individual within a corporation ultimately can control the company's use of his communications with counsel. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text. Even the chief executive
officer would be at the mercy of the board of directors or successor management. See supra
notes 121-22 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court has noted, "individual officers
and directors always run the risk that successor management might waive the corporation's
attorney-client privilege with respect to prior management's communications with counsel."
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 357 (1985). The survey
findings show that Professor Saltzburg is correct, however, to the extent that upper managers usually assume they have some degree of control over the corporation's exercise of the
privilege or at least would seldom expect a waiver to their detriment. See supra notes 20813 and accompanying text.
366In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979); see generally
Nath, supra note 114, at 37-54; The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 114, at 270-80.
367 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348, reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 950 (1971). Without explicitly addressing the shortcomings of
the control group test, the Supreme Court of California had previously adopted a more flexible approach to the issues in D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388
P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964). Seeking to adopt the same reasoning that supports the

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:191

ery of interview memoranda prepared by defendants' lawyers in
connection with the "debriefing" of several lower-echelon corporate officers following their testimony before a grand jury that was
investigating- possible antitrust activities.36 The court held that
the control group test gave inadequate protection to some corporate agents whose communications should be privileged. 69 Apparently taking its cue from Hickman, the court stressed that the corporate employees in the instant case were not speaking to the
attorney about matters or events as to which they were little more
than "bystander witnesses." Rather, they had been directed by
their corporate superiors to communicate with counsel, and the
subject matter of the communication was "the performance by the
employee of the duties of his employment."370 This, said the court,
was sufficient to bring their communications within the privilege.
A shortcoming of the subject matter test as articulated in
Harper & Row is that it presents the potential for immunizing
from discovery a multitude of corporate documents without providing the offsetting benefits that the corporate attorney-client
privilege is intended to foster, i.e., increased candor by the client
to enable counsel to provide informed advice. For example, if the
board of directors or top management adopted a policy that al
internally prepared documents concerning the activities of the corporation were to be routed to corporate counsel on a regular basis,
literal application of the test arguably would insulate the documents from disclosure despite their true character as routine busiprivilege in the case of individuals "to fit the corporate concept," the court enunciated
eleven guiding principles, many of which apply uniquely to the investigation of accidents by
a corporation's liability insurer. Of general applicability is the court's suggestion that the
communications of an employee with counsel "should not he ...privileged unless, under all
of the circumstances of the case, he is the natural person to be speaking for the corpora-

tion." Id. at 736-37, 388 P.2d at 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477. In elaborating on this notion, the
court anticipated the subject matter test. A distinction was drawn between the mere witness-an employee whose communications relate to matters with which he has no connection other than as an observer-and the employee whose communication is that of his employer: "Where the employee's connection with the matter grows out of his employment to
the extent that his report or statement is required in the ordinary course of the corporation's business, the employee is no longer an independent witness." Id. at 737, 388 P.2d at

709, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
3'8The plaintiffs were local governments, public schools and libraries suing on the basis
of an alleged price-fixing conspiracy in the publication industry. Harper& Row, 423 F.2d at

489.
...Id. at 491.
370Id. at 491-92.
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ness records. 7 1 In such cases, employees technically would be
"communicating" with counsel pursuant to a directive of their
superiors and the subject matter of the communication would concern the employees' performance of their duties. It is doubtful,
however, that the Harper & Row court intended to dispense with
the other traditional requirements of the privilege: a showing that
legal advice was sought from a lawyer acting as such; that the communications related to the seeking of legal2 advice; and that confi37
dentiality was intended and maintained.
A few years later, the court in Diversified Industries, Inc. v.
Meredith3 73 synthesized these concerns by adopting a modified
version of the subject matter test. While stressing the merits of the
subject matter test in encouraging the "free flow of information" in
those cases in which it is most needed, the court also noted the
potential for abuse that the standard presents.374 To resolve the
problem, the court set forth the following criteria: (1) the employee
must be communicating with counsel for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice at the direction of his corporate superior so that the
corporation can secure the advice; (2) the subject matter of the
communication must fall within the scope of the employee's duties;
and (3) access to the communication must be restricted to those
37, See Weissenberger, Toward Precision in the Application of the Attorney-Client
Privilege for Corporations,65 IowA L. Rav. 899, 912 (1980); Note, Privileged Communications - Inroads on the "Control Group" Test in the CorporateArea, 22 SYRAcus. L. Rv.
759, 766 (1971).
$72 See supra note 2. A "business" communication to counsel should contain, at the
very least, an implied request for legal advice based thereon. See infra notes 492-94 and
accompanying text.
3 572 F.2d 596, 606-11 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). The case grew out of disclosures in a
proxy contest that employees of Diversified Industries, Inc. may have used a secret "slush
fund" to bribe purchasing agents of other companies. Id. at 607. A law firm was retained
and authorized by Diversified's board of directors to investigate the facts, report the results
and set forth its recommendations for a course of action. Id. The firm thereupon interviewed several employees at all levels of the corporation and embodied the interview summaries together with its analysis and recommendations in a report to the board. Id. at 60708. Subsequently, one of the companies whose purchasing agents allegedly had been bribed
sued Diversified for damages and sought production of the law firm's report and board minutes referring to critical portions thereof. The original panel that heard the case denied
applicability of the privilege on the ground that the law firm had been hired to provide only
investigatory services that could have been performed by nonlawyers; work product immunity was also denied because no litigation was anticipated at the time of the investigation.
Id. at 598-604. In the en bane decision, the majority agreed that work product immunity was
unavailable, id. at 611 n.4, but found that the attorney-client privilege could apply because
the law firm had been providing legal services. Id. at 610.
3' Id. at 609.
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within the corporation who have a need to know of its contents due
to their own role within the corporate structure.37 5 The court

stressed that these modifications would prevent the privilege from
attaching to routine business reports merely because they pass
through the hands of counsel, would preserve the requirement of
confidentiality in the corporate context, and would avoid violating
the bystander witness concept by limiting qualified communications to those concerning the employee's corporate duties.3

7

The stage was thus set for the Supreme Court's 1981 decision
in Upjohn Co. v. United States37 7 to resolve the controversy over
whose communications within a corporate hierarchy should receive
the benefit of the attorney-client privilege. The General Counsel
for Upjohn Company had undertaken an investigation into the nature and scope of questionable overseas payments by various employees. He sent confidential questionnaires (accompanied by a letter from the Chairman urging cooperation and the maintenance of
confidentiality) to foreign managers requesting detailed information about their knowledge of any questionable payments and, together with outside counsel, conducted follow-up interviews of
eighty-six individuals.7 8
When the results were in, Upjohn voluntarily disclosed the existence of its questionable payments in filings with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"). The IRS began an investigation into the tax consequences
-11Id. The court drew upon the analysis in 2 J. WEINSTEI & M. BERGER, supra note
17, 5 503(b)[04], at 503-47 to -50.
371 Diversified, 572 F.2d at 609. A few courts have accepted Diversified's gloss on the
subject matter test. See, e.g., Marriott Corp. v. American Academy of Psychotherapists, Inc.,
157 Ga. App. 497, 507, 277 S.E.2d 785, 791-92 (1981); Leer v. Chicago, M., St. P.& P. Ry.,
308 N.W.2d 305, 308-09 (Minn. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982). Others have tried
their hand at formulating alternative standards. A notable decision in this regard is In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978), in which the court's criteria differed in only one major respect from those of Diversified. Instead of imposing the requirement that the employee be shown to have consulted with counsel at the direction of a superior, the Ampicillin court said that the employee "must have made a communication of
information which was reasonably believed to be necessary to the decision-makingprocess
concerning a problem on which legal advice was sought." Id. at 385 (emphasis in original).
In Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research Corp., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974), the
court attempted to synthesize the control group and subject matter tests by holding that a
communication: (1) must be made by a member of the control group or (2) an agent, employee or representative acting pursuant to the direction of a control group member, and (3)
must be incident to a request for legal advice. Id. at 1163-65.
37 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
3" See id. at 386-87, 394 n.3.
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of the transactions and, after receiving a list from Upjohn of all
employees who had provided information to the General Counsel,
issued an investigatory summons demanding discovery of the questionnaires and counsel's interview notes,379 The lower courts applied the control group test to determine the validity of Upjohn's
claim of attorney-client privilege,35 0 but the Supreme Court re-

versed, holding that the scope of a corporation's privilege is not to
be gauged by the limitations of the control group test.3 81
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority38 2 rejected the
concept that only those within the corporation empowered to direct the company's actions in response to legal advice personify the
corporation for purposes of the privilege. This approach, said the
Court, ignores the function of the privilege in protecting the "giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and
informed advice. 3 8 3 Whereas an individual client is both the
source of information and the person who will make decisions on
the basis of the attorney's advice, in a corporation these roles may
179 Id. at 387.
"0 A federal magistrate, whose recommendation was adopted by the district court, held
that Upjohn's disclosure of the payments to the SEC constituted a waiver of any privilege
that might attach to the questionnaires and interview notes. United States v. Upjohn Co.,
78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9277, at 83, 603 (W.D. Mich. 1978), adopted by district court at
78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) %9437 (W.D. Mich. 1978), remanded, 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir.
1979), reo'd and remanded, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that no waiver had occurred, but agreeing with the district
court's application of the control group standard. Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1227-28.
The court of appeals rejected Upjohn's contention that the subject matter test should
govern the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege. The court reasoned that the test
encourages senior management to insulate itself from unpleasant facts by directing counsel
to obtain the information about possibly illegal transactions from lower-echelon employees.
"Such purposeful ignorance," said the court, is detrimental to corporate interests. Id. at
1227. The court's reasoning on this point is obscure. There is no reason to believe that
counsel would not disclose the fruits of its investigation to management; the privilege, after
all, does not shield the employee's information from the employer. See supra note 118 and
accompanying text. The court went on, however, to its principal argument that under a
broad privilege, corporate counsel becomes an undiscoverable repository of all the details of
questionable transactions. To force the adversary to obtain the details from individual corporate agents was said to severely burden the discovery process. The court, therefore, rejected the subject matter test "because of the broad 'zone of silence' it would tend to create." Id. at 1227.
'l
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397.
" The Court's rejection of the control group test was unanimous, but Chief Justice
Burger wrote a concurring opinion in which he criticized the majority for not providing a set
of alternative guidelines. Id. at 402-04; see infra note 393.
I' Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
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be divided among many persons. 38 4 The Court observed that the
actions of employees in the middle and lower levels of a corporation can "embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties" and
that these are the persons who will have the information most
helpful to counsel in providing advice with respect to such difficulties.38 5 Since the control group test discourages communications
with lower-echelon employees, it frustrates the lawyer's task of becoming fully informed of the facts.3 8 Stressing that modern corporations rely on their lawyers to cope with regulatory legislation, the
Court also observed that the test "threatens to limit the valuable
efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with
the law. ' 387 Further, the control group standard was said to be unpredictable because of the inherent uncertainty in determining
whether a corporate officer will be deemed to have played a "substantial role" in acting on counsel's advice."8
38'Id. at 391.

383 Id. The Court's recognition of the realities of decentralization in the large modem
corporation is supported in the literature. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 257, at 1139-41;
Pierce, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility in the Corporate World: An Abdication of
Professional Self-Regulation, 6 U. McH. J.L. REF. 350, 365-66 (1973); Sonnenfeld & Lawrence, Why Do CompaniesSuccumb to Price-Fixing?,HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1978, at
145, 146; see also Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360"Mass. 188, 275, 275 N.E.2d 33,
83 (1971) ("Employees who are in the lower echelon of the corporate hierarchy often exercise more responsibility in the everyday operationsof the corporation than the directors or
officers"), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972) (emphasis in original).
As a matter of agency law, a corporation can be held liable for acts committed by its
agents within the scope of their employment. Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime:
Regulating CorporateBehavior Through CriminalSanctions, 92 H-Iv. L. REv. 1227, 124950 (1979). The scope-of-employment test is generally interpreted with flexibility so as to
encompass virtually any act occurring while an employee is engaged in a job-related activity.
Otherwise, a general corporate directive prohibiting illegal acts by employees would exempt
the corporation from liability because any such act would be outside the scope of an employee's authority. Id.; see also RIsTATEmr (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-232 (1958);
Brickey, Corporate CriminalLiability:A Primerfor CorporateCounsel, 40 Bus. LAw. 129,
132-33 (1984).
'" Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-92. The Court agreed with the view that the control group
test presents the corporate attorney with a "H-obson's choice ....If he interviews employees
not having 'the very highest authority,' their communications to him will not be privileged.
If, on the other hand, he interviews only those employees with the 'very highest authority,'
he may find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine what [actually transpired]." Weinschel, CorporateEmployee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12
B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv., 873, 876 (1971).
It has also been argued that the control group test discourages thorough factual investigations by corporate lawyers because of the fear that they will be creating evidence to be
used against their client by third parties. Burnham, supra note 293, at 548.
38 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
"s Id. at 393. To illustrate its point, the Court compared two cases in which the out-
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Having rejected the control group test, the Court simply reiterated the circumstances surrounding Upjohn's internal investigation s89 and concluded that the privilege should apply to the communications at issue in order to be "[c]onsistent with the
underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege." ' Although
the facts were tailor-made for application of the subject matter
test as refined in Diversified,3"1 the Court surprisingly declined to
adopt it or any other specific approach. The Court emphasized
that it was deciding only the case before it and that "draft[ing] a
set of rules which should govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas" would violate the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence
501.392 The most it would make clear was that the control group
test was unacceptable as a basis for "govern[ing] the development
of the law in this area." 393
come was different as to employees with similar job titles: Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308,
315-16 (N.D. Okla. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968)
(managers and assistant managers of patent division and research and development department held to be within control group); and Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D.
82, 83-85 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973) (directors of research and vice
president for production and research held to be outside control group).
31,Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95. The Court stressed the following seven factors: (1) the
employees communicated with Upjohn's counsel acting as such; (2) they did so at the direction of their corporate superiors; (3) the corporation was seeking legal advice; (4) the necessary information for such advice was available only from lower-echelon employees; (5) the
matters communicated were within the scope of the employees' corporate duties; (6) the
employees were aware that the purpose of the communications was to aid the corporation in
obtaining legal advice; and (7) confidentiality of the communications was requested and
maintained. Id.
310Id. at 395. The Court also held that the attorney's interview notes were protected
from discovery by the work product doctrine because they would reveal his mental
processes. Id. at 397-402.
"1 See supra notes 373-76 and accompanying text.
182 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396-97. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence directs federal courts, subject to certain exceptions, to utilize state-created privileges in diversity actions and in all other cases to "be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED.R. Evw. 501. The original advisory committee's draft of specific privileges in the
Federal Rules of Evidence provoked such intense public controversy that Congress rejected
them and adopted rule 501 as a compromise measure. See Krattenmaker, supra note 81, at
635-43.
,31
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated that
the Court was neglecting its "duty to provide guidance in a case that squarely presents the
question in a traditional adversary context." Id. at 403 (Burger, C. J., concurring). He therefore urged adoption of his own version of the subject matter test[Als a general rule, a communication is privileged at least when, as here, an employee or former employee speaks at the direction of the management with an
attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment.
The attorney must be one authorized by the management to inquire into the sub-
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B. Empirical Findings
Upjohn does not end the debate over which spokespersons
should be covered by the corporate attorney-client privilege. The
states are free to follow their own course,' 94 and the exact scope of
Upjohn is unclear even in the federal courts. s95 Do the competing

tests really make a difference in the conduct of lawyers and corporate managers? Have predictability, frequency of lower-level communications and the ability to gather facts been improved by
Upjohn? From the federal judiciary's perspective, are there any
indications, to date, that the inclusion of lower-level communications within the privilege causes undue discovery problems for the
adversaries of corporations? To gain insight on these issues, the
lawyers and judges in the survey were asked to describe their experience, both before and after Upjohn, and the executives were
asked how the scope of the corporate privilege might affect their
conduct.
1. The Lawyers' Views
The effect of the control group standard prior to Upjohn was
elicited by the following question put to the lawyers: "Was the
control group standard ever a factor that you took into consideration when communicating with representatives of your corporate
client?" About one-third of the lawyers in the combined samples of
house and outside counsel (32 of 102) recall having taken the standard into account prior to Upjohn. Of these thirty-two lawyers,
twenty-six (81.3%) indicated further that their conduct had been
affected by it. More specifically, on at least one occasion they had
sought to limit their communications to the control group. -" ' In
ject and must be seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the
following functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has bound or
would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if any, of that
conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that have been
or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.
Id. at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
311 See supra note 361.
" See infra notes 430-49 and accompanying text.
196 Six of the 32 lawyers (18.8%) said that even though they had taken the control
group standard into consideration, they had never sought to limit their lower-level communications. Their volunteered comments indicated that they had found it necessary to ignore
the control group standard in order to obtain information. One of them noted, "I was worried by the control group test but did nothing about it; the benefit of legal help for the
business outweighed the loss of privilege."
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order of frequency, litigation (actual or potential), sensitive matters, internal investigations of possible corporate wrongdoing, and
major transactions were mentioned as the circumstances in which
the twenty-six respondents had attempted, when possible, to avoid
speaking with persons outside the control group. Nevertheless, six
litigators in this group indicated that "when necessary" they had
spoken to lower-level employees. "In litigation, you have to get the
facts, regardless of the source," was a typical comment. Including
the remaining six lawyers who had taken account of the control
group test but had never sought to limit their lower-level communications,3 97 a total of twelve out of thirty-two respondents volunteered that they had spoken with lower-echelon employees despite
the absence of privilege because of the need for information.
A substantially larger number of lawyers-sixty-eight
(66.7%)-answered "no" when asked whether they had been influenced by the control group standard before the decision in
Upjohn. Unsolicited explanations were offered by forty-five of
these respondents. The three most common reasons, with an indication of how many respondents gave the particular explanation,
were: (1) the lawyer had dealt mostly with top management and
therefore was not concerned over the absence of privilege at the
lower levels (nineteen); (2) the lawyer had felt compelled to communicate with lower-level employees regardless of privilege rules
(seventeen); and (3) prior to 1981 the lawyer had not been in a
position to communicate with corporate employees because he was
employed by the government or was only an entry-level associate
at a law firm (seven). The seventeen lawyers who said that they
had felt compelled to communicate with lower-level employees regardless of privilege rules stressed that the facts needed to give
proper legal advice were often in the possession of such employees.
They therefore considered it necessary to speak to noncontrol
group employees "in order to do their job." In addition nine of
these individuals said that they had considered the control group
standard to be "bad law." Either they assumed that ultimately it
would be rejected in favor of a broader approach, or they were determined "to fight the privilege issue in court," as, for example, by
arguing that particular employees were within the control group.
The Supreme Court's rejection of the control group test substantially reduces the need of corporate lawyers to concern them*17 See supra note 396.
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selves over the question of whose communications are protected by
the privilege. Since some states have refused to follow the federal
rule, however, there remain enclaves in which the control group
standard could still exert an influence."' 8 State court litigation is
not infrequent for some corporations,399 and if such litigation were
to arise in a state such as Illinois, which adheres to the control
group standard,00 Upjohn would provide cold comfort. Furthermore, even if the case were litigated in federal court in such a state
pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, the local law of privilege would
still apply to the substantive matter in dispute. 401
The lawyers in the combined samples were therefore asked to
indicate whether the control group standard had ever been a factor
they had taken into consideration after the decision in Upjohn.
Twenty-one of the lawyers (20.6%) felt they were under the continuing influence of the control group standard. 40 2 As a result, all
398See supra note 361. The law of New York, the state in which the lawyers in the
study were practicing, is uncertain as to the status of the control group standard. Compare
Cornell Mfg. Co. v. Mushlin, 85 App. Div. 2d 592, 592, 444 N.Y.S.2d 709, 710 (2d Dep't
1981) (citing Upjohn to preclude pretrial discovery of counsel's interviews with corporate
employees) with In re Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, 103 App. Div. 2d 1000, 1001, 478
N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (4th Dep't 1984) (County Attorney's investigatory interviews of county
employees held subject to disclosure during trial to facilitate adversary's cross-examination
of employees as witnesses).
In a case involving the separate issue of whether a lawyer ethically may communicate
on an ex parte basis with employees of a corporate adversary, see supra notes 128-29 and
accompanying text, the Appellate Division, Second Deprtment, relied on Upjohn for the
following dictum: "The general rule is that the attorney-client privilege may apply to communications made by all corporate employees to corporate counsel in connection with a
particular litigation, and that the privilege is not limited to only those communications
made by the corporation's 'control group.'" Niesig v. Team I, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 1989, at 21,
col. 3, 29, col. 1. The only significant opinion of the Court of Appeals on the corporate
attorney-client privilege, however, dose not pass on the issue of how deep within the corporate hierarchy the privilege extends. See Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater New
York, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 588, 590, 540 N.E.2d 703, 703-04, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508, 508-09 (1989)
(upholding applicability of privilege to house counsel's memorandum to management).
"' The median percentage of time devoted by the litigators in the survey to matters in
state court was 35%. See supra notes.51-52 and accompanying text.
'10 See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Koppers Co., 138 Ill. App. 3d 276, 279-80,
485 N.E.2d 1301, 1303 (1985).
40 Federal courts are bound by Upjohn with respect to federal claims, but they must
apply state privilege law in diversity actions and other matters as to which state law supplies the rule of decision. See FED. R. Evr. 501; see generally Note, The Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Corporate Context: The Intersection of Federal and Illinois Law, 1984 U.
ILL. L. Rfiv. 175, 183-88.
"I' Altogether, 34 attorneys (one-third of the combined samples) had taken the control
group standard into account at some point either before or after the Upjohn decision.
Of the 32 lawyers who bad been concerned about the control group issue prior to
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but one of these respondents had occasionally restricted their
lower-level communications. 0 3 Interestingly, only three of them
cited the potential applicability of state evidence law as their reason for continued deference to control group principles. A more
frequent explanation was uncertainty as to the scope of Upjohn in
federal courts, as illustrated by the following comments: "After
Upjohn, you know the group is bigger, but by how much?"; "We
try to limit ourselves to the control group. Upjohn seems to say
only that we're not bound by it if necessary to go to the lower
levels"; "We're not confident that privilege applies at all levels"; "I
don't trust Upjohn." Habit was another volunteered reason for
conforming one's practice to the control group test: "I grew up
under the control group standard and still think that way. Besides,
the more you keep things in the control group, the better it looks
to a judge." Others simply said they considered it prudent to limit
communications to the control group in "sensitive" matters. Six of
the respondents, however, indicated that in spite of the potential
applicability of the control group standard, when necessary they
had spoken with lower-level employees either to give them advice
or to obtain factual information.
In order to further discern the practical effect of the control
group/subject matter dichotomy, the lawyers were asked to assess
the impact of Upjohn on three aspects of their practice: predictability that privilege will attach, frequency of communication with
lower-level employees and overall ability to gather facts. The responses to each question are shown in table 5.
A substantial majority of the lawyers (85.3%) thought that
predictability was improved by Upjohn. Several complained that
under the control group standard, they do not know at the time of
communication with a middle-level member of management
whether a court will subsequently characterize the individual as a
member of the corporation's control group. Typical comments were
Upjohn, only 19 were still concerned about it following Upjohn. Two attorneys said they
had not been affected by the control group issue prior to Upjohn, but had taken it into
account thereafter.
40 The one respondent who said that he had never limited his communications gave
the following explanation: "In states like Illiois, you still have to deal with lower-level people to get facts. We'll fight the privilege issue later in court. For example, it may be possible
to argue that as to the specific matter the employee was in the control group."
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that the Upjohn approach provides "greater comfort" or "peace of
TABLE 5.

Lawyers' Views of the Effect of Upjohn
on Three Aspects of Corporate Representation.

Percent of lawyers in
combined samples (N=102):
Yes

No

Does not
know

Totals

1. Did Upjohn
improve
your ability
to predict
that
privilege
will attach?

85.3

10.8

3.9

100.0%

2. Did Upjohn
affect the
frequency of
your lowerlevel
communications?

9.8

90.2

Question

3. Did Upjohn
affect your
overall
ability to
gather
facts?
26.5
71.6
2.0
* Total percent does not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

100.0%

100.1%*

mind" and that the control group test "doesn't make sense," is
"too fuzzy" or "causes too much uncertainty." The respondents,

hoivever, were not all equally enthusiastic about the improvement
in predictability afforded by Upjohn. Of those who perceived an
improvement, about a third of the house counsel and half of the
outside counsel characterized the impact as only "slight. ' 40 4 Sev40' The 87 respondents who said that the Upjohn approach improves predictability
were asked whether the improvement was "large" or "slight." Fourteen of 44 (31.8%) of the
house counsel and 23 of 43 (53.5%) of the outside counsel said that the improvement in
predictability was "slight."
It is noteworthy that a greater percentage of house counsel (68.2%) than outside counsel (46.5%) characterized the improvement in predictability as "large." One reason that may
account for the variation in response between the two groups of lawyers is that Upjohn
made clear that house counsel's communications can qualify for privilege. See supra note
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eral of the respondents in this category explained that they seldom
communicate with lower-level employees, making Upjohn almost
irrelevant for them. Similarly, a few indicated that since the control group issue had not been a factor for them, the Upjohn approach made only a "theoretical" or "abstract" improvement in
predictability that has had little practical significance. Several
others said that they still consider the law tenuous, even in federal
courts, as to the scope of the privilege at the lower levels. Ironically, one respondent felt that Upjohn introduced less certainty:
"Before Upjohn at least you knew who was not covered; you had a
'safe harbor' in the control group. Now it's unclear as to who is
covered."
As shown in table 5, Upjohn was said to have had a relatively
insignificant impact on the frequency of the respondents' communications with lower-level employees. Only about 10% of the lawyers said that the Upjohn decision had increased the frequency of
such communications. Even though they were not asked to explain
their answers, thirty-six lawyers, slightly more than one-third of
the combined samples, volunteered that they would communicate
with lower-level employees if necessary to get the facts, regardless
of the rule of privilege. The following comments are typical of
those who said that necessity dictates their communications: "You
must investigate the facts as needed, and then worry about privilege later if you have to"; "Even without privilege at the lower
levels, I have to get the facts"; "You must get the facts-the good,
the bad and the ugly, no matter what."
With respect to the overall ability to gather facts, table 5
shows that slightly more than a quarter viewed Upjohn as having
had a positive influence. A few of the respondents who gave an
affirmative answer volunteered that fact-gathering is improved be292. Lawyers serving as house counsel therefore may be more likely than outside counsel to
perceive Upjohn as making a large improvement in predictability. One of the house counsel,
for example, volunteered that Upjohn confirms the applicability of privilege for in-house
lawyers and therefore gives him "peace of mind." A law firm partner's comment is also
suggestive of this explanation for the disparity in response: "For me there is not much improvement in predictability. I view Upjohn as helping in-house counsel have greater
freedom."
A second reason why house counsel may be more inclined to view the Upjohn approach
as making a large improvement in predictability is that house counsel's continuous presence
in the corporation may bring him or her into more frequent contact with lower-level employees, thus enhancing the perceived value of Upjohn. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
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cause lower-echelon employees communicate more freely or candidly when told that the corporate privilege applies to their communications. Others attributed the improvement to a greater
willingness on the part of corporate management to encourage
lower-level communications.
2. The Corporate Executives' Views
During the pretest segment of the study, it was determined
that questioning the executives about their pre-Upjohn experience
would be unproductive. Instead, the executives in the final sample
were asked simply to state their current belief as to the scope of
the privilege: "Prior to this interview, was it your belief that privilege could attach to a lawyer's communications with any corporate
employee, regardless of rank?" Thirty-nine executives (75.0%) answered yes, five (9.6%) said no, and eight (15.4%) did not know.
That so many executives gave a positive answer was not surprising
because several attorney-respondents had stated during their interviews that most corporate managers assume coverage at all
levels. One of the lawyers, for example, had asserted that "[t]he
control group test runs counter to people's expectations."
To investigate the executives' potential conduct under the
control group standard, a hypothetical was posed as a follow-up
question. They were asked to assume that the corporate privilege
does not apply to counsel's communications with lower-level employees and that outside parties may therefore obtain access to
those communications in litigation. The executives were then
asked whether management would be less likely to encourage lawyers to obtain information from lower-level employees or whether
such a rule would in all likelihood have no effect. Twenty-eight
(53.8%) said they would be less likely to encourage lower-level
communications, twelve (23.1%) said the control group standard
would have no effect, eight (15.4%) said its effect would depend on
the circumstances, and four (7.7%) were unable to say. Combining
the first and third response categories, the total percentage of executives who thought the control group approach would more than
likely have a negative impact, at least in some circumstances, was
nearly 70%. Although this finding sheds no direct light on the
question whether lower-level communications with counsel would
be less candid in the absence of privilege, the data do suggest that
some lower-level communications would not take place at all.
Very few comments were volunteered by the executives, but a
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portion of those with a negative view of the consequences of the
control group standard used such terms as "chilling" and "crippling" to describe its effect. An equal number, however, said the
control group approach would impose only a "slight constraint."
Six executives said they would "leave it up to the lawyers" as to
how communications with lower-level employees should be handled. One executive whose company does business in Illinois an-

swered on the basis of experience that "special precautions" are
taken in control group jurisdictions. 405 In contrast, one of the executives who had formerly served as counsel in a variety of companies reported: "In my experience, businessmen talk to the lawyer
when they feel that they have to. They wouldn't stop lawyers from
speaking to lower-level employees just because of the absence of
privilege."
3. Views from the Bench
To obtain a sense of the potential cost of the Upjohn approach in terms of lost evidence, the respondents from the judiciary were asked the following question: "With respect to all of the
contested communications that you have held were protected by
the corporate attorney-client privilege, approximately what percentage involved communications with corporate employees whom
you would consider to be outside the control group?" Fourteen of
the twenty-four jurists with relevant experience said that such
communications had involved noncontrol group employees less
than 25% of the time; four said noncontrol group communications
accounted for 26-50% of the privileged communications; two said
that 60-70% of the communications had involved noncontrol group
employees; and four were unable to answer.
In the experience of the judicial respondents, therefore, most
corporate attorney-client communications that are upheld as privileged involve members of the control group. Upjohn's extension of
the privilege to communications with lower-level employees apparently makes little difference in the majority of their cases.
The judges and magistrates were also asked to indicate how
often, in their experience, the Upjohn approach had "significantly
increased the difficulty litigants have encountered in obtaining information that would be helpful in resolving the case." Six respondents said that the Upjohn approach had "never" caused any diffi405 See supra notes 371-401 and accompanying text.
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culties for a corporation's adversary, seven said that they had
"rarely" seen difficulties, one said "occasionally" and three said
"frequently." Some of the judicial respondents who said that
Upjohn has seldom or never been a stumbling block to the acquisition of evidence volunteered two principal reasons. First, since
most corporate attorney-client communications are with upper
management, the control group/Upjohndichotomy is usually irrelevant. Second, even if lower-level communications are involved,
the adversary usually can discover the facts directly from the employees or from other nonprivileged sources.
C. Discussion
1. Analysis of the Findings
The information provided by the lawyers in the survey regarding the effect of the control group/Upjohn dichotomy is difficult to
assess. Only thirty-four (one-third) of the attorneys in the study
had ever taken the control group test into consideration at some
point in their practice. A substantial majority of these lawyers,
however, indicated that the test had caused some limitation in
their communications with lower-level employees. 06 On the other
hand, over a third of the lawyers in the study made unsolicited
statements that the need to ascertain the facts would cause them
to speak to lower-level employees regardless of whether the corporate privilege applied. For these lawyers, application of the control
group standard would do little to decrease the frequency of their
lower-level communications. A good number of lawyers apparently
feel, in contradiction to some of the literature, °7 that they must
investigate facts in the possession of lower-level employees in order
to properly advise management even if the information might fall
into the hands of an adversary. 4 8 As a few of the litigators in the
408 Eighty-one

per cent of those who had been affected by the control group test prior

to Upjohn and 95% of those affected after Upjohn had, on occasion, attempted to restrict
their lower-level communications. See supra notes 396-97 and 402-03 and accompanying
text.
.,0 See supra note 386.

10 Subsequent to Upjohn, two members of a panel of the ABA Antitrust Section
agreed that communications with lower-level employees would be essential in order to provide proper representation regardless of whether privilege applied. See Barnette, Leary &
De Lone, supra note 120, at 133 & 137-38. Mr. De Lone put the matter as follows: "Surely,
failure to investigate for fear that the fruits of the investigation might someday fall into
hostile hands, either the government or treble-damage plaintiffs, would be a folly." Id. at
138.
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survey noted, the risk of discovery is minimal if the investigation is
conducted in anticipation of litigation because the work product
immunity would shield much of the information.
Would the communications of lower-level employees be candid
without the corporate privilege? In this portion of the interview,
the lawyers were not asked to focus specifically on the question of
candor by lower-level employees. Other segments of the interview,
however, produced data relevant to the issue. As reported above in
table 4, a substantial majority of the attorneys indicated that the
corporate privilege encourages candor on the part of employees
who are aware of it, regardless of their rank.409 As to such aware-

ness, however, most lower-level employees were thought to lack
knowledge.410 It is questionable whether the corporate privilege
could have very much of an influence on persons who are not cognizant of it. Even if the corporate privilege were brought to the
attention of a lower-level employee, he might very well be told that
counsel represents only the company or that the privilege is that of
the corporation, not the employee personally, when the interests of
the employee and the corporation are potentially adverse. 411 In

such cases, to the extent the employee is candid, it is more likely to
be as a result of
the orders of upper management, not a promise of
42
confidentiality.
Moreover, in a later section of the interview, the attorneys
were asked to assess the impact of a hypothetical change in the law
which would make the corporate attorney-client privilege a qualified privilege that could give way upon a showing by an adversary
of compelling need for the evidence. 413 Nearly two-thirds of the
lawyers felt that such a change in the law would do nothing to
affect the candor of lower-level employees. 41 4 Although qualifying
the privilege is not the same thing as eliminating it, this finding
nevertheless suggests that the control group standard has little adverse influence on the candor of lower-level employees.
Some of the lawyers in the survey would probably dispute the
foregoing conclusion. A few lawyers, for example, volunteered that
the corporate privilege was of "particular help" in getting lower409 See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
410 See supra table 1, section HLB.!. at 236.
411 See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.

412 See 24 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra note 63, § 5476, at 145-46.
413 See infra notes 606-15 and accompanying text.
41 See infra note 613 and accompanying text.
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level employees to be candid. Perhaps this is because the lawyers
do not tell employees that the privilege belongs solely to the corporation, or because the assumption is that the company will not
waive the privilege to their detriment. In any event, an equal number of lawyers singled out lower-level employees as examples of
corporate representatives who are not influenced by the corporate
privilege; rather, their candor was said to be a product of the directions of their superiors. Thus, to the extent the Upjohn Court
brought lower-level employees within the corporate privilege in order to encourage lawyers to investigate and to encourage lowerlevel employees to be candid, the effort may have been wasted.
According to the lawyers in the survey, the'only significant impact of the Upjohn decision itself was to increase their ability to
predict that privilege will apply to particular communications. 415
The answers to the remaining questions about Upjohn suggest
that it has had little influence in the practices of most corporate
attorneys. Nine out of ten respondents thought that Upjohn had
no effect on the frequency of their lower-level communications,
and nearly three out of four reported no impact on their fact-gathering abilities.4 16 The apparently minimal effect of Upjohn is reflected even in the responses of the subgroup of thirty-four lawyers
who indicated that the control group standard had been an inhibiting factor at some point in their practice. 1 Within this subgroup, only six house counsel and one outside counsel -eported
that Upjohn had increased the frequency of their lower-level communications. 4 8 Although fourteen members of the subgroup said

that the broader approach to privilege had improved their ability
to gather facts, this is still less than half of those who might be
expected to be especially enthusiastic about Upjohn.41 9
411

See supra table 5, section V.B.1 at 310.

'1

See id.

117See supra note 402. The 34 relevant attorneys were comprised of seventeen house
counsel and seventeen outside counsel.
418 The six house counsel constitute 35.3% of the relevant 17 house counsel, and the
one law firm partner constitutes 5.9% of the 17 outside counsel. Although the numbers are
small, use of the Fisher Exact Test showed the differences to be significant. More house
counsel than outside counsel may have been affected by Upjohn for reasons previously suggested. See supra note 404.
"0eSee also Barnette, Leary & De Lone, supranote 120, at 133 (remarks of Mr. Leary):
On balance, I doubt that the Upjohn case will have much impact on the way
corporate investigations are actually conducted. Even lawyers in jurisdictions
which followed the severely limited "control group" test had to pretty well ignore
it because they could not otherwise serve their clients. It has never made sense to
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Despite the apparent inconsequentiality of Upjohn to lawyers,
the findings do not necessarily prove that the Supreme Court was
wrong or that widespread adoption of the control group standard
would not make any difference in lawyers' conduct. The beforeand-after questions that were used in the interviews are inherently
imprecise because the pre-Upjohn and post-Upjohn time periods
do not provide a tidy division between two applicable rules of law.
Prior to Upjohn, federal courts were split over the control group
issue,'4 20 and some of the lawyers in the survey indicated that they
had always assumed a broader approach would prevail. 4 21 For such
lawyers, potential application of the control group standard by
lower federal courts may have posed little or no risk, and Upjohn
therefore signalled no dramatic change in the law. One respondent,
for example, argued that "the Supreme Court was really only following the law, not leading it." According to another, "If the
Upjohn decision had gone the other way, it would have caused a
general chilling effect."
Another important factor that may skew the findings regarding Upjohn's apparent failure to affect lawyers' conduct is that
many corporate lawyers seldom communicate with lower-level employees. Nearly a third of the respondents (thirty-one) volunteered
at some point during the interview that they rarely, if ever, personally come into contact with lower-echelon employees. If the need to
do so should ever arise, their evaluation of the effects of one test or
the other might be quite different. Otherwise, for these lawyers the
inclusion of lower-level employees within the privilege makes no
practical difference.
The answers given by the executives in the survey lend somewhat stronger support for a broad approach to the privilege. Their
responses suggest that if the control group standard had been endorsed in Upjohn, the management of a majority of corporations
might have sought thereafter to insulate lower-echelon employees
from counsel, at least in certain circumstances. 422 Thus, even attorneys who were still willing to speak to lower-level employees might

Id.

remain deliberately ignorant of the facts because of a fear of adverse discovery.
4,0See supra notes 358-76 and accompanying text.

21 Several attorneys, for example, volunteered comments to the effect that prior to
Upjohn they had considered the control group test a minority approach that ultimately
would be rejected by the Supreme CourL
412 See supra notes 404-05 and accompanying text.
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be interdicted by management's decision to narrow the scope of
their representation. The views of the executives are therefore consistent with the apparent hypothesis of the Upjohn Court that a
broad privilege is more helpful than the control group standard in
encouraging corporate clients to undertake corrective internal investigations.423 On the other hand, the question was presented to
the executives in an unavoidably leading manner, once again introducing the problem of subjectivity and bias.424 Furthermore, they
were not asked to take account of how the availability of the work
product immunity might affect their answers in cases of potential
litigation.
As to the costs imposed by the Upjohn approach, the data obtained from the judges and magistrates in the survey suggest that
the overall loss of evidence is small. Most of the communications
as to which the respondents had upheld claims of privilege had
involved members of the control group. 425 Most of the judicial re-

spondents also indicated that Upjohn rarely increases the difficulty that adversaries encounter in obtaining evidence. 42 6 Judicial

experience must be viewed cautiously, however, because it does not
account for claims of attorney-client privilege that go unopposed.
Indeed, a few of the attorneys in the survey observed that one of
the intangible effects of Upjohn had been a reduction in challenges
to their corporate clients' assertions of privilege. A survey of government attorneys or practitioners who represent individual plaintiffs against corporations might produce quite different results
with respect to the question of cost. From the vantage point of the
jurists in the sample, howe(er, adversaries are infrequently hindered by Upjohn.
In sum, the results of the survey fail to offer convincing evidence one way or the other as to the relative superiority of the
control group test or subject matter test in furthering the goals of
the corporate attorney-client privilege. At minimum, they create
some misgivings about the value of Upjohn in affecting the investigative efforts of lawyers and the candor of lower-level employees.
To this extent the findings support the decision of state courts and
legislatures that continue to follow the control group standard.
As previously discussed, however, the corporate privilege may
423 See suprrnotes 254-56 and 387 and accompanying
424 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
425

See supra notes 405-06 and accompanying text.

426 Id.

text.
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be justified because it provides an incentive for corporate management to undertake corrective self-policing with the assistance of
lawyers 422 If assured that the corporation can assert the privilege
for communications at all levels of the corporate hierarchy, upper
management may: (1) authorize counsel to obtain the facts directly
from lower-level employees; and (2) order such employees to be
candid with counsel. 428 Giving full credit to the views of the executives in the survey, most corporate managers will otherwise discourage counsel from seeking out important sources of information. Without thorough knowledge of facts that are obtainable,
perhaps, only from lower-level employees, the lawyer might not be
able to provide the type of legal advice that is needed to keep the
corporation within the bounds of the law or to correct past
misdeeds.
It seems accurate to say that expansion of the corporate attorney-client privilege beyond the control group at least has the potential for encouraging management to authorize open channels of
communication between all employees and the corporation's attorneys in an effort to comply with the law. Society, of course, is the
ultimate beneficiary of corporate legal compliance. To enhance the
prospects of this beneficial result, it makes sense as a general matter to take a broad approach to resolution of the question of whose
communications with counsel should be covered by the corporate
privilege. If the cost of a broad approach-concealment of important facts in adjudicative proceedings-is'seldom a problem or can
be mitigated when the cost becomes too high in particular cases by
lifting the privilege for some lower-level communications, 429 then
rejection of the control group test is a logical choice.
2. Suggestions for Determining Appropriate Corporate Spokespersons
Assuming that the corporate privilege should not be restricted
"17

See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.

as The proposed Restatement justifies a broad standard for the corporate attorney-

client privilege precisely for this reason: "Defining the organizational privilege as stated in
[Section 123] fully accords with the policy objective of the privilege... by encouraging an
organizational client to employ its power as principal to direct agents to communicate in
order to provide legal services for the organization." RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 123 comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, (1989); see also id. comment c (privilege is
necessary to induce organizational clients "to direct employees and other agents to be forthcoming in communicating with the organization's lawyer").
42 See infra notes 623-799 andaccompanying text.
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to the communications of upper management, exactly which other

communications should qualify? Upjohn leaves this issue unsettled, and the survey questionnaire did not pursue the point beyond
asking the respondents to compare the control group standard with
the "broad approach" taken in Upjohn. No precise formula is pro-

vided by the Upjohn opinion itself. In concluding that the corporate privilege should apply, the Court stressed seven characteristics
of the communications between Upjohn's employees and its counsel,4 30 but it is doubtful that all of the factors would have to be
satisfied in all cases. Courts must either opt for the unlimited
agency approach suggested by early federal precedents4 3 1 or adhere
somewhat closer to Upjohn by using some version of the subject

matter test.13
My own view is that the goal of encouraging corporate managers to authorize open channels of communication between lawyers
and employees throughout the organization can be adequately met
without a rule that would permit any agent of the corporation to

speak for the entity. An agent who is outside the control group
should be considered a spokesperson for the corporation only when
the subject matter of his communication with counsel concerns his
personal responsibilities as a member of the corporate organization.433 Thus, the most appropriate standard is one which extends
43

See supra note 389.

"' See supra notes 345-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 367-76 and accompanying text.
43S See 2 D. LouisELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 111, § 212, at 569-70; 2 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 17, 503(b)[04], at 503-49. The Upjohn Court noted that the communications at issue in that case involved matters within the scope of the employees' corporate duties. See supra note 389. A few courts subsequent to Upjohn have explicitly used a
scope-of-employment standard. See, e.g., Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 203
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Bruce v. Christian, 113 F.R.D. 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Ellenberg v.
Tuffy's Div. of Starkist Foods, Inc., 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 442, 447-48 (D. Minn.
1985); Marriott Corp. v. American Academy of Psychotherapists, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 497, 277
S.E.2d 785, 791-92 (1981); Leer v. Chicago, 308 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Minn. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 939 (1982).
An inappropriate interpretation of the subject matter test was made in Baxter Travenol
Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410 (S.D. Ohio), supplemented, 514 F. Supp. 1156
(S.D. Ohio 1981). In that case, the employee in question had worked for the plaintiff corporation prior to 1978, at which time he became associated with other former employees of the
plaintiff in a competing enterprise. When he left the competitors in 1980, he was retained by
the plaintiff corporation as a litigation consultant. In that capacity, he provided information
to plaintiff's counsel about the activities of plaintiff's competitors during his association
with them. Id. at 412. The court recognized that the content of the communications did not
concern the employee's job-related duties for the plaintiff corporation, but it held that the
communications nevertheless fell within the privilege because the employee's current duty
43
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the corporate privilege to confidential communications between the
corporation's attorney and any member of the control group 43 4 or
any other officer or employee, provided that as to such other individual, the subject matter of the communication concerns his corporate duties and the purpose of the communication relates to legal advice for the corporation.
Limiting eligible communications to those that deal closely
with the employee's particular corporate duties maintains the integrity of the principle that the privilege encompasses only communications with the client, not with bystander witnesses, and
thus preserves a degree of symmetry with the scope of the privilege
as it applies to individuals. 43 5 An employee who becomes aware of

the activities of others within the corporation simply because he is
on the job or in proximity to them when he acquires such knowledge is a fortuitous witness to the event.436 Of course, if it is a reg-

ular part of the employee's corporate responsibility to observe and
supervise the acts of other employees, his statements to counsel
about such matters could qualify for privileged treatment.437
was to communicate with counsel for the purpose of securing legal advice for the corporation. Id. at 414. Such a bootstrap approach would enable corporations to convert mere witnesses into sources of privileged information simply by designating them litigation
consultants.
431 See supranote 359 and accompanying text. Corporate rank and title should not be
determinative of whether an individual is in the control group, since titles can mean different things in different corporations. See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.). What is required is a factually specific inquiiy in individual cases to ascertain whether the person communicating with counsel was a true participant in the decision-making process with respect to which legal advice was solicited. In
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. App. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982), the
Illinois Supreme Court defined the standard along these lines by bringing within the control
group any "employee whose advisory role to top management in a particular area is such
that a decision would not normally be made without his advice or opinion, and whose opinion in fact forms the basis of any final decision by those with actual authority." Id. at 112,
432 N.E.2d at 258.
415 See supra notes 348-51 and accompanying text.
41 Some codifications take a broader view that apparently would allow the privilege to
apply whenever an employee in one department of the corporation reports to counsel about
activities in another department. See, e.g., ORE. R. Evm. 503(1)(d)(A) (any information acquired by employee "during the course of" employment); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GovERN NG LAwYEas § 123(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989) ("communication concerns a legal matter of interest to the organization"); UNIF. R. Evm. 502(a)(2) (1988) (employee makes a
communication "while acting in the scope of employment") (emphasis added).
4'7 See United States v. AT & T Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 618 (D.D.C. 1979) (subject matter
is within scope of employment if it is directly related to employee's own corporate activities

or those of employee's subordinates); Ellenberg v. Tuffy's Div. of Starkist Foods, Inc., 18
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 442, 448 (D.Minn. 1985) (in job discrimination lawsuit, co-
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An indispensable requirement, of course, is that legal rather
than business advice was being sought or offered on behalf of the
corporation. 38 This is fundamental to the attorney-client privilege
and must be a part of any subject matter test. A showing that the
employee was aware of potential legal issues, or that his superior
was aware of such issues if the employee is communicating at the
superior's direction, should satisfy this component. In addition,
confidentiality must have been intended and must be maintained. 39 This element can be adequately met by a showing that
the communications were disseminated within the corporation only
among those whose corporate function gives them a need to know
their content. 440 Both the legal advice and confidentiality issues are
pursued in greater depth in the next section of the Article.
Beyond the foregoing essentials, it seems unduly restrictive to
require, as some courts have, that the employee's particular communication was directed by his superiors. 441 Such a showing may,
worker of plaintiff was speaking about matter within scope of corporate duties in describing
observations about plaintiff's employment). It has been suggested that allowing the subject
matter test to include the communications of supervisory agents who report on the activities
of others invites abuse because a corporate attorney may simply "arrange job descriptions so
that observing other employees is part of the duties of the employee." 24 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 63, § 5483, at 297 n.110. A restraining influence, however, may be the
increased potential for the use by an adversary of employee statements as party admissions
of the corporation. The statement of an agent can constitute a party admission of the principal only if the agent was authorized to make such a statement or the statement concerned
a "matter within the scope of the agency." FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(C), (D). If all employees
are given the authority to observe the acts of other employees, the corporation increases the

risk that statements about such observations could be used as evidence against the
corporation.
"I See infra notes 488-94 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 452-54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 477-79 and accompanying text.
41 The original subject matter tests included this requirement, see supra notes 370-75
and accompanying text, and the employees in Upjohn were communicating upon the directions of their superiors. See supra note 389. Subsequent to Upjohn, some courts have denied the applicability of the corporate privilege where noncontrol group employees spoke to
counsel on their own volition. See Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334, 1364-65, aff'd on reconsideration,672 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C.
1986); Marriott Corp. v. American Academy of Psychotherapists, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 497,
505, 277 S.E.2d 785, 792 (1981). But see Bruce v. Christian, 113 F.R.D. 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (court's definition of attorney client privilege as applied to government agency contains no requirement that employee be speaking at direction of superiors).
The decision in IndependentPetrochemical Corp. is a particularly strict application of
the requirement, because the corporation's president submitted an affidavit stating that all
district managers, including the one whose communication was in issue, "had the responsibility and authority" to contact house counsel. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 672 F.
Supp. at 4. The court, however, suggested that a specific directive is required. Id. at 5.
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of course, support a finding that the purpose of the communication
was to seek legal advice for the corporation. But if an employee
voluntarily approaches the corporation's attorney and discloses
facts relating to his corporate responsibilities in order to seek resolution of a legal problem of the corporation, the goal of the privilege to increase legal compliance would be well served.44 2 Nor
should it be indispensable that the exchange of information was

actually "necessary" for the particular legal advice being sought; it
should be enough that the lawyer or employee reasonably believed
that the information would be relevant in resolving the problem
for which legal advice was sought.443 As is well-known to lawyers,
only some of the facts related by a client ultimately may be necessary in analyzing the legal issues involved. In sum, it should be
sufficient that the purpose of a communication was to obtain or
convey legal advice for the corporation, its content was closely related to the employee's corporate duties and dissemination of the
communication among other employees was appropriately

restricted.4

Another issue left unresolved by Upjohn is whether counsel's
communications with a former employee, regardless of his prior
status in the corporate hierarchy, should fall within the corporate
privilege. 51 I submit that they should not. Once the agency relationship has come to an end, there no longer is any conceptual baPrivilege was denied for the additional reasons that the communication was a "routine"
report and confidentiality was not intended. Id.
"2 See Sexton, supra note 114, at 499 (attorney will be able to aid in legal compliance
by providing objective viewpoint); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate
Client: Where Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 MicH. L. REv. 665, 679-83, 686-92 (1983)
(superiors might prefer for personal reasons to conceal misconduct from counsel, to detriment of corporation); Note, The Implications of Upjohn, 56 NoTma DAME LAW. 887, 884-95
(1981) (superiors might not be aware of need for legal advice); Comment, Upjohn Co. v.
United States: A Functional Expansion of the Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 67
IowA L. REv. 161, 175 (1981) (corporate officials may not recognize need for legal services).
4" See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 385 n.10 (D.D.C. 1978) (court
rejected requirement that a communication, in fact, contain information necessary for legal
analysis, "because such an ex post facto approach would discourage full disclosure by an
employee who may not know what information is necessary").
44 See Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 145 (D. Del. 1977) (whether
employee qualifies as representative of client depends on all relevant circumstances, including nature and content of communication, relationship of employee to communication and
to corporation, extent of disclosure within corporation, and purposes of attorney-client privilege); see also Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
4" See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 n.3 (1981) (Court declined to
consider applicability of privilege to interviews with former Upjohn employees because issue
had not been addressed by courts below).
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sis for treating the former agent as a spokesperson for the principal. From an instrumental standpoint, the current management of
the corporation no longer has any influence over whether the individual will speak candidly with counsel. This eliminates one of the
principal justifications
for extending the privilege
to
corporations. 4 8
Moreover, the corporate privilege is not likely to have any direct influence on the former employee's candor. Current employees
might at least be somewhat motivated to be forthcoming by the
corporate privilege, even if they know it is not theirs, because they

may feel confident that the company, perhaps out of loyalty, will
not waive it. 44' 7 A former employee could not possibly have the
same expectations; an employer's loyalty is a slender reed upon
which to rely once the employment ties are severed. Although a
few courts have held that the corporate privilege extends to former

employees,

448

the proposition is unsound and is by no means re-

"" See supra note 428 and accompanying text. The first draft of the proposed RESTATELAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 comment e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1988) took the
unqualified position that the corporate privilege should be available only if the speaker is
"in an agency relationship with the organization at the time that the agent communicates."
Id. The reasoning was that only during the agency relationship does the principal have the
necessary leverage to obtain an agent's cooperation in attorney-client communications. See
id. comment d. In the second draft, however, this position was modified so as to extend the
corporate privilege to communications by former agents to the extent that they are under a
continuing legal obligation to furnish information to the principal. See RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 comment e (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989). The drafters cite
section 381, comment f, of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957), as authority for the
proposition that such a legal obligation on the part of former agents may exist. It is doubtful, however, that any such legal obligation would give current management much influence,
as a practical matter, over the candor with which the former employee communicates with
the corporation's attorney.
47 See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
4' See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 658
F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1983); Command Transp.,
Inc. v. Y.S. Line (U.S.A.) Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94, 96 (D. Mass. 1987); United States v. King,
536 F. Supp. 253, 259-60 (C.D. Cal. 1982); see also Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup
Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 42 (D. Mass. 1987) (counsel's discussion of theory of case with former
employee did not waive privilege). In his concurring opinion in Upjohn, Chief Justice Burger would have brought former employees within the ambit of the corporation's privilege.
See supra note 393.
Applying California law, however, the court in Connolly Data Sys., Inc. v. Victor Technologies, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1987), denied application of the corporate privilege to
an attorney's communication with a former employee. The court stressed that former employees are not persons "who would ordinarily be utilized" as spokespersons for the corporation and the employee in question was "not the only one" with relevant knowledge about
the transaction in question. Id. at 94. The fact that the former employee may have had
better recollection than current employees was insufficient, said the court, because an indiMENT OF Tm
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quired by the logic of Upjohn. In cases of potential litigation,
which is the most likely circumstance in which former employees
will be contacted by counsel,4 9 the work product doctrine should
provide sufficient inducement for diligent investigation by counsel.
VI. PRESERVING THE PRIVILEGE: CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE

SEEKING OF LEGAL AsSIsTANCE

Lawyers and corporate clients who wish to preserve privilege
for their communications should be particularly sensitive to the
definitional requirements that the communications (1) originate
and remain "in confidence" and (2) relate to the attorney's providing of "legal" services not "business" advice. According to the judicial respondents in the survey, the absence of confidentiality (due
either to waiver or lack of secrecy within the corporation) and the
predominantly business nature of the communications are two
common grounds for denying claims of privilege in the corporate
context4 50 This section of the article presents the findings of the
survey and analysis with respect to the maintenance of documentary communications and the mixing of legal and business communications in the corporate attorney-client relationship.
A. The Internal
Communications

Confidentiality of

Documentary

One of the house counsel in the study asserted that "the worst
enemy of the attorney-client privilege is the photocopy machine."
He was alluding to the problem of reconciling the notion of confidentiality with the fact that written attorney-client communications are often broadly circulated throughout the corporation. The
danger of losing the privilege due to inadequate confidentiality is
the most common warning that the lawyers in the study give to
corporate clients. 51
To what extent should clients be required to restrict the intracorporate dissemination of attorney-client communications in order to preserve privilege? In general, secrecy must have existed
vidual client "cannot ask a witness who better remembers the events involved to speak to
his or her attorney and then claim the conversation is protected from disclosure." Id.
41, See, e.g., In re Potts & Co., 30 Bankr. 708, 711-12 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (counsel's
communications with corporation's former president in preparation for trial).
41 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
41 See supra table 3, section I.B.3. 240.
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when the communication originally took place and must have been
maintained thereafter. 452 Analytically, secrecy in connection with
the original attorney-client exchange affects the determination of
whether privilege attached at the outset.45 3 This is a straightfor-

ward question of confidentiality. Post-communication disclosure to
outsiders is more appropriately treated under the rubric of
"waiver" of the privilege. 54 The circumstances in which waiver
may occur due to subsequent third-party disclosure are not unique
to corporate clients and have become fairly well crystalized in numerous judicial decisions. 455 On the other hand, determining
whether the distribution and maintenance of documentary attorney-client communications within the corporation is itself consis412 See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
453 In general, communications made in the known presence of third parties are not
privileged. United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1978); Liggett Group Inc. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 211 (M.D.N.C. 1986). It has long been
the rule, however, that the presence of or transmittal through ministerial employees such as
secretaries and clerks will not destroy the privilege. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d
918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
Some courts have extended the charmed circle to include other agents of either the
client or the attorney who are deemed "necessary" or "highly useful" in the communications
process. See, e.g., id. at 922 (assistance of accountant necessary for lawyer to render legal
advice); McCaffrey v. Estate of Brennan, 533 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Mo. App. 1976) (close business associate of client); San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 230-31 P.2d 26, 27
(1951) (physician employed to aid in attorney's preparation of defense).
'" Waiver of the attorney-client privilege generally occurs upon "any voluntary disclosure by the client to a third party." In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
see generally C. McCoRmicK, supra note 97, § 93.
45 See, e.g., In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Fulbright & Jaworski), 738 F.2d 1367,
1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disclosure to SEC as part of its "voluntary compliance program"
results in waiver as to other government agencies and private parties); In re John Doe Corp.,
675 F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1982) (waiver occurs if privileged documents are disclosed to
accountant for business reasons distinct from assisting lawyer in providing legal services);
Derderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 13, 15-16 (D. Mass. 1988) (deponent's reliance upon
privileged documents to refresh recollection prior to or during deposition may waive privilege depending on circumstances); In re Consolidated Litig. Concerning International Harvesters Disposition of Wisconsin Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1154-55 (N.D. IM. 1987) (giving
adversary free access to files during discovery constitutes waiver as to privileged documents); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("inadvertent" disclosure of documents to adversary during discovery may constitute waiver depending on circumstances); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 720 (N.D. III. 1978)
(assertion of "advice of counsel" as affirmative defense waives privilege for communications
with counsel concerning matter as to which legal advice was sought); ITT v. United Tel. Co.,
60 F.R.D. 177, 185-86 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (waiver occurs if client or his attorney testifies to
confidential communication or introduces privileged document during trial).
No consensus exists as to the proper standard or scope for waiver. See generally Davidson & Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 64 ORE. L. Rnv. 637 (1986); Marcus,
supra note 124.
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tent with secrecy presents a hybrid of the confidentiality and
waiver problems and is a matter that has received much less attention in judicial opinions. One commentator aptly defined the issue
as follows: "[A]re there persons within the organization who should
be prevented from seeing or hearing confidential communications
to counsel, or is privacy from the 'outside' world sufficient?" 456 It is

principally the question of internal confidentiality, rather than
third-party disclosure, that is addressed in this study.
Among the few courts that have touched upon the issue, no
consensus exists as to what special precautions, if any, a corporation must have taken in order to justify a finding of confidentiality.
Under the control group approach for identifying the corporate
representatives whose communications with counsel qualify for
privilege, 457 the confidentiality issue is fairly simple: distribution to
employees outside the control group is tantamount to third-party
disclosure and thus destroys the applicability of privilege.458 Some
control group adherents have held that the mere accessibility of
attorney-client 459
documents to noncontrol group employees destroys
confidentiality.
With the diminished status of the control group standard in
the wake of Upjohn,6 0 the number of employees who may permissibly be in the chain of distribution of attorney-client communications is unclear. In Upjohn itself no confidentiality issue was
presented because apparently no one other than the company's
lawyers reviewed counsel's interview questionnaires. 461 The test for
internal confidentiality adopted by a few courts is a "need-toknow" standard.6 2 Does this standard also require the segregation
4' Simon, supra note 7, at 984-85. See Rossi v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater
New York Inc., 140 App. Div. 2d 198, 199, 528 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (1st Dep't 1988) (house
counsel's memorandum to two nonlegal officials within corporation deemed confidential because "[n]othing indicates that anyone outside the defendant company had access to it"),
aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 588, 540 N.E.2d 703, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1989).
4" See supra notes 358-66 and accompanying text.
41, See, e.g., Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 637-38 (E.D.
Pa. 1979); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397,
401 (E.D. Va. 1975).
4"'See, e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 693 (10th Cir. 1968); Jarvis, Inc. v. AT&T,
84 F.R.D. 286, 292 (D. Colo. 1979).
4"0 See supra notes 377-93 and accompanying text.
461 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 n.5 (1981). The Court observed:
"Pursuant to explicit instructions from the Chairman of the Board, the communications
were considered 'highly confidential' when made ... and have been kept confidential by the
company." Id. at 395.
411 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane);
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of attorney-client documents in the corporate files so as to prevent
access by nonessential personnel? Although not necessarily the determinative factor, some courts have cited the failure to label documents "confidential

'463

or to implement specialized filing systems

for the segregation of documents as indicative of a lack of confidentiality.464 The federal district court in James Julian Inc. v.
Raytheon Co.,46 5 however, rejected the notion that the potential

reading of a privileged document by unauthorized personnel renders the document nonconfidential. Requiring corporations to
maintain two sets of files with screening, committees to ascertain
"the need of each employee to know the contents of any requested
document[s]" was said to be impractical and unnecessary under
the case law.466
1. Findings
How do the views expressed in the case law square with existing corporate practices? To explore this issue, a series of interview questions asked the respondents in the samples of house
counsel and corporate executives to describe the procedures followed by the corporations employing them. The data from the two
samples were pooled, thus providing information about 102 large
Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D.Del. 1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec. 18,
1981 and Jan. 4, 1982, 561 F. Supp. 1247, 1258 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 870 (D.Minn. 1979); see also SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 518 (D. Conn. 1976) (executive may share legal advice with
"another who shares responsibility for the subject matter underlying the consultation"); Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 758, 769, 166 Cal. Rptr. 880, 888
(1980) (in allowing disclosure between corporations in parent-subsidiary relationship, court
refers to "need" of officers and employees in affiliated company for privileged information in
order properly to perform their duties).
4"3 See, e.g., Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (magistrate held that corporation "failed to make appropriate affirmative efforts to identify [the]
documents as privileged," noting that "none of [the] documents is marked 'confidential' or
'privileged' "); North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light, 110
F.R.D. 511, 516 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (absence of notations of confidentiality considered factor
in determining privilege); cf. Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631,
636 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (although not dispositive, legend on attorney's letter "Confidential Attorney-Client Letter; Do Not Circulate" influenced court's findings).
4 See, e.g., Hardy, 114 F.R.D. at 644; In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley
& Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 870 (D. Minn. 1979); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15
F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
465 93 F.R.D. 138 (D.Del 1982).
466 Id. at 142.
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4
corporations headquartered in New York City.

7

The first question sought to ascertain the extent to which nonlegal personnel within corporations maintain attorney-client communications in files physically separated from general business
files. As shown in table 6, only nine of the 102 corporations represented in the survey (8.8%) maintain segregated files of this nature
on a routine basis. Among the majority of respondents whose employers do not routinely segregate their files, several indicated that
all memoranda and correspondence, including communications to
or from counsel, are intermingled in "topical" or "subject matter"
files or folders. Some of the house counsel noted that a policy of
routine segregation would not be feasible. "Business would come to
a halt," according to one, and another felt that "the business people just wouldn't do it." Forty-six respondents in the combined
samples of house counsel and executives, however, said that although segregation is not a routine practice, attorney-client documentary communications are kept separate from general business
files "in particular matters." Potential litigation and sensitive matters, such as mergers and acquisitions or special investigations, in
that order, were the two most frequently mentioned circumstances
in which segregation was said to occur. Several house counsel and
executives reported that as to these matters, documentary attorney-client communications are kept either in the files of the internal legal department or "the desk drawer" of the executive. 468
The second question relating to confidentiality was whether
the corporate employers of the house counsel and executives had a
specific policy or practice that routinely limited the personnel
within the company who could have access to documentary com117See supra note 43.
Because the outside counsel in the study represented so many different corporate clients, see supra note 47, no attempt was made to learn from them the practices followed by
their clients. Instead, the law firm partners were asked whether they had ever advised their
corporate clients to follow certain procedures and how often they themselves followed the
practice of labelling their written communications. The results of these questions are reported in footnotes 468, 470 and 471.
"sSimilar results, not displayed in table 6, were obtained in a question put to the
outside counsel. When asked whether they had ever advised any of their corporate clients to
maintain, on a routine basis, separate files for documentary attorney-client communications,
only two of the 52 respondents answered affirmatively. 21 partners (40.4% of the sample),
however, said that they had advised segregation in matters relating to litigation or sensitive
circumstances.
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munications with counsel. As indicated in table 6, only one in four
TABLE 6. Corporations in Which Special Procedures Regarding Documentary Attorney-Client Communications
Are Followed.
(Combined Samples, N=102)
Number of
Corporations

Percent of
Corporations

Totals

9
46
55

8.8
45.1
53.9%

Totals

25
51
76

24.5
50.0
74.5%

13
67

12.7
65.7

80

78.4%

Procedure
1. Separate files
are maintained:
a. on routine basis,
b. in particular matters.
2. Access of corporate
personnel is limited:
a. on routine basis,
b. in particular matters.
3. Labels or legends are placed on documents or
special language is used:
a. on routine basis,
b. in particular matters.
Totals

of the corporations had such a routine practice. When asked to
whom access was restricted, all but two of the twenty-five respondents employed by these corporations replied that the standard
was based on the employee's "need to know. ' 469 Many of them
noted that this is the same standard they use for "all confidential
business matters." A number of house counsel and executives
pointed out that although their companies had no routine policies
for restricting access to attorney-client communications per se, executives have exclusive access to their own files, which is where
such communications are most likely to be stored. "An executive's
correspondence files are not accessible to other employees," was a
typical description of routine corporate policy. Similarly, some respondents noted that access to certain documents dealing with
confidential matters, many of which would include communica469

Two other respondents said that attorney-client communications were routinely re-

stricted to top management.
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tions with counsel, is restricted for reasons of trade secrecy.
An additional 50% of the corporations in the study limit employee access to documentary communications with counsel in particular circumstances. As in the case of segregation, the circumstances that were said by most of the respondents to trigger
restricted access were litigation and sensitive matters., In such
cases, the most commonly used standard, according to twentyeight of the fifty-one respondents (54.9%) whose employers limit
access in particular matters, was that of the employee's need to
know. Others said that in their companies access was limited, in
order of frequency, either to specifically named individuals, counsel, or top management. 70
The final area of investigation relating to the handling of attorney-client communications was the practice of using stamps, labels or legends on documents at the time of their preparation, indicating that they embody a privileged communication. Table 6
shows that although not a routine practice in most organizations,
use is frequently made of labels and legends in particular circumstances. As with the practices of segregating documents and restricting access, labelling was most often done in connection with
litigation and sensitive matters.'7 '
470In connection with the issue of restricted access, the outside counsel were asked
whether they had ever advised corporate clients to limit the business personnel who could
have access to documentary communications with counsel. The results parallel those obtained from the house counsel and corporate executives. Only two partners had advised
routine limitations on access, but thirty-two (61.5% of the sample) had advised limitations
in litigation and sensitive matters. The outside counsel said that they used the following
criteria for limiting access, in descending order of frequency. need to know, specifically
named individuals; top management; counsel only. A few of the law firm partners who had
never given advice regarding restricted access said that they leave such matters to house
counsel. Also, like some of the executives and house counsel, a few partners said that restricting access to those with a need to know is not motivated by the attorney-client privilege but by concern over trade secrecy.
The survey questions relating to the accessibility of written communications provoked
spontaneous grumblings from one of every four attorneys in the combined samples of house
counsel and outside counsel to the effect that corporations "put too much in writing." According to these lawyers, writings leave "smoking guns," are "misinterpreted by adversaries," and are "notoriously inaccurate" in their analysis. Several said that they discourage
corporate representatives from putting facts or thoughts in writing, regardless of whether
they involve communications to lawyers, in order to avoid creation of a "paper trail" that
could later haunt the client. Others warn their clients that if they put something in writing,
even to a lawyer, they should assume that "it will see the light of day in court" and should
choose their language accordingly.
7'Outside counsel were much less enthusiastic than were the house counsel with regard to the practice of using privilege notations. Whereas 94% of the fifty respondents in
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The most frequently mentioned procedure was the stamping
or labelling of memoranda from house counsel to corporate representatives as "privileged" or "confidential." This was the practice
in all of the corporations reporting the use of labelling on a routine
basis 47 2 and was the practice in fifty-eight of the sixty-seven corporations in which labelling was done on an ad hoc basis. Among the
examples mentioned by the respondents were captions such as
"PRIVILEGED," "CONFIDENTIAL," or "RESTRICTED" and
phrases with slightly greater detail such as "CONFIDENTIAL Subject to Attorney-Client Privilege," "PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL - Attorney-Client Communication," or "CONFIDENTIAL - Do Not Circulate." Some reported that lawyers indicate at the top of a memorandum that distribution of the writing
should be limited to a particular group of specified individuals unless counsel is first consulted or that the document should be returned to counsel without copying after having been read. Others
said that a privilege notation by itself is a signal that the memorandum is for the "recipient's eyes only" or that circulation is to be
47 3
on a need-to-know basis.
Stamping or labelling communications to counsel by corporate
. representatives was much less common. It was mentioned as a
practice in only four of the thirteen corporations reporting the use
of notations in routine matters and in ten of the sixty-seven corporations that use privilege notations in particular matters. Some of
the house counsel suggested they do not encourage business personnel to make privilege notations because such employees cannot
be expected to know when a communication may properly be characterized as privileged. These lawyers feared that clients might
stamp all communications to counsel as privileged, including
purely business matters, and thereby dilute the value of notations
on truly privileged documents. In lieu of directing corporate representatives to label their memoranda to counsel, in six corporations
the house counsel urge that communications to lawyers be introduced with language such as "This is a request for legal advice" or
the sample of house counsel said that they follow the practice, only 67.3% of the fifty-two
respondents in the sample of outside counsel had either followed the practice themselves or
had advised clients to do so.
472 Most of the house counsel who reported "routine" use of labels qualified their responses by stressing that labels are applied only to communications relating to legal advice.
473 In one company, house counsel reported that each memorandum from the legal department relating to legal advice bears a legend at the top of the document explaining the
need-to-know standard for distribution.
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"Written on the advice of counsel."
Regardless of who makes the notations, does the practice carry
any evidentiary' weight? Some of the lawyers in the study volunteered that labelling written attorney-client communications at the
time of their preparation may prove helpful in establishing the
privileged character of the documents in those instances in which
they become relevant in future litigation. According to these lawyers, a court may infer from the notations that confidentiality and
legal services-not business advice-were intended. 47

4

Since judi-

cial opinions on the evidentiary value of the practice are scarce,
the twenty-eight judges and magistrates in the study were asked
their opinion. Seventeen of the judicial respondents (60.7%) said
that legends or stamps would have little or no influence on their
decision as to the privileged status of a document. Some of these
respondents criticized the practice as one that is "overdone" or
"purely self-serving. ' '47 5 These judicial officers would look solely to
the content and subject matter of the communication in resolving
the privilege question. Ten of the jurists (35.7%), on the other
hand, said privilege notations have some evidentiary value in
showing that confidentiality was intended: "Legends are not decisive, but they are helpful," was a typical comment. 476
2. Analysis
Several conclusions are suggested by the findings with respect
to the care and maintenance of documentary attorney-client com471Some of the lawyers in the study said that they discourage the practice of labelling
for evidentiary reasons of a different sort. A few argued, for example, that using privilege
notations on a routine basis could result in negative inferences that confidentiality was not
intended as to documents inadvertently not labelled. Another observation was that if a labelled document were admitted into evidence either as a result of waiver or a court's determination that privilege did not apply, the label might cause the fact-finder to place undue
emphasis on the document or to infer a "consciousness of guilt." These objections to the
practice of labelling were voiced more often by outside counsel than house counseL See
supra note 471. In any event, a majority of the attorneys in both samples seemed to think
that the potential benefits of labelling outweighed whatever harm might result from adverse
inferences in litigation.
,71Three of these judges, however, recognized that notations may be valuable for lawyers and clients in preventing waiver of the privilege. Two others said that notations on a
document might cause them to consider the document a little more carefully than an unlabelled document. One judge said that he was more likely to be influenced by prefatory
language in a memorandum to the effect that it was a request for legal advice than by a
simple notation of confidentiality.
47 Four of these respondents indicated that they give "presumptive" effect to labelled
documents. One judge had no opinion on the issue.
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munications. It appears that the need-to-know standard, which has
been applied by some courts as the test for confidentiality in the
corporate setting,477 is consistent with actual practices in a significant number of corporations. 48 It is a standard that both lawyers
and corporate executives seem to understand and have come to expect as the governing standard for confidentiality.
Measuring internal confidentiality by the need-to-know standard is also conceptually appropriate. Corporate personnel who
have no need to know the contents of a particular attorney-client
communication in order to perform specific corporate duties or to
assist the lawyer in giving legal advice to the corporation are "outsiders" to whom distribution rightfully should destroy confidential4 The danger of disclosure to persons outside
ity.-1
the corporation
grows in proportion to the number of people within the corporation who are privy to the communication. When distribution
within the corporation has been made to persons with no role to
play in acting upon the advice of counsel, therefore, a strong inference arises that the promise of secrecy implicit in the privilege was
not the motivating force behind the communications. The number
of individuals with a need to know will, of course, vary from case to
case depending on such factors as the size of the corporation, its
internal management and the subject matter of the communication. It is accordingly appropriate to impose on the corporation the
burden of detailing why particular individuals had a need to know
the contents of the communication in question.
Should corporations be required in all cases to show that attorney-client communications were physically segregated from
nonlegal communications to ensure compliance with a need-toknow standard of confidentiality? Of all the possible precautions
for the maintenance of confidentiality, segregation of documents
was performed by the least number of corporations in the study,
'17 See supra note 462. The standard has also been advocated by commentators. See,
e.g., 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGEP, supra note 17, 503 (b)[04], at 503-49 to -50; Sexton,
supra note 14, at 503-04; Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corpora-

tions, the Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment,56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 248 (1961);
see also RESTATEMENT Op THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 123(4)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1989).
418 See supra notes 469-70 and accompanying text.
47 See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir.
1980) ("[i]f facts have been made known to persons other than those who need to know
them, there is nothing on which to base a conclusion that they are confidential").
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and only then in litigation or sensitive matters. 48 0 An across-theboard requirement of segregation apparently would disrupt the
practices of a large number of organizations and impose an administrative burden that probably could not be effectively policed by
counsel.
If corporate realities are to be reflected in the law, courts
should consider segregation merely as one factor in determining
whether confidentiality was intended and maintained. The intermingling of privileged documents and nonlegal business communications should not, standing alone, result in a loss of privilege. It
should be sufficient that a company has taken reasonable steps to
assure that access and distribution are in fact restricted to those
with a need to know. A number of respondents in the study, for
example, pointed out that an executive's files are subject to his sole
control, and as a practical matter other personnel have neither access to such files nor authority to go through them. A showing of
segregation would appear to be unnecessary in such cases.4 8 ' On
the other hand, if attorney-client communications are placed in
general files without any indicia of their confidential nature, and
are easily accessible by employees who have no reasonable need to
know their contents, an inference surely may be drawn that secrecy was not intended.
Labelling documents "confidential" or "privileged" at the time
of their preparation obviously does not make them so, but the results of the study suggest that practitioners would be well advised
to use such procedures for several reasons. First, although some
judges apparently ignore confidentiality notations, others give
42
them weight as some evidence that confidentiality was intended.
Second, unlike the segregation of documents, making notations apparently is an administratively simple task to perform, as evi480 See supra table 6 and note 468 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp., [1975-2] Trade Cas. (CCH)1 60,561, at
67,461 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (sufficient confidentiality where vice president's correspondence with
attorney was kept in officer's personal corporate files; correspondence was not segregated,
but files were within officer's personal control "and apparently were not openly available to
just anyone, either within or without the corporation").
A requirement of segregation might even prove counterproductive to the policies advanced by the privilege. Business decisions often must be made with dispatch. In order to
take appropriate action, however, a business executive should have all relevant papers
before him, including any legal opinions on the matter. If legal opinions are locked away in a
separate cabinet, they may be inadvertently overlooked.
412See supra note 476 and accompanying text.
482
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denced by the fact that so many corporations in the study do it. 8 3
Such labels could help support a showing of intent in situations in
which the physical segregation of documents was not undertaken.
Third, regardless of whether evidentiary value is attributed to the
label itself, a label may actually keep access limited. Several respondents in the study indicated that notations are a cue to representatives that distribution should be restricted. Proof that a notation has this effect in a particular corporation will help establish
that a need-to-know standard was in fact followed. Finally, placing
notations on documents may help avoid waiver of the privilege in
the event the documents become relevant in future litigation. 4
Several respondents noted that during pretrial document production, corporate officials and paralegals can be instructed to withdraw labelled documents from the files for further examination by
counsel.
In sum, the results of the study suggest the appropriateness of
a need-to-know standard for internal confidentiality. This, in turn,
will necessitate case-by-case analysis as to whether reasonable care
was taken to limit disclosure to employees with a need to know.485
A showing that appropriate precautions existed is a burden that
may fairly be placed on the corporation, which alone has access to
48 6
the proof concerning its internal procedures.
See supra table 6 & notes 471-73 and accompanying text.
During pretrial discovery, documents covered by the attorney-client privilege may
be inadvertently disclosed to adversaries in response to demands for document production.
See generally Marcus, supra note 124, at 1633-37. Courts have taken three different approaches in determining whether such inadvertent disclosure constitutes a waiver of the
privilege for the particular documents, thus precluding a protective order for return of the
documents. One line of authority holds that waiver never occurs in such cases because
413

484

waiver requires intent, which is lacking. See Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp.
951, 955 (N.D. Il1.1982). At the opposite pole are courts which hold that inadvertent disclosure is always a waiver because absolute confidentiality is required in order to preserve the
privilege. See International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 44950 (D. Mass. 1988). The middle ground is that each case should be determined separately,
taking into account such factors as the reasonableness of the precautions that were taken to
prevent disclosure, the number of documents disclosed, and the speed with which return of
the documents is sought upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure. See, e.g., Parkway
Gallery Furniture Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50
(M.D.N.C. 1987).
481 See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 n.10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973)
("determination whether there has been a loss of confidentiality may depend on the facts of
each particular case"); see also O'Leary v. Purcell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641, 646 (M.D.N.C. 1985)
(test for confidentiality is whether "reasonable precautions" were taken); Suburban Sew 'N
Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.RD. 254, 259 (N.D. III. 1981) ("reasonable steps").
'81 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 870
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B. Business Communications
Attorney-client communications are not always confined to legal matters; from time to time, the lawyer's business advice is
sought and given. Indeed, lawyers' codes of ethics have declared it
appropriate for an attorney to make the client aware of pertinent
nonlegal factorsA5 7 The involvement of lawyers in business discussions, however, may jeopardize the applicability of privilege because of the well-settled principle that purely business communications between attorneys and their clients are not protected by

privilege. 48 8 Although the rule is easily stated, the issue becomes
(D. Minn. 1979) (corporation must provide information about its own internal security practices sufficient to support finding of confidentiality); Gorzegno v. Maguire, 62 F.R.D. 617,
620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (corporation bears burden of proving that documentary attorneyclient communications were "in fact regarded and treated as confidential"); 2 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 17, 1 503(b)[04], at 503-49 to 503-50.
487 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESpoNsIBILrrY EC 7-8 (1981); MODEL RuLE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2(a), 2.1 (1983). Business considerations are not the only

type of nonlegal factors that lawyers might raise in their counseling. As stated by Judge
Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass.
1950):
The modern lawyer almost invariably advises his client upon not only what is
permissible but also what is desirable. And it is in the public interest that the
lawyer should regard himself as more than predictor of legal consequences. His
duty to society as well as to his client involves many relevant social, economic,
political and philosophical considerations.
Id. Nevertheless, business advice is perhaps the most likely type of nonlegal counseling that
a lawyer will provide in the corporate context. See Nelson, Ideology, Practice and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 503, 533-34 (1985) (in study of corporate law firms in Chicago, predominant situation in which lawyers were found to have given nonlegal advice was in connection with clients' business decisions).
418See United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 640 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 975 (1981); SEC v. Gulf & Western Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675, 683 (D.D.C. 1981); Barr
Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see also Simon
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1987) (counsel's attendance at business
meeting does not automatically create privilege for communications exchanged at meeting);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1979) (general counsel's participation
in managements internal investigation of corporate wrongdoing "does not automatically
cloak the investigation with legal garb").
Few authorities have given any reason for the exclusion of business matters from the
attorney-client privilege, see 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 63, § 5478, at 209-10,
but one court suggested that no privilege is thought necessary to induce business people to
make business communications. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 517 (D. Conn.),
appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Yale Study, supra note 3, at 1251
(privilege "not needed to encourage business communications"). The rule may also be
rooted in the notion that the lawyers' independent judgment as a legal adviser becomes
diluted when he becomes involved in the client's business decisions, thus making him less an
attorney and more a business person. See 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 63, §
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complicated when the communication involves a mixture of legal
and business considerations as is often the case in counseling at
the transactional stage of corporate affairs. Some of the judges and
magistrates in the survey, for example, volunteered that determining whether a communication relating to a corporate transaction
involves business or legal advice is one of the most problematical
aspects of applying the attorney-client privilege.489 In reported

opinions, most courts have resolved the issue of mixed communications by applying privilege only when legal considerations are "predominant."4 " In this connection, it was previously noted that
courts may be more inclined to characterize the communications of
house counsel than outside counsel as predominantly business in
1
nature.

49

A recurring situation in which the legal/business ambiguity
has arisen in the caselaw is in connection with a client's unsolicited
communication of business information to counsel without an explicit request for legal advice. Pre-existing corporate records do not
become privileged merely by placing them in the custody of a lawyer,492 and courts have also denied the applicability of privilege to
a business memorandum sent by one corporate officer to another
with a copy to counsel if the communication is found to be merely
part of a business dialogue.493 On the other hand, courts have
sometimes characterized the transmittal of business correspondence to attorneys as an "implied request" for legal advice,
thereby entitling the papers to privileged treatment.4 4
5478, at 210.
419See supra note 182.
400 See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 34 (N.D. IMI.1980);
Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 635 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Hercules,
Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 436 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977); Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61
F.R.D. 35, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D.Del.
1954); Rossi v. Blue Cross and Blue Shild of Greater New York Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 588, 594, 540
N.E.2d 703, 706, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (1989).
See supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
492 Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1913); In re Bekins Record Storage Co.,
62 N.Y.2d 324, 327, 465 N.E.2d 345, 346, 476 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807 (1984); State ex rel. Dudek
v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387, 399 (1967).
'93See, e.g., Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 403-04 (7th Cir. 1987). Similarly,
documents prepared for simultaneous review by legal and nonlegal personnel may be denied
the benefit of privilege if business considerations are viewed as the primary inducement for
the communications. See, e.g., FTC v. TRW, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 160, 163 (D.D.C. 1979).
4 Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 436 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D.Del. 1977); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 37 (D. Md. 1974); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54
F.R.D. 44, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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Is the giving of business advice a common practice among corporate attorneys? Do corporate clients want their lawyers to infuse
legal advice with practical business considerations? Do lawyers segregate business from legal advice? Are house counsel more likely
than outside counsel to give business advice? Is business information routinely "funneled" through attorneys' offices in an attempt
to cloak the documents with privilege? The survey results suggest
that a great deal of business information indeed is exchanged between attorneys and clients in the corporate context, but they contain little evidence of conscious attempts to create privilege for
such communications.
1. Findings
When asked whether they would characterize any of the advice they give to their corporate clients as "business advice," the
overwhelming majority of the lawyers in the study-ninety-one, or
89.2%-answered "yes."'9 5 Some of these attorneys at first hesitated to respond to the question, saying that they could not distinguish legal from business advice in their area of practice, but upon
reflection they conceded that some of their advice was indeed of a
business nature. In addition, the lawyers who answered affirmatively did not share the same degree of enthusiasm for giving business advice. One segment of respondents volunteered that they
"avoid" or "resist" giving business advice and do so only because
the client asks for it or they "feel compelled" because of "a vacuum." In contrast to the reluctant advisers were several respondents who indicated eagerness to give business advice.9 8 Some of
these attorneys said that their personal experience in handling particular types of transactions made them especially well qualified to
give a broad range of advice. "My clients expect me to serve as a
perceptive businessman," declared one of the outside counsel. Another partner observed that clients need to be "walked through"
transactions from beginning to end and that the lawyer's counseling necessarily entails the giving of both business and legal advice.
Surprisingly, even some of the litigators, who may have fewer op415 The few who said "no" volunteered such reasons as the client's lack of interest in
receiving business advice from lawyers, the respondents desire to restrict his role, and the
respondent's lack of confidence in his ability to give business advice.
49" Similar contrasting views were expressed in a survey of twenty-three house counsel
reported in Slovak, Working for Corporate Actors: Social Change and Elite Attorneys in
Chicago, 1979 AM. B. FouND. Ras. J. 465, 483-84.
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portunities to give business advice,49 7 displayed enthusiasm for
raising nonlegal factors with clients. Most commonly, the litigators
said that they raise business considerations in the context of discussions about dispute settlement.
Between the two poles of reluctance and enthusiasm about the
giving of business advice were respondents who expressed no
strong feelings on the matter. Several of these attorneys stated
that whether they give business advice is dependent on the topic or
the particular corporate representative with whom they are dealing. Another recurring conment was that business considerations
"creep" into legal advice because of the "inevitable" mixture of law
and business in corporate representation.4""
Based on the results of the pretest, no attempt was made in
the final sample to obtain precise percentages as to the amount of
business advice given by the attorneys. Rather, the ninety-one attorneys who had given business advice were asked to indicate in
broad terms how often they had done so. Choosing from three alternative response categories, 47.3% of the attorneys said "frequently," 42.9% chose "occasionally" and 9.9% indicated "rarely."
Do corporate clients want business advice from their lawyers?
Nearly four of every five corporate executives in the survey
(78.8%) answered "yes" to this question. "We want legal advice
tempered by practical business considerations," was a comment
that summarizes the view of several executives. On the other hand,
some executives qualified their answers with the caveat that business advice is welcome only from particular attorneys, such as
those who are "senior" or "experienced." A similar opinion was expressed by executives who said business advice from attorneys is
desirable only "upon request." In a somewhat jocular tone, a few
commented that they often receive business advice from lawyers
497 See Nelson, supra note 487, at 532.
""

The ninety-one attorneys who said that they had given business advice were asked

in an open-ended question to describe the nature of their advice. Some provided multiple

responses. Their descriptions, with an indication of the percentage of respondents who gave
each type of response, are as follows: (1) describes legal options and alternative courses of
action that are practical from a business perspective (38.5%); (2) volunteers business evaluation of a transaction or litigation (33.0%); (3) gives business judgment in connection with

legal advice when asked (31.9%); (4) gives advice in which business and legal considerations
are inextricably mixed (22.0%); and (5) gives general business advice (e.g., marketing, pricing, plant location) (19.8%). It is noteworthy that the type of business advice most likely to

be characterized as "pure" business advice-the fifth category in the list-was the type
mentioned by the fewest number of attorneys. Most of the descriptions are indicative of a
mixture of legal and business considerations.

1
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even if they do not want it. Indeed, all but one of the fifty-two
executives indicated that lawyers had given their companies business advice from time to time: twenty-four (46.2%) said attorneys
"frequently" give such advice; twenty (38.5%) said "occasionally"
and seven (13.5%) said "rarely."
Another recurring comment of the executives who indicated
willingness to hear the lawyer's business point of view was that
lawyers should distinguish business advice from legal advice. What
is the actual practice of corporate lawyers in this regard? The
ninety-one attorneys in the study who said they give business advice were asked to indicate the frequency with which they explicitly segregate it from their legal advice. Twenty-three (25.6%) indicated they "always" do so, twenty-four (26.7%) answered
"frequently," fourteen (15.6%) said "occasionally," twelve (13.3%)
said "rarely" and seventeen (18.9%) said they "never" explicitly
set apart the two types of advice. 4

9

Thus, a clear major-

ity-roughly two of every three attorneys-segregate at least occasionally, and only one-third seldom or never do so. Many of the
attorneys who indicated they infrequently or never segregate their
advice volunteered one of two alternative explanations: (1) corporate representatives "can usually tell from the context" whether
the advice is business or legal; or (2) the precise nature of the advice is "unclear" because it contains a mixture of business and legal considerations. Those who segregate on a more frequent basis
volunteered observations such as the following: "I don't want the
client to think my personal opinion is a legal opinion"; "I segregate
so they can weigh what I'm saying"; "If an officer would resent
getting my business judgment, 1 preface my remarks with an indication that I'm 'wearing my business hat' "; "I segregate in order to
preserve my role as lawyer"; "I always separate my advice because
I don't want to trespass on the client's responsibility to make the
ultimate business decision." A fe* specifically pointed out that
they were not motivated by the privilege but by the desire to caution the client not to mistake their business judgment for a legal
mandate.
As to whether house counsel in fact give more business advice
than do outside counsel, the survey results are mixed. For example,
no statistically significant variation appeared in the responses of
the house counsel and outside counsel with respect to the fre411 Only 90 responses are reported because of one missing case.
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quency with which they give business advice in the course of providing legal services.50 Indeed, some of the volunteered comments
of the law firm partners, particularly nonlitigators, suggest that
they may provide even more business counseling than do in-house
attorneys. One such respondent, for example, in a statement that
echoed those of other nonlitigators, declared: "About 95% of what
I do in putting a deal together for a corporate client is business in
nature." On the other hand, when asked to give their view of the
matter, 76.5% of the corporate executives said that their companies received business advice "more often" from house counsel
than from outside counsel. This perception may be attributable,
however, to the fact that most of the executives in the survey had
had more frequent contact with house counsel than outside counsel.5 01 Some of the executives pointed out, for example, that inhouse attorneys give business advice more often because "they are
in close proximity" or are "more likely to attend committee meetings." The actual ratio of business advice to legal advice as between the two types of attorneys was said by some of these executives to be about the same. The respondents who thought that
more or about the same amount of business advice is given by
outside counsel explained that outside counsel have "greater expertise" in specialty areas, such as acquisitions.
The position of some house counsel on the "management
team" may also affect perceptions as to the frequency with which
they give business advice. Among the fifty respondents in the
house counsel sample, for example, thirty-six (72.0%) indicated
that they perform some amount of nonlegal work for their employers. The performance of nonlegal duties was especially prevalent
among the chief legal officers: thirty-three of the thirty-seven respondents with the title of General Counsel (89.2%) devoted a por0OO
The breakdown of percentages between the 45 house counsel and 46 outside counsel
as to the frequency with which they give business advice was as follows: frequently-46.7%
house, 47.8% outside; occasionally-48.9% house, 37.0% outside; rarely-4.4% house,
15.2% outside. As indicated in the text, the slight differences in percentages are not statistically significant.
The wording of the frequency question as put to the house counsel was carefully chosen
to keep the respondent's role as lawyer distinct from his possible role as a company officer.
Thus, each respondent was asked to indicate how often he gave business advice in his "capacity as lawyer to the corporation." Many of the house counsel also performed business
functions for their employers during the course of which they may have given additional
"business advice."
501 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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tion of their time to nonlegal activities for their corporations, 0 2
while only three of the thirteen lower-ranking respondents (23.1%)
did so. The thirty-six respondents, some of whom performed multiple nonlegal duties, described their activities as follows: twentytwo (61.1%) served as corporate secretary; thirteen (36.1%) participated in business planning; eight (22.2%) served on one or more
management committees; seven (19.4%) supervised one or more
nonlegal departments; and seven (19.4%) engaged in miscellaneous
corporate activities such as lobbying and public relations. The median percentage of time devoted by these attorneys to nonlegal duties was twenty percent. Thus, while the ratio of business advice to
legal advice as between house counsel and outside counsel may be
about the same when house counsel is performing legal services, an
in-house attorney's overall participation in the business affairs of
the company may well be higher if the attorney has an additional
nonlegal role to play.
To obtain a sense of the general frequency with which business communications are routed to counsel, all of the attorneys in
the study were asked to indicate, in general terms, how often employees had sent them copies of business correspondence or memoranda without specifically requesting legal advice. Forty of the 102
attorneys who were interviewed (39.2%) said they had "frequently" received business communications of this nature, thirtyfour (33.3%) said "occasionally," and nineteen (18.6%) said the instances were "rare." Only nine attorneys (8.8%) had "never" received such communications. In the interests of simplification, the
question was put to the executives in the following form: "Have
any managers or employees in your company ever made it a practice regularly to send copies of their business correspondence or
memoranda to in-house counsel without a specific request for legal
advice?" Twenty-two executives (42.3%) answered "yes," twentyeight (53.8%) answered "no," and two (3.8%) were unable to say.
In an open-ended question, the respondents (both lawyers and
executives) who had experienced the phenomenon were asked to
state the purposes behind the sending of business correspondence
to counsel. The three reasons mentioned most frequently overall,
in descending order, were: (1) to inform the lawyer of develop502 Most of the respondents with the title of General Counsel were also officers of their
corporations at the rank of Vice President, Executive Vice President or Senior Vice President. See supra note 46.
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ments in particular matters as to which legal assistance previously
had been provided or was currently being sought; (2) to obtain the
lawyer's comments on any legal problems the lawyer may perceive;
and (3) to keep the lawyer informed about general corporate
business.
With respect to the second and third purposes, statistically
significant variations appeared in the responses of house counsel
and outside counsel. Whereas eighteen of forty-four house counsel
(40.9%) said that clients seek their comments on any legal
problems the lawyer may receive, only five of forty-nine outside
counsel (10.2%) mentioned this purpose. This difference may be
explained by the modern role played by house counsel in practicing "preventive law." Other research shows that in-house attorneys
have increasingly become involved in routine corporate activity in
503
order to identify and prevent legal difficulties before they arise.
Several house counsel in the study stressed that "implicit" in their
receipt of a great many business communications is the question,
"Do you see any problems here?" Another frequent observation
was that the business people "may not be sure of what they're doing" so they "run the matter by our office." These observations
were corroborated by several executives who said that they send
copies of business correspondence to house counsel "in anticipation of legal problems," "for monitoring," "for compliance," "to
make counsel aware of anything with legal implications, such as
personnel, ERISA or labor matters," "in anticipation of legal
problems," or "to be sure we're not infringing antitrust laws." Only
a handful of the outside counsel, however, reported receiving communications for this purpose. More common were replies such as
the following: "As an outside lawyer, I'm not on the 'mailing list'
unless I'm handling a particular matter."
Similarly, while eighteen of forty-four house counsel (40.9%)
said that they receive business materials in order to be kept apprised of general corporate activity, only seven of forty-nine law
firm partners (14.3%) said that they receive such communications.
The difference is perhaps attributable both to house counsel's preventive law function and to the managerial role played by most of
the house counsel in the survey. All but one of the eighteen house
503See supra note 240. Outside counsel, in contrast, tend to be retained by large corporations to perform litigation and other specialized tasks on an ad hoc basis. See supra notes
290-91 and accompanying text.
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counsel who said they receive general business information held
the title of General Counsel and also served as a corporate officer.504 "A lot of general material comes to me for informational

purposes because I'm a member of senior management," was the
typical explanation of several of these respondents. Some added
that they are impliedly being asked to spot any legal problems.
The few outside counsel who said they routinely receive business
correspondence for informational purposes attributed it either to a
"long-standing relationship with a particular client" or the client's
desire for "business input."
Noticeably absent from the volunteered reasons for sending
copies of business memoranda to counsel was any mention of a desire to obtain privilege for the documents. As a follow-up, therefore, all of the lawyers were asked how often they thought employees had sent copies of documents to their office solely to protect
the documents with privilege; the executives were asked if they
knew whether any managers or employees had ever sent "copies of
business documents to in-house counsel for the primary purpose of
obtaining the protections of the attorney-client privilege for the
documents." Three-fourths of the lawyers (76 of 102) said that
their clients had never sent documents to them solely for privilege
purposes, and the majority of the remaining quarter said that this
"rarely" occurred.505 Similarly, 76.9% of the executives (40 of 52)
said they were unaware of any such instances in their companies.
Most of the unsolicited comments of the lawyers who had
never been sent documents solely for privilege purposes were to
the effect that their clients were "too unsophisticated" to think of
this practice or that clients "don't think in terms of attorney-client
privilege." Most of the lawyers who reported instances of receiving
documents solely for privilege purposes were quick to add that
they had disabused their clients of the notion that privilege would
apply.
2. Analysis
Although the results of the inquiries into the frequency with
which attorneys give business advice lack quantitative precision,
1o Sixteen of these General Counsel also held the rank of Vice President or higher, and
one was Corporate Secretary.
"I'Seventeen of the lawyers said "rarely," eight said "occasionally" and one could not
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they nonetheless suggest that such advice is liberally given both by
high ranking members of internal legal departments and law firm
partners.50 6 Corporate clients apparently want lawyers-at least
those with experience-to include business perspectives in their
advice, and lawyers probably enhance the quality of their services
when they do. Extension of the attorney-client privilege to business communications, however, would be unwarranted. Since business exchanges between lawyers and corporate managers flourish
despite the long-standing unavailability of the attorney-client privilege, no basis exists for applying the privilege to such communications. 0 7 Any broader approach would extinguish a source of potentially relevant evidence without any corresponding benefit in
facilitating open communications between lawyer and client.
Few would contest the foregoing conclusion as it relates to
communications that are "purely" business in nature. The results
of the survey, however, show that lawyer-client exchanges frequently involve a mixture of legal and business considerations.50°
How should the privilege issue be resolved when business and legal
considerations appear in the same communication? A commendable solution-one practiced by some of the judicial respondents in
the study-would be for courts to sever the business content from
the legal content and order production only of the former, whenever such procedure is feasible. 0 9 If severance is not possible because business and legal considerations are too closely interwoven,
the "predominant purpose" test 510 is an appropriate compromise
between the overinclusiveness that would result if all such communications were deemed privileged and the underinclusiveness that
would result if privilege were always denied.5 11 When mixed communications are motivated predominantly by the desire to receive
or give legal assistance, they should be eligible for privilege in toto;
if motivated, however, predominantly by nonlegal considerations,
See supra notes 495-98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 488.
808 See supra note 498 and accompanying text.
809 Only a few reported decisions have made reference to the practice of severance of
portions of a single document. See, e.g., Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 403 (8th
Cir. 1987) (special master apparently "carefully applied" law "to the point of redacting sections of privileged material from within individual documents"); see also Cuno, Inc. v. Pall
Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 205-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (magistrate's rulings with respect to applicability of privilege to particular documents include paragraph-by-paragraph excisions).
820 See supra note 490 and accompanying text.
81 See Sexton, supra note 114, at 490-91.
808
807
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such communications probably would have occurred without the
inducement of privilege and should be fully discoverable. The test
is imprecise, to be sure, but it is consistent with the purpose of the
privilege to facilitate the giving of legal advice, not to promote the
conducting of business. 12
Because business communications occur on such a frequent
basis in the corporate setting, corporate parties claiming privilege
rightfully should bear the burden of proving affirmatively that the
seeking or giving of legal assistance was the predominant purpose
of particular communications. The corporate claimant has better
access than outsiders to the proof and it is responsible, in a sense,
for the ambiguity created by the intermingling of business and legal matters. 1 One federal court of appeals, however, relying upon
Wigmore, has held that matters referred by corporate clients to
lawyers are "prima facie" for legal services." 4 Regardless of what
may be said for such an approach when applied to individuals who
consult lawyers in a noncommercial context, the findings in the
survey show that no such presumption is justified in the corporate
context.
Should corporate lawyers segregate business from legal advice? Two-thirds of the lawyers in the survey do so at least occasionally and several executives said they prefer the practice. 5" Isolation of the two types of advice is indeed appropriate for two
reasons. First, segregation is an ethical consideration that helps
maintain a proper attorney-client relationship. Business people
should be informed when the lawyer is voicing a business judgment, rather than a legal opinion, so that the lawyer's advice can
512 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (attorney-client privilege "pro-

tects only those disclosures-necessary to obtain informed legal advice-which might not
have been made absent the privilege").
513 See Simon, supra note 7, at 978. "Since the client in such a case has placed the
attorney in a dual role where his true colors are hard to perceive, it should be up to the
client... to satisfy the court that a particular communication qualifies for protection ...
Id.
51 Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane). The
court quotes 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2296, at 566-67:
[A] matter committed to a professional legal adviser is prima facie so committed
for the sake of the legal advice which may be more or less desirable for some
aspect of the matter, and is therefore within the privilege unless it clearly appears
to be lacking in aspects requiring legal advice.
Id. (Emphasis in original).
115See supra note 499 and accompanying text.
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be given appropriate weight.5 16 Most of the attorneys in the survey
said that they segregate their advice for this very purpose. This
course of conduct furthers the admonition in lawyers' codes of ethics that in giving nonlegal advice, attorneys are to leave ultimate
decisions to the client.5 17 To be sure, counsel's presentation of the
legal consequences of particular action may, as a practical matter,
dictate only one feasible outcome, 5 8 but the attorney owes it to the
client to distinguish a legal opinion from a business judgment.
Second, segregation by the lawyer may help prevent the loss of
privilege for otherwise mixed legal and business communications
that a court might later characterize as predominantly business in
nature. One might take the tactical view that mixing legal and business advice could insulate the latter from discovery on the chance
that the communication might later be found to have been motivated predominantly by legal considerations. This is a high risk to
take, however, at the time of the communication. The better practice, from the vantage point of protecting the privilege, would seem
to be segregating the advice whenever possible. 9 Expecting clients
to be able to distinguish legal from business matters in their routine communications to counsel, however, is unrealistic, since even
some of the lawyers in the study said that they personally have
difficulty doing so. Perhaps after initial consultation on a particular matter, counsel may be able to instruct the corporate representative thereafter to address business and legal issues separately in
memoranda relating to the matter.5 0
When house counsel are acting in their legal advisory roles,
only the executives' perceptions support the proposition that inhouse attorneys are more likely than outside counsel to give business advice.5 21 These perceptions may be influenced by the fact
that most executives come into contact with house counsel more
518

See Redlich, Should a Lawyer Cross the Murky Divide?, 31 Bus. LAw. 478, 481

(1975).
51" See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981) ("[T]he lawyer
should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or
methods because of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself");
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983) ("A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation").
US See, e.g., G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 147-48 (1978).
519 See Brereton, Pye & Withrow, supra note 293, at 235, 247.
520 See Sexton, supra note 114, at 491 n.153; Weissenberger, supra note 371, at 924.
521 See supra notes 500-01 and accompanying text.

1989]

CORPORATE PRIVILEGE STUDY

often than outside counsel.2 2 With respect to some matters, in
fact, outside counsel may give even more business advice than do
house counsel. Thus, as a general matter, there should be no cause
to suspect that communications of a corporation's internal legal
department are more likely than those of outside counsel to be
business in nature. On the other hand, the data do show that house
counsel who serve as chief legal officers are likely to perform various nonlegal duties for the corporations employing them. 23 Whenever a member of a corporation's internal legal department is part
of the management team, the burden appropriately should rest
with the corporation to demonstrate that the particular communication was made to or by the lawyer in his legal advisory role.5 24 As

suggested by some courts 525 and commentators, 52 an attorney may
enhance the record by specifically designating his status in his
writings and instructing corporate representatives to do the same.
As shown above with respect to the issue of confidentiality,5 27 form
may have an impact, however slight, on the substance of the
matter.
Finally, the interview results suggest that most reports, memoranda and correspondence that are forwarded to counsel without
an express request for legal advice probably do not constitute a
conscious attempt to "funnel" business papers to counsel simply to
See supra note 501 and accompanying text.
See supra note 502 and accompanying text.
I2, Compare In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (house counsel who
was also vice president with responsibilities "outside the lawyer's sphere" was found to have
acted as lawyer when discussing antitrust compliance) with North Carolina EIec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 516 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (house counsel who also held management positions were not shown to have received "business updates" in their capacity as lawyers and were not giving legal advice when reporting to
management about lobbying activities) and Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp.,
84 F.R.D. 631, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (general counsel who also served as senior vice president
was not shown to have been acting in legal role during communications relating to pricing).
"2 See, e.g., Hardy v. New York News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court
stressed that Vice President and Director of Employee Relations, who also served as house
counsel, was neither addressed by others nor identified by himself as "counsel"); Barr
Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (memoranda
failed to show that senior vice president was addressed in his capacity as general counsel).
But see United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 41-42 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (although house
counsel signed memorandum as "Senior Vice President" rather than as "Acting General
Counsel," court upheld privilege because of actual legal role involved).
25 See, e.g., Brereton, Pye & Withrow, supra note 293, at 234; Szabad & Gersen, supra
note 8, at 245.
827 See supra note 476 and accompanying text.
522
523
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secrete them from discovery."28 On the other hand, an affirmative
answer to the question might have suggested illegitimate conduct
either on the part of the respondent or the respondent's client.
Thus, the apparent infrequency of attempts to create privilege for
business communications by sending them to counsel may be
somewhat exaggerated. During an earlier portion of the interview,
for example, three lawyers indicated that in particular matters
they had specifically instructed corporate representatives to send
"carbon copies" of employee-to-employee communications to counsel "so that privilege will attach.

52 9

Nevertheless, on their face, the findings provide evidence that
many documentary materials sent to counsel, both in-house and
outside, are in fact implied requests for legal advice. 30 Corporate
communications to house counsel who have additional nonlegal
management responsibilities, however, are more likely than communications to outside counsel to be business status reports that
are intended simply to keep counsel apprised of business activities.
Adversaries of corporations and courts, therefore, should be particularly skeptical of claims of privilege made for communications
that are routed to such attorneys.5 31 The efforts of house counsel to
practice preventive law are laudable and should be encouraged, but
not to the extent of broadening the attorney-client privilege to include routine business communications that are unrelated to the
seeking of legal advice. Obviously, the line is not easy to draw.5 32
Here again, because of the inherent ambiguity of such communications, corporations should be obligated to prove that the particular
memoranda that were routed to counsel contemplated the receipt
of legal assistance. 33

See supra note 505 and accompanying text.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
510 See supra notes 503-04 and accompanying text.
928
829

I'l See also supra notes

163 & 252 and accompanying text.

522 See Rossi v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 588,
593, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (1989) ("no ready test exists for distinguishing between protected legal communications and unprotected communications; the inquiry
is necessarily fact-specific").
931 Compare Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (court
interpreted communications that were intended to keep counsel apprised of business mat-

ters as implied requests for legal advice) with Henson v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 118

F.R.D. 584, 587-88 (W.D. Va. 1987) (corporation failed to demonstrate that memoranda
among various departments concerning ongoing business developments were related to seeking of legal advice) and North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light
Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 516-17 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (privilege applied only if "updates" to counsel
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In regard to the entire problem of business communications
and the maintenance of confidentiality, courts should use and enforce the type of "indexing" rules for privilege claims that have
been adopted in the Federal District Courts for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York.5 34 Such rules require litigants in
the first instance to provide adequate background information
about each privileged communication.5 35 Indexing requirements
are in harmony with the principle that corporations should bear
the burden of proving the confidentiality and legal subject matter
of particular communications, and they should help ensure that
adversaries are given a basis for determining whether to acquiesce
or to seek judicial rejection of the claims.
VII.

THE

GarnerDoCTRm=

Garner v. Wolfinbarger5s3

signaled a significant departure

from the long-standing tradition that the attorney-client privilege
is absolute. 37 The case held that in an action by shareholders of a
corporation against its officers and directors based on wrongdoing
injurious to shareholder interests, the privilege for communications
between management and the corporation's counsel is "subject to
the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be
invoked in the particular instance."' 38 The court thus introduced
to the jurisprudence of the corporate attorney-client privilege the
notion that the status of the plaintiff as the beneficiary of fiduciary
obligations owed by the corporation's management is a factor in
determining whether the privilege should apply. According to one
of the litigators in the survey, the decision "was a coup for the
plaintiff's bar."
Garner arose out of alleged fraud and violations of the federal
securities laws by the officers and directors of a life insurance company in the registration and sale of the company's stock. The
shareholders filed a class action suit for their personal damages
regarding business developments were connected to specific legal problems). See 2 J. WEINsTm & M. BERGER, supra note 131, %503(b)[04], at 503-50 (corporation "must be able to
prove connection between communication and rendition of legal advice").
53, See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
"" See supra note 184.
8"430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
537 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
8ssGarner,430 F.2d at 1103-04.
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and asserted a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation. 39
During pretrial discovery, the corporation refused to produce documents between it and counsel made contemporaneously with the
relevant transactions, and an attorney for the corporation who had
played a key role in the events refused to answer pertinent questions during a deposition. 540 The district court granted a motion to

compel, holding that the privilege was totally unavailable in suits
between a corporation and its shareholders. 41 In so holding, the
district judge relied upon two English cases that analogize the relationship between management and shareholders to that between
trustees and beneficiaries. 42
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected both the corporation's
contention that the privilege must be absolute in order to ensure
candid legal advice and the shareholders' position that the privilege must always yield in a suit by stockholders. Instead, the court
took a middle ground, creating a qualified privilege that was intended to balance the interests of the corporation against those of
the shareholders and the public.543 Stressing that "management
has duties which run to the benefit ultimately of the stockholders,"544 the court viewed the English precedents relied upon by the
district court as "persuasive recognition" that management's fiduciary duties to shareholders should be taken into account in applying the corporation's attorney-client privilege.5 45
The court drew additional support for its concept of a qualified privilege from the future crime or fraud exception to the privi39 Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1095-96.
54 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968), vacated, 430 F.2d 1093
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); accord, Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 45 F.R.D.
510 (W.D. Ky. 1968).
5,2 Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101-02. The English cases were W. Dennis & Sons, Ltd. v.
West Norfolk Farmers' Manure & Chem. Co-Operative Co., [1943] 2 All E.R. 94 (Ch.) and
Gouraud v. Edison Gower Bell Tel. Co., 57 L.J. Ch. (1888). The district court found no
American precedent on point, but in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188
A.2d 125 (1963), the Delaware Supreme Court, without mentioning the plaintiffs' status, had
denied shareholders in a derivative suit access to statements given to counsel by various
employees of the corporation in preparation for the corporation's defense of a prior antitrust
indictment. Id. at 89, 188 A.2d at 132. The Delaware decision does not contradict the ultimate teaching of Garner, however, because the documents in issue were prepared in anticipation of litigation concerning the subject matter of the derivative suit itself. See infra
notes 596-601 and accompanying text.
Garner,430 F.2d at 1103-04.
Id. at 1101.
Id. at 1102.
540
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lege. 48 Differences between prospective crime or fraud and "prospective action of questionable legality," said the court, "are
differences of degree, not of principle. 5 47 The court also found "instructive" value in the joint client exception, pursuant to which
communications to an attorney representing two parties with respect to a matter of common interest are not privileged from dis48
closure in subsequent litigation between the two clients.

In redefining the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege in shareholder actions, the Garner court relied in part upon

the cost-benefit analysis by which privileges have traditionally
been justified: the extent to which the harm that would result from
disclosure outweighs the benefits to be gained in the accuracy of
adjudication. 49 But the court added a new dimension to the
calculus by giving consideration to the fiduciary relationship between the parties in the "particularized context" of corporate
shareholder litigation.5 50 Moreover, the court held that the cost-

benefit analysis in corporate shareholder cases should occur on a
See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text
Garner,430 F.2d at 1103. Courts in subsequent cases have noted that Garner's reference to the crime-fraud exception was solely for the purpose of demonstrating the nonabsolute character of the attorney-client privilege and was not the basis for the court's decision. See In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 696 n.4 (N.D. 111. 1978);
Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
95,894, at 91,304 (N.D. Tex. 1977). The Garnerdoctrine, therefore, does not require a prima
facie showing of criminal, fraudulent or even tortious conduct. See infra note 552.
518Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104. See supra note 339 and accompanying text. The jointclient theory, standing alone, would not justify breaching the privilege in suits between the
corporation, management and shareholders. Under the entity theory of corporate representation, only the corporation, not its individual officers, directors or shareholders, is the attorney's client. See supra note 117 and accompanying text; see also Burnham, supra note
14, at 912. Furthermore, the conventional rationale of the joint-clierit exception has little
force in the corporate context. The joint-client exception is based on the premise that coclients who consult the same attorney with respect to a matter of common interest would
not expect the confidences of one client to be withheld from the other. See 8 J. WiGMOE,
supra note 2, § 2312, at 605-06; C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 97, § 91, at 220. It is questionable whether corporate managers would have such expectations.
A rationale for the joint-client exception which does not depend on client expectations
and therefore may have stronger relevance in the corporate context is that it is simply unfair in litigation between former co-clients for one to be favored over the other with respect
to control of the attorney-client privilege. As one court explained:
[T]he court will not allow the attorney to protect the interest of one client by
refusing to disclose information received from that client, to the detriment of another client or former client. The fiduciary obligations of an attorney are not
served by his later selection of the interests of one client over another.
Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 368 (D. Del. 1975).
11,9
Garner, 430 F.2d at 1100. See supra note 63.
111Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101.
'
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case-by-case basis,55 ' a radical approach in light of the long history
of absolute treatment of the attorney-client privilege upon satisfaction of its definitional elements. The court suggested several factors to be considered in determining whether good cause exists for
denial of the privilege in shareholder actions. 552 The most significant are: the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock
they represent; the good faith of the shareholders and the apparent
legitimacy of the claim; the need or "desirability" of the information and its availability from other sources; the nature of the legal
consultation, e.g., whether it related to prospective or past conduct
or involved the instant litigation;" and the risk of revealing trade
secrets or other confidential information in which "the corporation
has an interest for independent reasons. ' '65
The Garner doctrine has been recognized as valid by most
courts that have considered the issue. 54 Indeed, some courts have
extended the "good cause" qualification to other fiduciary relationships.55 Garner's critics, however, argue that the doctrinal notion
"'

Id.

at 1101, 1103-04.

Id. at 1104.
There are many indicia that may contribute to a decision of presence or absence
of good cause, among them the number of shareholders and the percentage of
stock they represent; the bona fides of the shareholders; the nature of the shareholders' claim and whether it is obviously colorable; the apparent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the information and the availability of it from
other sources; whether, if the shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by the corporation, it is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality;
whether the communications related to past or to prospective actions; whether the
communication is of advice concerning the litigation itself; the extent to which the
communication is identified versus the extent to which the shareholders are
blindly fishing; the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information in
whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for independent reasons.

552

Id.

553See id. On remand, the district court found good cause for setting aside the privilege, noting that several key witnesses had taken the fifth amendment, no trade secrets were
involved and no improper purpose had been shown on the part of the plaintiffs. Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 56 F.R.D. 499, 504 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
'59See, e.g., In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616, 620 (S.D. Ohio
1983); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 606-08 (NJD. Tex. 1981); Ohio-Sealy Mattress
Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31-32 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D.
480, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 722 (N.D. Ill.
1978);
In re TransOcean Tender Offer See. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 695-96 (N.D. IIl. 1978); Broad v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,894 (N.D.
Tex. 1977) (debentureholders); Neustetter v. District Court, 675 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. 1984) (accountant-client privilege); Beard v. Ames, 96 App. Div. 2d 119, 121-22, 468 N.Y.S.2d 253,
255-56 (4th Dep't 1983) (balancing of interests in derivative actions); see also IDAHO R.
EVID. 502(d)(6) (codification of Garner doctrine in shareholder actions).
635See, e.g., Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D. 671, 680-82 (D. Kan. 1986)
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of fiduciary responsibilities should not override the instrumental
justification for the attorney-client privilege, i.e., the promotion of
candid communications.5 58 Management needs the certainty of an
absolute privilege, it is contended, in order properly to chart the
course of the corporation's business, and Garner undermines this
desirable goal. Traditional limitations on the attorney-client privilege, such as the exception for communications made in contemplation of a future fraud or crime, are cited as sufficient protection
for shareholders.5 5 7 For these reasons, a federal district court in

Connecticut recently rejected the Garner doctrine.5 58
Does the Garner doctrine in fact have a negative impact on
corporate attorney-client communications? The results of the sur(union officers and union members); Helt v. Metropolitan District Comm'n, 113 F.R.D. 7, 911 (D. Conn.1986) (pension fund trustee and beneficiaries); Quintel Corp. N.V.v. Citibank,
N.A., 567 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (investment adviser for purchaser in real
estate acquisition); Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 586-87 (N.D. Il. 1981) (pension
plan trustee and beneficiaries); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 369-70 (D. Del. 1975)
(majority shareholder and minority shareholders); Hoopes v. Carota, 142 App. Div. 2d 906,
910, 531 N.Y.S.2d 407, 409-10 (3d Dep't 1988) (trustee of voting stock of corporation), aff'd,
74 N.Y.2d 716, 543 N.E.2d 73, 544 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1989). But see Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins.
Co., 815 F.2d 1095, 1099 (7th Cir. 1987) (no fiduciary relationship between insurer and insured with respect to fire loss policy;, cases involving lawyer's joint representation of insured
and liability insurer distinguished); In re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litig., 449 F. Supp. 828,
833-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no fiduciary relationship between lead lending bank and other
banks that entered into participation agreements with lead bank).
Some post-Garner cases deny the privilege outright to fiduciaries in litigation against
beneficiaries. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 796 F.2d 264, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1986) (trustee
of pension fund); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild Local 35 v. Washington Star Co.,
543 F. Supp. 906, 909-10 (D.D.C. 1982) (trustee of pension fund); Estate of Torian v. Smith,
263 Ark. 304, 564 S.W.2d 521, 526 (1978) (estate executor cannot assert privilege against
residuary legatees), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 883, (1979); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d
709,713-14 (Del. Ch. 1976) (testamentary trust). But see In re Estate of Baker, 139 Misc. 2d
573, 577, 528 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473-74 (Surr. Ct. 1988) (estate executor generally must disclose
legal advice relating to administration of the estate but is entitled to assert privilege for
communications relating to preparation of defense of potential action by beneficiaries).
556 See, e.g., Kirby, New Life for the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege in ShareholderLitigation, 69 A.B.A. J. 174, 176 (1983); Saltzburg, CorporateAttorney-ClientPrivilege in Shareholder Litigation and Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 HorsTRA L. REv.
817, 832, 839, 847 (1984); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in
ShareholderLitigation, 50 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 303, 321-35 (1977); see also Sexton, supra note
114, at 515 (Garner"threatens one of the basic assumptions of the Upjohn Court, to wit,
that the corporate attorney-client privilege induces communications with the corporation's
attorney that would not otherwise occur").
511See Saltzburg, supra note 556, at 834, 841-44.
I5 Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., 112 F.R.D. 389, 390-91 (D. Conn. 1986). See also
Hoiles v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1198-99, 204 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114-15 (1984)
(noting that "Garner's continued vitality is suspect.., even in federal courts," court held
that state law precluded judicial modification of statutory privileges).
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vey suggest that for the most part it does not.
A.

Findings

Seventy-two percent of the lawyers in the study (73 of 102)
said that the shareholder/fiduciary qualification had never been a
factor taken into consideration by them when communicating with
representatives of their corporate clients. The explanation offered
by nine of the house counsel for ignoring Garner was that their
companies were closely held, thereby eliminating the issue for
them. The most frequent reason given by the other attorneys who
had not taken the rule into account was that shareholder litigation
was not a realistic threat. "Shareholder suits are so rare you simply
don't worry about them," was a typical response.
Primarily for the same reasons, a slight majority of the attorneys responding to the question (53 of 101, or 52.5%) said that the
shareholder/fiduciary rule does not have any impact on their ability to predict whether the privilege will attach to their communications. Of the forty-seven attorneys who said that the rule does affect predictability, two out of three indicated that they are only
"somewhat" or "slightly" less able to predict the applicability of
privilege. According to several lawyers in the latter group, Garner
decreases certainty only in situations where shareholder rights are
implicated, and such occurrences are rare. 5 9 Only eleven attorneys
said they were "much less able" to predict as a result of the shareholder/fiduciary rule, and they indicated that they were answering
only with respect to situations in which shareholder litigation was
a threat.
The attorneys' perceptions that the potential loss of privilege
due to shareholder litigation is a rare threat seem well founded,
based on the data obtained in the survey of judges and magistrates. Only eight judicialfrespondents-one-third of those who
had adjudicated attorney-client privilege questions in the corporate context-recalled having had cases in which the Garner issue
had been litigated. Of these eight, only two had ever ordered production based on a showing of good cause; one failed to find good
cause'in the particular case; three others said the issue had become
moot in their cases either because of the parties' voluntary produc619 A half dozen attorneys who said that predictability was affected only slightly or not
at all pointed out that they seldom try to make predictions about the privilege under any
circumstances because it is "always subject to exceptions and the waiver doctrine."
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tion or due to judicial orders directing production on other
grounds; and two did not remember the outcome. 6 0
To what extent are corporate representatives aware of the
shareholder/fiduciary qualification? A majority of the attorneys
(56.4%) were of the opinion that no one at any level of the corporate hierarchy knew about the rule. About one-third (29.7%) believed that knowledge was limited either to senior executives or to
"a few individuals" at various levels. Three respondents indicated
that even lawyers are sometimes surprised to learn about the rule.
Based on the survey of executives, the lawyers' perceptions about
lack of knowledge among corporate representatives are probably
accurate, and perhaps even somewhat optimistic. Only nine executives (17.3%) indicated prior awareness, while forty-three (82.7%)
said they did not know that the privilege was qualified in the
shareholder/fiduciary context. Interestingly, about one of every five
executives made a spontaneous comment to the effect that the rule
was "reasonable" or "understandable" because "shareholders own
the company."
What is the effect of Garnerin situations in which it poses an
imminent threat to the privilege, i.e., prospective transactions in
which shareholder interests are implicated and in actual shareholder litigation? Twenty-nine of the lawyers who were interviewed (28.4%) had had occasion to take the shareholder/fiduciary
qualification into account in their communications with corporate
representatives. They were asked to describe the circumstances in
which Garne had been a factor and the impact of the potential
loss of privilege. The circumstances fell into three basic categories:
(1) counseling with respect to prospective corporate transactions
that might affect shareholder interests, such as recapitalizations,
mergers, acquisitions or takeovers (nine respondents);56 1 (2) inves860The results of a study published in 1980 also indicate that shareholder litigation is
relatively infrequent. See Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U.L. Rlv. 306 (1980). Only
30.5% of a nationwide sample of 190 publicly traded corporations had experienced such
litigation between 1971 and 1978. Id. at 313. After accounting for the fact that one event
may trigger multiple lawsuits, the study found that, on the average, a company is involved
in a shareholder dispute only once every 17.5 years. Id. The data also showed that larger
corporations are more likely to encounter shareholder suits than are their smaller counterparts. Id. at 315-17.
116Included in this group is one respondent who said that he had experienced the Garner doctrine most often in connection with general representation of trustees of pension
funds. Several recent cases hold that plan beneficiaries may be entitled to discovery of the
trustee's communications with counsel concerning management of the fund. See supra note
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tigations into past corporate transactions as to which shareholder
litigation was anticipated (nine respondents); and (3) the defense
of actual derivative or class actions (eleven respondents). Five of
the respondents in the first category said that corporate representatives' knowledge of the Garner qualification had no perceived impact on the nature of their communications with counsel. Four, on
the other hand, reported that client conduct was affected: communications to counsel were either "more guarded" or fewer in number. One of the outside counsel in the latter group, for example,
had had extensive experience in representing corporations that
were "takeover targets." He indicated that executives are no less
candid when apprised of Garner but they do take fewer notes at
meetings with counsel (at counsel's prompting) and are more in5 62
clined to communicate only with senior-level law-firm partners.
Seven of the nine respondents who had dealt with investigations of matters likely to result in litigation with shareholders-the
second category of circumstances in which Garner may affect the
privilege-also reported that communications with their clients
were affected. Knowledge of the shareholder/fiduciary exception
was said to result in "less candor," "circumspection," "restraint,"
or "fewer communications." One respondent, however, said that it
is the lawyer's conduct that is affected, not the client's; he still prepared memoranda of interviews with corporate representatives but
put fewer conclusions in writing. Only one respondent in this category said that Garner had had no effect on communications.
Of the lawyers who had actually defended derivative or class
actions, seven said that neither they nor their clients were affected
by Garner; two indicated that only the lawyer's "strategy" of communication was altered; and two more indicated that clients exercised "caution" when discussing the litigation. Some of the respondents said that once a matter is in litigation, Garner is a
"backward-looking" concept. The principal issue becomes which
discussions between management and counsel at the time of the
challenged transaction must be produced during discovery.
To obtain the corporate client's perspective on the potential
impact of the Garner doctrine, the executives in the survey were
555.
"'
Interestingly, another lawyer in the survey who had frequently represented corporate "raiders" reported that, for him, the Garner doctrine had not been a factor. In his
experience, shareholders of raiders, unlike those of targets, seldom complain about management's conduct in connection with takeover activities.
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asked the following question: "If management were made aware of
the shareholder rule in a transaction that might give rise to litigation with shareholders, do you think managers would be tempted
to be less candid in their communications with counsel?" The respondents were about evenly divided between those who did and
those who did not think that Garnerwould reduce management's
candor: Twenty (38.5%) answered "yes," twenty-two (42.3%) answered "no," and ten (19.2%) could not say how the management
3
of their companies would react.s
B. Analysis
The results strongly suggest that the Garner qualification to
the privilege is not currently a spectre that haunts the corporate
attorney-client relationship. It seems that most executives do not
know that the rule exists, and most lawyers experience little or no
anxiety over it. The Garner doctrine probably is not a pressing
concern in most corporate counseling because shareholder litigation is perceived to be an infrequent occurrence.56 4 For the lawyers
who have taken Garner into account, its potentially inhibiting effect on communications appears to be felt most strongly in connection with investigations into past transactions that could generate
shareholder litigation and felt the least when actual litigation materializes. When transactions are at the prospective stage, the effects are mixed. This is evidenced most clearly by the survey of
executives, who were about evenly divided between those who said
that management would be less candid and those who anticipated
no effect on candor in transactions as to which the Garner rule
might apply.56 5 Interestingly, one lawyer reported that Garnerperforms a prophylactic function at the transactional stage: In advising clients against entering into transactions that are clearly inimical to shareholder interests, a warning that his advice may be
subject to discovery can dissuade them from proceeding with the
"' The following typical comments were volunteered by the executives who said that
candor would most likely be reduced: "The lawyer will say 'I don't want to hear about it' ";
"Yes, but only as to written communications"; "It would have a chilling effect"; "We'd be
more judicious in what we say"; and "Yes, as to certain subjects." Those who thought that
candor would not be reduced made remarks such as the following: "Legal advice would be
necessary no matter what we do"; "The cost of illegality is too high, so we'd be as candid as
possible in seeking advice"; and "The effect would be to reduce the number of writings, but
we'd be just as candid in what we tell counsel."

See supra notes 559-60 and accompanying text.
'"See supra note 563 and accompanying text.
884
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transaction.
On the whole, the potential loss of privilege introduced by the
Garner doctrine has not caused an overall chill in corporate attorney-client communications. Nor does Garner appear to have inflicted too much damage even in the occasional situations in which
it is most likely to affect the candor of attorney-client communications, i.e., threatened shareholder litigation. In such instances,
courts applying Garner are not likely in any event to find good
cause for lifting the privilege, a point that. will be discussed
below.5 61
The data thus provide little basis for retreating from Garner,
as some have advocated, on the ground that it interferes with the
67
instrumental goals of the corporate attorney-client privilege.

Furthermore, the doctrine is sound. The ultimate beneficiaries of
management action are the shareholders of the corporation. Although the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors may
not equate with those of trustees, "when all is said and done management is not managing for itself." s8 Because of their status as
beneficiaries of fiduciary obligations, shareholders have an interest
in evaluating management's performance through scrutiny of their
relevant communications with counsel.""" A court's decision to give
61 See

infra notes 596-601 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 556-58 and accompanying text.
"I Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101. The well-established rule in England, and the apparent
667

rule in this country, is that trustees generally must provide full disclosure to beneficiaries of
all matters concerning the routine administration of the trust, including legal advice sought
by the trustee in his fiduciary capacity. See supra note 555; see also G.G. BOGERT & G.T.
BOGERT, TH LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs § 961 (2d ed. 1965). But see In re PrudenceBonds Corp., 76 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1948) (corporate trustee of indenture trust not
required to disclose opinions of counsel to bondholders in surcharge proceeding). The Garner court took care to avoid holding that the same rule applies to the management of a
corporation. There are a number of theoretical and practical distinctions between corporations and trusts, including the notion that the corporation is an independent legal entity
with a need for broad and flexible discretion in the conduct of its business and the fact that
often there are a great many more shareholders of a corporation than there are beneficiaries
of a trust. See G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra, § 16; Burnham, supra note 104, at 90809. Accordingly, it is generally accepted by modern authorities that corporate officers and
directors, although charged as agents with fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, do not have the identical degree of fiduciary responsibility as trustees. G. HENN &
J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CoRpoRATIoNs § 235 (3d ed. 1983); Note, The CorporateAttorneyClient Privilege in the FederalCourts,22 CATH. LAW. 138, 155-56 (1976). The trust analogy,
therefore, is not entirely satisfactory as a basis for denying the availability of the attorneyclient privilege to corporate management. See Burnham, supra note 104, at 908-10; Note,
supra note 556, at 317-20.
"8 See Valente v. Pepsico, Inc. 68 F.R.D. 361, 370 (D. Del. 1975) ("[a] fiduciary owes
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shareholders access to such communipations upon a showing of
good cause does not make them the clients of the corporation's attorney. 570 Judicial power over the privilege question simply recognizes that when the constituents of the corporate entity become
involved in an internecine dispute, thE management group should
not retain exclusive authority to assert the privilege. Since management has an inherent conflict of interest in such cases, the Garner doctrine in effect provides for a neutral arbiter to weigh the
discovery needs of the shareholders against the potential harm to
corporate interests. 2 1
Additional sustenance for the conceptual premise of Garneris
found in the Supreme Court's decisibn in Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Weintraub. 72 There, the Court held that
when a corporation goes into bankruptcy, management forfeits its
power to exercise or waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to pre-bankruptcy communications. 73 Administration of the corporation's privilege was said to be ordinarily a
management prerogative to be exercised "in a manner consistent
with [the managers'] fiduciary duty to.act in the best interests of
the corporation and not of themselves as individuals." 74 Since virtually all managerial authority passes to the trustee in bankruptcy,
control over the corporation's privilege likewise passes to the trustee.52 5 In support of its holding, the Court stressed that one of the
important goals of the bankruptcy laws is to enable the trustee to
uncover insider fraud by the corporation's officers and directors. If
managers could "use the privilege as a shield against the trustee's
efforts," '57
they
might "thwart an investigation into their own
6
conduct.

A bankruptcy trustee's inquiry into possible wrongdoing by
management obviously is not a perfect pnalogy to shareholder litigation because management in such cases retains its authority to
the obligation to his beneficiaries to go about his duties without obscuring his reasons from
the legitimate inquiries of the beneficiaries"); Lewis, Garneris Alive and Well in Securities
Litigation, 69 A.B.A. J. 903, 905 (1983) (Garner permits shareholders "to monitor the conduct of their servants").
670

See supra notes 117 & 548.

671 See Burnham, supra note 104, at 910-11.
-2

471 U.S. 343 (1985).

11-

Id. at 352-54.
Id. at 349.

5714

575 Id.

at 351-53.
171Id. at 353-54.
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manage the corporation. The Supreme Court's reasoning, however,

supports the view that when management, charged with its own
wrongdoing, may be motivated to exercise the corporation's privilege primarily in its own self-interest, someone other than existing
management should determine the privilege question. In the context of shareholder litigation, it is the court that is in the best posi57
tion to weigh the competing interests. 7
The argument made by opponents of Garnerthat a good cause
standard is unnecessary in light of the traditional crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is unpersuasive.57 e The type

of conduct through which officers and directors may have injured
the corporation may not fall neatly into the category of a crime or
fraud.5 79 Even if it did, courts have imposed on proponents of the
crime/fraud exception the burden of making a prima facie showing
that the client had a criminal or fraudulent purpose and that the
communications with counsel were related to the prima facie
wrong.58 0 The Supreme Court in Weintraub noted the difficulty of
177
Another possibility would be delegation of the decision to an independent committee of the board of directors of the corporation. See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 104, at 911.
Committees of this nature are sometimes formed at the outset of a derivative action for the
purpose of investigation and determination whether the best interests of the corporation He
in continuation of the litigation or in recommendation to the court of dismissal. See, e.g.,
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (DeL 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); see generally Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of
the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUm L.
REv. 261 (1981). Formation of such a committee for the limited purpose of deciding an
evidentiary question, however, does not seem practical. Furthermore, such a committee is
not in as good a position as the court to consider the evidentiary and procedural issues
involved, such as relevance and the plaintiff's inability to obtain the information from other
sources. In any event, even a committee's recommendation to maintain the privilege should
be subject to judicial review. Cf. A~muEcAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovERNANcE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.08 (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985) (court determines whether to dismiss derivative action after review of independent committee's
recommendation).
578 See supra note 557 and accompanying text.
'70 See Note, supra note 556, at 327.
880
See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The prima facie
standard has also been described as one of "probable cause," or one which "require[s] that
a prudent person have a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration of a crime or fraud."
In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 166 (6th Cir. 1986), (quoting In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984)). The
Supreme Court has not yet resolved the precise evidentiary burden that the opponent of the
privilege must meet in establishing applicability of the crime/fraud exception. See United
States v. Zolin, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 2626 n.7 (1989). With respect to the second requirement for
establishing the exception, it is not enough that the client was engaged in wrongful conduct
at the time of its communications with counsel; for the privilege to be lost, the particular
communication must facilitate the wrongdoing. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum,
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making such a showing to buttress its conclusion that the crime/
fraud exception is inadequate to facilitate the investigatory efforts
of bankruptcy trustees.5 8 1 The same can be said about the efforts
of shareholders in litigation against corporate management.
It bears emphasizing that Garner's good cause standard does
not invariably result in loss of the privilege. The Garner court recognized that management's decision-making is aided by legal advice and that there is utility in maintaining the confidentiality of
most of counsel's communications with management.5 82 Furthermore, managements flexibility and exercise of independent judgment can be jeopardized by vexatious interference from a handful
of disgruntled shareholders. 8 3 Giving proper regard to the realities
of corporate life, therefore, the Garnercourt considered it inappropriate to abrogate the privilege entirely in shareholder litigation.
While the argument for piercing the privilege may be strong, for
example, when all or nearly all shareholders desire disclosure, it
weakens when only a few seek such access.5 8 ' Furthermore, aside
from possible adverse interests between the corporation and the
party-shareholders, the interests of shareholders who are not parties to the particular litigation may also diverge from those who
are. Both the corporation and the shareholders at large may legitimately desire to avoid the risk that disclosure of sensitive communications will cause a disruption of business, competitive harm or
additional costly litigation against the corporation, any of which
could decrease the long-term value of the shareholders' investment. These competing interests can and should be taken into account by courts in individual cases when determining whether
shareholders have shown good cause for disclosure of privileged
communications.185
798 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1986). It has also been held that the client must have been engaged
in or have contemplated the wrongdoing at the time the legal advice was sought; subsequent
misuse of the advice does not vitiate the privilege. Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski,
751 F.2d 277, 282-83 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 472 U.S. 1022 (1985).
" Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 354 (1985).
£22

Garner,430 F.2d at 1101.

I' As the court noted, management cannot "[please] all of its stockholders all of the
time," thus making it rational for management to seek protection in the attorney-client
privilege "from those who might second-guess or even harass in matters purely of judgment." Id.
£84 Id. at 1101 & n.17.
"55 Even upon a finding of good cause, a court should minimize the potential injury to
the corporation that may flow from disclosure of its attorney-client communications, as, for
example, by granting an appropriate protective order that would confine access to plaintiffs'
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Another important factor for a court to consider is whether
the shareholder claims are derivative or nonderivative in nature. In
a derivative action, shareholders theoretically are asserting a claim
belonging to the corporation, which is merely a nominal defendant,
and any damages will be paid to the corporation. 6s Unlike derivative suits, individual actions and claims made on behalf of a class
usually seek damages for the shareholders personally, perhaps not
only from officers and directors but also from the corporation itself. It has been argued that in such cases, shareholders' interests
are inherently adverse to those of the corporation. 87 This criticism, however, ignores the underlying rationale of Garner.Shareholder interests in disclosure are not dependent upon an absolute
identity of interest between the shareholders and the corporation.
Rather, they flow from the fiduciary duties owed to the shareholders by management. These duties are owed regardless of whether
the suit seeks derivative or personal relief, a point that is underscored by the increasing number of decisions that have applied
Garner in cases involving other types of fiduciary relationships.588
Shareholders are not necessarily less pure in motive when they sue
for personal damages than when they seek damages solely for the
corporation; in both instances they are suing to protect their investment.8 Certainly, the fiduciary rationale loses some of its
counsel or delete discussions relating to commercially sensitive information. See, e.g., IDAHo
R. EvD. 502(d)(6) (in ordering discovery of attorney-client communications in shareholder
actions pursuant to finding of good cause, court may grant protective orders to prevent unnecessary or unwarranted disclosure). In general, the same procedural protections that are
discussed below with respect to a qualified corporate attorney-client privilege would be appropriate in Garnersituations as well. See infra notes 768-94 and accompanying text.
510 See George v. LeBlanc, 78 F.R.D. 281, 291-92 (N.D. Tex.) (shareholders and corporation do not have adverse interests in derivative action against officers and directors), aff'd,
565 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1977).
187See Block & Barton, supra note 262, at 35. Garner itself indicated that the good
cause test was intended to be available in both derivative and class actions. Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1097 n.11 (5th Cir. 1970) ("our decision does not turn on
whether [the derivative] claim is in the case or out"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); see
also In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 n.3 (5th Cir.
1982) (Garnerapplies to class actions). But see Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Res. & Mgt,
Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 23 (9th Cir. 1981) (Garnerheld inapplicable because plaintiff was former
shareholder, action was not derivative, and proposed class was not certified; court erroneously characterized Garner as solely derivative suit).
5" See supra note 555.

589 See Neusteter v. District Court, 675 P.2d 1, 8 (Colo. 1984) (Garnerapplied to statutory accountant-client privilege in action by minority shareholders asserting claims for dissolution of closely held corporations and derivative claims for damages; court held that both
remedies were directed at protection of plaintiffs' investments).

1989]

CORPORATE PRIVILEGE STUDY'

force if the plaintiff class includes former shareholders as to whom
fiduciary duties are no longer owed at the time of suit. The enhanced right of shareholder discovery, however, should apply regardless of whether a fiduciary relationship existed at the time of
suit or at the time of the transaction giving rise to the cause of
action.590
Nevertheless, nonderivative claims are somewhat more suspect
than derivative claims because of the diminished mutuality of interest between the plaintiffs and the corporation. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, for example, recently refused to find good cause
in an action by former shareholders of a closely held corporation
whose management allegedly had redeemed their shares for inadequate consideration as part of a "freeze out" of minority shareholders.591 Declaring that "careful scrutiny" is required when
shareholders seek pecuniary gain only for themselves, rather than
for shareholders at large,592 the court held that good cause was
lacking because the transaction sued upon-a stock redemption-involved inherent adversity between shareholders and management from the outset;593 the plaintiffs' aggregate holdings were
all See Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("That the special
relationship of management-to-stockholder existed as to all class members for some period,
however brief, thrusts those class members ineluctably within the scope of the protection
afforded by the Garner doctrine"; class included persons who purchased stock after the alleged misconduct occurred); Saltzburg, supra note 556, at 841 (assuming Garneris good law,
"[a]ny unique relationship between management and shareholders that warrants a special
rule ought to include any shareholders who claim to have been hurt qua shareholders as a
result of the action of corporate officials") (emphasis in original). Contra,In re Atlantic Fin.
Mgt. Sec. Litig., 121 F.R.D. 141, 145-46 (D. Mass. 1988) (court refused to apply Garner
where attorney-client communications in issue related to matters that allegedly induced
plaintiffs to purchase their stoclk "If the stock had not,yet been purchased a fiduciary relationship did not yet exist").
"' Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1988).
5,2Id. at 786.
"' Id. at 786. The adversity of interest was described by the defendants in the case as
follows:
Managers of a tendering corporation must seek to conserve assets by not overpaying for redeemed stock; shareholders wishing to redeem, however, are naturally
interested in obtaining the highest price they can get Shareholders redeem their
stock voluntarily, based upon whether the price being offered is satisfactory to
them individually. Valuing a closed corporation for purposes of redeeming its
stock is a difficult task because the mutual interest commonly shared between
management and stockholders partially unravels; some shareholders and managers
will elect redemption and others will not, as each consults his own self-interest.
Id. at 784. The defendants argued that good cause is lacking as a matter of law in such
cases, but the court rejected this position, holding instead that the issue should be resolved
on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 785.
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less than four per cent;5 94 and the plaintiffs had made no attempt
to obtain the requested information from nonprivileged sources. 95

Another situation in which courts have been reluctant to find
good cause is when the communications at issue concern preparation for defense of the shareholder litigation itself. One court reasoned that good cause is difficult to justify when the relevant communications occurred "after the fact" as part of counsel's remedial
advice or trial strategy.59 8 In such circumstances, the adversity of

interests between shareholders and management has become manifest at the time of the communications.5 9 7 Management, in fairness, ought to be able to consult with counsel to defend against
possible charges with a certain amount of assurance that the com-

munications will not be disclosed.5 98 As the survey findings show,
5" Id. at 786. Other courts that have found good cause to be lacking due in part to the
fact that the plaintiffs represented only a small fraction of the overall number of shareholders include Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research and Management Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 2325 (9th Cir. 1981) and Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 26 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
5 Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d at 786. "Although the attorney-client communications were not publicly available, the information presented in them may have been known
by other corporate employees or contained in other business documents." Id.
The court also suggested that the merits of plaintiffs' claims were weak. Stressing that
the sale of the company had occurred three years after the redemption, the court observed
that "[a]nyone even casually familiar with the intense competition in most industries in our
economy knows.., that the value of a company can change dramatically in three years or,
for that matter, in three months." Id.
G' In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 607-08 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("[O]nce accused of
wrongdoing, managements need to consult counsel in confidence is self-evident"); see also
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 723-24 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (good cause lacking
with respect to correspondence between corporate client and counsel after litigation commenced); IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d)(6) (good cause standard in shareholder actions inapplicable
to communications made "during the litigation and concerning the litigation in which the
privilege is asserted"); cf. In re Estate of Baker, 139 Misc. 2d 573, 577, 528 N.Y.S.2d 470,
473-74 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1988) (estate executor may assert privilege for communications relating to defense of action by beneficiaries).
5" It has been held that Garner's standard of good cause does not even apply to attorney work product because the "mutuality of interest" between shareholders and management upon which Garner is premised is "destroyed" when shareholder litigation is anticipated. See In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 (5th
Cir. 1982). Work product, therefore, can only be obtained upon a showing of substantial
need and the inability without undue hardship to obtain the materials elsewhere. See id. at
1239-40; In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616, 620-21 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
But see Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D. 671, 682 (D. Kan. 1986) (work product
materials held discoverable because they provided "unique source of evidence").
'" The joint-client exception to the attorney-client privilege, to which the Garnercourt
analogized in creating the good cause standard, see supra note 548 and accompanying text,
has also been circumscribed in cases in which the joint clients had adverse interests at the
time of their consultations with counsel. See, e.g., Eureka Inv. Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins.
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anxiety over the attorney-client privilege is at its highest when liti-

gation is anticipated, both in general 99 and at the investigatory

stage before actual shareholder litigation occurs.6 00 Since freedom
of communication is most likely to be inhibited in the litigation
context, courts should continue to strictly apply the good cause
test with respect to communications made in anticipation of litiga-

tion. Thus, the Garnerrule will most often result in loss of privilege for communications that are relatively contemporaneous with
the transactions comprising the subject matter of the shareholder
litigation.6 01 As the survey findings show, these are the situations
that are least likely to cause concern over the possible absence of
attorney-client privilege.
In sum, the Garner doctrine provides an appropriate resolution of the question of who should control the exercise of the corporate attorney-client privilege in shareholder litigation against
corporate management. The survey data lend support to this conCo., 743 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Whereas co-clients who consult one attorney about a
particular matter may expect their confidences to be shared so long as their interests are
congruent, such expectations are diminished when one of the clients consults the same attorney about the matter following a divergence of interests. In the latter situation, the privilege may still be asserted in litigation between the co-clients. Id.
The privilege for litigation-related communications with counsel, however, may be lost
for a reason entirely independent of Garner.A derivative suit may be dismissed at an early
stage of the proceedings on the basis of the conclusion of a special investigatory committee
of independent directors that the suit itself is not in the best interests of the corporation.
See supra note 577. Such committees invariably rely upon the efforts and advice of counsel,
and attorney-client communications may therefore form an integral part of the committee's
report. At least two courts have held that when the committee's report is submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment, it becomes part of the evidentiary record, resulting
in a waiver of otherwise privileged information contained in the report. See In re Continental Illinois Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1304, 1313-16 (7th Cir. 1984); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
811 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
410 See supra notes 559-63 and accompanying text.
*91 See, e.g., Garner, 430 F.2d at 1096 (at issue was content of communications between counsel and company officials at time of allegedly fraudulent issuance and sale of
company's stock); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.RPD. 718, 723 (N.D. Iln. 1978) (in
class action challenging management's opposition to tender offer in 1977, attorneys' correspondence with management relating to prior proposed mergers and 1977 tender offer held
subject to disclosure); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 484-85 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (in
securities fraud class action, contemporaneous legal opinions and attorney-client communications relating to corporation's fraudulent activities held to be discoverable; court stressed
that requested data would be particularly effective in showing corporation's state of knowledge at relevant time); In re TransOcean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 696-97
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (in class and derivative actions alleging fraud and other improprieties in
merger, attorney-client documents with respect to merger and prior transactions between
defendants held discoverable).
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clusion with evidence that Garner'slimited incursion on the "absoluteness" of the corporate attorney-client privilege has done little
thus far to chill the candor of corporate attorney-client communications and is unlikely to do so in the future.
VIII. A

QUALIFIED APPROACH TO THE CORPORATE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE

Aside from the Garner doctrine, 6 2 the corporate attorney-client privilege has been treated as absolute. Once the prerequisites
for application of the privilege have been met, no particularized
showing of need by the adversary for the information contained in
the confidential communication will overcome the privilege. 0 3 Professor McCormick, however, argued that a trial judge should have
the discretion to set aside any privilege "in order to secure the
facts essential to do justice in the case before him. ' 604 Application
of a qualified attorney-client privilege to corporations has been of
particular appeal to some commentators primarily for the reason
that such an approach would help compensate for the large number of communications that conceivably may be brought within the
shield of privilege in the corporate context. 5 Should a court be
able to order discovery of corporate attorney-client communicaSee supra notes 536-55 and accompanying text.
603 See, e.g., Henson v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 584, 587 (W.D. Va. 1987).
6 McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tax. L. REv.447,
469-70 (1938); see also C. McCoRMICK, supra note 97, § 87, at 206 (in order to ensure just
results, trial judge should be permitted to set aside privileged communications).
603 See Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney-Client Privilege: In Search of
an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary System, and the Corporate
Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASriNGs L.J. 495, 549-50 (1982); Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilegein the Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L.
R.v.473, 506-10 (1987); Developments in the Law, supra note 79, at 1490 n.125; Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege-Identifying the Corporate Client, 48 FoRDiAM L. Rv.1281,
1303-07 (1980); Note, supranote 113, at 473-77; Note, supra note 477, at 257-60; Comment,
The Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege for CorporationsAfter Upjohn Co. v. United
States: A Practical Approach, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 821, 839 (1982); Comment, Evidence-The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege in Tennessee, 11 MEM. ST.U.L. Rav. 289,
301 (1981); Comment, CorporateEmployee's Communication to Attorney at Direction of
CorporationHeld to be Privileged,23 VAND. L. Rav. 847, 853-54 (1970); see also infra notes
646-47.
A number of commentators, however, have argued that a qualified privilege lacks the
certainty believed necessary to effectuate the goals of the privilege. See Nath,osupra note
114, at 37 n.95; Sexton, supra note 114, at 482-83; Weissenberger, supra note 371, at 918;
The Control Group Test, supra note 114, at 426; Note, The Attorney-ClientPrivilege in the
Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 MICH. L. REv. 360, 370-75 (1970); Note,
supra note 556, at 321-24.
"12
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tions if significant information contained therein is unavailable
from nonprivileged sources with reasonable effort? To what extent
might such an approach conflict with the instrumental objectives
of the corporate privilege?
A. Findings
The concept of a qualified corporate attorney-client privilege
was briefly described to the participants in the study as a hypothetical change in the law, and they were then asked their views as
to the probable effects of such a change. They were told to assume
that information otherwise covered by the corporate privilege
could lose its protection, in the court's discretion, upon a showing
by the corporation's adversary of a special need for the privileged
information due to an inability to obtain it through reasonable effort from alternative sources.608 They were also told to assume that
under a qualification based on need, the privilege would in practice
rarely be lifted because of the difficulty litigants, in most cases,
would have in showing the court that the facts could not be obtained elsewhere.
The lawyers were almost unanimous (95.0%) in stating that a
qualified privilege would reduce their ability to predict the applicability of privilege. This response is not surprising because the evidentiary needs of a future opponent cannot be foreseen. About a
quarter of the lawyers, however, said that predictability would be
decreased only "slightly," either because the applicability of privilege already is uncertain, as, for example, in the case of mixed business and legal communications, or because privileged information
would usually be available from other sources. Some noted that
predictability ultimately would turn on whether the 0judiciary
lim7
ited its exercise of discretion to extraordinary cases
Despite their negative views with respect to the effect of a
qualified privilege on predictability, nearly two-thirds of the lawyers (63.7%) felt that a qualified privilege would have no effect on
the frequency with which corporate clients would seek their legal
advice. 08 The most common observation was that the need for le406 The standard described to the respondents is similar to the qualification applicable
to the immunity for ordinary work product. See supra note 66.
107 Some of the lawyers complained that a discretionary approach would be too dependent on the "vicissitudes" of individual judges who may be "anti-privilege" and desirous of
"evening up the score" between a corporation and its adversary.
"I'In this and all other questions relating to the impact of a qualified privilege on the
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gal advice would exist regardless of the standard of privilege. As
one attorney put it, "The risks of foregoing legal advice would be
too great." Some remarked that corporations might seek legal advice even more frequently if the privilege were qualified in order to
avoid getting into legal difficulties that could lead to litigation. One
out of three lawyers, on the other hand, forecast a reduction in the
use of legal services. "The frequency of consultation would decrease in proportion to their comfort level" is how one of these
respondents described the effect.
The corporate executives' views closely parallel those of the
lawyers with respect to the frequency of seeking legal advice.
When asked whether a qualified privilege would most likely cause
the management of their companies to seek legal advice less often,
thirty-six (69.2%) said "no," eleven (21.2%) said "yes," four
(7.7%) said "it would depend on the circumstances," and one
(1.9%) could not say. Some of the comments of executives in the
two-thirds majority who foresaw no decrease in the seeking of legal
advice were similar to those of the lawyers. For example, a few indicated that "the cost of illegality would be too high," and others
suggested that legal advice would be sought "more often, not less,
in order to stay out of trouble." One of the executives summarized
an apparently widely shared view when he said: "The benefits outweigh the risks. You have to run a business and the attorney-client
privilege is only one of many factors to worry about."' 9
If the privilege were qualified, would the lawyers probably
communicate less often with employees at lower levels of the corporation? Nearly three of every four attorneys (73.5%) answered
"no" to this question. Some said the "ground rules" might be different, "fewer writings might be generated" or "certain topics
might be avoided," but the vast majority indicated that they would
still communicate with lower-level employees if necessary to obtain
information.6 1 0 The corporate executives, on the other hand,

showed greater apprehension over the potential loss of privilege for
behavior of corporate clients, the attorneys were told to assume that corporate representa-

tives were aware of the qualification.
609 An interesting observation made by a few of the executives who thought legal advice
would be sought less often was to the effect that all business managers would have to become lawyers in order to cope with the heavily regulated business environment. Others commented that whether they would seek legal advice would depend on the risks of the particular situation.
110A few pointed out that they already speak to lower-level employees on an infrequent
basis.
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lower-level communications. They were asked: "If the privilege
were subject to the [described] exception, do you think management would probably encourage counsel to communicate with
lower-level managers and employees less often?" Twenty-four
(46.2%) answered "yes," eight (15.4%) said "it would depend on
the circumstances," eighteen (34.6%) said "no," and two (3.8%)
could not say. A majority, therefore, predicted negative consequences, at least in certain circumstances. 6 11 Those who said that it
would depend on the circumstances indicated they would either
wait and see what experience proved to be like under a qualified
privilege, leave the matter to the discretion of counsel, or continue
to encourage lower-level communications except in sensitive areas
or during litigation.
What would be the impact of a qualified privilege on candor?
With respect to managerial-level employees, a slight majority of
the attorneys thought that both upper management (54.9%) and
middle management (52.9%) would be less candid. The responses
of the executives were similar to those of the attorneys. Twentyone executives (40.4%) said that management would be less candid, eight (15.4%) said the extent of candor would depend on the
circumstances, nineteen (36.5%) said candor would not be affected,
and four (7.7%) could not say. "We'd communicate more shrewdly
and cautiously," typifies the comments of the majority of executives. Another frequent comment was to the effect that candor
would not be affected unless the loss of privilege became common.
Several attorneys and executives qualfied their answers with the
observation that candor would be reduced only with respect to
written communications: Writings would be "more circumspect"
but oral conversations would be as candid as always. 6112 One of the
executives who thought management's candor would not be affected at all asked rhetorically, "What's the point of seeking legal
advice if you don't tell the lawyer all of the facts?"
With respect to employees below the level of middle management, a little over one-third of the attorneys (36.3%) thought that
there would be less candor in communications. 1 Some of these
"I Some of the executives expressed concern that lower-level employees would be less
able to speak "judiciously" about corporate activity, thereby generating "possibly harmful
data" that could be used against the corporation.
" See also infra note 616 and accompanying text.

613 The corporate executives were not asked to hypothesize whether the communications of lower-level employees would be less candid.
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respondents felt strongly that a qualified privilege would have its
most serious impact at this level. Nearly two-thirds of the attorneys, however, felt just as strongly that the candor of communications with lower-level employees would not be affected. Volunteered comments suggest three reasons why the majority thought
that lower-level communications would be no less candid: lowerlevel employees have less at stake in corporate affairs because the
matters do not affect them personally; lower-level employees simply do not think about privilege; and the privilege "does not belong
to them, anyway."
In addition to testing the potential impact of a qualified privilege on the communications of employees at various levels of the
corporate hierarchy, the interview questionnaire sought to ascertain whether certain areas of legal counseling might be more seriously affected than others. A total of sixty-four lawyers had said
that a qualified privilege would affect the candor of at least one of
the levels of the corporate hierarchy. These respondents were
shown a card containing five areas of legal counseling and were
asked to rank the categories from one to five as to the seriousness
with which candor in each area would be affected by a qualified
privilege. "One" was to be used for the area most seriously affected, "two" the next most seriously affected and so on up to
"five" as the area least seriously affected. Table 7 displays the average numerical rank for each category 1 4

For each area of counseling, the total number of responses in each numerical rank
compiled,
and the average rank for each category was then calculated.
were
614
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TABLE 7. Lawyers' Views of the Relative Seriousness of the
Effect of a Qualified Privilege on Candor in Five
Areas of Legal Counseling (N=102).

Area of Legal
Counseling

Average Numerical Rank
(1 = most serious,
5 = least serious)

Investigations of specific problem
situations involving possible
corporate liability .....................................................

1.79

Actual litigation ......................................................

1.85

Investigations for routine compliance
with government regulations ...........................................
Non-routine transactions (e.g.,
acquisitions or divestitures) ............................................
Corporate transactions in the ordinary
course of business (e.g., contract
preparation or review) ................................................

2.88
3.36

4.57

As the results indicate, the two areas in which a qualified priv-

ilege would have its most serious impact on candor are internal
investigations of specific problems involving potential corporate liability and actual litigation. Interestingly, the average numerical
rank for communications relating to litigation was somewhat
higher than that for internal investigations. This result is explained by a recurring comment volunteered by a few lawyers,
mostly litigators, who gave the litigation category a high ranking:
"Once a matter goes into litigation, they have to tell you all of the
facts." Nevertheless, the overwhelming number of attorneys
ranked litigation as "one" or "two" with respect to diminished candor. Conversely, the higher end of the rankings were matters less
likely to result in litigation: routine "legal audits" for regulatory
compliance, major business transactions, and routine
transactions.6 ,
The final question put to the lawyers and executives was
whether a qualified approach to privilege would have any effect on
record-keeping practices with respect to lawyer-client communications. Two-thirds of the attorneys (66.7%) thought that their personal record-keeping would.change. When asked to describe the ef611While willing to rank the categories in accordance with the given instructions, some
of the lawyers nevertheless pointed out that depending on the circumstances, any one of the
listed counseling areas might be affected by a qualified privilege.
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fect on record-keeping, the most frequent responses, in descending
order, were as follows: they would put less in writing, be more circumspect in their writings, or save fewer documents for a shorter
period of time. "Why create writings that will help an adversary?"
was a commonly voiced sentiment.16 The lawyers who anticipated
no effect on their record-keeping gave one of the following explanations: either few attorney-client communications are reduced to
writing as it is ("especially if the matter is sensitive"), or the need
to keep written records for informational purposes would outweigh
the risks of discovery. Would corporate representatives also put
fewer attorney-client communications in writing? Seventy-one percent of the lawyers thought so, and an even larger percentage of
corporate executives-86.5 %-agreed.
To assess the judiciary's point of view, the twenty-eight judges
and magistrates were asked to state their general reactions to the
merits of applying the corporate privilege on a qualified basis to
counsel's communications with lower-level employees. 17 Four principal views were expressed. The majority-sixteen respondents-had a negative reaction. They were of the opinion that a
qualified approach would chill candor and that the evidentiary
needs of an adversary should remain irrelevant when it comes to
privileged communications."1 Two were uncertain in their views;
they questioned whether the privilege has very much impact on
candor in the corporate sector but said that they would want more
information on this point.1 9 Four thought that a qualified approach is "unnecessary" either because (1) the elements of the
privilege are "flexible enough" to permit a judge to compel production in cases of true need, (2) judges already have a "repository
power" to override privilege, or (3) because parties can be "persuaded" in pretrial conferences to make reciprocal exchanges of

"'

Several of the respondents asserted that recording fewer matters in reaction to a
diminished privilege would make the job of lawyering more difficult. Without a memorandum, the details of discussions that occurred months or weeks ago would be forgotten and
could not be dealt with as effectively at a later point in time.
017 Based on the results of the interviews of lawyers and executives, I decided to ask the
judicial officers about a needs-based qualification only with respect to lower-level

communications.
618 Two of the respondents in this group, however, pointed out that precedent exists
under current law for just about any conclusion that a judge might personally desire to

reach with respect to particular disputed communications.
819 The judicial respondents were not advised of the results of the survey of attorneys
and coporate executives.
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necessary information. Six respondents indicated that they would
have "no objection" to a qualified approach if restricted to "extraordinary cases." Two of these respondents suggested that judicial power already exists under the current state of the law to lift
the privilege "in the interests of justice."6' 20
Since negative responses were more numerous among the jurists than neutral or favorable ones, it would appear that even if a
qualified approach were mandated by legislation or Supreme Court
directive, the number of occasions in which the privilege would be
lifted would be few in number. Additional evidence for this conclusion is contained in the results of a question to the judicial respondents as to the frequency with which they had overridden claims of
62
attorney work product, which is already a qualified immunity, 1
based on an adversary's showing of need.122 Of twenty-five respondents with experience, eight (32.0%) said "never," thirteen
(52.0%) said "rarely," and four (16.0%) said "in about half" the
cases in which the issue had arisen.
In sum, the results are mixed with respect to the potential impact of a needs-based qualification to the corporate attorney-client
privilege. Although predictability about the privilege probably
would be reduced and the number of written communications
might decrease, most of the lawyers and executives agreed that
corporations would continue to seek legal advice to the same extent as under current law. A qualified approach probably would
reduce candor in communications with management, but nearly
two-thirds of the lawyers thought that lower-echelon employees
would be just as candid. In addition, most lawyers would still communicate with lower-level employees if necessary to develop the
facts. A potential tension between attorneys and clients might
arise, however, with respect to lower-level communications because
a majority of the executives suggested that management would be
less likely to encourage such communications. A qualified privilege
probably would not affect all topics of communication in equal
420

With respect to the cost of a qualified privilege in terms of administrative burdens

on the judiciary, 14 of the 22 respondents who answered the question (63.6%) thought that
such an approach would produce no increase in the consumption of judicial time in deciding
corporate attorney-client privilege issues. Of the'remaining eight respondents, one thought
there would be a "slight' increase, one said "moderate," and six predicted a "large" increase

in the consumption of time.
421 See supra note 66.

12In this question, the judicial respondents were asked to answer on the basis of their

experience both in corporate and noncorporate cases.
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measure, as suggested by the lawyers' views that candor would be
reduced to a greater extent in communications relating to litigation
and internal investigations than in communications relating to
more routine matters.
As some of the respondents noted, the actual impact of a qualified privilege would depend in substantial part on the manner in
which judges applied the qualification. If the results of the survey
of judicial respondents are any indication, judges apparently would
hesitate to lift the privilege, even with respect to communications
between counsel and lower-level employees, except in cases of significant need for the information contained in the communications.
If this is so, a needs-based qualification limited to lower-level communications would do little to diminish the effectiveness of the
privilege in the corporate context.
B. The Case for a Qualified Privilege
1. Recapitulation and a Proposal
The tortuous history of the corporate attorney-client privilege
demonstrates unease with its potentially obstructive effects on the
fact-finding process. 2 ' In the Garnerdoctrine, courts have found a
principled basis for setting aside the privilege in appropriate circumstances if the corporation or its management owes a fiduciary
duty to the opponents, such as a group of shareholders 24 The control group test, which limits eligible corporate spokespersons to
managerial agents who play a participatory role in the decisionmaking process for which legal advice was sought, is another way
of narrowing the scope of the privilege that has appealed to several
courts and state lawmakers.6

25

By narrowing the number of corpo-

rate representatives who may speak for the client, however, the
control group test accomplishes its goal of limitation in a way that
may discourage corporate managers from allowing lawyers to
gather important facts necessary for the provision of sound legal
advice. Upjohn rejected the narrow approach, suggesting a rule of
flexibility that focuses on the purpose and nature of the communication rather than the decision-making authority of the corporate
623 See supra notes 93-137, 292-94, 344-95, 430-49, 456-66, 487-94, & 536-58 and accompanying text.
612 See supra notes 536-55 & 567-601 and accompanying text
625 See supra notes 358-66 and accompanying text.
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employee. 2 6 This solution to the problem of identifying appropriate spokespersons for the corporate client is preferable because it
enhances the potential for fulfillment of the instrumental objec6 27
tives of the corporate privilege.
At the same time, the inevitable consequence of the Upjohn
approach is the creation of a large zone of silence that may directly
conflict with the goals of modern discovery and rules of evi-

dence.626 Since major corporations use lawyers in all phases of their

decision-making activities, 29 the Upjohn approach will sometimes
bring a large amount of significant information under the umbrella
of the privilege. The information in counsel's files may become relevant in the resolution of subsequent litigation and yet be beyond
reach due to the adversary's inability to reproduce the information.
Memories of corporate employees may fade, and those who were
originally candid with the corporation's lawyer may later be unavailable or obstructive when the corporation's adversary seeks to
depose them.6 30 The judges and magistrates in the survey suggested that such circumstances may not occur very often, but only
a third of them said that the situation had never arisen in their
31
experience.
The Upjohn model thus poses a conundrum: To maximize the
social utility of the privilege, a broad approach should be taken
with respect to the number of employee communications that qualify for privileged treatment; but when t!is standard is combined
with the traditional absolute nature of the privilege, the result in
some cases may be an unwarranted frustration of society's interest
in fair and accurate adjudication. A solution to this dilemma lies in
permitting greater judicial discretion to reject claims of privilege
by corporations. Since the number of privileged communications
has expanded, there is a corresponding need to increase the circumstances in which the privilege can be set aside in litigation
against corporations. A qualified approach would continue to give
corporations prima facie entitlement to privilege but would allow
the privilege to yield when evidentiary needs in a particular case
" See supra notes 377-93 and accompanying text.
617 See supra notes 433-44 and accompanying text.

41 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
'' See, e.g., supra notes 8, 240, 279-80, & 503-04 and accompanying text.
,,oSee supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
62 See supra notes 405-06 and accompanying text. As noted in the earlier section, judicial experience does not include privilege claims that are not litigated.
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outweigh the potential benefits of confidentiality.
As noted previously, a few commentators have advocated the
concept of a qualified corporate attorney-client privilege, 632 but few
courts have openly embraced the idea except in actions involving
parties in fiduciary relationships. 33 Some fertile seeds, however,
have been planted along the way.
In Upjohn itself, the Court placed heavy emphasis on the ability of the IRS to gather the evidence it needed directly from the
corporation's employees. 34 Indeed, the Upjohn Company provided
the IRS with a list of the eighty-six persons interviewed by its
counsel, and the IRS had already conducted twenty-five of its own
interviews.636 At two points in the opinion, the Court stressed that
it was deciding only the instant case and was refraining from announcing any rule "to govern all conceivable future questions in
this area."636 The Court's preference for case-by-case development
is not, of course, an invitation for federal courts to employ a totally
ad hoc approach, but it does leave room for a measure of flexibility. For example, if Upjohn's employees had proven to be either
obstructive or unavailable during the course of discovery, perhaps
32 See supra note 605.
6
See supra notes 536-55 & 568-601 and accompanying text. In SEC v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675 (D.D.C. 1981), the court suggested in dicta that Garner's
qualified privilege for fiduciary relationships might also encompass actions against corporations by the SEC "as protector of the public interest." Id. at 686. Some dicta in state court
opinions also support the concept of a qualified privilege. See Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d
62, 69, 409 N.E.2d 983, 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (1980) (privilege may "yield in a proper
case, where strong public policy requires disclosure"); Amoss v. University of Wash., 40
Wash. App. 666, 687, 700 P.2d 350, 363 (1985) (court appears to approve of balancing
approach).
A New Jersey appellate court, however, explicitly overruled a trial judge for ordering
disclosure of a corporate employee's communication with counsel because "he felt that the
public policy favoring full pretrial disclosure outweighed the benefits to be derived from
enforcing the attorney-client privilege." Macey v. Rollins Envtl. Serv., Inc., 179 N.J. Super.
535, 538, 432 A.2d 960, 961 (App. Div. 1981). See also Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
101 F.R.D. 674, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (rejection of public policy exception based on "the
critical importance of documents"); Rossi v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New
York, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 588, 594, 540 N.E.2d 703, 706, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (1989) (neither
death of attorney-author of memorandum nor subject matter of litigation justified application of "public policy" exception).
63 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981).
61 Id. at 396.
038 Id. at 386, 396. It has also been noted that the Court spoke of "the control group
test adopted by the court below," Id. at 392, 397 (emphasis added), suggesting that "some
other 'control group' test might escape the Court's condemnation." 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 63, § 5483, at 308.

I
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379

37
a different result would have been reached.1
Subsequent to Upjohn, two federal district court opinions
have suggested the possibility of movement away from the traditional absolute approach. In Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia v.
Steamship Mount Dirfys,638 a ship's master in an admiralty case
had given a statement to the attorney for his corporate employer's
liability insurer. The chief officer and an engineer, whose whereabouts subsequently became unknown, had verified the report as
true. 3 9 The court, using language traditionally encountered only in
connection with the work product immunity, stated that the report
was "subject to disclosure only upon a showing of truly substantial
need and undue hardship."6' 0 Discovery was denied because the
master had been made available for a deposition, but the court indicated that "further inquiry might be in order" if the statement
became necessary for impeachment purposes.6 4
42
In Carter-Wallace,Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc.,
the court came very close to breaching the privilege in a case in
which numerous current and former executives of the defendant
corporation asserted their individual privileges against self-incrimination during depositions.6 43 "This shield," said the court, effectively blocked plaintiff's efforts to obtain information about an internal investigation into the employees' alleged wrongdoing that
had been conducted by defendant's counsel in anticipation of litigation. 44 While holding that counsel's interviews with employees

'37
In Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 37 Bus. LAw. 461, 507-08 (1982),
the author suggests that a private litigant with fewer resources than the federal government
might have fared better. In the analogous situation of work product, however, the financial
resources of the adversary have seldom provided a basis for overcoming the qualified immu-

nity. See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 616 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (cost of duplicating other party's investigation is not basis for discovery unless cost would be "prohibitive");
see also In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616, 621 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (in
shareholder action, court held that large expense of deposing corporation's employees was
not "particularly onerous" in light of the financial claims at stake); see generally Note,
supra note 66, at 810-11.
' 537 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
Id. at 55.
440

Id. at 56.

",

Id. at 57. See also Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Ontario County Health Facility,

103 App. Div. 2d 1000, 1001, 478 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (4th Dep't 1984) (court refused to apply

Upjohn to written statements of county employees obtained by county's attorney, stressing
that statements were needed for purpose of cross-examining employees during arbitration

proceeding).
442 553 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
91 Id. at 48.
"I Id. at 50.
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were protected by the attorney-client privilege, the court characterized the factual findings contained in counsels report as work
product and held that plaintiff had made a sufficient showing of
need to overcome the immunity.645 The same need might have justified disclosure of the interviewees' actual statements to counsel if
no separate factual findings had been prepared.
Thus, some judicial authority, albeit scant, supports the notion of a needs-based qualification to serve as a "safety valve" to
relieve the pressure that the broad approach of Upjohn may sometimes put on the adjudicatory system. 46 My own proposal, which
draws upon the findings of the survey, is that the corporate attorney-client privilege should continue to operate in traditional absolute fashion with respect to counsel's communications with members of the corporate control group, but should be qualified as to
noncontrol group communications 4 The results of the empirical
'" Id. at 50-51. A similar situation with a different outcome occurred in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Dated December 19, 1978, 81 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), in which a grand
jury was held entitled to the factual contents of attorneys' questionnaires and interview
memoranda concerning questionable foreign payments by the corporation's employees because all of the employees were either foreign nationals who were not subject to subpoena or
had refused to testify in the absence of a grant of immunity. Id. at 695. Because the court
applied the control group standard to determine which employee communications were absolutely privileged, the disclosed materials involving noncontrol group members were characterized as work product as to which the Government had made a sufficient showing of
need. Id. The attorneys were held in contempt when they refused to comply with the subpoena, but the Second Circuit reversed. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.
1979). The court of appeals held that the work product immunity had not been overcome,
stressing new factual developments: the attorneys had furnished the identity and addresses
of all relevant employees and descriptions of the questionable payments; fourteen employees
had been interviewed by the United States Attorney without claiming the privilege against
self-incrimination; two had testified before the grand jury; and separate counsel had been
recommended to the employees to reduce the risk of a concerted claim of privilege by all of
the employees. Id. at 512-13.
616 See J. GERGACz, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE I 3.0213][d][iii], at 3-74
(1987) (consideration of adversary's needs described as "safety valve for the fears of the
proponents of the control group test").
6" At least two other commentators have reached the same conclusion. See 24 C.
WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 63, § 5476, at 191 & 192 n.366; Note, Attorney-Client
Privilege-The Supreme Court Rejects the Control Group Test as Applied to Corporations, 57 TuL. L. REV. 165, 176-78 (1982); see also infra note 656.
The recent decision in Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States District Court, No. 88-7345
(9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1989) (available on WESTLAW), appears to be inconsistent with my proposal. In Admiral, the Ninth Circuit rejected a needs-based qualification to the corporate
attorney-client privilege where two corporate officers who had been interviewed by the corporation's attorney later became "unavailable" to testify at a deposition because of an expressed intent to invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. The court's reasoning was
that the corporate attorney-client privilege should admit of no exception grounded on the
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study lend strong support to the merits of the proposition and suggest some of the factors that a court should consider in determining whether to lift the privilege for lower-level communications.
2. Empirical Basis for a Qualified Privilege
The survey findings demonstrate that an absolute privilege for
lower-level communications is not necessary to achieve the principal goals of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context.
Two-thirds of the lawyers and executives were in agreement that
qualifying the privilege would not decrease the frequency with
which legal advice is sought."48 Moreover, nearly two-thirds of the
lawyers said that a qualified privilege would have no effect on the
candor of lower-level employees6 49 and almost three-fourths said
that if such an approach were taken, they would probably communicate with such employees just as often as they do now.650
To qualify the privilege for communications with upper management, however, would probably have a more damaging impact.
A slight majority of both the lawyers and executives predicted less
candor in managerial-level communications if the privilege were
qualified.6 51 The corporate privilege probably is a greater incentive
for candor at the upper levels of management because executives
have frequent contact with lawyers, 52 and they are more likely
than lower-level employees to know about the privilege 5 3 and to
expect it to be used to prevent disclosure to outsiders. 65 Although
executives have no ultimate guarantee that the privilege will protect their communications from disclosure to third parties, 6 55 expectations of confidentiality undoubtedly rise in proportion to
adversary's discovery burdens because of the negative impact that such an exception would
have on the instrumental goals of the privilege. Insofar as communications with noncontrol
group employees are concerned, much of the data in my study undermine the court's rationale. See, e.g., supra notes 606-16 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the Admiral
court might have reached the same result even under my proposal, because the corporate
attorney-client privilege should remain absolute for counsel's communications with members of the control group. See infra notes 651-60 and accompanying text. It is unclear
whether the corporate officers in Admiral fell within the control group.
418 See supra notes 608-09 and accompanying text.
41,See supra note 613 and accompanying text.
,50See supra note 610 and accompanying text.
65, See supra notes 612 & 616 and accompanying text.
652 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
653 See supra table 1, section Il.B.1. at 236.
6"I See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
15 See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
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one's position in the corporate hierarchy. 56
The results thus indicate that an absolute privilege may be an
important factor in assuring candor in upper management's communications with counsel but that a qualified privilege is sufficient
as to lower-level communications. The probable impact of a qualified privilege on middle management is less clear. Almost an equal
number of lawyers in the survey thought that middle management's communications would be less candid as those that thought
upper managers would be less candid. 57 At the same time, most of
the lawyers thought that fewer in middle management were aware
of the privilege. 58 Levels of management, therefore, do not necessarily provide an appropriate dividing line for determining which
communications should be absolutely privileged and which should
be subject to a qualified privilege. The control group standard provides a practical demarcation.6 59 Since almost all upper managers
would fall within the control group, their communications with
counsel would qualify for absolute treatment. To the extent a middle manager was within the control group, his communications
would likewise be within the absolute privilege when expectations
of confidentiality are probably at their highest, i.e., when he is participating in the decision-making process as to which legal advice
was sought.66 0
A potential negative consequence of a qualified privilege is
611See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text. As noted previously, Professor
Saltzburg's proposed approach to the corporate privilege would make its applicability turn
on whether or not the particular employee could control the corporation's use of his communication with counsel. See supra note 365. No employee at any rank, however, ultimately
has such control. Nevertheless, Professor Saltzburg is correct in suggesting that expectations
of confidentiality may vary depending on an employee's status in the corporation. The practical effect of his proposal and mine are similar to the extent that attorney-client communications with upper-level management will almost always be absolutely privileged. At the
lower-levels, however, Professor Saltzburg would remove the privilege entirely, leaving only
the qualified protection of work product immunity in matters involving litigation. See
Saltzburg, supra note 124, at 306; see also Waldman, supra note 605, at 503-05 (attorneyclient privilege should not apply at lower levels until litigation has commenced). The effect
of my proposal would be somewhat broader in that qualified protection would still be available regardless of whether litigation was anticipated. See infra notes 705-56 and accompanying text.
e See supra notes 559-63 and accompanying text.
"~ See supra table 1, section HI.B.I at 236.
See supra notes 359 & 434 and accompanying text.
6 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979) ("We believe
that it is socially desirable to protect, at a minimum, communications made by a person who
has the authority to take part in a decision about any action to be taken in response to the
solicited advice").
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suggested by the executives' beliefs that at least in some circumstances, they might not encourage counsel to speak to lower-level
employees. 6 1 To the extent management restricted the scope of
counsel's employment, the corporation might not receive legal advice that is sufficiently well informed to forestall or correct violations of law. But counsel could make clear to management the
risks of "playing ostrich," as one of the lawyers in the study put it.
Furthermore, management can be reminded that prima facie entitlement would still exist for most communications at all levels of
the corporate hierarchy 6 2 In situations in which litigation is anticipated, the attorney-client privilege would be augmented by the
work product doctrine.8 s Moreover, as will be developed below, in
litigation and similar situations in which management's concern
over privilege protection is probably at its highest, the burden on
the adversary in4 overcoming the privilege is likely to be propor6
tionately high.
Another risk in qualifying the privilege is that lawyers would
stop making records of their employee interviews out of fear that
such documents might contain damaging information subject to
discovery. Two-thirds of the lawyers and executives in the survey
hypothesized this result if the privilege were to become qualified. 65 With fewer records, the quality of legal services might suffer. But the question that was put to the respondents about record-keeping dealt with the issue of a top-to-bottom qualified
privilege. It is doubtful that very much reduction in the documentation of employee interviews would occur if the qualified approach
were limited to communications with employees outside the control group. The hazards of forgetting what an employee said, losing
a source of potentially helpful evidence or relinquishing a means of
impeachment in the event the employee becomes a turncoat witness would be too great." Experience under the work product
doctrine, which is already qualified, belies the prospect of any radi'"See supra note 611 and accompanying text.
The percentage of executives who thought that management would be less inclined
to encourage counsel to communicate with lower-level employees under a qualified privilege
(61.6%) is almost as high as in the case of total unavailability of the privilege for lower-level
employees (nearly 70%). See supra notes 404-05 and accompanying text. The executives
may have mistakenly assumed that a qualified privilege is tantamount to no privilege.
See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
66 See infra notes 721-24 & 754 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 616 and accompanying text.
'"See supra note 225.
'2
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cal change in the way lawyers would preserve the results of employee interviews. The threat of an occasional loss of work product
immunity due to an adversary's inability to obtain equivalent information from other sources has little inhibiting effect in the recording of witness statements.
It might be argued that taking a qualified approach to the corporate privilege would be discriminatory since the individual client's privilege is absolute. But since the most important goal of
litigation is to ascertain the truth,6 7 the proper approach to the
privilege should be one which strictly confines it "within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle."66
The empirical findings show that an absolute privilege is simply
not necessary to further the goals of the privilege in the corporate
context.
Furthermore, the privilege as applied to corporations has the
potential for the loss of a great deal more relevant information
than is lost in the case of an individual. 6 9 Whereas an individual
opponent can be questioned about the facts with relative ease, extracting information from a host of corporate employees sometimes
may be not only burdensome but also impossible to achieve if the
witnesses are unavailable or uncooperative. 7 °
Finally, as discussed in an earlier section of the Article, the
attorney-client privilege for individuals may be justified both by
instrumental goals and personal privacy interests. 7 1 When two

such principles underlie a privilege, the case for absolute protection is at its strongest. For this reason, a sound basis exists for an
essentially inviolable privilege for confidential communications between individual clients and their attorneys. The same cannot be
said in the case of corporate clients, because the personal privacy
dimension is lacking, especially outside the control group. Corporations are state-created artificial entities that are incapable of ex667

deg

See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554. See also Trammel v. United States, 445

U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (privileges are subject to rule of strict construction); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (attorney-client privilege "applies only where necessary to
achieve its purpose"); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (privileges are not to

be "expansively construed").
669 See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BaGER, supra note 17, 1 503(b)[04], at 503-41 to 503-42; see
also Saltzburg, supra note 124, at 309 (increased difficulty of discovery from corporate employees "is a reason not to expand a privilege beyond the rationale that supports it").
170 See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
671 See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
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periencing the sense of trust, intimacy and sharing that is experienced by individuals in private counseling relationships. 2
Although upper-level corporate officers may interact on a personal
level with counsel, none of the corporation's agents are the lawyer's
clients under ordinary circumstances. 73 Corporations have some
legitimate needs for institutional secrecy, but such privacy interests are not of the same dignity as those of individuals.
Because there are no personal privacy rights to be protected,
the corporate attorney-client privilege is supported only by instrumentalist arguments. When the putative utility of the privilege
with respect to lower-level communications is doubtful, a case-bycase balancing approach, pursuant to which the interests in accurate fact-finding are weighed against the interests in secrecy, is
appropriate.
3.

Reconciliation with the Need for Certainty

Perhaps the most serious objection to a qualified privilege is
the uncertainty that it may cause client and counsel at the time of
their communications. 74 It was the absence of certainty, for example, that contributed to rejection of the control group test in
UpjohnM5 As the Supreme Court observed, "An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all. 876 By parity of reasoning, it is arguable that if the maximum
benefits of the corporate attorney-client privilege are to be realized, the corporate client and its counsel must not be left to wonder whether a court's discretionary judgment will override the
privilege for lower-level communications.
For several reasons, however, the certainty argument is not a
basis for rejection of the proposal for qualifying the privilege for
communications between counsel and employees outside the control group. First, the empirical findings show that certainty in the
application of the privilege to lower-level communications is nbt
essential to secure open communications. Second, qualifying the
privilege for noncontrol group communications may have the ac171 See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying 'text.
673

See supra note 273.

67,See supra note 607 and accompanying text.

6,5See supra notes 387-88 and accompanying text.
676Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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tual effect of increasing certainty in the law of corporate privilege.
Some courts purporting to follow Upjohn have narrowly construed
its extension of the privilege to the lower levels of the corporate
hierarchy. 71 If courts knew that the privilege need not be applied
in an absolute manner, they might be more willing to bring a larger
number of lower-level communications within the privilege 78 This
would help offset whatever predictability is thought to be lost due
to the nonabsolute nature of the privilege. In any event, the proposal provides greater certainty than does the control group test as
originally formulated because prima facie entitlement would almost always apply throughout the corporation.
A third reason that certainty is not likely to be seriously affected by the proposed qualified approach is that courts can be
expected to lift the privilege only rarely. Experience under the
work product doctrine suggests that adversaries are seldom capable of making the necessary showing that they are unable to obtain
the evidence they need from nonprivileged sources. 79 The same result is contemplated in the case of a qualified corporate attorney6 80
client privilege.
Finally, uncertainty about the applicability of the corporate
privilege already prevails. Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of
the control group test in federal courts, the states are still free to
employ it, and a significant minority do."8 ' Thus, many communications that might be privileged in federal court would still be subject to disclosure in a suit in one of those states or possibly even in
a federal court if the law of such a state were controlling on a particular substantive issue, as, for example, in a diversity action. 82
See supra note 441.
See Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1987). In Kelly, a civil
rights action in which the plaintiff sought to overcome application of the government's privilege for police department files, Magistrate Wayne D. Brazil made the following cogent
observation that applies, by analogy, to the corporate attorney-client privilege:
(lAn important argument in favor of rejecting an absolute privilege for information gathered by police departments is that courts will be willing to consider
more kinds of information as falling within the scope of the privilege (thus entitled to some level of qualified protection) if they can use a more flexible analysis
thereafter to decide whether, in a given situation, a plaintiff should have access to
the material.
Id.
62 See supra notes 620-21 and accompanying text.
680 See snfra notes 705-56 and accompanying text.
882 See supra note 361.
'7

678

See supra note 401.
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Since a corporation cannot always control the choice of forum,
counsel's ability to determine which communications will be privileged is circumscribed. Even without reference to state law, twenty
per cent of the lawyers in the study said that they were still uneasy
after Upjohn about the applicability of privilege to lower-level corporate communications. s3
Also contributing to existing uncertainty is the inherent lack
of precision that accompanies judicial application of the privilege
in the corporate context. The definitional elements of the privilege
and existing exceptions give trial judges the ability to make what
are essentially ad hoc decisions that may be affected by the judge's
perception of the adversary's need for the evidence. 8 4 Thus, a
backdoor balancing of interests may already be occurring under
the existing "absolute" approach. The comments of a few of the
judges in the survey lend credence to this possibility," 5 and some
of the lawyers in the survey said that they already warn their corporate clients that the privilege is not absolute.688
Perhaps the leading source of definitional uncertainty is the
rule that "predominantly business" communications fall outside
the privilege, 8 7 which, as previously discussed, may be of particular concern to house counsel who provide counseling in the ordinary course of the corporation's business. 88 Whether a document
containing mixed business and legal matters ultimately will be
classified as privileged is not always capable of prediction. 6s 9 The
corporation's failure to maintain internal confidentiality 69 0 and the
possibility of waiver through a myriad of circumstances 91 are further limitations on certainty.69 2 Indeed, these are uncertainties
about which corporate clients are frequently explicitly warned. 93
To be sure, the corporation itself can minimize the danger of
waiver by maintaining strict confidentiality. But from the perspective of the persons whose conduct is supposed to be influenced by
"1 See supra note 402 and accompanying text.

Note, supra note 113, at 471-72.
See supra notes 617-19 and accompanying text.
611 See supra table 3, section ]IILB.3, at 240; see also supra note 559.
617 See supra notes 487-94 and accompanying text.
"'See id.; supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 451-56 and accompanying text.
"'
See, e.g., supra note 455; supra note 598.
"2 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
6' See supra table 3, section 11I.B.3. at 240.
""See

485
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the privilege-the individual corporate employees-the possibility
of waiver is always present. Employees, especially those outside the
control group, can never be certain that their communications will
not be subsequently revealed to outsiders because the decision
whether to waive the corporate privilege is not theirs to make. °4 In
a sense, then, the privilege is already qualified from the vantage
point of the employees. Even if employees are not, in general,
aware of the fact that the privilege does not belong to them personally, they may be so advised when their interests conflict with
those of the corporation. 95
Exceptions to the privilege, such as the crime/fraud rule 96 and
the Garner doctrine,69 7 are more likely to be a source of uncer-

tainty for lawyers than for clients because the survey results suggest that clients generally are not made aware of them.69 8 These
exceptions apparently are rarely applied 699 and may come as a surprise to clients when they become relevant. Another troubling exception that may come as a surprise to clients is the rule that permits a lawyer to reveal confidences in order to collect a fee from
the client 00 or in defense of charges of wrongdoing made either by
the client"10 or third parties. 0 2 The potential for occasional loss of
the privilege due to such exceptions has long been tolerated in the
interests of justice.703
" See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
61s See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
6 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 536-55 and accompanying text.
618 See supra table 3, section II.B.3., at 240.
600

See supra note 189.

See, e.g., Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 532 F.2d 1118, 1120 (7th Cir. 1976) (action
by attorney for fee); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmILrrY DR 4-101(C)(4)
700

(1981).

See, e.g., Nave v. Baird, 12 Ind. 318, 320 (1859) (client's claim of malpractice).
SEC v. Forma, 117 F.R.D. 516, 524-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (attorney properly disclosed
confidences during SEC investigation when threatened with charges of aiding and abetting
client's wrongdoing); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2)
701

701

(1983).

703 See, e.g., Stern v. Daniel, 47 Wash. 96, 98, 91 P. 552, 553 (1907) (privilege is unenforceable "where it would be manifest injustice to allow the client to take advantage of the
rule of privilege to the prejudice of the attorney"). In light of the fee-collection and selfdefense exceptions, the McCormick treatise asks "whether in all cases the privilege ought
not to be subject to the same qualification, that it should yield when the evidence sought is
necessary to the attainment of justice." C. McCORMIcK, supra note 97, § 92, at 221. Similarly, in support of his provocative argument that lawyers should be required to disclose
adverse information about their cases, former Judge Marvin Frankel cites the fee-collection
and self-defense exceptions to make the point "that life is filled with surprises for clients
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In light of the foregoing elements of uncertainty that are interwoven in the current fabric of the law of attorney-client privilege,
predictability obviously is not a hallmark. Giving judges an additional amount of discretion to weigh the benefits of applying the
corporate privilege to noncontrol group communications against
the harm that will result to accurate adjudication probably would
not hamper the attorney's ability to obtain information necessary
to provide sound legal advice. An occasional loss of privilege due to
an adversary's discovery needs is not likely to chill the corporate
attorney-client relationship because each future case would involve
a fresh balancing of the competing interests based on the particular facts and circumstances with a presumption against discovery.70' In any event, certainty is simply too high a price to pay
when the corporation's assertion of privilege effectively precludes
an adversary from obtaining evidence that is necessary to his case.
4. Suggested Contours of a Qualified Privilege for Noncontrol
Group Communications
If the parties seek judicial intervention to resolve a dispute
over the discovery of allegedly privileged material, the burden of
proof should lie on the corporation to establish all of the prerequisites for application of the privilege.70 5 In this connection, the corporation should have to prove which attorney-client communications involved members of the control group in order to obtain the
benefits of the traditional absolute protection. This burden is fairly
placed on the corporation because it is in the best position to prove
which of its managers had the authority to participate in the decimore unsettling than any client should experience under the regime of limited truth-telling
that I am proposing here." Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued: More Disclosure,
Less Privilege,54 U. COLO. L. REv. 51, 59 (1982); see also Rhode, supra note 261, at 615-16
(recognition of attorney's fee-collection exception to confidentiality is concession that limited bases for disclosure will not erode client trust).
7
Cf. In re Franklin Nat'l Bank See. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(bank officials unlikely to be reticent in future discussions with bank examiners because of
disclosure of confidential examiners' report in case at bar because "[t]he official information
privilege requires a fresh balancing of the competing interests in each case where the privilege is asserted").
7'1 See Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Mgt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir.
1981) ("the burden of proving that the attorney-client privilege applies rests not with the
party contesting the privilege, but with the party asserting it"); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72,
82 (2d Cir.) ("person claiming the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing all
essential elements"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); see also supra notes 486, 513, 524 &
533 and accompanying text.
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sion-making process for which legal advice was sought. To establish entitlement to the qualified privilege for noncontrol group employees, it should be sufficient for the corporation to show that the
communication with the attorney was kept confidential, related
primarily to legal advice and concerned matters within the scope of
the particular employee's corporate duties." 6
The party seeking discovery should bear the burden of proof
in overcoming the privilege, either by showing that an existing exception applies or by persuading the court that the privilege for
noncontrol group communications should be set aside due to need.
A traditional exception, of course, would lift the privilege for communications at any level of the corporate hierarchy. The qualification based on need would be an independent basis for lifting the
privilege only with respect to counsel's communications with employees who are not within the control group.
In applying the qualified privilege, courts should balance the
potential harm to corporate interests in the confidentiality of attorney-client communications with noncontrol group employees
against the adversary's need for the information contained in the
communications. Despite the legitimacy of a flexible balancing approach, more specific guidance is appropriate with respect to the
criteria to be employed in the process. From the perspective of client and counsel, some measure of predictability is essential if the
privilege is to accomplish its intended purpose of facilitating candid attorney-client communications throughout the corporation.
From the court's perspective, another "decision point" should not
be added to an already complex matter without fairly specific
guidelines. 7 In the paragraphs that follow, I will suggest various
factors that a court should consider in weighing corporate interests
in confidentiality against the adversary's needs. Under a 'qualified
approach, additional relevant factors undoubtedly would be identified by courts as the caselaw developed.
Commentators sometimes criticize balancing tests that contain
lists of factors to guide judicial discretion when no indication of
the relative importance of the factors is given.7 03 In discussing the
701See supra notes 433-40 and accompanying text.
707 See J. FRANK, AmERiCAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 65-66, 105-10 (1969).
701sSee, e.g., Berger, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 281, 286-92 (1977) (criticizing listing of factors for judicial determination of
attorney's fee awards); Note, supra note 556, at 322 (criticizing Garner court's listing of
factors for judicial determination of "good cause" as basis for overcoming corporate privi-
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factors that I deem relevant in application of a qualified corporate
attorney-client privilege, I will attempt to meet such criticism, at
least in part, by identifying those factual circumstances that I feel
favor discovery and those which weigh against it. In this endeavor,
I draw upon the approach taken by Judge Weinstein in a case involving one of the government's qualified privileges for official information.706 As Judge Weinstein observed, "[T]he general importance of each set of interests can provide useful-but not
decisive-content and guidance to applications of the balancing
test in individual cases.7

10

Beyond indicating what I believe are

the circumstances generally favoring and disfavoring disclosure in
the corporate context, I do not offer any mathematical pre-weighting of particular factors. It is impossible to foresee every combination of circumstances, and predetermined outcomes would undermine the flexible nature of the proposed privilege. 11 The purpose
of qualifying the privilege, after all, is to make it "amenable to the
71 2
finer touch of the specific solution.$

a. Factors Relating to CorporateInterests in Confidentiality
At least four factors should be taken into account in marshaling a corporation's interests in preserving the confidentiality of the
lege in shareholder actions).
70 See King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 188-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); see also Kelly v. City of
San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 660-71 (N.D. CaL 1987).
King was a civil rights action against a county police department and individual officers
in which the plaintiff sought access to information in the police department's files. The
defendants asserted the privilege for police records, which is a subspecies of the government's qualified privilege for official information. King, 121 F.R.D. at 188. In most cases, the
government's privilege for official information is subject to a balancing test that weighs various public policy considerations against the adversary's discovery needs. See, e.g., Association for Reduction of Violence v. Hall, 734 F.2d 63, 65-66 (Ist Cir. 1984). On the other hand,
the privilege for "state secrets," which includes matters of national security, defense and
foreign relations, is absolute. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953).
70 King, 121 F.R.D. at 191.
711 See id. ("The enterprise of suggesting weights for each interest is treacherous for it
risks being perceived as prejudging disputes in the abstract").
712 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 97, at 187.
In his proposal for codification of the emerging qualfied privilege for self-critical analysis, see supra note 254, Professor Leonard makes the following relevant observation about
case-by-case balancing:
Although the lack of specificity in discretionary standards can lead to inconsistent
application, the flexibility afforded by such standards allows the courts greater
opportunity to view each case in light of its own facts and circumstances and to
reach decisions consistent with the goals of justice and the needs of the litigants.
Leonard, supra note 254, at 135 (footnote omitted).
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communications in issue: (1) the general subject matter of the legal
counseling; (2) the status of the lawyer, i.e., house counsel or
outside counsel; (3) the extent to which the contents of the communication are evaluative or factual; and (4) whether the communication was oral or written.
The results of the empirical study suggest that an important
factor in determining corporate interests in confidentiality is the
context in which the legal counseling took place. Certain types of
lawyer-client communications need a greater sense of security than
others. Thus, an appropriate inquiry is whether the communications related to (1) legal advice with respect to routine transactions, (2) actual or anticipated litigation, or (3) some particularly
sensitive matter. The survey results repeatedly show that corporate clients are most often concerned about the protections of the
attorney-client privilege when they anticipate or are involved in
litigation or a sensitive transaction as to which confidentiality is
desired. "I The most graphic illustration of the point is the relative ranking that the attorneys gave to the potential negative impact on candor of a qualified privilege in five areas of legal
counseling. 14
In an earlier part of the Article, I suggested that the survey
results provide a rational basis for reviving the rule that the attorney-client privilege, at least in the corporate context, should be
limited to communications relating to litigation.11 I argued, however, that such an approach might unduly exclude areas of counseling in which candor would be affected and that a precise standard
for inclusion of only certain other areas would be extremely difficult to fashion.71 1 Under a case-by-case balancing approach, how-

ever, such precision is unnecessary. The nature of the legal counseling would thus be a relevant factor because different interests
are at stake depending on the nature of the matter.
Legal counseling in connection with routine transactions in the
ordinary course of business requires the least amount of judicially
protected secrecy. 111 The communications and documents generated in routine business affairs and corporate operations are so
often interwoven with legal and business considerations that appli713 See
714 See
715 See
" See
717 See

supra note 228 and accompanying text.
supra table 7, section VIII.A. at 372.
supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
supra table 7, section VIII.A. at 372.
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cability of the privilege in subsequent litigation is already difficult
to predict.7 18 This is particularly true if the attorney whose advice
has been sought is house counsel, whose role as legal adviser is
often hard to differentiate from that of business adviser.71 9 It is
also doubtful that the need for confidentiality comes even close to
approaching the absolute in this area, since management is probably sufficiently motivated by business considerations to seek the
advice of counsel and to encourage employees to be forthright in
order for the corporation to achieve its objectives without legal difficulties.7 20 The prospect of litigation-with its possible chilling ef-

fect on such communications if confidentiality is not assured-would be remote since most corporate transactions do not
result in litigation. The routineness of the matter, therefore, is a
factor weighing in favor of discovery.
Corporate concern over privilege protection is likely to be at
its highest, however, when the communications relate to litigation
that has been or is about to be commenced by or against the corporation and the lawyer is consulted in order to prepare a case with
respect to a past transaction. 21 Such concern is probably equally
high during internal investigations into specific problems involving
possible corporate liability, which are often conducted in anticipation of litigation. 22 In all of these circumstances, there would appear to be a greater interest in confidentiality than in the case of
prospective corporate transactions in*the ordinary course of business. With litigation on the horizon, the fear of courtroom disclosure may be a deterrent to managements authorization of communications between counsel and lower-echelon employees. When the
lawyer is acting as litigator, he is performing the role with which
he is commonly associated in the public eye, and confidentiality of
communications would usually be assumed in such a setting. Furthermore, the communications more clearly involve legal rather
than business advice, thus increasing the expectation that the privilege will attach. An element of fairness is also operative. The same
considerations that underlie the attorney work product doctrine
also support application of the attorney-client privilege in this context: Each side should prepare its own case and not seek to "bor7,8 See

supra notes 487-535 and accompanying text.
See id.; supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
710 See, e.g., supra note 609 and accompanying text.
721 See supra table 7, section VJII.. at 372.
7" See id.
719
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row the wits" of the adversary's advocate in unearthing the facts
from his client.723
Although the relation of the communications to potential litigation should be a factor weighing against discovery, it should not
be conclusive. Expectations of confidentiality are not necessarily
absolute in these contexts. For example, an internal investigation
by a corporation into specific illegal transactions might result in a
decision to participate in a "voluntary disclosure program" pursuant to which the information obtained during the investigation is
shared with a government agency in exchange for lenient treat"ment.724 Such disclosure may cause a general loss of privilege
through waiver.7 25 Even under current law, other forms of waiver
and exceptions also preclude an absolute, guarantee of privilege for
litigation-related communications.7 26
Thus, there may be occasions when the needs of the adjudicatory process may properly override the corporation's interest in
"' Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
In the litigation context, the proposed qualified approach to the attorney-client privilege would be essentially coterminous with the work product doctrine. Under either theory
of protection, the adversary would have to demonstrate "substantial" need for the desired
material. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); supra notes 66-69 and infra notes 746-56 and accompanying text.
7" The SEC, for example, has used a voluntary disclosure program designed to ease
burdens on its staff and to provide an incentive to corporations to police their own misconduct. By making disclosure of the results of self-investigations to the SEC, corporations may
be able to convince the agency that an enforcement action is not warranted. See Note, Discovery of Internal CorporateInvestigations, 32 STAN. L. Rxv. 1163, 1166-68 (1980).
711 Courts are split over whether a corporation's disclosure of the results of counsel's
investigation to an agency constitutes a "limited" waiver such that privilege is not deemed
waived vis-a-vis third parties or, on the other hand, whether it is a general waiver that will
enable other litigants to obtain discovery of the materials given to the government. See, e.g.,
In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disclosure of privileged documents to SEC and grand jury results in general waiver, entitling class-action
plaintiffs to discovery); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir.
1977) (en banc) (in order to encourage internal investigations, disclosure of documents to
SEC does not waive privilege as to private party in subsequent civil action); Teachers Ins. &
Annuity Ass'n v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (general waiver occurs upon disclosure to SEC unless right to assert privilege in subsequent
proceedings is explicitly reserved). Some courts have held that third parties are entitled to
access not only to the privileged communications that were actually disclosed to the government but also to all other privileged communications relating to the same subject matter.
See, e.g., In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988). See generally
Developments in the Law, supra note 79, at 1650-56; Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back
Into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative
Agency Proceeding, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1198, 1209-28 (1982).
721 See, e.g., supra notes 73-74, 455, 484, 548 & 681-82 and accompanying text.
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confidentiality even as to litigation-related communications. For
example, if all of the noncontrol group employees with material
information have become unavailable, either because of death,
physical inability to testify, or invocation of their personal privilege against self-incrimination, and their prior communications
with the corporation's lawyer are essential to a tlaim or defense,
discovery might be deemed appropriate.
Between the poles of routine transactions and litigation-related matters are numerous other types of corporate matters that
defy categorization in terms of expectations of confidentiality. In
general, the more sensitive the matter, the more likely it is that
management would expect and desire confidentiality in the lawyer's communications with employees. Discussions about personnel
decisions, for example, might be an area in which litigation is not
necessarily anticipated but which implicates a number of privacy
concerns both for the corporation and its employees.7 27 Similarly, a
routine legal audit of compliance with rules against payments to
government officials might begin without any fear of problems, but
mushroom into a sensitive situation upon discovery of a specific
questionable payment. Further, a proposed tender offer might
start out as a routine matter yet later give reasonable cause to anticipate litigation, if, for example, it became hostile.728 Courts
should consider all of the surrounding circumstances in determining the degree of expected certainty of confidentiality that a specific type of situation warrants and weigh it, together with other
factors favoring nondisclosure, against the strength of the competing evidentiary needs in the particular case.
The second factor that the court should consider in the exercise of its discretion is whether the communication in issue was
with house counsel or outside counsel. As previously discussed, the
survey findings raise doubts about the value of the attorney-client
privilege as an encouragement to open communications when the
lawyer is a member of the corporation's internal legal depart727See, e.g., supra note 155.
7" Cf. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 725 n.6 (N.D. Inl. 1978) (court

rejected per se rule that tender offers or other business combinations have inherent potential for litigation; in order to invoke work product immunity, court required showing of
"clear threat of litigation" involving claims that have already arisen).
Many potentially sensitive transactions, such as tender offers and corporate reorganizations, are not likely in any event to involve communications with noncontrol group
employees.
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ment.7 29 The nature of the ongoing relationship between employees
and internal lawyers and their shared institutional incentives to
achieve their employer's business objectives may be far greater inducements to candor than the privilege. Furthermore, the corporate client's ability to predict that the privilege will apply to house
counsel's communications is already weak because of the potential
for a court's characterization of the communications as having
been motivated predominantly by a desire for business advice
rather than legal advice.13 0 The privilege may very well play a more
significant role in encouraging candor with outside counsel, and
whether accurate or not, outside counsel are more likely to be perceived as giving predominantly legal advice. 3 ' Since the value of
the privilege and corporate expectations of confidentiality vary depending on the status of the lawyer, discovery should be favored
when the communications are with house counsel and disfavored in
the case of outside counsel.
A third factor for the court to consider is the extent to which
the contents of the communication are evaluative or factual. A few
of the lawyers and executives in the survey, for example, made unsolicited comments suggesting that one of the principal reasons
they might fear disclosure of a lower-level employee's communications with counsel is that such employees often do not speak "judiciously. 73 2 They may be quick to offer theories, opinions and conclusions to counsel about matters as to which they are
inadequately informed.7 3 3 Such untested opinions, however, might
be helpful to the corporation and its counsel in ascertaining the
actual facts. If attorney-client communications of this nature were
easily discoverable, counsel might hesitate to solicit such opinions
in the future and management might cut off the channels of communication entirely. Objective facts, on the other hand, are more
729 See supra notes 277-87 & 298-333 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 500-02 and accompanying text.
73 See supra note 611.
73 One of the respondents in the sample of house counsel said that the principal value
of the attorney-client privilege, in his view, is the protection it offers to "the mistakes, speculations, opinions, theories, ideas, and inferences" that clients communicate to lawyers. For
him, a higher level of confidentiality is more important for "nonfactual elements than for
73

the facts themselves." One of the business executives expressed a similar thought- "The
privilege should protect subjective inferences and opinions, which can be so bizarre and
misleading to a judge and jury. Facts aren't such a problem." See also supra note 470 (lawyers' complaints that written analyses by corporate representatives are "notoriously
inaccurate").
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likely to become known during pretrial discovery in any event.

Counsel, therefore, will not stop eliciting factual statements from
employees even if disclosure of such statements is occasionally
compelled by operation of the qualified privilege.
Thus, the more factual the nature of the communication, the
greater should be the court's inclination to grant discovery. A
rough analogy is provided by the government's qualified privilege
for deliberative processes:73 4 Whereas factual information in government documents usually is freely discoverable, opinions, evaluations and conclusions are subject to the privilege in order to encourage a frank exchange of ideas.7 35 In the case of the proposed
qualified corporate attorney-client privilege, both types of commu-

nications would be conditionally privileged, except7 3 that
factual
e
content should be more readily subject to discovery.
This is not to suggest that evaluative statements to counsel

7' The deliberative process privilege is close in theory to the corporate attorney-client
privilege in that its safeguard against public disclosure is intended to promote effective government operations by encouraging the free expression of ideas and a candid exchange of
views among decision-makers. See In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577,
581 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
71 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1973)
("memoranda consisting only of compiled factual material or purely factual material contained in deliberative memoranda and severable from its context would generally be available for discovery by private parties in litigation with the Government"); Ackerley v. Ley, 420
F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (deliberative process privilege is intended to encourage
"exchange and communication of opinions, ideas and points of view"); In re Franklin Nat'l
Bank See. Litig., 478 F. Supp. at 581 (deliberative process privilege "protects only expressions of opinion or recommendations in intragovernmental documents; it does not protect
purely factual material").
73, See Brazil, supra note 127, at 1351 (if scope of attorney-client privilege were narrowed during pretrial discovery in order to facilitate adversary's access to material evidence,
"[c]lients still might be permitted to prevent disclosure of specific feelings, opinions, and
theories that relate to the litigation").
If the communication in issue was made in anticipation of litigation and contained
"mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories," it would often receive special
protection in any event as opinion work product. See supra note 66. The showing that is
necessary to overcome the immunity for opinion work product has never been definitively
established, but the Supreme Court has stressed that such materials "cannot be disclosed
simply on a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981). It has been said that
an attorney's memorandum containing his account of interviews of witnesses will "rarely"
be discoverable because it will reieal his mental impressions. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979). The evaluative content of an attorney's memorandum, however, can be a matter of degree. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397
F. Supp. 1146, 1199-1200 (D.S.C. 1974) ('as the work product of the attorney becomes less a
matter of creative legal thought and more a mere recognition of observed fact, the work
product becomes increasingly susceptible to discovery").
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should never be discoverable, because the only information available on an important issue may be embodied in such a statement.
Furthermore, the line between "opinion" and "fact" is seldom
clear, because "opinions often represent a summary of statements
of fact. 2'

37

If the court leans toward discovery, redaction of purely

evaluative content should be ordered to the extent feasible.73 8 Alternatively, the corporation might be directed to prepare a generic
abstract or summary of the facts contained in the privileged communication, which is an approach that has been suggested in connection with the government's qualified privilege for official information." Even if an employee's evaluative statement is held to be
discoverable as is, it will not necessarily be admissible in evidence
against the corporation at trial.740
The fourth factor that I believe should be a part of the balancing test is whether the communication was oral or written. If the
communication is embodied in a document, the likelihood of needing the attorney's testimony is diminished. As discussed previ7-' In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. at 584 (in applying government's
official information privilege, court found that bank examiner's coment--"Directors exercised reasonable and independent supervision, however, daily supervision is left largely to
active management"--had "conclusory ring of an opinion" but was predominantly factual in
content).
The Supreme Court recently acknowledged the "analytical difficulty of drawing [the]
line" between fact and opinion with respect to the admissibility of "factual findings" in
government reports pursuant to the hearsay exception for public records. Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439, 449 (1988). The Court held that applying a broad standard
of admissibility for government investigatory reports would be "consistent with the Federal
Rules' general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion testimony."' Id. at
450. By way of example, the Court cited Fed. R. Evid. 701, which allows even a lay witness
to testify in the form of an opinion if it is based on actual observations and the testimony
would be "helpful" to the fact-finder. Beech Aircraft, 109 S. Ct. at 450.
738 Cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1231-32 (in ordering discovery
of
attorney's memorandum of interview with now-deceased witness, court noted appropriateness of severing attorney's opinions from factual content). If the evaluative content is only
minor, however, redaction should not be ordered if it would distort the balance of the communication. See In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. at 585 (official information privilege).
"7' See, e.g., United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719, 720 (W.D.
La. 1949), af'd, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (government offered to file "an abstract of factual information" contained in FBI documents).
710 Despite the modern liberal approach to opinion testimony by lay witnesses, see
supra note 737, an employee's conclusory statement may not be admissible as an admission
against the corporation if it is a mere "legal conclusion" that would not be helpfal to the
trier of facts. See, e.g., Mitroff v. Xomox Corp., 797 F.2d 271, 276 (6th Cir. 1986) (in employment discrimination action, assistant personnel manager's out-of-court statement to fellow employee "that there was a pattern of age discrimination" in company held inadmissible
against employer at trial in part because of its conclusory form).
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ously, one of the justifications for the attorney-client privilege is
the strong tradition in the adversary system against compelling an
attorney to give testimony that would reveal information given to
him in confidence by his client. 41 Aside from the noninstrumental
consideration of "treachery" that is implicated, counsel's testimony
may prove disruptive to the progress of the litigation, as, for exam42
ple, where his testimony at trial would result in disqualification.
The fact that particular communications were oral rather than
in writing, therefore, ought to be a factor weighing against discovery.74 On the other hand, if the oral communications were with
house counsel, the danger of disqualification at trial might not exist because trial advocacy on behalf of corporations, at least in major cases, is often handled by outside counsel.7 " Furthermore, as
an alternative to maintaining the privilege in toto when the communication is oral, the court might enter an order that any evidence from the attorney be obtained only during pretrial discovery
by interrogatories or deposition and that the interrogatory answers
or testimony be used only as a lead to other evidence.7 45 This
7," See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text The same sentiment was also expressed in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 517
(1947) (Jackson, J., concurring), in support of recognition of the work product immunity:
Every lawyer dislikes to take the witness stand and will do so only for grave
reasons. This is partly because it is not his role; he is almost invariably a poor
witness. But he steps out of professional character to do it. He regrets it; the profession discourages it.
Id. Some courts are loathe to compel attorneys to testify at pretrial depositions even if their
testimony would not reveal privileged communications or work product. See supranote 311;
see also Herzel & Hagan, Do CorporationsReally Have an Attorney-Client Privilege?, 1978
Cm. B. REO. 296, 300 (when showing of good cause results in loss of privilege in shareholder
action, courts should exercise "close control" over questioning of counsel to avoid intimidation of corporate lawyers).
742 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
7,1 If an employee's oral statement was made to counsel in connection with litigation,
the attorney's recollection of the statement would also be entitled to the heightened protection that is afforded opinion work product. See In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 273 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (to overcome work product immunity for attorney's memory of oral statements,
"a far stronger showing is required than the 'substantial need' and 'without undue hardship'
standard applicable to discovery of work-product protected documents and other tangible
things"); see also supra notes 66 & 736.
7" See supra notes 291 & 305-12 and accompanying text.
741 In advocating elimination of work product protection for the substance of statements by witnesses to attorneys, Professor Shapiro makes the following suggestion for a
procedure that may be equally appropriate in application of the qualified corporate attorney-client privilege: "For those who are concerned about making the lawyer a witness, it
may be necessary to bar any use of the [interrogatory] answer except as a lead to other
evidence, and to preclude compelling a lawyer to testify at trial about what he was told in a
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would prevent the attorney from being called by the adversary at
the trial to testify to what he was told, thus minimizing the potential for disqualification. Any such order might be subject to modification in the event the attorney's testimony turns out to be the
only form through which a crucial element of the case can be
proven.
b. Factors Relating to the Adversary's Need
Guidelines developed by the courts in applying balancing tests
for other types of qualified privileges, such as the government privilege for official information,748 suggest that the "importance" or
"relevance" of the requested evidence are factors to be considered
in evaluating the need criterion. 47 Professor Margaret Berger is
even more specific in recommending that among the factors to be
taken into account in application of a qualified privilege are the
significance of the issue to which the evidence is addressed and the
probative value of the evidence.748 Thus, for example, is the communication in question a remote link in a chain of circumstantial
evidence on an ancillary issue or does it bear substantially on a
fact that is central to the case? The adversary's need for the evidence presumably is increased by the significance of the issue and
the probative value of the evidence. Although the standard of relevance for pretrial discovery ordinarily is broad, 749 in the context of
balancing need against the policies served by the attorney-client
privilege, it is appropriate to consider the relative importance of
the requested data. Since the court may have difficulty evaluating
the importance of the evidence at the pretrial stage, 5 it might be
appropriate to postpone determination of the qualified privilege issue until pretrial discovery is nearly complete. This would be consistent with the next factor to be discussed, to wit, the extent to
which the adversary has pursued and exhausted other avenues of
pretrial interview." Shapiro, supra note 127, at 1091.
746See supra notes 709 & 734-35.
747See, e.g., In re Franklin National Bank Sac. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (five-factor list for official information privilege includes "the relevance of the evidence sought to be protected"); Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(ten-factor list for official information privilege includes consideration of "importance of the
information sought").
718Berger, supra note 63, at 1412.
719See, e.g., supra note 5.
758This problem was noted by one of the magistrates in the survey. See supra notes
196-97 and accompanying text.
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inquiry.
The most important element of the need criterion is the un-

availability of substantially equivalent information from nonprivileged sources. The adversary should be required to demonstrate
with particularity the futility of his attempts to obtain the information he seeks directly from the corporation's employees or other

nonprivileged sources, such as business documents. A similar requirement has been imposed, for example, on litigants seeking to
overcome the qualified work product immunity7 51 or to demonstrate good cause for the discovery of privileged communications in
shareholder actions. 52 Even if an employee is available and testi-

fies at a deposition or at trial, however, his prior statement to
counsel might be a unique form of impeachment evidence with re-

spect to a crucial issue, thus tipping the scales in favor of production following the testimony.7 5 3

In all cases, the adversary's need must outweigh the corporation's interests in confidentiality for noncontrol group communications. Since the privilege creates a presumption against disclosure,

the ultimate burden properly lies with the adversary to show that
the aggregate of factors favoring need in the particular case outweigh those favoring the preservation of confidentiality. The ad75 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231-33 (3d Cir. 1979) (in
grand jury investigation, government showed sufficient need for statements to counsel of
deceased witness; statements of living witnesses, however, were held nondiscoverable because grand jury had not yet attempted to subpoena them); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,
434 F. Supp. 136, 153 (D. Del. 1977) (no basis shown for overcoming work product immunity
where party made no requests for interrogatories or depositions); Xerox v. IBM Corp., 64
F.R.D. 367, 375, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (plaintiff deposed 23 of 37 relevant employees and
each one disclaimed memory of any pertinent facts; court ordered discovery of prior statements to counsel by 23 employees, but required plaintiff to attempt to interview remaining
14 as precondition to discovery of their statements); Almagner v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 55
F.R.D. 147, 150 (D. Neb. 1972) (in seeking to overcome work product immunity, "some diligence on the part of the plaintiff" must be shown; plaintiff gave no explanation for failing to
take depositions); see also notes 642-45 and accompanying text.
782 See, e.g., Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 786 (5th Cir. 1988) (plaintiffs made "unsupported assertion" that privileged information was unavailable); In re
Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616, 621 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (court concluded "at
this time" that plaintiff was merely speculating that corporate employees would be obstructive or that cost of obtaining information through alternative sources would be prohibitively
expensive; court indicated willingness to reconsider its ruling upon showing of new or
changed circumstances).
783 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1231-33 (employees' written
answers to questionnaire circulated by counsel were work product but were subject to possible disclosure for impeachment or corroboration purposes following issuance of grand jury
subpoenas); see also supra note 641 and accompanying text.
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versary's burden will thus rise or fall in proportion to the strength
of the factors favoring nondisclosure. By way of example, but without intending to prejudge any particular case, a relatively modest
threshold of need may well overcome a claim of privilege for a factual memorandum from a lower-level employee to house counsel
regarding a prospective business transaction that, at the time of
the writing, presented no realistic threat of a dispute. Conversely, a
description of a past transaction made to outside counsel retained
for the purpose of defending the corporation in litigation should
require a substantial showing.of need. These examples obviously
lie at the extremes, and cases lying in between will require refined
analysis. In general, however, corporate clients can be advised that
communications relating to litigation and sensitive matters would
be the least likely to lose the privilege. 4 This will provide an increased level of predictability for those matters that were shown by
the results of the empirical study to cause concern over privilege
protection.
It bears emphasizing that since the main linchpin for defeasance of the privilege under the proposed balancing guidelines is
the adversary's inability to obtain the information from nonprivileged sources, the corporation and its lawyers can minimize the potential for losing the privilege by actively seeking to make those
sources available upon proper request. For example, the corporation can diligently cooperate in complying with discovery demands
for nonprivileged information as well as encourage its employees to
do the same. For adversaries who may not be financially able to
utilize expensive discovery techniques, the corporation's counsel
should be receptive to the adversary's requests for informal interviews with employees.7 5 The corporation can thus help preserve
its privilege by making it difficult for the adversary to demonstrate
frustration in obtaining information from nonprivileged sources. A
possible collateral benefit of such cooperation would be a reduction
in the obstructionist tactics that other empirical research has
shown to be common in corporate litigation.7 56
7"The greater likelihood of discovery of communications that take place in the context
of routine business transactions than of those that relate to litigation parallels the line of
cases applying Garner'sgood cause standard in shareholder actions: attorney-client communications that are made on a relatively contemporaneous basis with relevant corporate
transactions are more likely to be subject to disclosure than communications made in anticipation of litigation. See supra notes 596-601 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
7" See Brazil, Views from the Front Lines, supra note 127, at 229-35, 243-44; Brazil,
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5. Implementation of a Qualified Privilege
a. Impact on the Judiciary
How would a qualified corporate attorney-client privilege be
managed by the courts? The advent of a balancing test might increase the consumption of a very important resource: the judge's
time. A proper weighing of interests in most cases would require in
can be
camera review of the privileged material by the court, which
7
m7
a burdensome and time-consuming task in large cases.

Most of

the judges and magistrates in the survey, however, indicated that
they would not expect a qualified privilege for lower-level communications to increase significantly the amount of time that they
spend in deciding corporate attorney-client privilege issues.758
Even under current law, claims of corporate attorney-client
privilege can force judges to painstakingly labor over such close
questions as whether the content of communications relates to legal or business matters, whether the test of confidentiality has
been satisfied, whether good cause to overcome the privilege has
been shown in a shareholder action, and whether one of the traditional exceptions applies, such as that for future crime or fraud.
Adding the question of whether, in a case involving lower-level
communications, practical necessities outweigh the prospect of future reticence by corporate employees probably would not significantly increase the judiciary's task in this area of the law. Many of
the suggested guidelines described above7 59 are drawn principally
from existing rules governing such qualified privileges as the work
product immunity and the government privilege for official information, with which judges are already familiar. Finally, if the
amount of privileged material to be considered is large, courts can
utilize magistrates or special masters to make preliminary
determinations. 6 0
supra note 143, at 851.
'7
See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
7' See supra note 620.
71, See supra notes 732-53 and accompanying text.
710 See, e.g., FED. R. Cirv. P. 53; United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154, 156-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (in massive antitrust lawsuit, court designated special masters for purpose
of making recommendations to court regarding various claims of privilege). The successful
use of magistrates in managing discovery disputes in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of New York is described in Weinstein & Weiner, supra note 60, at 438-41.
See generally Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Limitations
on Existing Sources and the Need for a New FederalRule, in MANAGING COMPLEX LTGATON: A PACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASs 305-94 (1983).
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b. Procedurefor Resolution of Privilege Claims
In using a balancing approach, in camera review of the privileged material by the court may be necessary to resolve the issue
unless the opponent's showing of need is inadequate on its face.78 1
In camera proceedings are often employed by federal courts not

only in adjudicating other types of qualified privileges 6 2 but also
in deciding traditional questions concerning the applicability of
3
the attorney-client privilege."
In camera proceedings, however, can impose several burdens
on the adjudicatory system.7 6 4 It is unfair to leave the opponent of
761 Cf. United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619, 2630-32 (1989) (before conducting in
camera review of attorney-client communications challenged on ground of crime/fraud exception, opponent of privilege must make threshold evidentiary showing "sufficient to support a reasonable belief that in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the exception's applicability"); Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 94748 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (in seeking to overcome government's qualified privilege, party must make
prima facie showing of need before court will conduct in camera review).
7 2 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (executive privilege);
United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 78 n.9 (2d Cir.)(news reporter's sources), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 816 (1983); Pilar v. SS Hess Petrol, 55 F.R.D. 159, 164 (D. Md. 1972) (government
investigatory memoranda). Government claims of exemption from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act have produced a discrete body of law on the topic of in camera
inspection of privileged documents. See generally Note, In CameraInspections Under the
Freedom of Information Act, 41 U. Ci. L. REV. 557 (1974) (detailed exposition on judicial
use of in camera inspection within parameters of FOIA provisions).
I" The Supreme Court, for example, recently affirmed the right of federal courts to
conduct in camera inspection of attorney-client communications for the purpose of determining the applicability of the crime/fraud exception. Zolin, 109 S.Ct. at 2632; see also
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 864 (8th Cir.) ("court is entitled to an opportunity to make inspection of any such documents in order to satisfy itself that they are in fact
privileged"), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v.
Carolina Power & Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511, 512 n.1, 515-18 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (magistrate
reviewed over 200 documents that were "representative of categories of documents" withheld on ground of privilege and work product); Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Work, 110
F.R.D. 500, 505-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (listing of magistrate's rulings with respect to 175 documents reviewed in camera to determine claims of privilege and work product); Jack Winter,
Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (court reviewed 415 corporate documents in camera to determine which fell within boundaries of attorney-client privilege).
In contrast, section 915(a) of the California Evidence Code prohibits courts from conducting in camera inspections for the purpose of deciding claims of attorney-client privilege
unless the privilege-holder voluntarily produces documents for such inspection. See Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1047, 1051, 233 Cal. Rptr. 825,
828 (1987). In camera inspection specifically is allowed, however, with respect to the qualified privileges for government information and trade secrets in order to facilitate judicial
balancing of the competing interests. CAL. EvID. CODE § 915(b) comment.
7" In litigation under the Freedom of Information Act, for example, the benefits and
costs of in camera proceedings have been summarized as follows:
In camerainspection, which provides a basis for an individualized determina-
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the privilege to play a game of "blindman's buff" while the judge
decides the issue in secret,76 5 and the court itself should not be
deprived of a meaningful adversarial presentation that will
sharpen the issues and facilitate the judicial function. 6 Guidelines
developed over the past few years by judges and masters for the
resolution of privilege disputes in complex litigation provide useful
models for procedures to resolve the issues that would arise in con77
nection with a qualified corporate attorney-client privilege.
To expedite the decision-making process, a corporation should
be required to provide adequate factual support for the prima facie

applicability of the privilege, including the following information:
tion whether a particular document is factually exempt, has a certain surface appeal as a technique for exercising de novo review and ensuring the validity of alleged exemptions. But, the inability of the party making a request under FOIA to
offer an alternative interpretation of the records, the difficulty of contesting such a
ruling on appeal, the burden such a time-consuming procedure places on district
courts, the paucity of information available to appellate courts on review, and the
limited precedential value of decisions based on in camera scrutiny all underscore
the inadequacies of such an arrangement.
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Deparment of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 984 (3d Cir. 1981) (footnote
omitted); see also Note, supra note 762, at 558-61 (cost/benefit analysis of judicial use of in
camera inspection under FOIA).
713McLean, PretrialManagement in Complex Litigation:The Use of Special Masters
in United States v. AT&T, in MANAGING CohwLEx LIGATIoN: A PRAcTrcAL GUIDE TO THE
USE OF SPECiAL MAs'Rs 275, 285 (1983).
7'1 See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C.Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977
(1974) (FOIA case).
767 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 97 F.R.D. 427, 433-36 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (government deliberative process privilege); United States v. AT&T Co., 86 F.R.D.
603, 604-12, 651-53 (D.D.C. 1979) (attorney-client, work product and other privileges);
Duplan Corp. v Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1156-58 (D.S.C. 1974) (attorneyclient privilege, work product and trade secrets); Hazard & Rice, JudicialManagement of
the PretrialProcess in Massive Litigation:Special Masters as Case Managers, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATzON: A PRAncIAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 77, 93-100

(1983).
The leading case on in camera proceedings is Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974), in which the court analyzed the problems of in
camera review in litigation under the Freedom of Information Act and proposed the following guidelines for deciding government claims of exemptions from disclosure: (1) the agency
must submit a "relatively detailed analysis [of the privileged material] in manageable segments"; (2) the agency must provide "an indexing system [subdividing] the document into
manageable parts cross-referenced to the relevant portion of the Government's justification"; (3) "adequate adversary testing" must occur by the agency providing its justification
and index to the opponent and by in camera judicial inspection; and (4) the court should
consider possible use of a master in examining and evaluating documents to ease its burden.
Id. at 826-28; see also Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1203-05, 1214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(Wright, C.J., concurring) (review of guidelines for deciding government claims of exemption from disclosure).
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if a document-the type of document (letter, memorandum, etc.),
date, author, addressee, other recipients, general subject matter,
and the relationships of the participants (including the employee's
status in the company and role with respect to the attorney-client
communication and whether the lawyer involved is a member of
the corporation's internal legal department or is outside counsel);
if an oral communication-its date, the speaker, persons present,
general subject matter, and the relationship of the speaker to those
present (including the status and role of the participants)."e Local
court rules requiring similar information with respect to all privilege claims are already in force in the Federal District Courts for
the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. 89 The factual
data, provided by a person with the requisite knowledge, should
set forth all of the elements necessary to sustain the claim of privilege ° and should be made available to all parties and the court
prior to any in camera inspection. 7 1
Some corporate litigators have objected to such requirements
for resolving privilege questions on the ground that it is unfair to
impose them in the first instance on the party claiming privilege
because of the burden, expense and threat to the sanctity of the
privilege that they cause.7"
Good reasons, however, support stringent requirements for
substantiation at the outset. First, in the case of corporations,
prima facie applicability of the privilege turns on the satisfaction
of so many elements that they should be set forth in some detail. 73
Under the qualified approach proposed in this Article, the court
must also know the basic circumstances surrounding the communication in order to be able to weigh the suggested factors in decid'18 Information of this nature was required with respect to assertions of attorney-client
communications, work product and other privileged documents in United States v. AT&T
Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 604-08, 651 (D.D.C. 1979) (Special Masters' Guidelines for Submission
and Resolution of Privilege Claims). See also Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy,
644 F.2d 969, 972 n.5 (3d Cir. 1981) (FOIA exemptions); International Paper Co. v.
Fibreboard Corp., 63 F.R.D. 88, 93-94 (D. Del. 1974) (corporate attorney-client privilege).
" See supra note 184.
770 See supra notes 705-06 and accompanying text.
771 The suggested procedure is analogous to "Vaughn indexing." Vaughn, 484 F.2d at
826-28; see supra note 767.
772 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 250, at 36-38; cf. McLean, supra note 765, at 285-86
(questioning whether rigorous substantiation requirements are appropriate in situations
other than complex litigation in which stakes are high, parties' resources are vast and documents could have appreciable impact on outcome).
77
Rice, supra note 267, at 298-99.
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ing whether the privilege should be breached.7 7 4 If in camera inspection becomes necessary, the court's burden will be eased if its
attention has been directed to the key issues.
Second, the requirement of a detailed showing will deter the
making of blanket claims of privilege. The corporation will be induced to consider seriously the prospects for sustaining its claims
of privilege and the possibility that assertion of privilege is not
worth the effort with respect to some communications.77 5 Third, a
"costly" initial showing may actually reduce the overall expense
and delay incurred in resolving the privilege claim because all of
the necessary information to sustain it will have been placed "up
front." This may avoid the need to come forward with additional
data in response to the opponent's papers or a request from the
court while it is reviewing the material in camera. 7 Moreover, an
initially strong substantiation of the claim may persuade the oppo77
nent not to challenge it.
Finally, preliminary proof in support of the privilege claim enhances the adversarial quality of the proceedings by giving the opponent a reasonable amount of information to fairly contest the
applicability of the privilege, establish an exception, or make a
case for overriding the privilege for noncontrol group communications due to the necessity of the circumstances. If revelation of the
identifying information for a particular confidential communication would, in itself, raise a strong inference as to its contents, 7 8
the corporation could request in camera review at the outset.77 9
Comments by some of the judges and magistrates in the empirical
study lend support to the argument that indexing procedures
7 80
would help to achieve the foregoing goals.
7' See supra notes 713-53 and accompanying text.

771Hazard & Rice, supra note 767, at 96.
Ie

Id. at 96-97, 100.

777Cf. Standard Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings (U.S.) Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76,

86-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (initial lack of substantiation of privilege claim led opponent to challenge claim because of distrust).
773 See, e.g., In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1984) (group consultation by multiple clients with single attorney might raise inference of discussions about concerted

activity).
7 The indexing rules in effect in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York
explicitly provide that the party asserting a privilege may withhold the required background
information if "divulgnce of such information would cause disclosure" of the privileged
communication. S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 46(d)(2)(ii); E.D.N.Y. Standing Order on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases No. 21(a)(2), (b)(2).
780 See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
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c. Protective Orders
If a claim of corporate privilege is overridden because of the

particular evidentiary needs of the litigants, the court should be
receptive to the corporation's request for a protective order to minimize the risk of dissemination of the attorney-client communications to the public or to parties in other proceedings. During pretrial proceedings, for example, Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides a basis for a protective order that would
limit access to the immediate parties and their consultants and re-

strict use of the discovered materials, under seal, to the instant

litigation.18 1 An order of this scope would be virtually essential
with respect to attorney-client communications held discoverable
pursuant to a particularized balancing of interests because the
communications would still be prima facie privileged vis-a-vis nonparties. If disclosure has been compelled by the court due to the
needs of the individual case, there has been no voluntary waiver of
the privilege by the corporation. 8 2 This fact alone should satisfy
781 The rule allows the court "for good cause shown . . . [to] make any order which

justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). For an example of a protective order that
limited the use of documents produced during discovery to the instant litigation and precluded access thereto by third parties, see Pretrial Order No. 7, United States v. AT&T Co.,
Civ. No. 74-1698, filed Dec. 16, 1976, reproduced in Hazard & Rice, supra note 767, at 18083.
8 2 Waiver requires a voluntary act by the privilege-holder. See supra notes 454-55. The
court in Shields v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 864 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1989), analyzed a similar
waiver issue in a manner that would be appropriate in applying the qualified corporate attorney-client privilege. A corporate defendant in a state-court action had been compelled to
disclose a document over an objection based on the qualified work product immunity. In the
state court, the plaintiff used the document at trial, again over defendant's objection, and
the defendant thereupon relied upon the same document in rebuttal. Id. at 380. In the subsequent federal action, a different party sought to introduce the same document against the
corporate defendant, arguing that any work product immunity had been waived in the prior
action. Id. at 382. The federal court disagreed:
When a party is compelled to disclose privileged work product and does so
only after objecting and taking other reasonable steps to protect the privilege, one
court's disregard of the privileged character of the material does not waive the
privilege before another court. The record is clear that Ruger's attorneys asserted
the privileged character of their work product at every opportunity before the California court, that they objected to any disclosure of the [document], and that
they disclosed the [document] under compulsion by the court, not voluntarily.
Id.
It is unclear whether the state court had properly applied the work product immunity.
If the immunity had been overcome by the plaintiff's need in the particular case, the lifting
of the immunity would have been legitimate. If this is so, the Shields case is persuasive
authority for the proposition that disclosure of corporate attorney-client communications
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the burden of proof for issuance of a protective order 18 3
The extent to which such a protective order could effectively
deny access to the public at large or other litigants upon termination of the litigation, however, is an unsettled question. Whether
the court will modify an order that imposes a long-term seal may
turn upon the use that is made of the corporation's attorney-client
communications in the first lawsuit and the status of the party
seeking access. If the materials are held to be discoverable at the
pretrial stage of the proceedings, and the action is privately settled
before trial, the Supreme Court's decision in Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart 8 4suggests that a continuing protective order could preclude dissemination of the materials to the press or other members
pursuant to a balancing of interests in the particular case should not be considered a waiver
with respect to other litigants. Shields stands for a somewhat-different proposition if it is
based on the notion that the prior court erroneously lifted the privilege. See, e.g., Ward v.
Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1988) (in shareholder action in which
district court erroneously ordered disclosure of attorney-client communications pursuant to
Garner doctrine, corporate defendant's reliance at trial on same communications in support
of "advice-of-counsel" defense did not constitute waiver of privilege; corporation was merely
rebutting plaintiffs evidentiary use of the same communications); Ur. R. Evin. 511 (privilege not waived if disclosure was "compelled erroneously"). In either situation, however, the
rationale is the same: a party does not waive privilege if the disclosure is not voluntary.
7,, The party seeking a protective order pursuant to rule 26(c) bears the burden of
proving good cause for its issuance. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d
139, 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987).
71 467 U.S. 20 (1984). In Seattle Times, the defendants in a libel action in the state of
Washington-two newspapers and various authors-challenged a protective order that prevented them from publicly disseminating, or using for any purpose other than trial preparation, confidential (but nonprivileged) information obtained through discovery of documents
about the finances and membership of the plaintiff, a religious organization. Defendants
contended that the order, issued pursuant to the "good cause" standard of Washington's
analogous rule to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, infringed their first
amendment rights. Id. at 25-27; see, e.g., In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
See generallyNote, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and the FirstAmendment, 80 COLUM. L.
Rav. 1645, passim (1980).
The Court rejected the defendants' argument that the protective order was a prior restraint on speech, thus requiring a stricter showing of necessity than the good cause standard of rule 26(c). The Court stressed that defendants' acquisition of the information
through discovery was a matter of "legislative grace." Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32. Further, since discovery is not a public component of a civil trial, "restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source
of information." Id. at 33. Finally, because of the liberality of modern pretrial discovery,
courts have a substantial interest in limiting the potential for abuse due to public dissemination of information that could damage the reputation and privacy interests of litigants
and third parties. Id. at 34-36. The Court therefore held: "[W]here, as in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause .... is limited to the context of pretrial
discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other
sources, it does not offend the First Amendment." Id. at 37.
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of the public at large.7 5

If modification of the protective order is sought by litigants
asserting a specific interest in the materials in other actions, the
prospects for continued secrecy are less clear. When nonprivileged
information is at stake, courts generally favor dissemination to
other litigants78 s If the information is privileged, however, which
would be the case as to corporate attorney-client communications
held discoverable in the first action only because of the particular
balance of interests that was struck therein, the new parties seeking access should have to make an independent showing of their
entitlement to the materials. 75 7 Otherwise, they would gain the unfair advantage of avoiding the need to prove a basis for overcoming
the privilege that should still stand as to them.71 Before modifying
781 Subsequent to Seattle Times, appellate courts have been generous in upholding
lower courts' issuances of protective orders for materials exchanged by parties during pretrial discovery. See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 355 (11th Cir.
1987); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 11-13 (1st Cir. 1986); Harris v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 768 F.2d 669, 683-85 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986); Shenandoah
Publishing House, Inc. v. Fanning, 235 Va. 253, 262, 368 S.E.2d 253, 257 (1988).
If a pretrial settlement requires no judicial approval and results in a voluntary stipulation of dismissal, courts may treat the discovery exchange essentially as a private matter
and extend the protective order indefinitely upon a modest showing of good cause. See, e.g.,
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 343-44
(3d Cir. 1986). On the other hand, if the settlement agreement must be filed with the court,
the matter takes on a public character that may trigger a presumption of public access to
the agreement and any exhibits, transcripts or motion papers submitted in connection with
it. See, e.g., id. at 343-46; Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197,
205 (Minn. 1986); ShenandoahPublishingHouse, 235 Va. at 260-62, 368 S.E.2d at 255-56.
Any such presumption of access, however, is rebuttable. See infra notes 793-94 and acccompanying text.
186 See, e.g., Ex parte Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435, 440 (1915) ("So long as the object physically exists, anyone needing it as evidence at a trial has a right to call for it... however
proper and effective the sealing may have been as against the public at large"); Olympic
Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264-66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964) (records
in prior government antitrust action ordered unsealed for benefit of litigants in subsequent
private action involving some of the same parties, subject to reasonable restrictions regarding continuing trade secrets or sensitive competitive information). See generally Note, Protective Orders and the Use of Discovery Materials Following Seattle Times, 71 MNN. L.
R-v. 171, 196-98 (1986). One of the reasons for a liberal approach to discovery transfers is
that they increase the overall efficiency of litigation by reducing duplicative discovery. See
Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 41-43
(1983).
787 See Marcus, supra note 786, at 43 ("in order to obtain access to materials produced
under a protective order in litigation number one, the party involved in litigation number
two should demonstrate that he would have the right to obtain them in the second action").
788 See Crystal Grower's Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1980) (court
refused to remove seal on documents in appellate record containing corporate attorney-client communications that were presumptively privileged; court stressed that parties in other
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the original protective order, therefore, the court should engage in
a fresh balancing of the competing interests.
The matter becomes more complicated if the attorney-client
communications, although kept under seal, are relied upon in the
first action as a basis for a judicial ruling on the merits, either at
trial or by summary judgment. The general public, and by implication, other litigants, would have a presumptive right of access to
such materials in the interest of public evaluation of the judicial
process. 89 In shareholder derivative actions, for example, it has
been held that when the corporation obtains a dismissal of the action on the basis of the recommendation of a special committee" of
the board of directors, attorney-client communications contained
in the recommendation lose the benefit of whatever seal was previously placed on them.79 0 In such circumstances, however, the cor-

poration itself has affirmatively relied upon communications with
its attorneys in support of its own case, and therefore has waived
the privilege.791 In the converse situation in which the corporation's adversary has relied upon privileged material that was held
discoverable only because of the particular evidentiary needs of the
actions against same corporation "might obtain information that would be nondiscoverable
absent a determination that the documents were not privileged").
71 See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252-54 (4th Cir.
1988) (presumption of access attaches to exhibits submitted in connection with motion for
summary judgment); Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570-71 (11th Cir.
1985) (district court abused discretion in sealing records of civil trial proceedings). There
exists a general interest in understanding disputes that are resolved in a public forum, and
the public has an interest in ensuring that judges act fairly and honestly. See Crystal
Grower's Corp., 616 F.2d at 461. But see Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co.,
854 F.2d 900, 902-05 (6th Cir. 1988) (no right of access to "summary jury trial," pursuant to
which attorneys argue their cases before jury in order to obtain nonbinding prediction of
probable outcome of an actual trial, because procedure is "much like a settlement conference"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989); Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 678, 681-83
(3d Cir. 1988) (no presumptive right of access to documents admitted into evidence during
liability phase of bifurcated trial if they are returned to party-owner by court clerk following
settlement and closing of case).
7,0 In re Continental Illinois Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1314 (7th Cir. 1984) ("special
litigatiion committee reports used in the adjudicationstages of derivative litigation should
be available for public inspection unless exceptional circumstances require confidentiality")
(emphasis in original); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893-94 (2d Cir. 1982) (derivative actions
may not be "routinely dismissed on the basis of secret documents"), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1051 (1983).
7'9 Reliance upon the advice of counsel in connection with a claim or defense or placing
a privileged document in issue are traditional bases for waiver of the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 615 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. dismissed, 380 U.S. 248, 249 (1965).
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case, the waiver argument should be rejected. 9 2 Moreover, the presumption of public access is rebuttable.79 3 The public interest in
monitoring the judicial process should yield to the compelling public interest in preservation of the confidentiality of attorney-client
communications. 9
d.

Implementing a New Approach

Whether courts should take a qualified approach to the corporate attorney-client privilege in the absence of legislation is a
troubling question. Adoption of a balancing standard through legislation would be the ideal solution because the policy issues could
be thoroughly debated, specific guidelines such as those suggested
in this Article could be codified, and the predictability that comes
from prospective application of a new rule of law could be
achieved. 9 5 The absence of such legislation, however, should not
cause courts to retreat from the traditional absolute nature of the
corporate privilege where, in an exceptional case, the adversary has
evidentiary needs that outweigh the corporation's interests in confidentiality. Such judicial action is permissible in federal courts
under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides that privileges
79 6
are to be interpreted "in the light of reason and experience.
Even in states with codified versions of the attorney-client privilege, exceptions based on public policy may be engrafted onto statutes by the courts. 97 The courts' presumptive entitlement to all
"I See

113See

supra note 782 and accompanying text.

Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800

F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986) ("the right of access, whether grounded on the common law or

the First Amendment, is not absolute"); Shenandoah Publishing House Inc. v. Fanning, 235
Va. 253, 258, 368 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1988) (public's statutory right of access is rebuttable
presumption).
701 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 98 F.R.D. 539, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
("Where unsealing of documents might reveal material governed by the work product privi-

lege or the contents of communications between an attorney and client might be disclosed,
the public interest in protecting those privileges would take precedence over its interest in
inspecting and copying court records").
1'"
See Berger, supra note 63, at 1415-16.
796 FED.R. EVID. 501. In Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980), the Supreme
Court stressed that Congress' purpose was to "'provide the courts with the flexibility to

develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis,' ... and to leave the door open to change."
The Trammel Court thus relied upon rule 501 to modify an ancient common law rule of
privilege and thereby permit a spouse to voluntarily testify against her husband in a criminal trial.
797 See Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 69, 409 N.E.2d 983, 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511,
514 (1980) ("[Elven where the technical requirements of the privilege are satisfied, it may,
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relevant evidence and the increased potential for obstruction
caused by Upjohn's broad approach to the scope of the corporate
privilege arguably constitute sufficient public policy grounds for
courts to adopt a qualified approach.
It bears emphasizing that Upjohn itself is not a bar to implementation of a qualified approach. The Supreme Court's extension
of the corporate privilege to lower-level communications does not
necessarily mean that the privilege must apply to such communications in an absolute fashion. The Court did not consider the issue,
and on the facts, the IRS had not made a very persuasive showing
that the information it desired was inaccessible directly from
Upjohn's employees. 98s The vagueness of the Upjohn Court's opinion7 99 may be its greatest strength as future courts grapple with the
problem of leashing the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context. The proposal for qualifying the privilege for counsel's
communications with noncontrol group employees offers a reasonable accommodation of the goals sought to be achieved by the corporate attorney-client privilege and the needs of the adjudicatory
system.
CONCLUSION

The empirical study upon which this Article is based attempts
to shed new light on how the attorney-client privilege affects, and
in some hypothetical circumstances how it might affect, the behavior of attorneys and their corporate clients. To be sure, gaps remain in the research. For example, two untouched areas of inquiry
that would further illuminate the issues include the views of midnonetheless, yield in a proper case, where strong public policy requires disclosure"); Beard v.
Ames, 96 App. Div. 2d 119, 121, 468 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (4th Dept. 1983) (court cited "public
policy" rubric of Priest v. Hennessy in adopting Garner doctrine). But see Rossi v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York, 73 N.Y.2d 588, 594, 540 N.E.2d 703, 706, 542
N.Y.S.2d 508, 511 (1989) (neither death of attorney-author of memorandum nor nature of

litigation warranted application of "public policy" exception); Dickerson v. Superior Court,
135 Cal. App. 3d 93, 99, 185 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1982) (legislative intent behind codified law
of privileges was to preclude judicial modification; Garner doctrine rejected for this reason).
7"

In the section of the opinion dealing with Upjohn's assertion of the qualified work

product immunity, the Court was unimpressed with the IRS's argument that the employees

whose statements it sought were "scattered across the globe" and that the employees had
been told not to answer "irrelevant" questions. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
399 (1981). No claim was made by the IRS that the employees were otherwise unavailable or

that their communications with Upjohn's counsel were necessary to ascertain the truth. See
supra note 635 and accompanying text.
7" See supra notes 389-93 & 636-37 and accompanying texL
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die management and lower-echelon employees concerning the effect of the corporate privilege on their communications and the
views of lawyers who litigate against corporations concerning the
costs that the privilege imposes on adversaries. Other potentially
productive areas of research were suggested at relevant points in
the Article.
Empirical data alone, however, will never resolve all of the
problems generated by the corporate privilege. Policy considerations should also play a role in shaping it. Furthermore, the type of
empirical data collected in a survey of attorneys and corporate executives unavoidably contains a certain amount of professional
bias. It is undoubtedly true "that one's evaluation of the corporate
attorney-client privilege will reflect the way one views the power of
multinational corporations."800 Since law professors are also influenced by such "political considerations,"80 1 I make no personal
claim to any superior objectivity in my analysis and conclusions.
No attempt will be made here to summarize all of the findings
of the study. The discussion in each section of the Article endeavors to synthesize the pertinent data that were collected with respect to the principal issues surrounding the corporate privilege.
Some concluding observations about the major findings, however,
are in order.
The study does not prove, by any means, that the attorneyclient privilege actually encourages candor in communications between attorneys and corporate management, but it contains more
evidence tending toward that conclusion than has been systematically gathered to date. At the same time, the circumstances in
which the privilege plays a major role in influencing candor seem
to be relatively rare. In day-to-day corporate counseling, the findings suggest that a manager's need to cope with a heavily regulated
business environment and his sense of trust in counsel are probably sufficient to produce open communications. It is in situations
involving potential litigation and matters of a "sensitive" nature,
as the respondents repeatedly described them, that the privilege
becomes a conscious concern. In addition, there is some indication
that the relationship between corporate representatives and house
counsel is not nearly as dependent on the privilege as an incentive
to candor as is the relationship with outside counsel.
0024
801 Id.

C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 63, § 5476, at 190.
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Restricting the type of legal counseling to which the corporate
privilege applies or eliminating the privilege for house counsel,
however, probably would be inappropriate. Litigation is a potential
risk in any transaction, routine matters may unexpectedly become
"sensitive," and the survey results are too ambiguous to support a
call for total abolition of the privilege for house counsel. Until further experience shows more precisely how the privilege affects specific types of communications, the privilege should continue to be
made available to corporations in all matters with respect to which
legal advice is sought, whether from house counsel or outside
counsel.
The data also support the conclusion, although not nearly as
convincingly as one might have expected, that the Upjohn approach, which favors inclusion of communications of lower-level
employees within the privilege, is more likely than the control
group standard to encourage voluntary corporate legal compliance.
If Upjohn had been decided differently, and the control group test
had become the norm, the results of the interviews suggest that
counsel would still communicate with lower-echelon employees because of the necessity of learning the facts. Corporate management, on the other hand, apparently would be tempted to curb
such communications in order to avoid the creation of potentially
harmful evidence. To the extent management were to restrict the
scope of counsel's employment in response to the control group
standard, the client might not receive legal advice that is sufficiently well informed to prevent or correct violations of law. In
general, then, inclusion of lower-level communications within the
corporate privilege may serve socially useful goals.
Cloaking substantially all employee communications relating
to the provision of legal services with an absolute privilege, however, may occasionally result in an unwarranted obstruction to
fact-finding. Since the cost of the corporate attorney-client privilege may be too high in particular cases, consideration ought to be
given to converting the corporate privilege to a qualified standard,
at least with respect to communications outside the control group.
The questions that were put to the respondents in the study
about such a change in the law suggest that breaking with the tradition of absolute privilege would have little or no effect on the
candor of lower-level attorney-client communications, and would
not deter, in most instances, the frequency of communication between attorneys and corporate employees. The experience of the
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respondents with the "good cause" qualification in shareholder actions also shows that the prospect of an occasional loss of privilege
due to the unforeseen needs of the adversary has not caused much
of a chill in the corporate attorney-client relationship. Furthermore, uncertainty is already inherent in the process of analyzing
prospective applicability of the corporate privilege, yet corporations continue increasingly to consult lawyers. If courts applied a
balancing test to the communications of noncontrol group employees in accordance with the approach suggested in this Article, there
would be little diminution in the ability of the affected parties "to
predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. 3 80 2 The empirical data tend to confirm that

a qualified approach would be a legitimate means of facilitating
the search for truth in the adjudicatory process without diminishing the benefits of the corporate attorney-client privilege.
Most of the attorneys in the study felt that the corporate privilege was "alive and well" as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Upjohn. But they also demonstrated a keen awareness that
"murky lines" still exist due to continued uncertainty in rules regarding the mixture of business and law-related communications,
the dissemination of attorney-client documents within the corporation, the exact depth within the corporate hierarchy to which the
privilege extends, and the problem of who actually "owns" the
privilege in particular matters-management, shareholders or the
corporate entity. This Article may not make the lines any clearer,
but it shows how lawyers, corporate clients and members of the
federal bench cope with them. In the words of one of the lawyers
in the study, "It would be nice if the lines were black and white,
instead of gray, but the same can be said about most areas of the
law."

802 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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APPENDIX
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
COVER SHEET
RESPONDENT INFORMATION
Name:
Title:
Firm:

Address:
Phone:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:
LENGTH OF INTERVIEW:
COMMENTS:
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INTRODUCTION
1. Thank you for your willingness to participate in this study.
2. My purpose is to gather information about the practical effects
of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting. The study
will compare the views of corporate counsel, outside counsel, corporate executives and federal judges regarding the privilege. Let
me assure you that neither your name nor that of your company
will be identified in any reports of the study.
3. Please do not hesitate to ask for an explanation if you do not
understand any question. Some questions will ask you to estimate
percentages as to when different things occur. I do not expect you
to be able to answer with precision; rough estimates will be fine.
4. Please consider only the past five years of your experience unless the question asks you whether certain things have ever happened in your experience.
5. Let me define two terms: "Corporate representative" means
any person who is a member of the board of directors or an employee of the corporation, regardless of rank.
"Attorney-client privilege" refers to the rule of evidence that
prevents courtroom disclosure of confidential communications between attorney and client. This does not include attorney work
product except to the extent that work product may overlap with
confidential communications with the client.
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L RESPONDENT'S PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
1. What is the general type of business in which your corporate client is engaged? (SHOW RESPONDENT CARD # 1).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Manufacturing
'Transportation or Utility
Bank
Investment Banking, Stock Brokerage, or Other Financial
Services
Insurance
Miscellaneous Commercial Services (e.g., Management
Consulting, Retail, Advertising)
Diversified and/or Conglomerate
Publishing or Broadcasting
Oil, Gas, Metals or Mining
Other

2. Approximately how many employees work for your comand what is the company's latest annual revenue
pany (a)(b)___

3. How long have you been on the legal staff of your corpora(IF LESS THAN 5 YEARS, ASK PREVIOUS
tion? EMPLOYER.)
4. (a) Do you perform any non-legal duties for your corporation? Yes, No-.
IF YES, could you briefly describe the nature of these duties:
(b) What % of your time is devoted to these duties?
5. To what extent does your company utilize the services of
outside counsel and for what types of matters?

6. What % of your time as lawyer to the corporation has
been devoted to matters relating to:
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(a) Litigation (In this category, include litigation before
administrative agencies and also your participation in matters handled by outside counsel.)
(b) Non-Litigation (IF 100% NON-LITIGATION, GO TO
Q. 8)
7. With respect to Corporate Litigation (IF APPLICABLE):
(a) What % of time was spent on civil matters (including adjudication by administrative agencies)?
_%
(b) What % of time was spent on criminal matters?-%
(c) Of time spent on civil litigation, what % was devoted to
representing the corporation as plaintiff, _%, and what % was
devoted to representing the corporation as defendant, -%?
(d) During the past five years, what types of cases have you
handled for this company? (SHOW RESPONDENT CARD #2).
Antitrust
Securities
Commercial Transactions
Environmental
Patents
Trademarks
Copyright
Admiralty
Products Liability

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Civil Rights, Title VII
Labor Law
Corporate Governance
Business Fraud (Civil)
Business Crime
Insurance
Banking
Administrative Law
Other (please specify)

(e) What % of your time has been devoted to matters in federal court, _%, and what % has been devoted to matters in
state court (regardless of state), -%?
8. With respect to Non-Litigation-related corporate matters
(IF APPLICABLE), what are the types of matters you have handled? (SHOW RESPONDENT CARD # 3).
1. Corporate Governance
2. Antitrust/Trade Regulation

3. Acquisitions and Mergers
4. Banking
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5. Tax
6. Financing
7. Trademarks
8. Securities
9. International
10. Environmental
11. Miscellaneous Government

12.
13.
14.
15.

Compliance (e.g., FDA,
OSHA, EEOC)
Contract Preparation and/or
Review
Patents
Labor Relations
Other (please specify

11. GENERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING CORPORATE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
9. During the past five years, in your communications with
individual representatives of the company, how often have you explicitly raised with the representative an issue of attorney-client
confidentiality with respect to those communications? (SHOW
RESPONDENT CARD # 4).
-Never (IF NEVER, GO TO (d))
Or Twice
- 2 - 6 Times
7 - 12 Times
13 - 24 Times
25 - 50 Times
51 - 100 Times
100 Times
-Over
-Once

(a) Under what circumstances do you raise the issue?
(b) For what purposes do you raise the issue?
(c) Have you ever raised the issue for the specific purpose of
encouraging candor on the part of a corporate representative?
Yes, No.
10. During the past five years, have corporate representatives
ever taken the initiative in raising an issue of attorney-client confidentiality with you? Yes-, No. IF YES, under what circumstances?
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(IF NEITHER RESPONDENT NOR CLIENT HAS RAISED
THE ISSUE, GO TO Q. 12.)
11. When the issue of confidentiality is raised, either by you
or corporate representatives, what do you usually tell them about
the attorney-client privilege?
12. (a) To what extent do you think that members of upper
management believe, without any prompting, that their communications with you concerning the corporation are protected by the
attorney-client privilege from disclosure to outsiders?
(b) To what extent do members of middle management believe their communications are protected from disclosure to
outsiders?
(c) How about employees
management?

below the level of middle

13. I'd like to concentrate now on the corporate representatives, regardless of rank, who believe that the attorney-client privilege covers their communications with counsel. It doesn't matter
whether you told them about it, or you are confident they have
become aware through other sources.
(a) (i) Based on your experience, does the privilege serve to
increase their candor? Yes, No-, Don't know
-.

(IF NO OR D/R, GO TO (iii))
(ii) IF YES, is their candor increased somewhat

-,

or a

great deal

(iii) (1) In your experience, are there any factors other than
the privilege that encourage or discourage candor? Yes-., No_IF YES, what are they:
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(2) You have identified
-, and - as other factors
that may affect candor. Considering privilege together with these
other factors:
Which one would you say is the most important in affecting
candor:
-,

Which is the least important:
[Equal Weight (volunteered response)]:
(b) (i) Based on your experience, does the privilege serve to
increase the frequency with which corporate representatives seek
your legal advice? Yes-, No-, Don't know(ii) IF YES, does the privilege increase frequency somewhat., or a great deaL_?
(iii) (1) In your experience, are there any factors other than
the privilege that affect the frequency with which legal advice is
sought? Yes_, NoIF YES, what are they:
(2) You have identified
,
, and
- as other factors
that may affect the frequency with which legal advice is sought.
Considering privilege together with the other factors:
Which would you say is the most important one affecting frequency:
Which is the least important:
[Equal Weight (volunteered response)]:
14. Several courts have held that unless the lawyer affirmatively undertakes to represent both the corporation and an employee, the attorney-client privilege belongs solely to the corporation. That means, of course, that the privilege may be waived by
the corporation and the communications can be disclosed to outsiders, such as the government, despite the objections of the individual whose communications are involved.
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(a) To what extent do you think that individual representatives of your client are aware of this probable limitation on their
ability to assert the privilege in their own behalf?
(b) Is there any difference in the degree of awareness as between upper, middle and below-middle management? Yes-,
No_.
IF YES, what is the difference?
(c) Have you ever told an individual representative that the
privilege belongs solely to the corporation? Yes-, No_.
IF YES, under what circumstances do you tell them about the
rule and when do you not tell them about the rule?
IF NO, what are your reasons for not telling people about the
rule?
15. (a) Have you ever provided legal representation to your
company with respect to matters in foreign countries or tribunals
in which, to your knowledge, the attorney-client privilege was unavailable or substantially curtailed? Yes-, No_.
IF YES, please describe the circumstances.

(b) IF YES, did the nature of your communications with corporate representatives differ in any respect from communications
as to which the applicability of U.S. privilege law was expected?
Yes-, No_.
Please elaborate:

III. PROCEDURES FOR PRESERVING ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE
16.

(a) Do the employees of your company segregate docu-
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mentary communications with counsel from the general files on a
routine basis? Yes-, No. (IF YES, GO TO Q. 17).
IF NO: (b) Have you ever advised the company to segregate
attorney-client documents in particular matters? Yes-, NoIF YES, under what circumstances:

17. Does your company have a policy or practice that routinely limits the personnel within the company who may have access to documentary communications with counsel? Yes-, No_.
(IF NO, GO TO Q. 18)
IF YES: In general terms, to whom is access usually restricted? (AFTER ANSWER IS GIVEN, GO TO Q. 19)

18. Have you ever instructed company personnel to limit access to attorney-client documents in particular matters? Yes-,
NoIF YES: Under what circumstances, and to whom was the access limited, in general terms?

19. (a) Does your company have any special procedures,
other than the possibilities I've mentioned, such as using labels or
stamps, for the routine handling of attorney-client communications? Yes-, No-.
IF YES, could you please describe them:
(b) Have you ever implemented any special procedures in particular matters? Yes-, No.
IF YES, could you please describe the circumstances ahd the
procedures that were implemented:

20. (a) Do middle-management employees have the authority
to seek legal advice for the company from your office without the
need to first obtain specific permission from superiors to do so?
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, No-

(b) Do employees below the level of middle management have
the authority to seek legal advice from your office without first obtaining permission from their superiors?
Yes-, No.
(c) Does your company distribute or make available to employees any policy manual, handbook or memorandum which includes a discussion of communications with counsel? Yes-, NoIF YES, would it be possible for me to obtain a copy?
21. (a) How often in your experience have employees sent
copies of their business correspondence or memorandums to your
office without a specific request for legal advice? (SHOW RESPONDENT CARD #5)
Frequently

Occasionally-

Rarely-

Never-

IF EVER: (b) Typically, what is their purpose in doing so?
(c) How often do you think employees have sent copies of documents to your office solely to protect the documents with privilege? (SHOW RESPONDENT CARD #5)
Frequently

Occasionally-

Rarely

Never

22. (a) In your capacity as lawyer to the corporation, would
you characterize any of the advice that you give as "business advice"? Yes-, No. (IF NO, GO TO Q. 23)
IF YES: (b) How often do you give business advice?
Frequently-

Occasionally

Rarely-

(c) Under what circumstances do you usually give such advice?
(d) When you give business advice, how often do you seek to explicitly segregate the business from the legal? (SHOW RESPONDENT CARD #6)
Always-

Frequently

Occasionally-

Rarely

Never-

1989]

CORPORATE PRIVILEGE STUDY

IV. EFFECTS OF UPJOHNAND OTHER DOCTRINAL
FACTORS
The 1981 decision of the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United
States held that, in federal courts, the attorney-client privilege
may attach to communications at all levels of the corporate hierarchy. Prior to Upjohn, some federal courts held that the corporate
attorney-client privilege attaches only to communications with the
'"control group" (managers who have the authority to take action
on the basis of counsel's legal advice). A few state courts still adhere to the control group standard.
23. (a) Before the decision in Upjohn, was the control group
standard ever a factor that you took into consideration when communicating with representatives of your corporate client? Yes-,
No-. (IF NO, GO TO (c))
(b) IF YES, did you ever seek to arrange your communications
so that only members of a control group were privy to them?
Yes-, No-_
IF YES, under what circumstances?
(c) After Upjohn, has the control group standard ever been a
factor that you took into consideration when communicating with
representatives of the corporation? Yes-, No- (IF NO, GO TO

Q. 24)

(d) IF YES, did you ever seek to arrange your communications
so that only members of a control group were privy to them?
Yes-, NoIF YES, under what circumstances?
24. I'd like to ask some questions about the effect, if any,
that the Upjohn decision has had in the representation of your
corporate client.
(a) In your experience, would you say that, in comparison to
the control group standard, the Upjohn approach makes a large
improvement
or a slight improvement
in your ability to predict that privilege will attach to particular
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communications?
IF ONLY "SLIGHT": Why only "slight" rather than large
improvement?
(b) Does Upjohn have any effect on the frequency with which
you communicate with employees at lower levels of the corporation? Yes-, No-.
(c) In actual practice, does Upjohn have any effect on your
overall ability to gather facts when representing the corporation?
Yes-, No_.
IF YES, does it make a large improvement or a slight
improvement - in fact-gathering?
25. According to several courts, the corporate privilege becomes qualified in litigation with shareholders or other persons to
whom the corporation owes a fiduciary duty. In such cases, the
court, in its discretion, may order disclosure of corporate attorneyclient communications.
(a) In your experience, has the shareholder/fiduciary rule ever
been a factor that you took into consideration when communicating with representatives of your clients? Yes-, No- (IF NO GO
TO Q. 26)
IF YES, please describe the circumstances.

(b) If you advised any corporate representatives of the rule,
was there any effect on the nature of their communications with
you? Yes-, No-.
IF YES, please describe the effect.

26. To what extent are corporate representatives of your
company aware of the shareholder/fiduciary rule?
27. What is the effect, if any, of the shareholder/fiduciary
rule on your ability to predict that privilege will attach to particu-
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lar communications? Is there no effect-_, are you somewhat less
able to predict-, or are you much less able to predictL..?
LET ME GIVE YOU A HYPOTHETICAL. Assume that the
privilege were to be treated as a qualified privilege in all cases, not
just shareholder actions, using the same standard that is applied in
the case of attorney work product. Under the qualified standard,
information that would otherwise be covered by the corporate privilege would lose its protection, in the court's discretion, upon a
showing by the corporation's adversary of a special need for the
privileged information due to an inability to obtain it from alternative sources through reasonable effort. Assume that as in the case
of work product, the privilege would be lost only rarely under a
qualified standard.
If the corporate privilege were applied in this manner:
28. What do you think would be the probable effect on your
ability to predict that privilege will ultimately attach to particular
communications? Would there be no effect_-, would you be
slightly less able to predict__-, or much less able to predict
?
29. Assuming that representatives of your client were aware
that a court occasionally might not uphold the privilege under this
qualified approach, do you think they would probably seek your
legal advice less often? Yes__, No_.
IF YES, would it probably be somewhat less often
?
much less often

-,

or

30. Would you probably communicate with employees at
lower levels of the corporation less often? Yes, NoIF YES, would it probably be somewhat less often-, or much
less often-?
31. (a) Assuming their awareness that the privilege was qualified, would members of upper management probably be less candid in their communications with you? Yes-, No.
IF YES, would they probably be somewhat less candid-,
much less candid-_?

or

(b) Would communications with middle management probably
be less candid? Yes-, No-.
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IF YES, would they-probably be somewhat less candid__, or
much less candid-?
(c) Would communications with employees below the level of
middle management probably be less candid? Yes-, No_.
IF YES, would they probably be somewhat less candid__, or
much less candid-?
(IF RESPONDENT ANSWERS "NO" IN ALL CATEGORIES, GO TO Q. 33)
32. Of the counseling situations appearing on this card
(SHOW RESPONDENT CARD # 7), in which ones do you think
the qualified privilege would have its most serious adverse effect on
candor? I'd like for you to rank each category from 1 to 5 as to the
seriousness of the effect. "One" would be the area which you think
would be the most seriously affected, "2" the next most seriously
affected, and so on down to "5" as the area that would be the least
seriously affected.
Corporate Transactions In The Ordinary Course Of
Business (E.G., Contract Preparation Or Review)

_

Non-Routine Transactions (E.G., Acquisitions Or
-Divestitures)
Investigations For Routine Compliance With Government
-Regulations
Investigations Of Specific Problem Situations Involving
__

_

Possible Corporate Liability

Actual Litigation

33. Would the qualified approach probably have an effect on
your record-keeping of communications with corporate representatives? Yes-, No-.
Please explain:

34. Would a qualified approach probably have an effect on
your client's record-keeping practices? Yes-, No.
Please explain.
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V. CONCLUDING PERSONAL DATA
35. In what year were you first admitted to a bar?__
36. For statistical purposes, would you please indicate your
age:_
37. How many lawyers currently are on your legal staff.
38. Do you have any comments or observations about the
corporate attorney-client privilege that my other questions have
not given you an opportunity to express?

